Epstein Data Wiki

Deutsche Bank

Properties2
tagsentity, bank, new-york, germany, compliance, litigation
aliasesDeutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas, DBTCA, Deutsche Bank Private Bank

38 min read

InstitutionDeutsche Bank AG, headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany1
New York entitiesDeutsche Bank AG New York Branch and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, both licensed and supervised by the New York State Department of Financial Services1
Epstein relationshipAugust 19, 2013 to December 21, 201823
AccountsThe bank counted 76 accounts in the “Southern Financial Relationship” in September 2019, 42 of them capitalized; the consent order records more than 40 opened and funded42
Regulatory actionConsent order under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, July 6, 2020; $150,000,000 penalty567
LitigationJane Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:22-cv-10018 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.)8
DispositionRecorded by the court as settled for $75,000,000; order and final judgment entered October 20, 20239

Deutsche Bank AG is a global bank headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany. Its New York branch and its trust company, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, are licensed and supervised by the New York State Department of Financial Services.1 The bank held accounts for Jeffrey Epstein and for entities and associates connected to him from August 19, 2013, when it opened brokerage accounts for Southern Trust Company, Inc. and Southern Financial LLC, until December 21, 2018, when it wrote to tell him it would no longer service his accounts.23 In a consent order of July 6, 2020 the Department found that the bank had classified Epstein as high-risk and then failed to scrutinize the accounts for the conduct that classification implied, and imposed a $150,000,000 penalty; the same order also addressed the bank’s correspondent relationships with FBME and Danske Bank’s Estonian branch.1056 A class action brought in the Southern District of New York on behalf of a certified class of women and girls sexually abused or trafficked by Epstein or his associates between August 19, 2013 and August 10, 2019 settled for $75,000,000, and judgment was entered on October 20, 2023.119

Onboarding, 2012–2013

The consent order records that the relationship came about through a relationship manager who had been part of the team servicing Epstein’s accounts at a competitor bank and who joined Deutsche Bank’s private wealth department in November 2012; soon after joining he suggested to senior management that Epstein was a potential client who could generate millions of dollars of revenue and leads to other clients.12 The bank’s own know-your-customer record for the “EPSTEIN, JEFFREY RELATIONSHIP,” which names Paul Morris as primary officer, gives the introduction in the same terms: “Jeffrey Epstein was a client of Paul’s a[t] JP Morgan. Paul and Jeffrey Epstein had a mutual friend/colleague who introduced them while Paul was at JPMorgan. Over the course of a few meetings Paul was able to get Jeffrey to bring some of his funds over to Deutsche Bank[.]”13 The transfer of Epstein’s assets from JP Morgan to Deutsche Bank across 2013 and 2014 was later a category of documents the bank produced to prosecutors.14

In April 2013 a junior relationship coordinator prepared a memorandum for the relationship manager to send to the bank’s then Co-Head of Wealth Management Americas and the Chief Operating Officer of Wealth Management Americas.12 The consent order quotes it as stating that “Epstein was charged with soliciting an underage prostitution [SIC] in 2007,” that “[h]e served 13 months out of his 18 month sentence,” and that “[h]e was accused of paying young woman [SIC] for massages in his Florida home,” and as highlighting that Epstein was involved in 17 out-of-court civil settlements related to the conduct behind the 2007 conviction.15 The covering email estimated “flows of $100-300 [million] overtime [SIC] (possibly more) w/ revenue of $2-4 million annually over time,” and proposed that all Epstein-related accounts be for “entities” affiliated with him, “not personal accounts.”15

On May 5, 2013 the Co-Head sent the message the Department calls the Approval Email: “spoke with [the Head of AML Compliance for Deutsche Bank Americas and the then-General Counsel for Deutsche Bank Americas, who at that time served as chair of the Bank’s Americas Reputational Risk Committee (“ARRC”)]. Neither suggest [that the Epstein relationship] requires rep risk and we can move ahead so long as nothing further is identified through KYC and AML client adoptions.”15 The bank told the Department it had no other record of that communication, and that the reputational risk committee did not meet in connection with the initial onboarding.15 An AML compliance officer cleared the relationship on the strength of the email, and the bank represented that there was no indication that officer had spoken directly to the Co-Head or to the compliance and legal officers the email mentioned.2

The relationship began on August 19, 2013 with brokerage accounts for Southern Trust Company Inc. and Southern Financial LLC.2 It was classified high-risk from the outset and designated an “Honorary PEP” because of Epstein’s connections to prominent political figures, which triggered enhanced transaction monitoring; the Department found that the monitoring “was not tailored to the specific risks that he posed.”1617

Accounts

The consent order records that Epstein, his entities and his associates eventually opened and funded more than 40 accounts.2 In a presentation to the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York dated September 12, 2019, the bank counted 76 accounts in what it called the Southern Financial Relationship, of which 71 were opened intentionally, 42 were capitalized, 56 were Epstein-controlled and 36 were both.4 Two further account types found in bank records, described as administrative or “dummy accounts,” were excluded from those totals.4

The same presentation set out, in nineteen exhibits, what the bank had reconstructed for prosecutors: the breakdown and stated purposes of the accounts, the affiliates it had onboarded and the parties to each account, biographical information on female Butterfly Trust beneficiaries, a timeline of the Butterfly Trust and summaries of payments to its beneficiaries, cash withdrawals over $10,000, hedge fund investments, a summary of payments to ostensible foreign models, potential settlement payments, suspected payments for the legal expenses of co-conspirators, a timeline of payments of $10,000 or more to or on behalf of alleged co-conspirators, payments to Epstein-affiliated individuals and entities it had not onboarded, notable payments to high-profile individuals, potentially notable payments, tuition payments on behalf of children and women, and Epstein’s links to other financial institutions and wealth management firms.18 Several exhibits concern individuals whose names are redacted in the released copy and are not described further here.

On January 24, 2014 the bank opened checking and money market accounts for a trust called The Butterfly Trust, whose beneficiaries included the three individuals the order identifies as CO-CONSPIRATORS 1–3 and a number of women whom the order describes as having Eastern European surnames.17 In October 2013 a compliance officer running background checks on the beneficiaries had flagged that one of them had been alleged to be a co-conspirator; the relationship coordinator replied that she “was accused as a co-conspirator in a case but was never brought to trial nor ever convicted,” and the alert was cleared by citing the Approval Email.19

Transactions the Department examined

The Department found that from November 1, 2013 Epstein and his representatives used Deutsche Bank accounts to send wires to people who had been alleged to be co-conspirators in his earlier offenses, including at least 18 wires of $10,000 or more.17 It found that he used the Butterfly Trust account and other accounts to send over 120 wires totaling $2.65 million to beneficiaries of that trust, among them alleged co-conspirators and women with Eastern European surnames, for the stated purposes of hotel expenses, tuition and rent.19 It further found what appeared to be multiple settlement payments totaling over $7 million to law firms, and dozens of payments totaling over $6 million that appeared to be the legal expenses of Epstein and of co-conspirators.19

The order also records that Epstein’s personal attorney made 97 withdrawals from the bank’s Park Avenue branch between 2013 and 2017, each of $7,500, the bank’s limit for third-party withdrawals, and that in a roughly four-year period he withdrew more than $800,000 in cash on Epstein’s behalf.203 In May 2014 the attorney asked how often he could withdraw cash without triggering an alert; the relationship coordinator put the question to the branch manager, the bank has no record of any response, and the coordinator later said she had understood the question to be about the $7,500 third-party limit rather than about reporting requirements.21 In July 2017, after he broke a withdrawal over $10,000 across two days, members of the wealth management transaction monitoring team met to discuss suspected structuring, told him his pattern gave the appearance of structuring, that it was unacceptable, and that he would be provided with additional information about CTR reporting requirements, then accepted his statement that he had not intended to structure and allowed him to continue withdrawing cash from his own and Epstein’s accounts; in 2018, shortly before the bank closed the Park Avenue branch, he withdrew a further $100,000 in cash on Epstein’s behalf.21 The bank filed currency transaction reports appropriately throughout, and the Department found no indication that it ever sought or received any explanation for the cash beyond travel, tipping and expenses.3

A separate chart the bank sent to prosecutors on August 13, 2019, headed “Exhibit A: Leon Black / Rothschild Group Transactions,” listed twenty-one transfers, most of them into Southern Trust Company, Inc.; the transfers involving Leon Black and Black-affiliated entities are set out on his page.22 Exhibit E of the same set traced the money market deposit account of Epstein’s charity Gratitude America from 2015 to 2019; the bank’s covering note records that the account was “primarily capitalized via a $10 million deposit from BV70 LLC” and cites a Bloomberg report of August 6, 2019 that Black controls BV70 LLC.23

The 2015 escalation and the committee’s conditions

At the end of 2014 and into 2015 the bank’s Anti-Financial Crime department escalated the relationship. On January 16, 2015 Wayne Salit conditionally approved enhanced due diligence on Southern Financial LLC (triggered, an earlier message in the same thread said, by a request to open a Global Markets relationship), writing that “negative information was identified regarding Jeffrey Epstein, the sole UBO of Southern Financial LLC” and that AML Compliance and Compliance Advisory “have recommended that the entire DB relationship with Mr. Epstein in both AWM and CB & S be presented to the Americas Reputational Risk Committee (and possibly a Global Reputational Risk Committee, if necessary) for additional review.”24 The consent order records that the AML officer who identified the issue had picked up a June 2014 federal appeals court ruling granting alleged victims access to details of the 2008 plea bargain, and further press allegations about Epstein’s relationships.25

A more senior AML officer at first pointed to the 2013 Approval Email; the first officer replied that it was “not a direct approval” by the compliance and legal officers it named but “a statement by a front office MD about his conversation with them and their alleged opinion not to escalate to Rep Risk,” that the Head of AML Compliance had left the bank, and that there were new developments that could reopen the 2008 conviction.25 On January 22, 2015 the Co-Head of Wealth Management Americas and the relationship manager met Epstein at his New York home; the bank told the Department it holds no contemporaneous record of the substance of that meeting and is not aware of any other step taken at the time to test the allegations.26 The committee met on January 30, 2015. Contrary to the bank’s own policy no minutes were kept, and later that day a member emailed the Co-Head to say the committee was “comfortable with things continuing” and that another member had “noted a number of sizable deals recently.”26

The following week the Americas Reputational Risk Committee’s conditions were transmitted in an email from the bank’s Head of Compliance, Americas: Epstein could continue to trade in existing accounts without compliance pre-approval provided the business determined the transactions did not involve unusual or suspicious activity or an unusually significant or novel size or structure; Corporate Banking and Securities could open accounts to book activity already approved by the wealth management division; and the business was to monitor for further developments in the reputational risk of the relationship.2728 The Department found that although the conditions reached senior personnel up to the bank’s chief executive for the Americas, they were apparently never passed to all members of the Epstein relationship team, and that the senior AML officer read the first condition as referring to transactions unusual by comparison with the relationship’s own history, so that the conditions never reached the transaction monitoring team.2829 The order gives an exchange of March 2017 as an example: answering an alert about payments to two individuals, a member of the monitoring team wrote, “[s]ince this type of activity is normal for this client it is not deemed suspicious.”29

A screening alert was generated in the private bank’s portfolio on February 5, 2015, concerning a person whose name and entity are redacted in the released copy; the alert was sourced to a Palm Beach Post report of March 18, 2008. The released copy does not show whom the alert concerns, and this page does not assert that it concerns Epstein.30

On July 21, 2015 Epstein asked for an increase in his trading limits. The chairman of the committee replied on July 29 that there were no objections, adding, “I also checked in with [EXECUTIVE-1] last night to make sure he supports this and has heard nothing negative on the client. [EXECUTIVE-1] confirmed both.”29

Gratitude America, 2016

On January 4, 2016 an accountant acting for Epstein asked the bank to open a brokerage account for Gratitude America. The request was escalated to the committee’s secretary, who conferred with a member and ordered an external due diligence report on Epstein; the accountant then told the bank that Epstein had resigned from the charity and withdrew the request, and no report was run.31 The consent order does not name this accountant. A separate email thread beginning February 6, 2015 and continuing to January 20, 2016 shows Jeffrey Epstein’s CFO, Richard Kahn, requesting a Gratitude America account and being referred up through the bank for a ruling on whether the existing reputational-risk approvals covered it.32 This page does not identify the consent order’s unnamed accountant with Kahn. On January 21, 2016 a Deutsche Bank Securities officer told Paul Morris that the committee had requested an external due diligence report, that it took about eight business days, and that “DB personnel cannot disclose to the client this matter is being evaluated for reputation matters”; when asked, staff were to say only that “we are in the process of internal due diligence to review the opening of this account, as it is done with all new accounts.”33

By April 2016 the original relationship manager had been replaced by a second, who had the know-your-customer file and knew of the earlier escalation but was not told of the committee’s three conditions.31 The consent order does not name this second relationship manager, and this page does not identify him.

A promotion self-assessment written on June 25, 2018 by Stewart Oldfield, Director, Deutsche Bank Wealth Management, describes the client as “one of the most complicated client situations I’ve seen,” records that the client “was offboarded by Global markets at the end of 2016 due to lack of profitability” and that “[f]urther internal issues nearly caused us to offboard the client completely,” and states that the relationship had since been re-onboarded, the ISDA reestablished and the client had become “the largest trading counterparty of the KCP capital markets group.”34

KYC remediation, autumn 2018

On October 9, 2018 Stewart Oldfield wrote to Kimberly Hart, copying Bradley Gillin, under the subject “Epstein - negative media”: “This just surfaced in our latest KYC reviews. Let’s discuss what info I need from the client and then next steps.” The rest of the message is a single link to a PDF hosted on a class-action reporting site, whose filename refers to a Ponzi scheme complaint; what that document contains is not established here, and the message does not say which client it concerns.35

On November 2, 2018 Bradley Gillin forwarded to Vijay-A Sawant, copying Oldfield and Richard Iarossi and marked high importance, a reply he had received from Richard Kahn. The know-your-customer rejection point at issue, numbered (6), asked the client to “attach evidence of signing authority (Corporate authorization) for the brokerage account of J. Epstein Virgin Islands Foundation In., granting signing auth for Erika Kellerhals”; Kahn answered that “Erika Kellerhals who is secretary and treasurer does not have signing authority on this account.”36

On November 5, 2018 Thomas Klemm wrote to Patrick Campion and nineteen other named recipients under the subject “Update on KYC HR 2018”, attaching a file named “DBTCA - Notice to Clients - MRG Approved.docx.” He told them: “I will be sending the below standard emails to all bankers and copy you for your bankers where clients have either not reacted or bankers could not commit a date by when client information would be available. Cut off date is as communicated the 15 Nov. After that the exit letters will go out (draft attached).” The standard email he then set out thanked each banker for “your ongoing efforts to address our HR KYC challenge,” said that “[f]or the first time we have a line of sight to closing the year at zero HR overdues,” and continued: “For the following clients of yours, the project team has been informed that the client will either not provide the relevant information by 15 November or did not commit to a due date. Given that the bank would not be in a position to continue business with those clients unless the KYC gets completed, those clients will receive an exit letter after 15 Nov (DBTCA draft attached).”37 The same standard text recurs across the release: a full-text search of the corpus for the phrase “zero HR overdues” returns ten pages.

Under the heading “Entire list for transparency below” the email runs a list of bankers, each name followed by the clients concerned. A later page of the same production run continues that list in the same typography; there the entry under Stewart Oldfield’s name is Gratitude America Ltd.38

A Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas letter dated November 30, 2018 is addressed to Gratitude America Ltd. Its three-line standfirst reads: “Please give this your immediate attention. / Important information about your account(s) with Deutsche Bank. / Your account may be closed if we do not receive alternative instructions.” The letter does not in its own text terminate anything. It says the bank has “enhanced its Know Your Customer (‘KYC’) policies” and needs updated documentation; that “we have not yet been able to complete all elements of our KYC review” and “will be compelled to close or otherwise restrict your accounts if we are unable to complete this process with your help”; that if the information “continues to remain out-dated or missing, you should expect to see a more formal notice of action in the next 30 days”; and that “[i]f you do not wish to comply with our requests for additional information, we request that you make arrangements for the possible transfer of your assets to another financial institution.” It closes by asking the client to contact its relationship manager “so that we may avoid closing or restricting your accounts.”39

The release also holds the same form blank, one revision earlier. On the blank form the merge fields print as bracketed placeholders in the clear, among them “[Company Name]”, “ATTN: [Client Name]”, “[Address Line 1]”, “[Date]” and “Dear [client name],”, and no part of any of its three sheets is redacted. Set beside the completed letter, the pair shows where the standard instrument was altered. The blank form provides one account field, reading “In reference to account ending in: [Last 4] (the ‘Account’)”; the Gratitude America letter reads “In reference to accounts ending in:” and carries two entries, each marked “(Deposit Account)”. Both fields are withheld by the producing party and are not reproduced here. The two documents are not the same letter: the body text is identical, but the footer code on the blank form is 026814 092518 and on the Gratitude America letter 026814 110518. Because they are different revisions, this page does not say whether the plural was an alteration made for this client or an alteration made to the form; the first pages of the other instances of it in the release, which would settle that, are not among the pages read for this section. One field the completed letter did not resolve is the transfer deadline, which prints in the same wording and with the same asterisks as on the blank form, “by 45 days from now (the ‘Transfer Date’)”, rather than as a date.3940

No sheet of the letter carries a signature. Below “Regards,” there is white space and then a printed name stack, with no ink, no signature rule and nothing blacked out, and the identical stack is printed on the blank form, so it is part of the standard instrument rather than an act of signing. The stack gives, one line per line, the names Oliver Esslinger and Zia Memon, then the titles Director and Managing Director, then Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas twice, then Deutsche Bank Wealth Management. That is a two-column block flattened into a single column, and no line on the sheet joins either title to either name.41

At least two further instances of the same form are in the release. Each survives only as a second sheet, so neither addressee is established and none is supplied here; both are the 092518 revision, and both carry the caption “CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)” and Deutsche Bank production Bates numbers, neither of which appears on any of the six pages of the letter and the blank form. A full-text search of the corpus for the letter’s standfirst sentence “Your account may be closed if we do not receive alternative instructions” returns two pages, one of the letter and one of the blank form; a search for the form code printed in the footer returns these two further instances as well, because those pages carry the code but not the wording searched for.42

The letter of November 30 told its recipient to expect “a more formal notice of action in the next 30 days.” The bank’s letter telling Epstein it would no longer be servicing his accounts is dated December 21, 2018, and is described in the section below. No document read for this section connects the one to the other.

Termination, December 2018

The consent order records that the Miami Herald’s article on Epstein’s 2008 plea deal, published in November 2018, “prompted senior members of Wealth Management to reassess the relationship’s reputational risk and ultimately terminate the Epstein Relationship,” and that the bank informed Epstein by letter on December 21, 2018 that it would no longer be servicing his accounts.3 Despite that decision, a relationship manager drafted reference letters to two other financial institutions on Deutsche Bank letterhead, one of them saying he was “unaware of any problems relating to the operation or use of [the] accounts.”3

Epstein was arrested at Teterboro Airport on July 6, 2019.43 At 7:33 on the following Monday morning Kimberly Hart, Managing Director and Divisional Control Officer for Wealth Management Americas, sent Stewart Oldfield and three colleagues an instruction headed “URGENT!!! Need to close accounts ASAP - please prioritize today,” which opened “The following need to be completed today:” and set out the Epstein-related accounts still open in three groups: deposit accounts standing at a zero balance, brokerage accounts standing at a zero balance, and deposit accounts still holding residual balances, which were to be distributed and the accounts closed that day. Among the names left legible are Gratitude America, Ltd, LSJE, LLC, Southern Financial LLC, Southern Trust Company Inc, Hyperion Air, LLC, Neptune, LLC, Zorro Management, LLC, the Butterfly Trust and accounts in Epstein’s own name; the account-number column is blacked out in the produced copy, and one account name is blacked out with it. Oldfield passed the instruction to a colleague at 8:34 with the words “FYI. Thanks.”; the colleague answered at 8:40, “The accounts are in Pending Close category. I have requested they are hard closed,” and Oldfield forwarded that answer on at 8:55.44

The closures did not go through at once. At 8:10 on the morning of July 9 Hart wrote again: “The below accounts are still open. How do we get these closed today? They are all $0 balance.” Brigid Macias, an assistant vice president in Wealth Management, replied at 8:26 that the Butterfly Trust and Epstein’s own account would be closed that day and that “The other accounts have been closed since May, but are still showing active in DB Force,” which the bank’s production support was aware of and working to fix. At 8:57 on the evening of July 10 Hart asked, “To whom do we need to escalate?” Macias answered at 9:44 that she had copied her on an email to the team responsible for getting it completed.45

On July 8, 2019 Hart wrote to Patrick Campion, Managing Director and Head of Wealth Management Americas, that Epstein had been a client since 2013, that at onboarding “the potential reputational risk concerns were escalated to regional management by Chip Packard, Head WM Americas, including John Caruso, Head AML Compliance Americas,” that Packard “was given the go ahead to proceed ‘so long as nothing further is identified through KYC and AML client adoption’,” and that since 2013 “[a] number of KYC updates have been processed for Mr. Epstein since 2013 and all alerts have been cleared — often relying on the original clearance by Chip Packard and John Caruso.”46 Campion replied: “What was the catalyst for our decision last year to exit?”46 Later the same evening Hart sent a link to a Miami Herald article by Julie K. Brown together with a pasted summary of that reporting.47

The New York State Department of Financial Services issued a consent order under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44 against Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch and Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas.5 Its findings on the Epstein relationship conclude:

The Bank’s fundamental failure was that, although the Bank properly classified Mr. Epstein as high-risk, the Bank failed to scrutinize the activity in the accounts for the kinds of activity that were obviously implicated by Mr. Epstein’s past.10

The order adds that the bank “did little or nothing to inquire into or block numerous payments to named co-conspirators, and to or on behalf of numerous young women, or to inquire how Mr. Epstein was using, on average, more than $200,000 per year in cash,” and that whether that money was used to cover up old crimes or to facilitate new ones was a question “that must be left to the criminal authorities, but the fact that they were suspicious should have been obvious to Bank personnel at various levels.”10 It records a series of procedural failures alongside the substantive one: the first account was approved in what appeared to be an off-hand conversation reflected only in the Approval Email, that email was then relied on to open numerous further accounts, no minutes were taken of the 2015 committee meeting, and the conditions the committee imposed were neither transmitted to most of the relationship team nor correctly understood.1048

The Department also examined the bank’s correspondent and dollar-clearing relationships with FBME and with Danske Bank’s Estonian branch, finding among other things that between 2007 and 2015 the bank cleared more than $267 billion in 1,638,844 transactions for Danske Estonia and identified 340 suspicious transactions referencing its correspondent accounts.4950 It credited the bank’s “exemplary cooperation” with its investigations and its remediation efforts, and said it had given those substantial weight under New York Banking Law § 44(5).5051

The Department found that Deutsche Bank had conducted business in an unsafe and unsound manner in violation of Banking Law § 44 and had failed to maintain an effective and compliant anti-money-laundering program in violation of 3 NYCRR § 116.2.51 The order required a penalty of $150,000,000, payable within ten business days, with no tax deduction, reimbursement or indemnification, and directed the independent monitor already engaged under a 2017 consent order to address the failures it identified.6 This copy carries the regulator’s signatures and an execution clause dated July 6, 2020; the Deutsche Bank signature column in this copy is unsigned.7

Jane Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank

A class action was filed against Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas in the Southern District of New York on November 24, 2022, and reassigned to Judge Jed S. Rakoff five days later, and consolidated for all pretrial purposes with the parallel action against JPMorgan Chase, No. 1:22-cv-10019.52 A first amended complaint was filed on January 13, 2023, running to 163 pages and pleading twelve counts: violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (I–VI), RICO (VII–VIII), and four New York common-law claims at counts IX to XII: aiding and abetting battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent failure to prevent physical harm, and negligent failure to exercise reasonable care as a banking institution.8 The four New York common-law claims were pleaded as timely under the Adult Survivors Act’s one-year revival window.8 It alleged that the bank had provided “the financial lifeblood and infrastructure” for Epstein’s trafficking venture and that, knowing it would earn millions from the relationship, “Deutsche Bank chose financial gain over following the law.”53

The complaint names three bank employees and states their roles: that Paul Morris joined as a relationship manager in November 2012 and was involved in bringing Epstein over from JP Morgan Chase and in keeping him as a client; that Charles Packard was co-head of Deutsche Bank’s Wealth Management Americas group when Epstein became a client and was involved in approving and maintaining him as a client; and that Patrick Harris was Chief Operating Officer of Wealth Management Americas and was likewise involved.54 These are allegations in a pleading; the case was resolved without any adjudication of them.9

Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss. On March 20, 2023 the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, and on May 1, 2023 it issued the opinion explaining the ruling. Four claims survived: that the bank knowingly benefited from participating in a sex-trafficking venture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2); that it obstructed enforcement of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d); that it negligently failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent physical harm; and that it negligently failed to exercise reasonable care as a banking institution providing non-routine banking. All other counts, including the RICO claims, were dismissed.55

The parties settled. Preliminary approval was granted on June 16, 2023 and amended on June 27, 2023; the fairness hearing was held on October 20, 2023.52 In the memorandum supporting final approval, class counsel described “a historic $75 million settlement agreement for the victim-survivors of Jeffrey Epstein.”11 The order and final judgment of October 20, 2023 certified, for settlement purposes only, a class of all women and girls sexually abused or trafficked by Epstein or his associates between August 19, 2013 and August 10, 2019, approved the settlement, found that the defendants would satisfy their obligations by paying $75,000,000 into a qualified settlement fund, and dismissed the litigation with prejudice.9 Simone K. Lelchuk was appointed claims administrator;5657 taking the parallel JPMorgan settlement months later, Judge Rakoff said of her from the bench that “she was who I selected in the Deutsche Bank settlement after looking at the other two candidates,” and appointed her again only after confirming that her fees would be the same as in the Deutsche Bank case.57

The SDNY grand jury subpoena and the bank’s productions

On the evening of July 10, 2019, the day before the subpoena to the bank is dated, an internal Southern District of New York email thread, one of its four messages carrying a (USANYS) sender tag, asked: “Anybody have a good contact at Deutsche Bank, or have had dealings with a firm representing them?”58 A grand jury subpoena dated July 11, 2019 followed, and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP responded for the bank in rolling productions through the rest of the year.1459

The eleventh production, transmitted on November 19 and 20, 2019 as DB-SDNY-PROD011, was described in a covering letter as containing records and communications on the bank’s decision to onboard the relationship, in-person meetings between bank personnel and Epstein or his associates, the transfer of his assets from JP Morgan across 2013 and 2014, the bank’s reputational risk committee policies from 2013 to 2018, revenue-sharing accounts, wire transfers from Gratitude America, records of large cash withdrawals, and check images from over twenty Epstein-affiliated accounts. The letter also enclosed supplemental exhibits on wire transfers relating to investments, payees of the LSJE, LLC account, Butterfly Trust account transactions, a timeline of account openings and closings, and payments to certain beneficiaries of the 2013 Butterfly Trust.1460

A further production was transmitted on December 13, 2019.61 The thirteenth, on December 24, 2019, produced the custodial email files of the relationship manager who held the account from 2013 to 2016 (covering account openings, know-your-customer reviews, wire transfers and correspondence with account holders) and those of a co-head who served from 2013 to 2016 and who, the letter says, “was involved in the decision to onboard Mr. Epstein as a client, as well as the decision to maintain the relationship after concerns were raised in January 2015.”59

Deutsche Bank records were among the categories the government listed in its July 31, 2019 discovery letter in United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19 Cr. 490 (RMB), at USAO_000965–USAO_002252.62 In August 2020 Akin Gump told the office that the bank had received a third-party subpoena from the Attorney General’s Office of the U.S. Virgin Islands, in connection with the territory’s civil suit against Epstein’s estate and its executors, seeking any government subpoenas the bank had received relating to Epstein and any productions made under them, and asked the office’s permission to disclose the subpoena and the productions.63 In September 2020 the office’s staff arranged for the Deutsche Bank and JPMorgan productions to be exported and produced in the prosecution of Ghislaine Maxwell.64

Footnotes

  1. Consent Order, p.1 (recitals as to headquarters, the New York Branch and DBTCA). https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  2. Consent Order ¶¶24–25, p.8. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  3. Consent Order ¶¶52–54, p.18. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  4. “Exhibit A: Breakdown of Southern Financial Relationship Accounts,” Deutsche Bank presentation to the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, September 12, 2019. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01681865 p.2. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. Consent Order under New York Banking Law §§ 39 and 44, In the Matter of Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, and Deutsche Bank Trust Company of the Americas, New York State Department of Financial Services, July 6, 2020, p.1. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  6. Consent Order ¶¶114–117, p.33. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. Consent Order, execution clause, p.37: “IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Consent Order to be signed this 6th day of July, 2020.” https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  8. First Amended Individual and Class Action Complaint, Jane Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, No. 1:22-cv-10018-JSR (S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 42, filed January 13, 2023, pp.1, 83, 89–161. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00161958 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. Order and Final Judgment, Doc. 122, entered October 20, 2023 (Rakoff, J.). https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/122/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/ The $75 million figure is corroborated in the corpus: https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00129019 p.1 (see 11). ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  10. Consent Order ¶¶56–58, p.19. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  11. Memorandum of law in support of the class representative’s unopposed motion for final approval of class action settlement and approval of plan of allocation, Doc. 101, filed September 15, 2023, p.1 (PDF p.8). https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/101/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/ The $75 million figure is corroborated in the corpus: https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00129019 p.1, reporting that the same lawyers “negotiated a tentative $75 million settlement with Deutsche Bank.” ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. Consent Order ¶¶16–19, p.6. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  13. Deutsche Bank global know-your-customer case record 01195100, “EPSTEIN, JEFFREY RELATIONSHIP,” printed August 28, 2015; primary officer Paul Morris, reason for KYC “New Client,” high-risk box marked, office New York. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01360427 p.1. ↩

  14. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, November 19, 2019, eleventh submission in response to the July 11, 2019 grand jury subpoena, production DB-SDNY-PROD011. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00015937 pp.1–3. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  15. Consent Order ¶¶20–22, p.7. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  16. Consent Order ¶26, p.8. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩

  17. Consent Order ¶¶26–28, pp.8–9. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  18. Deutsche Bank presentation to the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, September 12, 2019, table of exhibits. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01681865 p.1. ↩

  19. Consent Order ¶¶30–32, p.10. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  20. Consent Order ¶48, p.16. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩

  21. Consent Order ¶¶50–51, pp.17–18. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  22. Justin Alfano, Director and Associate General Counsel, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, “Deutsche Bank Production – Transaction Charts,” August 13, 2019, 01:13 UTC, Exhibit A at pp.1–2. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00080250 ↩

  23. Same message, Exhibit E and footnote 8, pp.8–10. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00080250 ↩

  24. Wayne Salit to Jan Bornebusch, “FW: Southern Financial LLC - EDD,” January 16, 2015. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01420399 pp.1–2. ↩

  25. Consent Order ¶¶33–34, p.11. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  26. Consent Order ¶¶36–38, p.12. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  27. Consent Order ¶39, p.13. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩

  28. Consent Order ¶¶40–41, p.13. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  29. Consent Order ¶¶41–43, p.14. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  30. Regulatory DataCorp screening alert, “DB12000P - Deutsche Bank Private Bank,” batch and alert date February 5, 2015 (Bates DB-SDNY-0045183). The person and entity name fields are redacted in the image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01357977 p.1. ↩

  31. Consent Order ¶¶44–45, p.15. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  32. Daniel Sabba to Carol Saracco, copied to Wayne Salit and others, “Jeffrey Epstein/Southern Financial LLC - Rep Risk Approval,” thread February 6, 2015 – January 20, 2016. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01419226 pp.1–4. ↩

  33. Daniel Sabba to Paul Morris, “Epstein account opening,” January 21, 2016. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01368534 p.1. ↩

  34. Stewart Oldfield, Director, Deutsche Bank Wealth Management, promotion self-assessment, June 25, 2018. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01421399 pp.1, 3, 6–7. ↩

  35. Stewart Oldfield to Kimberly Hart, copied to Bradley Gillin, “Epstein - negative media,” October 9, 2018; the Sent field carries no time zone, so no clock time is given here. Read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01373349 p.1. ↩

  36. Bradley Gillin to Vijay-A Sawant, copied to Stewart Oldfield and Richard Iarossi, “FW: J Epstein Foundation Inc.,” November 2, 2018, forwarding Richard Kahn’s reply of the same date; neither Sent field carries a time zone, so no clock time is given here. Read from the page image. An account-number-class field on that page is withheld by the producing party and is not reproduced here. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01373347 p.1. ↩

  37. Thomas Klemm to Patrick Campion and nineteen other named recipients, “Update on KYC HR 2018,” November 5, 2018, attaching “DBTCA - Notice to Clients - MRG Approved.docx”; the Sent field carries no time zone, so no clock time is given here. Read from the page image. The phrase counts given in the text were run against the full-text corpus with its FTS5 index. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356319 p.1. ↩

  38. The list begun on that page continues on a later page of the same Deutsche Bank production run, in the same typography and under the same grand jury caption, where the entry under Stewart Oldfield’s name is Gratitude America Ltd. Read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356320 p.1. ↩

  39. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas to Gratitude America Ltd, November 30, 2018, form 026814 110518, three pages. Read from the page images. Two account-number-class fields on p.1 are withheld by the producing party and are not reproduced here; p.3 carries nothing but a dashed rule and the production stamp. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01420989 pp.1-3. ↩ ↩2

  40. The same form, blank, revision 026814 092518, three pages, in which the merge fields print as bracketed placeholders and nothing is redacted. Read from the page images. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01418346 pp.1-3. ↩

  41. The letter joins neither title to either name. Each officer’s own correspondence in the same production states his own: Oliver Esslinger’s signature block gives “Director | COO, Head of Business Integrity Americas, Deutsche Bank Wealth Management” (https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356509 p.1), and Zia Memon’s, on a message of June 14, 2016, gives “Managing Director | Head, WM-US Business Supervisory Office, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Wealth Management Americas” (https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01421860 pp.1-2). Both read from the page images. ↩

  42. Second pages of two further instances of the same form, revision 092518, each captioned “CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)” and carrying Deutsche Bank production Bates numbers DB-SDNY-0042137 and DB-SDNY-0067475. Read from the page images. Neither addressee is established by these pages and none is supplied here. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356321 p.1; https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01373348 p.1. ↩

  43. Indictment, Document 1, United States v. Noel and Thomas, 19 Cr. 830 (S.D.N.Y.), filed November 19, 2019, p.6 of 20: Epstein “was arrested and detained at the MCC on sex trafficking charges.” https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00021908 p.6. See the SDNY 2019 indictment. ↩

  44. Kimberly Hart to Stewart Oldfield, copied to three colleagues, “URGENT!!! Need to close accounts ASAP - please prioritize today,” July 8, 2019, 7:33 am, with Oldfield’s forwards at 8:34 and 8:55 am and the reply of 8:40 am. Read from the page images; the account-number column and one account name are redacted in the image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01432070 pp.1-5. ↩

  45. Same thread, “RE: URGENT!!! Need to close accounts ASAP - please prioritize today,” July 9 and 10, 2019. Read from the page images. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01427113 pp.1-3. ↩

  46. Kimberly Hart to Patrick Campion, “Epstein,” July 8, 2019, 6:28 pm, the stamp as quoted in the reply; and Patrick Campion to Kimberly Hart, “RE: Epstein,” July 8, 2019, 7:26 pm, the stamp in the produced header. Neither Sent field carries a time zone. Read at the image at 400 dpi. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356821 p.1. ↩ ↩2

  47. Kimberly Hart to Patrick Campion, “RE: Epstein,” July 8, 2019, 7:40 pm. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA01356804 p.1. ↩

  48. Consent Order ¶58, p.20. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩

  49. Consent Order ¶¶103–104, p.30. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩

  50. Consent Order ¶¶105, 109, p.31. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  51. Consent Order ¶¶110–113, p.32. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00151495 ↩ ↩2

  52. Docket, Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:22-cv-10018-JSR (S.D.N.Y.): Complaint, Doc. 1, filed November 24, 2022, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/1/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/; case reassigned to Judge Rakoff, docket minute entry, November 29, 2022, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/#minute-entry-212848252; Order consolidating the case with 22-cv-10019 for all pretrial purposes, Doc. 27, signed December 5, 2022, entered on the docket December 6, 2022, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/27/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/; Initial Pretrial Conference held December 6, 2022, at which consolidation was confirmed on the record, docket minute entry, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/#minute-entry-213587808; Order Granting Preliminary Approval, Doc. 91, June 16, 2023, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/91/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/; Amended Order Granting Preliminary Approval, Doc. 95, June 27, 2023, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/95/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/; fairness hearing held October 20, 2023, docket minute entry, https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/#minute-entry-368575200. ↩ ↩2

  53. First Amended Complaint, pp.2–3. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00161958 ↩

  54. First Amended Complaint ¶¶20–23, p.7. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00161958 ↩

  55. Opinion and Order, Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:22-cv-10018-JSR (S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 75, filed May 1, 2023, pp.52–53 (reconfirming the “bottom-line” order of March 20, 2023, Doc. 56). https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65893857/75/doe-1-v-deutsche-bank-aktiengesellschaft/ ↩

  56. Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action, Jane Doe 1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 1:22-CV-10019 (JSR): “The Claims Administrator, Simone K. Lelchuk, shall determine a Participating…” https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00146745 p.5. ↩

  57. Transcript of proceedings before Judge Jed S. Rakoff, filed as an exhibit in Government of the United States Virgin Islands v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:22-cv-10904-JSR, Doc. 226-52, July 24, 2023. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02810293 p.4. See also the class representative’s response to objections in Jane Doe 1 v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:22-cv-10019-JSR, Doc. 256, November 2, 2023, pp.9 and 15 of the filing, recording that multiple candidates with budgets and fee schedules had been submitted in the Deutsche Bank case. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00145643 ↩ ↩2

  58. Internal U.S. Attorney’s Office email thread, “Re: ISO Deutsche Bank contact — in-house or outside counsel,” originating July 10, 2019 at 9:58 pm and continuing to 03:03 UTC on July 11, 2019. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00018170 ↩

  59. Akin Gump to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, December 24, 2019, thirteenth submission, production DB-SDNY-PROD013 (DB-SDNY-0100861 to 0124801). https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00016422 pp.1–2. ↩ ↩2

  60. Akin Gump transmittal emails, November 19 and 20, 2019, enclosing DB-SDNY-PROD011 and correcting a mislabelled file. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00015935 ↩

  61. Joseph T. DiPiero, Akin Gump, “Deutsche Bank Production,” December 13, 2019. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00016397 ↩

  62. U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, discovery letter in United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19 Cr. 490 (RMB), July 31, 2019, index entry “Deutsche Bank Records / USAO_000965-USAO_002252.” https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00018618 pp.1–2. ↩

  63. Parvin D. Moyne, Akin Gump, “RE: Epstein accounts,” August 3, 2020. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00017084 ↩

  64. Internal U.S. Attorney’s Office thread, “Epstein/Maxwell Upload,” September 17–25, 2020. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00019851 pp.1–3. ↩

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