February 12, 2026
AI-generated report (Claude, Anthropic) — iteratively fact-checked against source documents but may contain errors. Verify claims against linked EFTA sources before citing. No affiliation with Anthropic.

Corrupted PDF Recovery — Epstein Files Dataset 9

Overview

Five files in Dataset 9 (DS9) were identified as corrupted or non-standard PDFs that could
not be processed by normal PDF tools (PyMuPDF, Poppler, Ghostscript). Forensic analysis
revealed that none of these are simply corrupted PDFs — they are disk image fragments,
truncated scans, and files with other data types saved with .pdf extensions during the
forensic imaging process.

All five files were analyzed byte-by-byte, and all recoverable content has been extracted.

File Inventory

EFTA00645624 — Sharp Scanner Fax (FULLY RECOVERED)

Property Value
Original size 35,153 bytes
Corruption type Missing xref table, trailer, and %%EOF marker (truncated)
What it is Single-page CCITT Group 4 fax image from a Sharp scanner
Recovery method Extracted CCITTFaxDecode stream from PDF object 6, wrapped in TIFF header for PIL decoding

Content: Legal memorandum dated April 22, 2015, from W. Chester Brewer Jr. to Jeffrey Epstein,
Darren Indyke, Jack Goldberger, and others. RE: Jeffrey Epstein vs. Scott Rothstein, Bradley J.
Edwards, et al.
— 15th Judicial Circuit Case No. 502009CA040800XXXXMB. Concerns a UMC hearing
about motion for fees/costs.

Recovered files:
- EFTA00645624_decoded.png — Full-resolution page image (1704x2196 px, bilevel)
- EFTA00645624.tiff — Raw TIFF with CCITT data
- EFTA00645624_ocr.txt — Full OCR text
- EFTA00645624_ccitt_raw.bin — Raw CCITT Group 4 bitstream (31,992 bytes)

Recovery technique:
1. Parsed PDF objects manually (no xref available)
2. Located image object 6 with /Filter/CCITTFaxDecode /DecodeParms<</K -1/Columns 1704/Rows 2196>>
3. Extracted 31,992 bytes of raw CCITT Group 4 data
4. Constructed TIFF header: little-endian, 1704x2196, 1-bit, CCITT Group 4 compression
5. Opened with PIL, converted to PNG
6. OCR'd with Tesseract


EFTA01175426 — Faxed Court Order (FULLY RECOVERED, 10 of 11 pages)

Property Value
Original size 826,803 bytes
Corruption type Linearized PDF truncated ~10,735 bytes short; missing main xref/trailer and Pages tree object
What it is 11-page fax of a San Mateo County Superior Court order
Recovery method Direct extraction of CCITT Group 3 fax streams from each page's image object

Content: San Mateo County Superior Court probate order — "Order Approving Modification
of Trust." Involves the Elisa Zaffaroni irrevocable trust (dated April 15, 1989), trustee succession
rules, J.P. Morgan Trust Company as corporate co-trustee, and a $4.1 million principal distribution
for a Tiburon, CA residence. References David Packard and the Zaffaroni family. Faxed from
"Academic Affairs" at 972-883-6764 (UT Dallas area code), dated March 22, 2012/2014.

Recovered files:
- EFTA01175426_page02.png through _page20.png — 10 page images (1728x2203 px, bilevel)
- EFTA01175426_full_ocr.txt — Full OCR text of all pages
- EFTA01175426_repaired.pdf — Repaired PDF with recovered pages

Recovery technique:
1. PyMuPDF, Ghostscript, and pdftoppm all failed (truncated xref)
2. Regex-scanned file for all /Subtype/Image objects with CCITTFaxDecode parameters
3. Found 10 image objects with consistent params: W=1728, H=2203, K=0 (Group 3), Cols=1728, EndOfBlock=false
4. For each: extracted raw stream data, built TIFF header with Group 3 1-D compression, decoded with PIL
5. Note: Page 1 (title page) and page 11 may be in the missing ~10KB truncated section


EFTA01220934 — Forensic Disk Image Fragment (FULLY CARVED)

Property Value
Original size 1,138,878 bytes
Corruption type Not a PDF at all — raw disk image sectors saved as .pdf
What it is Fragment of a Windows PC hard drive containing cached web content, application files, and photos
Recovery method File signature scanning and carving from raw sectors

Content: This is NOT a document. It is a fragment of a forensic disk image (~279 sectors of
4096 bytes) containing miscellaneous files from a Windows computer. The content is a mix of:
- Cached web page images (partially recovered due to sector fragmentation)
- Macromedia Dreamweaver and AutoCAD application files
- Windows system manifests (IE Extension Compatibility, MSAuditEvtLog)
- An Adobe license agreement in Czech
- An Apple Interface Builder plist from a music application
- Apple macOS codec descriptions (GSM, MPEG-4)

The JPEGs show the classic "top half recovered, bottom half garbage" pattern — this is because
each JPEG spans multiple disk sectors, but only the first contiguous run of sectors was captured.
The rest of each JPEG's data was in sectors belonging to other files on the original disk.

Recovered files:
- EFTA01220934_jpeg1.jpg through _jpeg9.jpg — 9 JPEGs carved from disk (2 corrupted, 7 viewable)
- jpeg2: Small thumbnail (160x120), woman with goggles (scientist/lab worker?)
- jpeg4: Sky icon (160x44)
- jpeg5: Low-res stamped document (160x44)
- jpeg6: Small fragment (264x197), pink/blue image
- jpeg7: Harlequin Presents poster — "Heidi Rice" (480x360) — romance novel cover
- jpeg8: Image of money/currency (286x384)
- jpeg9: Tall image (532x922)
- jpeg1, jpeg3: Corrupted (cannot be opened)
- EFTA01220934_gif1.gif — Office/application icons (344x280)
- EFTA01220934_png1.png — Tiny icon (9x9)
- EFTA01220934_png2.png — Small icon (38x12)
- EFTA01220934_content.html — Macromedia Dreamweaver tag library dialog (not case-relevant)
- EFTA01220934_content.rtf — Browser Extended Validation certificate help text (not case-relevant)

Sector map (each character = 4096 bytes):

P = PDF header, O = PDF object, J = JPEG, G = GIF, I = PNG, R = RTF, H = HTML
B = Apple PLIST, # = compressed data, ~ = medium entropy, - = low entropy
. = null, n = mostly null

P-#~#~--------------------G#####IJ#####---n..#n..#####nJJ-R-RR##
#####~###n##J##J##~~~~~##~~~~##~~###~~#~##~###--------~-#B-###n#
#####~#~~######################J##~####J###################---##
######H#--#####################H~#n~~I###.#--#..............n...
............nH--~~~~n--

Recovery technique:
1. Identified file as disk image via file command and absence of valid PDF structure
2. Scanned for file magic signatures: JPEG (FFD8FF), PNG (89504E47), GIF (47494638), RTF ({\rtf), HTML (<html)
3. Carved each embedded file by following its format-specific structure
4. Also found: 3 XML assembly manifests, 1 bplist (Interface Builder), Apple codec tables

Why the JPEGs are half-broken:
JPEG files use sequential encoding. When a JPEG spans sectors 100, 101, 102 on disk but the
forensic image only captured sector 100 (plus sectors from other files at 101, 102), the JPEG
decoder renders the first N scan lines correctly, then produces garbage for the rest.


EFTA00597207 — Apple Address Book + iPhone Photo (CONTACTS RECOVERED)

Property Value
Original size 882,743 bytes
Corruption type Linearized PDF with disk sectors overwritten by Apple Address Book data
What it is PDF wrapper around a mix of: address book contacts, an iPhone photo, and compressed page data
Recovery method PLIST parsing for contacts; base64 decoding for embedded JPEG

Content: The PDF structure claims 10 pages but they are irrecoverable — the sectors that
contained the page cross-reference data were overwritten. Instead, 8 disk sectors (28KB-57KB) contain
Apple macOS AddressBook.app binary property list records — one contact per 4096-byte sector.

8 Contacts Recovered:
1. [?] Sussman — Phone: (713) 478-6444 (Houston, TX)
2. Karim Wade — Email: [email protected] (Senegalese government)
3. Jacquie [?] — Email: [email protected]
4. Gwendolyn Beck — Email: [email protected]
5. Jay Lefkowitz — Phone: (917) 617-2278, (212) 446-4970 — Email: [email protected] (Kirkland & Ellis)
6. Michael Wolff — Email: [email protected]
7. J. Robert Strang — Email: [email protected]
8. Jean-Luc [?] — Phone: 1 (646) 961-8500 (NYC), +33 648 519 751 (France) — Email: [email protected]

Cross-references with persons registry: Gwendolyn Beck (known associate), Jay Lefkowitz (Epstein attorney),
Michael Wolff (journalist), Gerald Sussman.

Also recovered: 1 photograph taken with an iPhone 5s on August 3, 2014, at 9:38:27 AM (iOS 7.1.2).
Recovered as 640x480 thumbnail; original was 3264x2448.

Recovered files:
- contacts_extracted.txt — Full contact details with cross-references
- EFTA00597207_embedded_photo.jpg — iPhone 5s photo from Aug 3, 2014

Byte-level structure:

Offset 0-18KB:     PDF header + 13 small compressed objects (real PDF structure)
Offset 28KB-57KB:  8 Apple Address Book bplist records (4096 bytes each)
Offset 61KB-200KB: Base64-encoded JPEG (iPhone 5s photo, Aug 2014)
Offset 200KB-260KB: Null padding
Offset 260KB-882KB: Compressed data (original PDF page images, irrecoverable without xref)

Recovery technique:
1. Identified bplist00 signatures at 4096-byte aligned offsets
2. Extracted readable strings from each bplist sector (binary PLIST format)
3. Parsed contact fields: UID (UUID format), First, Last, Phone, Email
4. Found base64 JPEG at offset 61440 — decoded and extracted EXIF metadata
5. Verified no additional contacts or hidden data in remaining sectors


EFTA00593870 — Null-Padded PDF Shell (MINIMAL CONTENT)

Property Value
Original size 45,783 bytes
Corruption type Linearized PDF header intact but page data sectors are all null bytes
What it is PDF shell with %%EOF at byte 734; remaining 45KB is 64.3% null
Recovery method Stripped null padding; only ~16KB of real data remains

Content: Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 v. United States — Case No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM
(Marra/Johnson). "Unopposed Motion of Jane Doe 1 and 2 to Exceed Page Limits in Their
Response to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment." Document 412, entered on
FLSD Docket 08/11/2017. This is from the landmark Crime Victims' Rights Act case.

Page 1 of 4 was recovered from PDF content streams in the non-zeroed sectors. The motion
describes the complexity of the case (157 separate assertions of material fact) and the
Government's three responsive filings (DE 407, DE 402, and the 30-page cross-motion).

Recovered files:
- efta00593870_stripped.pdf — Null bytes removed, 16,384 bytes remaining
- EFTA00593870_cleaned_text.txt — Cleaned, readable text from page 1

Recovery technique:
1. Identified %%EOF at byte 734 (linearization first part)
2. Mapped sector types: 4 real sectors, 8 null sectors
3. Found 8 FlateDecode streams in the non-null sectors; decompressed with zlib
4. Extracted text from PDF content stream operators (Tj/TJ)
5. Cleaned letter-spaced OCR text and reconstructed readable paragraphs
6. Pages 2-4 were in zeroed sectors and are irrecoverable


Methodology

All five files were subjected to the same analysis pipeline:

  1. Header inspection — Verify PDF signature, find %%EOF markers, count objects
  2. Sector mapping — Classify every 4096-byte sector by content type (null, PDF, compressed, JPEG, PLIST, etc.)
  3. File signature scanning — Search for embedded file magic bytes (JPEG FFD8FF, PNG 89504E47, bplist, RTF, HTML, ZIP, SQLite, etc.)
  4. Stream extraction — For valid PDF objects, extract and attempt decompression of each stream
  5. CCITT fax decoding — For scanner/fax images, extract raw CCITT data and wrap in TIFF headers for PIL decoding
  6. PLIST parsing — For Apple binary plists, extract readable strings and parse contact field structure
  7. OCR — Tesseract with page segmentation mode 3 or 6 on all recovered images
  8. Cross-referencing — Check extracted names against persons_registry.json (1,536 persons)

Tools Used

Key Finding

The most forensically significant recovery is EFTA00597207 — 8 Apple Address Book contacts
from a macOS computer, including known Epstein associates (Jay Lefkowitz, his attorney; Gwendolyn Beck;
Michael Wolff) plus a Senegalese government contact (Karim Wade) and an unidentified French contact.
The iPhone 5s photo from August 2014 was also recovered from the same file.

The "corrupted PDFs" are better understood as forensic imaging artifacts — fragments of hard drives
that were captured during evidence collection and assigned EFTA numbers regardless of their actual content.


File Directory

github_release/ — Curated recoveries organized by EFTA number

File Description
EFTA00593870/EFTA00593870_cleaned_text.txt Cleaned OCR text — CVRA motion page 1
EFTA00597207/contacts_extracted.txt 8 Apple Address Book contacts with cross-references
EFTA00597207/EFTA00597207_embedded_photo.jpg iPhone 5s photo, Aug 3, 2014
EFTA00645624/EFTA00645624_decoded.png Legal memo — full-resolution fax image
EFTA00645624/EFTA00645624_ocr.txt Full OCR text of legal memo
EFTA01175426/EFTA01175426_full_ocr.txt Full OCR text — San Mateo probate order (10 pages)
EFTA01175426/EFTA01175426_page02.png ... _page20.png 10 recovered page images
EFTA01220934/EFTA01220934_jpeg1.jpg ... _jpeg9.jpg 9 JPEGs carved from disk image
EFTA01220934/EFTA01220934_gif1.gif GIF carved from disk image
EFTA01220934/EFTA01220934_png1.png, _png2.png PNGs carved from disk image
EFTA01220934/EFTA01220934_content.html Dreamweaver tag library (not case-relevant)
EFTA01220934/EFTA01220934_content.rtf Browser EV cert help text (not case-relevant)

carved_pdfs/ — Raw forensic carving output (all 44 files)

File Description
efta00593870_stripped.pdf Null-stripped PDF shell (16KB)
EFTA00597207_embedded_photo.jpg iPhone 5s photo recovered from bplist data
EFTA00597207_pdftoppm-01.png ... -10.png 10 pdftoppm render attempts (mostly blank — sectors overwritten)
EFTA00645624_ccitt.bin, _ccitt_raw.bin Raw CCITT Group 4 fax bitstreams
EFTA00645624_decoded.png Decoded fax page image
EFTA00645624.tiff TIFF-wrapped CCITT data
EFTA01175426_full_ocr.txt Full OCR of 10 recovered pages
EFTA01175426_page02.png ... _page20.png 10 recovered fax page images
EFTA01175426_repaired.pdf Repaired PDF with recovered pages reinserted
EFTA01220934_content.html Dreamweaver HTML carved from disk
EFTA01220934_content.rtf RTF carved from disk
efta01220934_first_image.jpeg, _first_png.png First image/PNG found in disk sectors
EFTA01220934_gif1.gif GIF carved from disk image
EFTA01220934_jpeg1.jpg ... _jpeg9.jpg 9 JPEGs carved from disk (2 corrupted)
EFTA01220934_png1.png, _png2.png PNGs carved from disk image
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