[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 13 of 22 extradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process and, at worst, impossible."). Having carefully reviewed the experts' reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,2 the Court's analysis of the relationship between the Defendant's French citizenship and the risk of flight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal questions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that any extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood that the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to resolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any extradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition entirely—weighs strongly in favor of detention. In addition, the Defendant's extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide her the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not by itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant's financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and foreign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the press, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6–88:23 (distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), 2 The Defendant also argues that "a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order has been recognized as an indication of the defendant's intent not to flee." Def. Mot. at 27 (citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).