Epstein Data Wiki

A. Marie Villafaña

Properties2
tagsperson, prosecutor, usao-sdfl, non-prosecution-agreement, cvra, department-of-justice
aliasesA. Marie Villafana, Ann Marie C. Villafana, Ann Marie C. Villafaña, Marie Villafana, Villafafia

45 min read

OfficeAssistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida, from September 10, 2001; West Palm Beach office from January 20041
Role in the Epstein matterLine prosecutor on the federal investigation from 2006; author of the prosecution memorandum and proposed indictment; negotiator and signatory of the 2007 non-prosecution agreement234
Earlier careerLaw clerk to Judge David F. Levi, E.D. Cal., 1993–1994; Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco; Dorsey & Whitney, Minneapolis and London5
Bar admissionsCalifornia 1995, Minnesota 1997, Florida 2005; California and Minnesota inactive as of 200856
OPR statusOne of five subject attorneys in the 2020 Office of Professional Responsibility report; OPR found no professional misconduct by her789
Related court findingFebruary 21, 2019: the district court held that the government violated the Crime Victims’ Rights Act; the finding was against the government, and OPR separately found no misconduct by her109

A. Marie Villafaña is a federal prosecutor who, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the West Palm Beach office of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, was the line prosecutor on the 2006–2008 federal criminal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein; her counsel told the Office of Professional Responsibility in May 2019 that she was then still assigned to that office.2111 She drafted the prosecution memorandum and the proposed 60-count indictment, negotiated the non-prosecution agreement of September 2007 on instructions from her supervisors, and signed it for the United States.3124 The Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) named her as one of five subject attorneys in its November 2020 report and concluded that she committed no professional misconduct, either in relation to the agreement or in her dealings with victims.1379 The same report criticised the government’s treatment of victims, to which it found her decisions had contributed, and recorded that she had repeatedly urged her supervisors to charge Epstein and had sought at several points to notify victims but was constrained by her managers.141516 Her own account of each of these matters, as OPR records it, is set out below.

Career before the Epstein investigation

Villafaña, a native of Minnesota, graduated from Cornell University and the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall), taking her J.D. in 1993.56 She served as a law clerk to David F. Levi, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, from 1993 to 1994, and then spent seven years in private practice as a litigation associate at Morrison & Foerster in San Francisco and a trial associate at Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis and London, specialising in intellectual property litigation.5 She was admitted to the California Bar in 1995, the Minnesota Bar in 1997 and the Florida Bar in 2005.5

She became an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of Florida on September 10, 2001, rotating through the Appellate Section before joining the Major Crimes Section in Miami from late September 2001 until January 2004.117 In that section she handled narcotics, firearms, child exploitation offences, immigration matters, credit card fraud, bank robbery, violent offences and supervised release violations.1 She was among the district’s first Project Safe Neighborhood prosecutors.1 In January 2004 she transferred to the West Palm Beach office, and in 2006, when the Justice Department launched Project Safe Childhood, she was made the district’s first Project Safe Childhood coordinator; from 2004 through early 2009 she handled the bulk of the child exploitation cases in West Palm Beach.1 In March 2009 she was appointed the first Chief of the new Special Prosecutions North Section in the Fort Lauderdale office, and in late 2010 she asked to be transferred back to West Palm Beach, where her caseload shifted towards economic crimes.1 As of May 2019 she was assigned to the West Palm Beach office and was the office’s liaison to the Greater Palm Beach County Health Care Fraud Task Force; her counsel told OPR that court records showed her as counsel of record in some 445 criminal matters in the district.1

The federal investigation, 2006–2007

The Palm Beach Police Department referred the Epstein matter to the FBI in West Palm Beach after the chief and the lead detective concluded that the state grand jury’s charge did not address the totality of Epstein’s conduct; the FBI brought it to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, who opened a file with her supervisor’s approval and with the knowledge of U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta.2 In a declaration filed in July 2008 Villafaña identified herself as “the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein” and stated that “[t]he federal investigation was initiated in 2006 at the request of the Palm Beach Police Department (‘PBPD’)” into allegations that Epstein and his personal assistants had used facilities of interstate commerce to induce minors to engage in prostitution, among other offences.11

OPR summarised her role: “As the line AUSA, Villafaña handled all aspects of the investigation. Villafaña determined the lines of inquiry to pursue, identified the witnesses to be interviewed, conducted legal research to support possible charges, and sought guidance from others at the USAO and in the Department,” and she “drafted a prosecution memorandum, indictment, and related documents, and revised those documents in response to comments from those in her supervisory chain of command.”17 She worked with two FBI case agents, sought guidance from the Justice Department’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS) on legal questions in the case, and collected records of Epstein’s business entities in part to establish an interstate nexus.23 On May 1, 2007 she submitted an 82-page prosecution memorandum, addressed to Acosta, First Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Sloman, Criminal Division Chief Matthew Menchel, Deputy Criminal Chief Andrew Lourie and her immediate supervisor, supporting a proposed 60-count indictment charging Epstein with “a variety of federal crimes relating to sexual conduct with and trafficking of minors.”318 OPR recorded that the memorandum set out the legal issues and potential defences for each proposed charge, explained why other statutes had been rejected, and addressed the credibility of each victim expected to testify.3 Epstein’s sentencing exposure under the federal guidelines, OPR found, “was in the range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.”18 The CEOS Chief reviewed the memorandum and twice opined that the charges were appropriate.18 In a February 28, 2008 notification to the Civil Rights Division, drafted by Villafaña and edited by Sloman, the office stated that it “anticipates charges of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 2422, 2423, and 1591.”19

The office’s own account of the case, in a letter of June 2, 2008 from the First Assistant U.S. Attorney to Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, described by OPR as a lengthy letter from Sloman recounting the history of the negotiations, states that “[b]y May 2007, AUSA Villafaña began seeking approval from her supervisors to indict Epstein.”2021 The same letter records that at the end of 2006 Guy Lewis, described in it as a former U.S. Attorney for the district and former Executive Director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, contacted Villafaña, a former colleague, on learning that she was handling the investigation, and “asked to meet with her but she said that she believed such a meeting would be premature.”20 OPR noted the prior relationship, “Villafaña and Lourie had worked for Lewis”, as one of several preexisting connections between Epstein’s attorneys and government lawyers, and found no evidence that any of them produced an improper benefit to Epstein.22

OPR recorded that Villafaña “was concerned from the outset of the federal investigation that Epstein might try to employ against the USAO the same pressure that she understood had been used with the State Attorney’s Office, and she proactively took steps to counter Epstein’s possible influence by meeting with Acosta and Sloman to sensitize them to Epstein’s tactics.”23

The non-prosecution agreement

Negotiations with Epstein’s attorneys, conducted by Villafaña on her supervisors’ instructions, produced the non-prosecution agreement signed on September 24, 2007.224 The agreement’s signature block prints “R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY” above a line for “A. MARIE VILLAFAÑA, ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY.”25 In the executed copy reproduced in the appendix to Ghislaine Maxwell’s 2025 certiorari petition, Epstein’s signature is dated 9/24/07 and the acknowledgment block carries the signature “/s/ A. Marie Villafaña” dated 9/27/07; Gerald Lefcourt and Lilly Ann Sanchez signed for Epstein on 9/24/07.4 OPR states that Acosta did not sign the agreement, although he participated in its drafting and approved it with knowledge of its terms.7 The addendum was signed by Epstein and his attorneys on October 29, 2007; Villafaña’s name was printed as the office’s representative, but at her request Sloman signed it on her behalf.26

On the clause under which the United States agreed not to prosecute “any potential co-conspirators of Epstein” in addition to four named individuals, the report records two separate accounts from Villafaña, given eighty-five pages apart, and they are set out separately here because they are not one answer.27

On the negotiation itself, she told OPR that she had been willing to include a non-prosecution provision for Epstein’s co-conspirators, whom she understood at the time to be the four women named in the proposed agreement, because the USAO was not interested in prosecuting those individuals if Epstein entered a plea: “[W]e considered Epstein to be the top of the food chain, and we wouldn’t have been interested in prosecuting anyone else.” On the same page OPR recorded that she did not consider the possibility that Epstein might be trying to protect other, unnamed individuals, and that no one, including the FBI case agents, raised that concern.24

Asked about the breadth of the clause, she said that apart from the women named in the agreement the investigation had not developed evidence of “any other potential co-conspirators. So, … we wouldn’t be prosecuting anybody else, so why not include it? … I just didn’t think that there was anybody that it would cover.” She conceded, however, that she “did not catch the fact that it could be read as broadly as people have since read it.”28

The emails with defense counsel

During the CVRA litigation the petitioners obtained from Epstein’s attorney and filed under seal a redacted series of September 2007 emails between Villafaña and defense attorney Jay Lefkowitz; the redactions removed most of Lefkowitz’s side of the exchange, and the emails were later unsealed over Epstein’s objection.29 OPR identified three passages from her side of the exchange as the ones later cited against her: that she was willing to include a provision agreeing not to prosecute others but would “prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge”; that she offered to meet Lefkowitz “off campus”; and that, “[o]n an ‘avoid the press’ note,” filing federal charges in Miami rather than West Palm Beach would substantially reduce press coverage.29

Villafaña gave OPR an explanation for each.12 On the tone of the exchange she said that it reflected how she communicated generally (“I’m a Minnesota girl, and I prefer not to be confrontational until I have to be”) and that “when he would come back to me asking for changes, my response was always, ‘No, I will not make that change.’”12 On the co-conspirator passage she said the email answered a defense proposal that the agreement promise not to prosecute Epstein’s assistants and employees, and that her concern was that an overly detailed agreement would prompt the court to demand further information about uncharged conduct, which Epstein might then treat as a breach.12 On “off campus” she said a meeting at a neutral location with the decision-makers present might finally conclude negotiations that had dragged on.30 On “avoid[ing] the press” she said her goal was to protect the anonymity of the victims, because the case was far more likely to be covered by the Palm Beach press, and “if [the victims] wanted to attend [the plea hearing], I wanted them to be able to go into the courthouse without their faces being splashed all over the newspaper.”30

OPR reviewed the full email traffic, including the passages redacted from the public versions.30 It recorded that she “consistently advocated in favor of prosecuting Epstein and worked for months toward that goal,” repeatedly pressed her supervisors for permission to indict, opposed meetings with the defense team and “nearly withdrew from the case” when her supervisors agreed to them, and objected to resolving the case through a state guilty plea.30 Sloman told OPR that reports Villafaña “was soft on Epstein … couldn’t have been further from the truth”; Lourie said he had been “surprised to see how nice she was to them … [w]hen I know the whole time she was the one who wanted to go after him the most.”30 OPR found that her explanations were “entitled to significant weight,” credited them, and concluded that the emails did not establish that she acted to benefit Epstein, was motivated by favouritism, or sought to silence victims.27

The gain-time exchange, 21 September 2007

On the afternoon of Friday 21 September 2007 she wrote to the State Attorney for Palm Beach County, Barry Krischer, copying his assistant state attorney. The subject line is “RE: Meeting with Epstein’s attorneys.” Her message reports that the offices had settled a division of labour, he would finalise the state agreement and she was finishing the federal one, and then asks him a specific question, for a stated reason:

I want to put in a provision that he will actually be in jail at least a certain number of days to make sure he doesn’t try to “convince” someone with the Florida prison authorities to let him out early. So, do you know how much “gain time” would Epstein earn?31

Eight minutes later he answered with the arithmetic: three days a month of gain time, three more if the defendant worked, “So I think that would work out to 15 months actual time served”, a year of house arrest afterwards, and the observation that the registration offence would not keep him out of the county stockade. He closed: “Glad we could get this worked out for reasons I won’t put in writing.”31

⚠ The sequence matters and this page states it rather than leaving it to be inferred: his calculation was an answer to her request for a guaranteed minimum time in custody. What she was seeking in that exchange was a floor on the sentence, not a ceiling.

⚠ This page draws no conclusion about what his closing sentence meant. No document read for this page says, and the desk does not guess. It is recorded here because the message was addressed to her and the reply is to her.

An hour later she sent both of them the draft non-prosecution agreement itself, writing “There are still some outstanding issues, but I thought that you might want to see what the most recent looks like.”31

Victim consultation before the agreement

OPR devoted a section of its report to a disputed account.32 Villafaña told OPR that at an “early” meeting with Acosta, Sloman and Menchel, which took place when “we were probably just entering into plea negotiations,” she raised the government’s obligation to confer with victims.32 In her first OPR interview she said she was instructed, “Don’t talk to [the victims]. Don’t tell them what’s happening,” but was not told why and could not recall who gave the instruction; in a later interview she recalled being told, “Plea negotiations are confidential. You can’t disclose them,” and said she remained uncertain who had said it but believed it may have been Acosta.32

None of the three supervisors recalled such a meeting.32 Acosta told OPR that whether to solicit the victims’ views “is something [that] I think was the focus of the trial team and not something that I was focused on at least at this time,” and that he did not “recall discussions about victim notification until after the NPA was signed.”32 Sloman said he did not recall a meeting at which victim notification was discussed.32 Menchel wrote in his response to OPR, “I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions regarding whether the USAO should notify victims of its intention to enter into a pre-charge disposition of the Epstein matter,” and added that the issue would have been premature before he left the office on August 3, 2007.32 Menchel’s counsel, commenting on OPR’s draft report, contended that her claim was inaccurate and inconsistent with other evidence; OPR considered the comments but “did not conclude that the evidence to which Menchel’s attorney pointed necessarily refuted Villafaña’s assertion,” while also noting that it found no document dated before the signing that referred to such a meeting or instruction.33

OPR declined to resolve the dispute: “given OPR’s conclusion that the Department did not require prosecutors to consult with victims before charges were brought, OPR does not reach a conclusion regarding the alleged meeting and instruction.”33

The report does record a contemporaneous document on the point.32 On September 6, 2007, more than two weeks before the agreement was signed, Villafaña wrote to Sloman that “the agents and I have not reached out to the victims to get their approval, which as [CEOS Chief Oosterbaan] politely reminded me, is required under the law” and that “the [PBPD] Chief wanted to know if the victims had been consulted about the deal”; Sloman passed the point to Acosta.32 In her own written response to OPR she said, “I felt strongly that we should have conferred with the victims before entering into the NPA and that we should have informed them of the change of plea and sentencing,” and that “the victims were given no access — I could not even talk with them about plea negotiations or notify them about the plea hearing.”34 She also wrote that “[a]s a line AUSA, I was duty bound to follow the directives of the U.S. Attorney, which I did,” and that many of the decisions she disagreed with were, in her opinion, incorrect but not illegal.34

11 December 2007: her answer, in the first person

The fullest first-person statement A. Marie Villafaña makes anywhere in the release is a five-page letter she wrote to Epstein’s counsel on 11 December 2007, two and a half months after the non-prosecution agreement was signed. It sits between the First Assistant’s reply of 6 December and the United States Attorney’s of 19 December, and it is unlike either: they answer policy, and she answers for herself. She says so in the first sentence:

I am writing not to respond to your asserted “policy concerns” regarding Mr. Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement, which will be addressed by the United States Attorney, but the time has come for me to respond to the ever-increasing attacks on my role in the investigation and negotiations.

35

⚠ Authorship. The letter goes out over the United States Attorney’s printed name with the signing attorney’s own name blacked out and the title “Assistant United States Attorney” printed beneath it. This page names her rather than hedging, on four independent unbarred bases on the face of the document itself: that printed title; her self-description on page 3 as “a simple line AUSA” who “handled the primary negotiations for the Office”; her first-person account on page 2 of selecting the victims’ attorney representative, which was this prosecutor’s task; and the whole voice of the letter as the prosecutor of record describing her own file.35

She opens on the personal register: “It is an understatement to say that I am surprised by your allegations regarding my role because I thought that we had worked very well together in resolving this dispute and because I had described you to others as a man of integrity.”35

She then lists what she says she did for the defendant: she warned that one potential plea could result in no gain time; she corrected one of the defence’s own Sentencing Guidelines calculations “that would have resulted in Mr. Epstein spending far more time in prison than you projected”; she contacted the Bureau of Prisons “to see whether Mr. Epstein would be eligible for the prison camp that you desired”; and she told the defence her suspicions about the source of a press leak. Then, in the same paragraph:

Importantly, I continued to work with you in a professional manner even after I learned that you had been proceeding in bad faith for several weeks — thinking that I had incorrectly concluded that solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution was a registrable offense and that you would “fool” our Office into letting Mr. Epstein plead to a non-registrable offense. Even now, when it is clear that neither you nor your client ever intended to abide by the terms of the agreement that he signed, I have never alleged misconduct on your part.

35

What she says about the victims’ attorney representative

The first allegation she answers is that she had concealed a personal connection to the lawyer she approached to act as the victims’ attorney representative under the agreement. Her account is that she selected him because he was a friend and classmate of two people she respected; that she had never met or spoken to him before contacting him about the case and still had not met him; that he did not then know of her relationship with his friend; and that a suggested business relationship was “patently untrue”. Her denial is specific rather than blanket: “neither my boyfriend nor I would have received any financial benefit from Mr. Ocariz’s appointment.”36

On the criticism that she had said “friend” rather than “boyfriend”, her answer is one line: “it is not my nature to discuss my personal relationships with opposing counsel.”36

Two further points she makes are answers of a different kind. After that lawyer learned more about Epstein’s conduct, “he expressed a willingness to handle the case pro bono, with no financial benefit even to himself.” And she says the defence had been offered several other candidates, including the firm the judge later selected: “You rejected those other options.”36

Her stated reason for wanting someone she could trust is the letter’s own explanation of the choice, and it is quoted here for that reason:

Your attacks on me and on the victims establish why I wanted to find someone whom I could trust with safeguarding the victims’ best interests in the face of intense pressure from an unlimited number of highly skilled and well paid attorneys.

36

She also records what she says the defence had earlier wanted from her, which is the reverse of the interference it was now alleging: a “desire to have me perform the role of ‘facilitator’ to convince the victims that the lawyer representative was selected by the Office to represent their interests alone and that the out-of-court settlement of their claims was in their best interests.”36

On the investigation, the state charge, and who was negotiating against whom

On the allegation that she kept the defence’s challenges to the police investigation from those who reviewed the proposed indictment, she says the submissions “were attached to and incorporated in the proposed indictment package, so your suggestion that I tried to hide something from the reviewers is false”. She objects to “the duplicity of stating that we must accept as true those parts of the Recarey reports and witness statements that you like and we must accept as false those parts that you do not like”, and notes that the defence had “impressed upon me from the beginning the need to undertake an independent investigation”: “It seems inappropriate now to complain because our independent investigation uncovered facts that are unfavorable to your client.”37

On the state prosecutor, she alleges the defence wanted her kept uninformed:

You complain that I “forced” your client and the State Attorney’s Office to proceed on charges that they do not believe in, yet you do not want our Office to inform the State Attorney’s Office of facts that support the additional charge nor do you want any of the victims of that charge to contact Ms. Belohlavek or the Court. Ms. Belohlavek’s opinion may change if she knows the full scope of your client’s actions.

37

See Lanna Belohlavek for that prosecutor. On the charges the defence called manufactured, she reports what a superior had meant: when Mr. Lourie said they would “embarrass the Office”, he meant “that the Office was unwilling to bend the facts to satisfy Mr. Epstein’s desired prison sentence – a statement with which I agree.”37

And on the shape of the negotiation itself, which is the passage most worth setting beside her later account to OPR that “[a]s a line AUSA, I was duty bound to follow the directives of the U.S. Attorney”:

As you mention in your letter, I – a simple line AUSA – handled the primary negotiations for the Office, and conducted those negotiations with you, Ms. Sanchez, Mr. Lewis, and a host of other highly skilled and experienced practitioners. The agreement itself was signed by Mr. Epstein, Ms. Sanchez, and Mr. Lefcourt, whose experience speaks for itself. You and I spent hours negotiating the terms, including when to use “a” versus “the” and other minutiae. When you and I could not reach agreement, you repeatedly went over my head, involving Messrs. Lourie, Menchel, Sloman, and Acosta in the negotiations at various times.

37

That sentence is written in December 2007, contemporaneously, and it says the same thing her 2020 response to OPR says: that she conducted the negotiation, and that when she would not agree, the defence went above her. Jay Lefkowitz’s page sets the letter in the sequence of the December correspondence it belongs to.

After the agreement

Continued investigation

The signing of the agreement did not immediately lead to Epstein’s guilty plea: for the next nine months, in OPR’s account, he deployed his attorneys to try to change its terms and to persuade senior Department officials to set it aside.38 OPR found that Villafaña and the case agents continued to prepare for a federal prosecution throughout that period.39 The report lists the steps taken: FBI interviews during 2007 and 2008, in the course of which further victims were identified; the assignment of a CEOS trial attorney in January 2008; Villafaña’s revision of the prosecution memorandum; notification of the Civil Rights Division of the office’s “ongoing investigation of a child exploitation matter”; her securing of pro bono counsel for victims whose depositions Epstein’s attorneys were seeking; the preparation of a revised draft indictment; obtaining approval to immunise a potential witness; and steps to allow federal charges to be filed on July 1, 2008 if Epstein did not plead guilty on June 30.39

When Sloman forwarded a February 2008 message in which he told defense counsel that the office would close its investigation if CEOS decided against a federal prosecution, Villafaña replied by asking why the office would let Epstein keep the same deal “after all he has put us through,” and pointed to the further victims the investigation had identified since the agreement was signed.40 On learning that State Attorney Barry Krischer and Epstein’s local counsel Jack Goldberger had discussed a 90-day resolution, she wrote to her immediate supervisor: “Please tell me that you are joking. Maybe we should throw him [Epstein] a party and tell him we are sorry to have bothered him.”21 OPR found that she “believed she could have prevailed had she taken the case to trial, and even after the NPA was negotiated, she repeatedly recommended declaring Epstein in breach and proceeding with an indictment, because she continued to have confidence in the case.”16

OPR recorded that after Epstein’s June 30, 2008 guilty plea colleagues wrote to Villafaña praising her work on the case, and that she was not satisfied with the outcome, replying to one of them: “After all the hell they put me through, I don’t feel like celebrating 18 months. He should be spending 18 years in jail.”41

Work release

The day after the plea, Villafaña and her immediate supervisor met a Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office official about work release and asked to be notified if Epstein applied.42 The office received no such notice, and on October 10, 2008 the Sheriff’s Office placed Epstein in the work release programme.42 Villafaña learned of it in mid-November, notified Acosta, Sloman and the Criminal Division Chief by email and asked, “Can I indict him now?”43 On November 24, 2008 she wrote to defense attorney Roy Black giving notice that Epstein had violated the agreement “by failing to remain incarcerated twenty-four hours a day for the eighteen-month term of imprisonment”; Black replied on November 26 acknowledging the work release but denying any breach.43 On December 11, 2008 she wrote to the Sheriff’s Office Corrections Division setting out what she said were inaccuracies and omissions in Epstein’s work release application, including that the telephone number given for his stated employer was that of Goldberger’s law firm.44

In her written response to OPR she stated that she had had to withdraw the notice of breach and “could only write a letter to the Sheriff’s Office pointing out all of the false statements contained in Epstein’s application for work release,” adding that the Sheriff’s Office never responded.45 She also stated that on June 9, 2009 she prepared what she believed was the last memorandum seeking authorisation to issue a notice of breach and to indict Epstein; the notice was served on June 12, 2009, and, she wrote, “[o]nce again, Epstein was allowed to ‘cure’ his breach, and we were not allowed to file the indictment.”45

Communications with victims after the agreement

The FBI form letters

The FBI sent victims letters during 2007 and 2008 stating that the case was “currently under investigation.”46 In its February 21, 2019 opinion the district court found that those letters “misl[ed] the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility” and that “[i]t was a material omission for the Government to suggest to the victims that they have patience relative to an investigation about which it had already bound itself not to prosecute.”46 OPR determined that the letters were standard form letters generated by the FBI’s Victim Notification System and sent by the FBI’s Victim Specialist, that neither case agent reviewed them, and that it “found no evidence that Acosta, Sloman, or Villafaña was aware of the content of the letters until the USAO received them from the FBI for production for the CVRA litigation.”4647 Villafaña told OPR: “The decision to issue the letters and the wording of those letters were exclusively FBI decisions.”47 OPR concluded that the statement that the matter was “currently under investigation” was not false, because the investigation did continue, but that the letters “risked misleading the victims, and contributed to victim frustration and confusion, because the letters did not provide important information that would have advised victims of the actual status of the investigation.”48

The withheld notification letters

On December 7, 2007 Villafaña prepared victim notification letters and emailed Acosta and Sloman for permission to send them.49 Sloman had that day received a letter from Epstein’s counsel asking the office to hold off until the contents could be discussed further, and he replied to Villafaña with an instruction to “Hold the letter.”49 She told OPR that she did not recall asking Sloman for an explanation and “just remember[ed] putting them all in the Redweld and putting them in a drawer and being disgusted.”50 A few days later she emailed Sloman asking whether there was “anything that I or the agents should be doing,” reporting that the case agent was concerned because another agent and an AUSA were the subject of an OPR investigation in an unrelated matter for failing to confer with and notify victims, and adding, “We seem to be in a Catch 22”; OPR did not find a response to that email.51 She told OPR that “Catch 22” referred to instructions from supervisors “[t]hat we can’t go forward on” filing federal charges and “I was told not to do victim notifications and confer at the time.”52 In her written response she described preparing letters that were never sent: “At one point, my assistant and I had letters and envelopes ready to be stuffed and put through the franking machine and we received notice from Miami that they could not go out.”34

Her own statements to victims and to counsel

OPR examined separately whether Villafaña’s own statements were misleading.53 She told OPR that during victim interviews in early 2008 she did not use the term “non-prosecution agreement” because “most people don’t understand what that means,” and that to those victims she understood the FBI had already told about the resolution she said that “an agreement had been reached where [Epstein] was going to be entering a guilty plea, but it doesn’t look [like] he intends to actually perform … [and] now it looks like this may have to be charged … and may have to go to trial.”54 She told OPR she explained that the case was under investigation, that she and the agents were “preparing … again” to file charges, and that they hoped charges would be brought.54 She added: “So to me, saying to a victim the case is now back under investigation is perfectly accurate.”55

In a 2017 affidavit filed in the CVRA litigation, victims’ attorney Brad Edwards alleged that when he asked her about the status of the investigation she replied that she could not answer because the matter “was an on-going active investigation,” and that she left him with “the impression that the Federal investigation was on-going, very expansive, and continuously growing.”55 Answering that allegation, Villafaña told OPR that she “listened more than [she] spoke,” that she did not feel comfortable sharing information given the uncertainty and the possibility of trial, and that because of “instructions that I had been given by Alex [Acosta] and Jeff [Sloman] not to disclose things further and not to have any involvement in victim notification” she felt “prohibited” from telling him more.55

On June 27, 2008, the Friday before Epstein’s Monday state plea hearing, she telephoned Edwards to tell him the hearing was taking place.56 She told OPR she “was not given authorization to contact” any victim’s attorney other than Edwards, and stated in her written response to OPR that she had asked permission to make oral notifications to the victims but that the office decided notification could come only from a state investigator.56 Edwards said in his affidavit that she “did express that this hearing was important, but never told me why she felt that way,” and alleged that she did not tell him that the state plea would bring the federal investigation to an end.5653 The allegation at the centre of the CVRA litigation was that victims were not told about the agreement or the plea in time to be heard.10

OPR concluded that “the evidence does not show that Villafaña knowingly made an affirmative false statement to the victims or Edwards or that her omissions were ‘the equivalent of affirmative false statements’ about material facts,” crediting her statement that she believed the investigation was genuinely continuing.57 It found her concern about creating impeachment evidence, that telling victims of their potential to recover damages would allow the defense to argue a financial motive, “not unreasonable,” noted that the case agents had raised the concern first and that she had taken it to the office’s Professional Responsibility Officer, and observed that “[h]ad she sought to exclude him from the state proceedings, she could have elected not to inform [name redacted] at all.”9 It therefore concluded that the evidence did not establish a violation of Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-4.1 or 4-8.4(c) or (d).9

OPR nonetheless placed those interactions within its wider criticism, finding that they “contributed to the likelihood that the victims would feel that the government was intentionally concealing information from them.”58

The July 2008 declaration

On July 9, 2008, two days after the first CVRA petition was filed, Villafaña filed a declaration, stamped by the clerk that day, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida in In re: Jane Doe, No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson, in support of the United States’ response to the petition; the cited exhibit reproduces only the first four of the declaration’s 21 pages, stopping mid-paragraph, and does not include a signature page.6 She set out the office’s account of victim notification, stating that as victims were identified they were sent notification letters both by her and by the FBI’s Victim-Witness Specialist.11 She stated that one victim’s attorney’s “fees were paid by Jeffrey Epstein, the target of the investigation.”59 She described the agreement’s provision under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 as intended to preserve a federal remedy for the victims, and recorded that an agreement had been reached in September 2007 and contained an express confidentiality provision.5960 On the point that became the centre of the litigation she stated: “Although individual victims were not consulted regarding the agreement, several had expressed concerns regarding the exposure of their identities at trial and they desired a prompt resolution of the matter.”60

In a further declaration filed in the same litigation on June 2, 2017, she explained the office’s rationale for the agreement, saying that before being directed to negotiate she had discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the case with the office’s management “and informed them that most of the victims had expressed significant concerns about having their identities disclosed.”61

The OPR investigation

OPR’s investigation examined the office’s decision to resolve the federal investigation through the agreement, and after the district court’s February 21, 2019 ruling OPR added to its scope the conduct underlying the court’s CVRA findings.62 It named five subject attorneys: Acosta, Sloman, Menchel, Lourie and Villafaña.78 She responded through counsel Jonathan Biran of Baker Donelson, whose letter of May 10, 2019 answered OPR’s letter of April 2, 2019 and enclosed her own 58-page written statement.563

On the agreement, OPR concluded that “none of the subject attorneys violated a clear and unambiguous standard or engaged in professional misconduct in developing, negotiating, or entering into the NPA, including its addendum,” and that “Menchel, Sloman, Lourie, and Villafaña did not commit professional misconduct with respect to any aspect of the NPA because they acted under Acosta’s direction and with his approval.”8 The report’s finding of “poor judgment” was directed at Acosta alone, for resolving the investigation through the agreement and for leaving to the state the decision whether to notify victims of the state plea hearing.6465

On motive, OPR reported that it “was attentive to any evidence that any of the subjects was motivated by bribes, gratuities, or other illegal political or personal considerations, and found no such indication.”66 It recorded that Villafaña told OPR she believed Acosta “was influenced by the stature of Epstein’s attorneys,” and quoted her view that the defense had been “able to convince members of our office that it was somehow extremely novel and legally complex,” so that “the legal prowess, if you will, of the attorneys [ ] [became] something to consider.”2267 OPR found that neither she nor anyone else it interviewed identified specific evidence that any subject extended an improper favour to Epstein.22

On victims, OPR concluded that none of the subjects committed professional misconduct, but that “victims were not treated with the forthrightness and sensitivity expected by the Department.”58 It found that “[t]he evidence is clear that Villafaña sought at various points to consult with and to notify victims about the details of the NPA but was constrained before the NPA was signed by managers who either made a decision to not consult victims or did not address the issue after it was raised, and after the signing by her own concern about creating possible impeachment evidence.”14 Its closing assessment reads: “Although OPR credits Villafaña’s statements that she wanted to go beyond her obligations in dealing with victims, the end result nonetheless was that communications with victims were not prioritized by the USAO … However, decisions made by Acosta, Sloman, and Villafaña also contributed to the problems.”15

OPR also examined an allegation Villafaña herself had raised.68 In December 2018, after the Miami Herald’s investigative report of November 28, 2018 renewed public attention to the case, she wrote to a supervisory AUSA recounting a conversation in which, she said, Sloman had told her that defense attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez had asked Menchel to “do her a solid” and persuade Acosta to offer a two-year sentence.68 In her OPR interview she said she could not recall whether Sloman had asserted this or had said he “always figured” it, and that she was unaware of any information indicating an exchange of favours; Sloman did not recall making the remark.68 OPR concluded that “there is no evidence supporting the suggestion that the plea was instigated by Menchel as a favor to defense counsel.”69

Coverage

On November 28, 2018 the Miami Herald published Julie K. Brown’s investigative report “Perversion of Justice: How a future Trump Cabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a lifetime”; OPR records that the report renewed public attention to the case and that press and congressional scrutiny of the office’s handling of it followed.7062

The September 2007 emails between Villafaña and Lefkowitz were unsealed in the CVRA litigation. OPR’s report, which does not name the outlets, summarised the resulting coverage as treating their content and tone “as proof that Villafaña and the USAO worked in concert with Epstein’s attorneys to keep the ‘sweetheart’ deal a secret from the victims and the public”; the report did not adopt that characterisation.29 Villafaña answered OPR that the tone of the emails was how she communicated generally and that her reply whenever the defense asked for a change was “No, I will not make that change,” and she gave a separate explanation for each of the three passages quoted against her.1230 Having reviewed the unredacted traffic, OPR concluded that “a public narrative developed that Villafaña colluded with defense counsel to benefit Epstein at the expense of the victims. After thoroughly reviewing all of the available evidence, OPR finds that narrative to be inaccurate.”30

Documents

DocumentDescription
EFTA02830776OPR Report, November 2020, 348 pages, filed as an exhibit in United States v. Maxwell. Villafaña is one of its five subjects. Also produced as DOJ-OGR-00003177 (absent from the site’s page-image store) and DOJ-OGR-00023013
DOJ-OGR-00004697Declaration of A. Marie Villafaña, filed July 9, 2008, in support of the United States’ response to the first CVRA petition
DOJ-OGR-00000290The non-prosecution agreement as filed in Epstein’s 2019 bail proceedings; signature pages print her name and title for the United States
DOJ-OGR-00000034Maxwell certiorari petition; Appendix B reproduces the executed agreement, including the acknowledgment block signed “/s/ A. Marie Villafaña” and dated 9/27/07
EFTA00225378Her 58-page written response to OPR and her counsel’s covering letter of May 10, 2019, within a larger production
EFTA00190318Contains the U.S. Attorney’s Office letter of June 2, 2008 to Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip describing her role in the investigation

Footnotes

  1. Biran letter, May 10, 2019, p. 2 of 7 (page stamp EFTA00225542, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00225378 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8

  2. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. i. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.3 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  3. OPR Report, narrative p. 25. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.51 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  4. Petition for a writ of certiorari, Maxwell v. United States, filed April 10, 2025, Appendix B at 33a–34a (page stamps DOJ-OGR-00000096 and DOJ-OGR-00000097, not document IDs); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00000034 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  5. Letter from Jonathan Biran, Baker Donelson, to the Office of Professional Responsibility, May 10, 2019, p. 1 of 7 (page stamp EFTA00225541, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00225378 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6

  6. Declaration of A. Marie Villafaña in support of the United States’ response to victim’s emergency petition for enforcement of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, In re: Jane Doe, No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson (S.D. Fla.), filed July 9, 2008, ¶ 1; read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00004697 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  7. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. ix. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.11 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  8. OPR Report, narrative p. 134. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.160 The conclusion quoted here RUNS ACROSS A PAGE BREAK: the report’s narrative p.134 ends “none of the subject attorneys violated a clear and” and p.135 opens “unambiguous standard or engaged in professional misconduct in developing, negotiating, or entering into the NPA, including its addendum.” No single page carries the whole sentence, which is why a one-string search of the text layer returns nothing for it, and why an earlier version of this page carried a splice of the section HEADING’s wording onto this sentence’s subject. Read from the page images at 400 dpi. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  9. OPR Report, narrative p. 279. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.305 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  10. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. iv. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.6 ↩ ↩2

  11. Villafaña declaration, July 9, 2008, ¶¶ 2–3; read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00004697 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  12. OPR Report, narrative p. 164. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.190 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  13. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 2006–2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation, November 2020, filed as Government Exhibit 3, Document 204-3 in United States v. Maxwell, No. 1:20-cr-00330-PAE (S.D.N.Y.), April 16, 2021; cover page. Citations below are to the report’s own narrative and executive-summary page numbers. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 ↩

  14. OPR Report, narrative p. 281. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.307 ↩ ↩2

  15. OPR Report, narrative p. 282. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.308 ↩ ↩2

  16. OPR Report, narrative p. 148. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.174 ↩ ↩2

  17. OPR Report, narrative p. 6. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.32 ↩ ↩2

  18. OPR Report, narrative p. 138. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.164 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  19. OPR Report, narrative p. 103 n.162. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.129 ↩

  20. Letter from the First Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida, to Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, June 2, 2008, p. 2 (page stamp EFTA00190453, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00190318 p.136 ↩ ↩2

  21. OPR Report, narrative p. 109. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.135 ↩ ↩2

  22. OPR Report, narrative p. 150. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.176 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  23. OPR Report, narrative p. 143. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.169 ↩

  24. OPR Report, narrative p. 70. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.96. The text layer of this sheet welds two words, printing “the top ofthe food chain”, so a phrase search for the quotation does not find the page that carries it. ↩ ↩2

  25. Non-Prosecution Agreement, signature page (p. 7 of 7) as filed in United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y.), at p. 8 of the filed exhibit (page stamp DOJ-OGR-00000297, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00000290 ↩

  26. OPR Report, narrative p. 93. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.119 ↩

  27. OPR Report, narrative p. 166. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.192, where the provision’s language is quoted in a section heading. The same phrase appears again at p.333. ↩ ↩2

  28. OPR Report, narrative p. 81. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.107 ↩

  29. OPR Report, narrative p. 163. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.189 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  30. OPR Report, narrative p. 165. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.191 ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7

  31. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02756198 p. 2, Exhibit 22 in Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. United States, filed 10 February 2016, which reproduces the thread. Read from the text layer; not verified at the image. ⚠ The header renders her forename differently from the form used on this page, and the desk has not resolved which is correct; no claim about her middle initial is made here. Times as this copy prints them. The thread is also held at https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00215163 p. 1. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  32. OPR Report, narrative p. 204. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.230 The September 6, 2007 email quotation RUNS ACROSS A PAGE BREAK: narrative p.204 ends ‘and that “the [PBPD]’ and narrative p.205 (run p.231) opens ‘Chief wanted to know if the victims had been consulted about the deal.”’ A pin checker searching for the second half alone reports this page as wrong; it is not. Verified against both sheets 18 September 2026. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9

  33. OPR Report, narrative p. 204 n.290. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.230 ↩ ↩2

  34. Villafaña statement, p. 58 of 58 (page stamp EFTA00225540, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00225378 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  35. Letter to Jay P. Lefkowitz, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, dated 11 December 2007, five pages, on United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Florida letterhead at the West Palm Beach address, “DELIVERY BY ELECTRONIC MAIL”, RE: Jeffrey Epstein, “Dear Jay:”. EFTA01659864 p.1. Authorship as it appears on the document: the signature block on p.5 prints “R. Alexander Acosta / United States Attorney / By:” with the signing attorney’s name blacked out and “Assistant United States Attorney” printed beneath, and the letter is copied to Acosta and to the First Assistant U.S. Attorney. ⚠ The name is barred on this sheet, and the identification is an inference from unbarred content on that same document, on the four bases set out in the body. Nothing here is recovered from anywhere else. A second name on the copy line of p.5 is also barred. She is a federal prosecutor, of age, not a survivor, and the subject of this page; naming her is within the editorial rule this desk works to, and a by-office formula on her own page would be a hedge without a purpose. One printed date on p.1 renders as “December I I. 2007” in the searchable text; the letterhead facsimile line is not reproduced. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  36. Same letter, p.2. EFTA01659864 p.2. The lawyer approached as the victims’ attorney representative is named on the sheet and is named here. ⚠ The third party in the relationship the allegation concerned is not named on the sheet at all and is not identified here. The firm the letter says the judge later selected is named on the sheet. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5

  37. Same letter, p.3. EFTA01659864 p.3. “Recarey” is the Palm Beach Police Department detective who led the investigation. ⚠ The two dash marks quoted from this sheet are rendered as EN dashes because that is what they are: read at 600 dpi both are spaced en dashes, about one en wide, not em dashes, and the “simple line AUSA” instance is not symmetrically spaced on the sheet. The dash in the page-1 “bad faith” passage above has NOT been measured and is left as the searchable text renders it. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4

  38. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. ii. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.4 ↩

  39. OPR Report, narrative p. 263. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.289 ↩ ↩2

  40. OPR Report, narrative p. 105. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.131 ↩

  41. OPR Report, narrative p. 112. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.138 ↩

  42. OPR Report, narrative p. 114. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.140 ↩ ↩2

  43. OPR Report, narrative p. 115. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.141 ↩ ↩2

  44. OPR Report, narrative p. 116. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.142 ↩

  45. Villafaña statement, p. 3 of 58 (page stamp EFTA00225485, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00225378 ↩ ↩2

  46. OPR Report, narrative p. 261. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.287 The district court quotation is reproduced twice in the report, and THIS SHEET CARRIES IT MANGLED: the text layer renders the court’s bracketed “[i]t” as the English word “tilt”, so run p.287 reads ‘“tilt was a material omission for the Government to suggest…”’ while a second occurrence at run p.281 carries it cleanly. A pin checker searching for the clean string finds the other page and reports this one as wrong; it is not. Verified against both sheets 18 September 2026. A duplicate copy of the report in the release renders the same insertion a third way, as “[iJt”; this page prints the court’s own “[i]t”, which all three renderings are attempts at. ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  47. OPR Report, narrative p. 262. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.288 ↩ ↩2

  48. OPR Report, narrative p. 264. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.290 ↩

  49. OPR Report, narrative p. 215. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.241 ↩ ↩2

  50. OPR Report, narrative p. 215 n.317. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.241 ↩

  51. OPR Report, narrative p. 217. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.243 ↩

  52. OPR Report, narrative p. 217 n.321. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.243 ↩

  53. OPR Report, narrative p. 277. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.303 ↩ ↩2

  54. OPR Report, narrative p. 274. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.300 ↩ ↩2

  55. OPR Report, narrative p. 275. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.301 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  56. OPR Report, narrative p. 276 and n.436. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.302 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  57. OPR Report, narrative p. 278. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.304 ↩

  58. OPR Report, narrative p. 280. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.306 ↩ ↩2

  59. Villafaña declaration, July 9, 2008, ¶¶ 4–5; read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00004697 ↩ ↩2

  60. Villafaña declaration, July 9, 2008, ¶¶ 6–7; read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00004697 ↩ ↩2

  61. OPR Report, narrative pp. 144–145 and n.215, quoting the declaration of A. Marie Villafaña filed June 2, 2017 in Doe v. United States, No. 9:08-cv-80736 (S.D. Fla.). https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.170 ↩

  62. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. vi. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.8 ↩ ↩2

  63. Statement of A. Marie Villafaña in response to the letter of April 2, 2019, p. 1 of 58 (page stamp EFTA00225483, not a document ID); read from the page image. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00225378 ↩

  64. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. x. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.12 ↩

  65. OPR Report, Executive Summary p. xi. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.13 ↩

  66. OPR Report, narrative p. 142. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.168 ↩

  67. OPR Report, narrative p. 151. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.177 ↩

  68. OPR Report, narrative p. 153. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.179 ↩ ↩2 ↩3

  69. OPR Report, narrative p. 154. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.180 ↩

  70. OPR Report, narrative p. 4 and n.3, citing Julie K. Brown, “Perversion of Justice: How a future Trump Cabinet member gave a serial sex abuser the deal of a lifetime,” Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 2018. https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02830776 p.30 ↩

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