{"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_count": 9, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822461", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822461.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE sITEIUOR COURT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\n\nFILED\n\nJanuary 16. 2024 11:47 AM\n\nST-2020-CV-00155\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nDIVISION OF ST.\nAND ST. JOHN\n*********************************\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF\nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF\nTHE ESTATE OF JEFFREY K ESTEIN,\nand NES, LLC, a New York Limited\nLiability Company,\n\nCIVIL NO: ST-20-CV-155\nCOMPLEX\n\nDefendants.\n\nCO-EXECUTORS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO\nDISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY. COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO APPEAR PRO SE\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and through their undersigned\ncounsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and\non behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC (\"NES\"), an entity administered in probate by the CoExecutors as part of the Estate (collectively, \"Defendants\"), respectfully submit this reply in\nsupport of their supplemental motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, or alternatively, to\ncompel Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell (\"Maxwell\") to appear pro se.\nBACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nAlmost four years ago, Maxwell initiated this action, seeking contractual and common law\nindemnification of attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in connection with her criminal\nprosecution in the Southern District of New York. Subsequently, Defendants moved to dismiss\n\nEFTA02822461\n\n", "char_count": 1518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Procedure 12(6)(6) (hereinafter, the \"Rule 12(bX6) Motion\").\nIn their Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, Defendants argued that (1) NES's operating agreement bars\nMaxwell's claims; (2) the lawsuits for which Maxwell seeks indemnification are not related to her\nperformance of legitimate, employment-related duties on behalf of Epstein or his affiliated entities;\nand (3) Maxwell's criminal conviction precludes her indemnification claims as a matter of public\npolicy. That Motion has been fully briefed and pending before this Court since August 2022.\nIn September 2022, the Court stayed these proceedings to allow Maxwell to secure new\nrepresentation after her attorney withdrew. Six months later, in March 2023, Maxwell still had\nnot engaged new counsel and the Court granted her an additional 60 days to do so. Again, Maxwell\ndid not engage new counsel.\nHaving received no indication from Maxwell that she had retained new counsel or intended\nto proceed pro se, on September 19, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 41(b) for\nfailure to prosecute, or alternatively, to compel Maxwell to appear pro se (hereinafter, the \"Rule\n41(b) Motion\"). But on October 3, 2023, the Court docketed a filing from Maxwell—apparently\ndated May 16, 2023—in response to the Court's March 2023 order.' In that filing, Maxwell sought\nan additional 180 days to secure new counsel and requested yet another stay during the pendency\nof the appeal of her criminal conviction. Defendants opposed a stay on October 31, 2023.\nOn December 22, 2023, the Court received Maxwell's opposition to Defendants' Rule\n41(b) Motion.' In her opposition, Maxwell indicated that she still has not secured counsel and\n\nWhile the Court docketed Maxwell's filing on October 3, 2023, Maxwell did not serve\nDefendants with a copy. Defendants did not receive a copy until October 17, 2023, when the Court\nalerted Defendants of the filing.\n2\n\nAgain, Maxwell failed to serve Defendants with a copy of her opposition brief.\n2\n\nEFTA02822462\n\n", "char_count": 2023}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "repeated her request to continue the stay while she seeks counsel. Additionally, she presented\nseveral substantive arguments in relation to Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.\nMaxwell's stalling must end. As with her May 16, 2023 filing, Maxwell's opposition sets\nforth no new grounds or good cause for continuing the stay in this matter. Further, Maxwell's\narguments as to the merits of Defendants' Rule 12(6)(6) Motion should be rejected—indeed, each\nofMaxwell's substantive arguments here merely parrot her prior briefing on the long-pending Rule\n12(b)(6) Motion and are no more convincing today than they were more than a year ago.\nAccordingly, Defendants respectfully submit that the Court should lift the stay and address\nDefendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.\nARGUMENT\nMaxwell's most recent filing is yet another attempt to delay these proceedings—an attempt\nthe Court should decline to entertain. While Defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion was premised in part\non Maxwell's perceived disregard of the Court's March 2023 Order—which Maxwell apparently\ndid respond to in May 2023, but just failed to serve Defendants—the fact remains that this case\nhas lain dormant for well over a year and Maxwell is no closer to finding new counsel. Under the\ncircumstances, Defendants respectfully request that the Court lift the stay and address Defendants'\npending Rule 12(b)(6) Motion at its earliest convenience.\nMoreover, Maxwell's arguments opposing Defendants' Rule 12(6)(6) motion have already\nbeen briefed by her then-counsel and presented to the Court, further militating in favor of lifting\nthe stay and ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Indeed, Maxwell repeats the arguments made in\nher prior briefing, specifically that (1) Virgin Islands' public policy does not bar her\nindemnification claims; (2) Defendants' supposed unclean hands bar them from asserting a public\npolicy defense; (3)Epstein intended to indemnify her for her criminal conduct; and (4) her criminal\n\n3\n\nEFTA02822463\n\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "conviction is not dispositive of her claims. Opp'n Br. at 3-7. Each of these arguments lacks merit,\nas outlined in Defendants' prior briefing.\n\nFirst, Virgin Islands' public policy prohibits\n\nindemnification for those who have engaged in intentional criminal conduct. Second, the doctrine\nof unclean hands has no application to Defendants' public policy defense. Third, the language of\nNES's Operating Agreement plainly demonstrates that there was no intent to indemnify Maxwell\nfor her intentional criminal conduct. Finally, Maxwell's criminal conviction is one of several\nreasons to dismiss her claims. There is no continuing reason to stay this action; respectfully, the\nCourt should now consider and grant Defendants' pending Rule 12(bX6) Motion.\nI.\n\nThe Stay Should Be Lifted.\nThere is no reasonable basis to further delay this matter. Though Maxwell once again\n\nrequests more time to secure new counsel, she fails to offer any new grounds or good cause to\nsupport such a request. The Court has granted Maxwell ample time to find new counsel, but she\nhas been unable to do so. The Court should decline to entertain additional requests from Maxwell.\nAnd though Maxwell is unrepresented, this does not excuse her from diligently prosecuting her\nclaims in accordance with the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure.\n\nv. Herbert, 69 V.I.\n\n963, 697 (V.I. 2018) (\"Although we have traditionally given pro se litigants greater leeway where\nthey have not followed the technical rules of pleading and procedure, self-representation is not a\nlicense excusing compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.\") (cleaned up).\nIndeed, as detailed in Defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion, Maxwell's failure to abide by the rules of\nprocedure—specifically, Rule 41(b)—is prejudicial to Defendants. As each day passes, evidence\ncould be lost, memories will fade, and witnesses may become unavailable, making it all the more\ndifficult for Defendants to refute Maxwell's claims. Further, though other matters remain open,\nthe Estate cannot complete its probate proceedings and bring the Estate to a close while this\nindemnification matter remains pending. Thus, any further requests for a stay should be denied.\n4\n\nEFTA02822464\n\n", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Moreover, as Maxwell indicates in her opposition, she will \"continue to appear\" in this\nmatter pro se. Maxwell has now indicated her willingness to proceed pro se twice—in her May\n16 filing and the most recent opposition—and that status does not justify any further delay of the\nCourt's consideration of Defendants' Rule 12(bX6) Motion. That Motion was briefed by all parties\nwhen Maxwell was still represented by counsel. Whether Maxwell is able to obtain counsel or not\nshould have no effect on the Court's consideration of the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. Accordingly,\nDefendants respectfully submit that the Court should lift the stay.\nII.\n\nMaxwell's Substantive Arguments Are Meritless.\nIn her most recent opposition, Maxwell offers several substantive arguments in opposition\n\nto Defendants' Rule I2(b)(6) Motion—all of which have been addressed previously and lack merit.\nFirst, Maxwell falsely contends that public policy does not bar her contractual and common\nlaw indemnity claims. She notes that Virgin Islands common law recognizes a right of indemnity\nas between two tortfeasors, and that Virgin Islands statutes permit indemnification for corporate\nofficers and employees who engage in criminal conduct on behalf of the corporation. See Opp'n\nBr. at 3. But common law indemnity is an equitable remedy, and such a remedy is barred where\nthe claimant has been convicted of intentional criminal conduct as is the case here. See, e.g., Cruse\nv. Callwood, 55 V.I. 999, 1003 (D.V.I. 2010) (parties to a pyramid scheme cannot recover on a\ntheory of restitution when they were aware of the nature of the scheme); Willie v. Amerada Hess\nCorp., 66 V.I. 23, 92 (Super. Ct. V.I. 2017) (Virgin Islands recognizes common law\nindemnification \"where an innocent party is held vicariously liable for the actions of the true\ntortfeasor\") (emphasis in original).\n\nSimilarly, Virgin Islands statutory law permitting\n\nindemnification for criminal acts requires the claimant to have acted (1) in good faith and (2)\nwithout reasonable cause to believe her conduct was unlawful. See 13 V.I.C. § 67a. Maxwell does\nnot even attempt to explain how she meets these requirements, nor could she. She was convicted\n5\n\nEFTA02822465\n\n", "char_count": 2208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "of several offenses related to her intentional criminal misconduct. As Judge Alison Nathan\nreflected at her sentencing, Maxwell \"was instrumental in the abuse of several underage girls,\"\nand is now being \"punished for the role that she played.\"3 The law is clear: public policy bars\nindemnification for a claimant's intentional criminal wrongdoing. Such is the case here.\nSecond, Maxwell argues that the doctrine of unclean hands estops Defendants from raising\na public policy defense.\n\nHowever, it is Maxwell who is seeking an equitable remedy\n\n(indemnification) for her intentional wrongdoing—not Defendants. Additionally, the assertion of\nunclean hands requires that the individual's alleged wrongful conduct bear relation to the\ntransaction at issue, here, Maxwell's indemnification. See In re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517,\n523 (3d Cir. 1999). But Maxwell fails to identify any purported wrongdoing by Defendants in\nrelation to her indemnification claims. Thus, the doctrine of unclean hands does not preclude\nDefendants' public policy defense.\nThird, Maxwell argues that Epstein's conduct prior to his death, specifically negotiation of\na non-prosecution agreement, and the Estate's assumed indemnification of others support a finding\nthat Epstein intended to \"indemnify employees and [his] co-conspirators.\" Opp'n Br. at 6.\nHowever, the NES Operating Agreement expressly prohibits indemnification for claims that are\n\"the result of... reckless or intentional misconduct.\" Given this unambiguous language, Maxwell\ncannot be indemnified for her intentional criminal misconduct. See Matter of Carpe Diem 1969\nLLC, No. 2017-56, 2019 WL 3413841, at *5 (D.V.I. July 29, 2019) (\"[C]ourts assume that the\nintent of the parties to an instrument is embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear\n\n3 Transcript at 89:8-25, USA v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-00330 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2022), ECF No.\n\n779.\n6\n\nEFTA02822466\n\n", "char_count": 1923}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement.\")\n(cleaned up).\nFourth, Maxwell wrongly asserts that her conviction does \"not conclusively establish any\nissue presented here\" and is \"not dispositive\" of her indemnification claims. Br. at 7. Though\nMaxwell's conviction is currently on appeal,' there are other bases set forth in the Rule 12(6)(6)\nMotion that independently support dismissal of her claims, including that the lawsuits for which\nMaxwell seeks indemnification are not related to her performance of legitimate, employmentrelated duties on behalf of Epstein or his affiliated entities. Accordingly, there is no need to await\nthe outcome of Maxwell's appeal. In sum, Maxwell's substantive arguments in opposition to\nDefendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion are meritless and should be rejected.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Rule 41(b) Motion. lift the stay. and\ngrant the pending Rule 12(bX6) Motion.\nRespectfully,\nDated: January 16, 2024\n\n/s/\n\nKroblin\nKROBLIN, ESQ.\nSHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ\nV.I. Bar Nos. 966 & 1221\nKELLERHALS\nKROBLIN PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\n9053 Estate •\nSuite 101\n, V.I. 00802\nSt.\nTelephone: (340) 779-2564\nEmail: ckroblin@kellfer.com\nsdandrade@kellfencom\n\nAs discussed in Defendants' prior briefing, the Court should decline to stay these proceedings\nduring the pendency ofMaxwell's criminal appeal. The appeal has not yet been scheduled for oral\nargument, see Appeal No. 22-1426 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 2023), ECF No. 90, and as described above,\nfurther delay in this matter is prejudicial to Defendants' ability to refute Maxwell's claims or\nadminister the Estate.\n7\n\nEFTA02822467\n\n", "char_count": 1693}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Counsel for Executor Darren K. Indyke, the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein, and NES, LLC\n\nDated January 16, 2024\n\n/s/ Daniel H. Weiner\nDANIEL H. WEINER\nV.I. Bar No. PHV4223\nHUGHES HUBBARD &\nLLP\nOne Battery Park Plaza\nNew York, New York 10004\nTelephone: (212) 837-6460\nFacsimile: (212) 299-6460\ndaniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com\nCounsel for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein\n\nDated January 16, 2024\n\n/s/\n\nDated January 16, 2024\n\n/s/ Daniel S. Ruzumna\nDANIEL S. RUZUMNA, ESQ.\nV.I. Bar No. PHV4357\nPatterson Belknap\n& Taylor, LLP\n1133 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, New York 10583\nTelephone: (212) 336-2034\nEmail: druzumna@pbwt.com\nCounsel for Executor Richard D. Kahn\n\nC. Rhea\nC. RHEA, ESQ.\nVI Bar No. 220\nC. Rhea, PC\n1533 Appling Drive\nMount Pleasant, SC 29464\nTelephone: 340-244-8768\ngrhea@rpwb.com\nCounsel for Executor Richard D. Kahn\n\n8\n\nEFTA02822468\n\n", "char_count": 850}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822461", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 16, 2024, I will cause a true and exact copy of the\nforegoing Co-Executors' Reply in Support of Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, or\nAlternatively, Compel Plaintiff to Appear Pro Se, which complies with the page or word\nlimitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), to be served via Certified Mail return receipt requested upon:\n\nMs. Ghislaine Maxwell\nRegister Number 02879-509\nFCI Tallahassee\nP O Box 5000\nTallahassee FL 32314\n\n/s/\n\nKroblin\n\n9\n\nEFTA02822469\n\n", "char_count": 505}]}