{"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_count": 15, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02824167", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02824167.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-.1B\n\nDocument 6-2\n\nFiled 07/11/16\n\nPage 1 of 15\n\nEXHIBIT 2\n\nEFTA02824167\n\n", "char_count": 93}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cvl-W2APIcAlQ0496thihignt Agc2intettieeli orFFitiablat-44 0 tRP34264.91 age 2 of 20\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA\nJANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2,\nPetitioners,\nvs.\nUNITED STATES,\nRespondent.\n\nUNITED STATES' SEALED MOTION TO DISMISS\nFOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION\nThe United States hereby requests that this Court enter an order dismissing these\nproceedings and the Petition for Enforcement of Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section\n3771 (DE I, the \"Petition\"), through which Petitioners Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 have\nadvanced claims pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), for lack of subject\nmatter jurisdiction.'\n\nThis Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition because\n\nSee, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004)\n(\"Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction can of course be raised at any time prior to final\njudgment.\"); United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing\nthat \"a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings\"); Harrell\n& Sumner Contracting Co. v. Peabody Petersen Co., 546 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 1977)\n(\"[U]nder Rule I 2(hX3), Fed.R.Civ.P., the defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be\nraised at any time by motion of a party or otherwise.\"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(hX3). In the\npresent motion, the United States seeks dismissal of Petitioners' claims based on both a legal and\nfactual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. This Court may properly consider\nand weigh evidence beyond Petitioners' allegations when evaluating such a challenge to the\nCourt's subject matter jurisdiction:\nFactual attacks [on a Court's subject matter jurisdiction] ... \"challenge subject\nmatter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.\" In resolving a factual\nattack, the district court \"may consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and\n... [truncated, 2098 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/1 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=1]", "char_count": 2098}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-\n\n43t91.9\\1Q045PcliifYignt 2@gc2inn4eZ orfideigitlat-MA 0 ifti201.91 age 3 of 20\n\nPetitioners lack Article III standing and because the claims raised by Petitioners in these\nproceedings are not constitutionally ripe.\n1.\n\nThe Claims Raised in the Petition Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject\nMatter Jurisdiction Because the Petitioners Lack Standing to Bring Those Claims.\nThese proceedings pursuant to the CVRA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter\n\njurisdiction because Petitioners lack standing to pursue the remedies that they are seeking for\nalleged CVRA violations. As the Supreme Court has explained,\nto satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a plaintiff must show (1) it has\nsuffered an \"injury in fact\" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or\nimminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the\nchallenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely\nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.\nFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81\n(2000); see also, e.g., Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town ofJupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th Cir.\n2008) (quoting Harris v. M,\n\n20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Moreover, \"a\n\nplaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.\" Friends of the\nEarth, 528 U.S. at 185.\nHere, the record incontrovertibly demonstrates that Petitioners cannot satisfy the third\nprong of the standing test, and the Petition and these proceedings must accordingly be dismissed\nfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 E.g., Florida Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. South Florida\n\ncourt's jurisdiction, a \"trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as\nto the existence of its power to hear the case\" without presuming the truthfulness\nof the plaintiff's allegations.\nMakro Capital of America, Inc. v. UBS AG, 543 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008)\n... [truncated, 2518 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/2 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=2]", "char_count": 2518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cvl-W2319Pkicil0491ickifigit Agc2JIThetifeg orfFitAbtlabigt 0 /ft4201\n19f age 4 of 20\n\nWater Management Din, 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (\"If at any point in the litigation\nthe plaintiff ceases to meet all three requirements for constitutional standing, the case no longer\npresents a live case or controversy, and the federal court must dismiss the case for lack of subject\nmatter jurisdiction.\"); Phoenix ofBroward, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 489 F.3d 1156, 1161 (11th\nCir. 2007) (\"[T]he issue of constitutional standing is jurisdictional ....\"); National\nConservation Ass 'n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (\"[B]ecause the\nconstitutional standing doctrine stems directly from Article III's 'case or controversy'\nrequirement, this issue implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, and accordingly must be\naddressed as a threshold matter regardless of whether it is raised by the parties.\") (citation\nomitted).\nIn these proceedings, the only identified legal relief that Petitioners have sought pursuant\nto the CVRA is the setting aside of the Non-Prosecution Agreement that was entered into\nbetween Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida\n(\"USAO-SDFL\"). See, e.g., DE 99 at 6 (recognizing that the relief Petitioners seek \"is to\ninvalidate the non-prosecution agreement\"). But even assuming arguendo that Petitioners' rights\nunder the CVRA were violated when Epstein and the USAO-SDFL entered into the NonProsecution Agreement, constitutional due process guarantees do not allow either the NonProsecution Agreement — which by its terms induced Epstein to, inter alia, plead guilty to state\ncriminal charges and serve an 18-month sentence of state incarcerations — or the governmental\n\nthis Court need not reach or address those issues because an analysis of the third prong of the\nstanding test incontrovertibly establishes the Petitioners' lack of standing. Nonetheless, the\ncircumstances which demonstrate Petitioners' \n... [truncated, 2406 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/3 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=3]", "char_count": 2406}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-?*031449s1A0491ickifYigit Agc2inteific441orFldeignblatigt 0 ifti264.91 Afrage 5 of 20\n\nobligations undertaken therein to be set aside.° See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,\n262 (1971) (\"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the\nprosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise\nmust be fulfilled.\"); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) (\"Due\nprocess requires the government to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity\nagreement it makes.\"). Indeed, even if this Court were somehow to set aside the NonProsecution Agreement on the authority of the CVRA, and even if after consultation with\nPetitioners the United States determined that it would be proper and desirable to institute a\ncriminal prosecution in the Southern District of Florida against Epstein on the criminal charges\ncontemplated in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, the United States would still be\nconstitutionally required to adhere to the negotiated terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.\nSee, e.g., Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Harvey, 869 F.2d at 1443.\nDue process considerations further bar this Court from setting aside a non-prosecution\nagreement that grants contractual rights to a contracting party (Epstein) who has not been made a\nparty to the proceedings before the Court. See, e.g., School Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Secretary\nof U.S. Dept of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6th Cir. 2009) (\"It is hornbook law that all parties to a\ncontract are necessary in an action challenging its validity ....\"); Dawavendewa v. Salt River\nProject Agr. Imp. & Power Dist, 276 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (\"[A] party to a contract is\nnecessary, and if not susceptible to joinder, indispensable to litigation seeking to decimate that\n\nsubsequent 18-month state incarceration).\nTo the extent that the Petitioners' requested invalidation of the Non-Prosecution\nAgreement would implicitly reject and n\n... [truncated, 2443 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/4 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=4]", "char_count": 2443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-€\n\n23VIC-Alc4046fictihignt Age2inLeti(eg orfFit4OtbUgt 0 tittnifigf age 6 of 20\n\ncontract.\"); Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975) (\"No procedural\nprinciple is more deeply imbedded in the common law than that, in an action to set aside a lease\nor a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are\nindispensable.\"); see also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940) (\"It is\nelementary that it is not within the power of any tribunal to make a binding adjudication of the\nrights in personam of parties not brought before it by due process of law.\").5\nAdditionally, a \"favorable ruling\" from this Court will not provide Petitioners with\nanything for the alleged CVRA violations that is not already available to them. For the due\nprocess reasons already discussed above, the United States must legally abide by the terms of the\nNon-Prosecution Agreement even if this Court should somehow set the agreement aside for\nPetitioners to consult further with the government attorney handling the case. Moreover, as will\nbe explained in greater detail below, see infra at 8-12, Petitioners already have the present ability\nto confer with an attorney for the government about a federal criminal case against Epstein —\nwhether or not the Non-Prosecution Agreement is set aside — because the investigation and\npotential federal prosecution of Epstein for crimes committed against the Petitioners and others\nremains a legally viable possibility.'\nThe present proceedings under the CVRA must accordingly be dismissed for lack of\nstanding because Petitioners simply have no injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable\nruling in these proceedings. See, e.g., Scott v. Taylor, 470 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 2006)\n(holding that there was no standing where it was speculative that remedy that Plaintiff sought\n5 Significantly, it is Epstein 's contractual rights under the non-prosecution agreement that\nPetitioners seek to void t\n... [truncated, 2352 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/5 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=5]", "char_count": 2352}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-\n\n31PIC-AIGI049ficliifrigril 2@gc2intefil441 orFldefabbligt 0 tft42071.9f age 7 of 20\n\nwould redress claimed injury).\nII.\n\nThe Claims Raised in the Petition Are Not Constitutionally Ripe, and These\nProceedings Must Thus Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.\nThis Court must also dismiss these proceedings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction\n\nbecause the Petitioners' claims are not constitutionally ripe.\nRipeness, like standing, \"originate[s] from the Constitution's Article III requirement that\nthe jurisdiction of the federal courts be limited to actual cases and controversies.\" Elend v.\nBasham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2006). \"'The ripeness doctrine keeps federal courts\nfrom deciding cases prematurely,' Beaulieu v. City ofAlabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.\n2006), and 'protects [them] from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the\nreview of potential or abstract disputes,' Digital Props., Inc. v. City ofPlantation, 121 F.3d 586,\n589 (11th Cir.1997).\" United States v. M,\n\n613 F.3d 1046, 1050 (11th Cir. 2010); see also\n\nPittman v. M, 267 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (\"The ripeness doctrine prevent[s] the\ncourts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract\ndisagreements . . . .\"') (quoting Coalition for the Abolition ofMarijuana Prohibition v. City of\nAtlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted))). Under the\nripeness doctrine, a court must therefore determine \"'whether there is sufficient injury to meet\nArticle III's requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is sufficiently\nmature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to permit effective decisionmaking by\nthe court.\"' In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d\n1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)).\nWhen evaluating whether a claim is ripe, a court considers: \"11) the fitness of the issues\nfor judicial decision\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/6 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=6]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-\n\n03191f-A610496clafrignt 2@gc2intienOalorFldegtraibigt 0 tft426319f age 8 of 20\n\nsee also, e.g., Association For Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc. v. Conger, 899 F.2d\n1164, 1165 (1 1 th Cir. 1990). Under the doctrine, \"[a] claim is not ripe when it is based on\nspeculative possibilities,\" In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011), such as if the claim\n\"'rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur\nat all,\"' Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1392, 1404 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texas v.\nUnited States, 523U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Indeed, \"[t]he ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent\nfederal courts from engaging in such speculation and prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily\nreaching constitutional issues.\" Pittman, 267 F.3d at 1280.\nIn these proceedings, the Petitioners have sought to set aside the Non-Prosecution\nAgreement between Epstein and the USAO-SDFL so that Petitioners can \"confer with the\nattorney for the Government\" about the possible filing of federal criminal charges against\nEpstein and the potential disposition of any such charges. See, e.g., July 11, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 6-7\n(seeking an \"[o]rder that the [non-prosecution] agreement that was negotiated is invalid\" so that\nPetitioners can exercise the right to confer with the government); id. at 19-20, 24; 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3771(a)(5); see also DE 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (claiming that Petitioner was \"denied her rights\" under the\nCVRA because she \"received no consultation with the attorney for the government regarding the\npossible disposition of the charges\").\nNotwithstanding the Non-Prosecution Agreement, Petitioners are and have been free to\nconfer with attorneys for the government about the investigation and potential prosecution of\nEpstein. At least one attorney for the government (Assistant United States Attorney Villafafia\nfrom the USAO-SDFL) had spoken to Petitioners about the offenses committed against them by\nEpstein prior to the signing of \n... [truncated, 2177 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/7 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=7]", "char_count": 2177}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-&1-1M2APICAIGI049EiclaNignt 209c2nitefifek?lorFldeg0tthgt 0 /ft420919f age 9 of 20\n\n48 at 6 ¶ 8; see also DE 99 at 3, and government attorneys have on multiple occasions offered to\nconfer with Petitioners, see, e.g., July I I, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 13 (\"I will always confer, sit down\nwith Jane Doe 1 and 2, with the two agents and Ms. Villafana. We'll be happy to sit down with\nthem.\"). Indeed, on December 10, 2010, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of\nFlorida, accompanied by supervisory and line prosecutors from the USAO-SDFL, personally\nconferred with Petitioners' counsel and with Petitioner Jane Doe #1 and entertained discussion\nabout Petitioners' desires to see Epstein criminally prosecuted on federal charges.' The United\nStates Attorney and prosecutors in the USAO-SDFL have also corresponded with Petitioners'\ncounsel on multiple occasions about Petitioners' desires to have Epstein criminally prosecuted on\nfederal charges.8\nAdditionally,\na number of districts outside the Southern District of Florida (e.g., the Southern\nDistrict of New York and the District of New Jersey) share jurisdiction and venue with the\nSouthern District of Florida over potential federal criminal charges based on the alleged sexual\nacts committed by Epstein against the Petitioners.\n\nEpstein is thus subject to potential\n\nprosecution for such acts in those districts. Furthermore, because of the nature of the allegations\nagainst Epstein, the filing of such potential charges against Epstein still remains temporally\nviable; charges for such sexual activities involving minors are not barred by the applicable\n\nThe United States Attorney also offered to confer with Jane Doe #2, but Jane Doe #2\ndeclined the invitation and did not attend the meeting that was scheduled with the United States\nAttorney.\n'\n\n8 Since that time, the USAO-SDFL has been recused by the Department of Justice from\nprospective responsibility for any criminal investigation or potential prosecution relating to\n... [truncated, 2399 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/8 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=8]", "char_count": 2399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:006€81):46c1KAAII9DrgiNent49(5-121enWed iribiat@t/tidkfiet\n20\n\n49102f image 10 of\n\nstatutes of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3283, 3299. Petitioners arc free to contact the United\nStates Attorney's Office in those districts and seek to confer with government attorneys in those\noffices about investigating and potentially prosecuting Epstein based on the alleged federal\ncrimes committed against them.9\nPetitioners nonetheless have appeared to contend throughout these proceedings that the\nmany opportunities that they have been given to consult with the attorneys for the government\nabout Epstein's offenses and the potential charges against Epstein — opportunities which continue\nto be available to Petitioners — are not meaningful under the CVRA due to the existence of the\nNon-Prosecution Agreement. According to Petitioners, the Non-Prosecution Agreement has\ngiven Epstein a \"free pass\" on federal criminal charges for the offenses he committed against\nPetitioners and others. See, e.g., DE 9 at 15 (characterizing Non-Prosecution Agreement as \"a\n'free pass' from the federal government\"), 2 (contending that the Non-Prosecution Agreement\n\"allowed [Epstein] ... to escape all federal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses\nagainst minors\"), 7 (\"the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment\"), 12 (\"[T]he\nagreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses.\"); DE 77 at\n2 (describing Non-Prosecution Agreement as \"an agreement that blocked federal prosecution of\nEpstein for the multitude of sex offenses he committed again [sic] the victims\"), 17 (\"The [Non-\n\nThe USAO-SDFL has no present knowledge about whether the United States Attorney's\nOffices in those districts have opened any investigations into the allegations that have been made\nagainst Epstein, whether those offices are even aware of those allegations or the evidence\nsupporting them, or what investigative or prosecutorial actions, if any, those offices might take \n... [truncated, 2301 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/9 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=9]", "char_count": 2301}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:0“603MecRA0119OtRinent4941EneEhcePed driliatgt/tidiPet dt112O41C31 image 11 of\n20\n\nProsecution Agreement] barred prosecution of the federal sexual offenses that Epstein had\ncommitted against Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 ... .\").10 That is simply not so.\nContrary to Petitioners' contentions, there has been no disposition by the government of\nany federal criminal charges against Epstein. No federal charges involving Petitioners have ever\nbeen brought against Epstein, and no such federal charges have been resolved. The NonProsecution Agreement about which Petitioners complain disposes of no federal criminal\ncharges against Epstein, and that agreement does not bar the United States from bringing federal\ncriminal charges against Epstein. Instead, when addressing potential federal criminal charges\nagainst Epstein, the USAO-SDFL merely agreed in the Non-Prosecution Agreement that:\non the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred\nin favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the\nfollowing conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth below.\nand that\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no\nprosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any\nother offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal\nBureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses\nthat arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this\nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed.\nNon-Prosecution Agreement at 2 (emphasis added).\nThus, the Non-Prosecution Agreement simply obligated the government not to prosecute\nEpstein in the Southern District of Florida for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution\n\nI° This Court has also previously described the Non-Prosecution Agree\n... [truncated, 2582 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/10 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=10]", "char_count": 2582}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:0“0€81):AfecKAP09OMARentillisiDeetkged irillat@t/tAgRet\n\nnl.4 image 12 of\n\n20\n\nAgreement. The Non-Prosecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing\nfederal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution\nAgreement in any other district in the nation!' See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678,\n680 (5th Cir. 1979) (\"Where . . . the prosecutor is not found to have made promises relating to\nnonprosecution of charges in another district and the [defendant] is not found to have relied on\nsuch alleged promises, this Court will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss the\nsubsequent prosecutions.\"). Neither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar prosecution in any\ndistrict for offenses not identified in the agreement.\nPetitioners contend that the CVRA gives a victim the right to confer with the attorney for\nthe government before there is a disposition of contemplated, but-not-yet-filed federal criminal\ncharges arising from offenses against the victim. But, although the government disputes that the\nCVRA creates such a right,\" the Petitioners have never been denied any such right. The\nPetitioners have had and still have the ability confer to with the attorney for the government\nabout potential federal criminal charges against Epstein and about the potential disposition of\nany such charges, should they be filed. In fact, Petitioners are free to approach the United States\nAttorney's Offices in districts such as the Southern District of New York and the District of New\nJersey — whose authority to institute criminal charges against Epstein in their districts has not\nII Significantly, under the governing provision of the United States Attorney's Manual, the\nUSAO-SDFL did not have the authority to unilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in any other\ndistrict in the country:\nNo district or division shall make any agreement, including any agreement not to\nprosecute, which purports to bind any other district\n... [truncated, 2530 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/11 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=11]", "char_count": 2530}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:0c46€84MbicKAP09athiVilent4O9-iirleEfifePed ciriketgeltlegRet CFNI2106,14 115age 13 of\n20\n\nbeen curtailed by the Non-Prosecution Agreement — to discuss the possibility of pursuing federal\n•\ncriminal charges against Epstem.\n13 Nothing precludes Petitioners from doing so, and there is\n\nnothing to indicate that Petitioners' wishes to confer with government attorneys in those districts\nwould be rebuffed in any way. Indeed, it would be rank speculation by Petitioners to contend\notherwise.\nHere, Petitioners have acknowledged that the best relief they can hope to obtain through\nthese proceedings is the ability to confer with the attorneys for the government. See, e.g., July\nII, 2008 Hr'g Tr. at 7 (agreeing that \"the best [Petitioners] can get\" is the \"right to confer\").\nYet, under the circumstances, a claim that Petitioners have been denied the opportunity to confer\nwith the attorney for the government about the filing and disposition of criminal charges against\nEpstein is premature and constitutionally unripe. \"This is plainly the type of hypothetical case\nthat [a court] should avoid deciding.\" Association for Childrenfor Enforcement ofSupport, Inc.\nv. Conger, 899 F.2d 1164, 1166 (11th Cir. 1990). Any speculation by Petitioners that they might\nprospectively be denied the opportunity to confer with the government about still-legally-viable\nfederal charges against Epstein simply cannot ripen Petitioners' claims. See id. (recognizing that\ncourts \"do not generally decide cases based on a party's predicted conduct\").\nFor these reasons, Petitioners' claims in these proceedings should be dismissed for lack\nof subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Jacks, 642 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011)\n(holding that claims that are \"based on events that may take place in the future\" are to be\n\"dismissed for lack of jurisdiction\") (citing Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City ofAlabaster, 881 F.2d 1570,\n1574 n.7 (1I th Cir. 1989) (\"[R]ipeness goes to whether the district court had subject m\n... [truncated, 2406 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02824167/12 or ?id=EFTA02824167&page=12]", "char_count": 2406}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:0t140€80293cr,APPOrgiNentraymneetk?ed ifiliPt9t/t1d1Ret ISSimletlifsage 14 of\n20\n\njurisdiction to hear the case.\")); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1415 (11th Cir. 1994)\n(\"The question of ripeness 'goes to whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.')\n(quoting Greenbriar, 881 F.2d at 1573); see also Jacksonville Property Rights Ass'n, Inc. v. City\nof Jacksonville, 635 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that when plaintiffs ask a\ncourt \"to issue a declaration on an issue that might never impact their substantive rights,\" they\nare \"asking th[e] court either to issue an impermissible advisory opinion, or to decide a case that\nis not yet ripe for decision\"), reh'g & reh'g en bane denied, Case No. 09-15629,\n\nFed. App'x\n\n(11th Cir. Jun. 29, 2011) (Table).\nConclusion\nFor the reasons set forth above, the United States respectfully requests that this Court\nenter an order dismissing the Petitioners' claims and these proceedings for lack of subject matter\njurisdiction.\n\n13\n\nEFTA02824180\n\n", "char_count": 1031}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02824167", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:0ctle€8Micitfilli*VdiViient4OWEneEibifePed irilinatltidifiet ~164\n20\n\nimage 15 of\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nWIFREDO A. FERRER\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\nBy:\nDexter A. Lee\nAssistant United States Attorney\nFlorida Bar No. 0936693\n99 N.E. 4th Street\nMiami, Florida 33132\nTel: (305) 961-9320; Fax: (305) 530-7139\nEmail: dexter.lee@usdoj.gov\nEduardo 1.\nAssistant United States Attorney\nFlorida Bar No. 877875\n99 N.E. 4th Street\nMiami, Florida 33132\nTel: (305) 961-9057; Fax: (305) 536-4676\nEmail:\nVillafafla\nA.\nAssistant United States Attorney\nFlorida Bar No. 0018255\n500 S. Australian Avenue, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\nTel: (561) 820-8711; Fax: (561) 820-8777\nEmail:\nAttorneys for Respondent\n\n1.4\n\nEFTA02824181\n\n", "char_count": 720}]}