{"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_count": 12, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822421", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822421.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE SITEIUOR COURT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISIANDS\n\nFILED\n\nSepterbeT 19, 2023 08:20 n\n51-2020-CV-00155\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nAND ST. JOHN\nDIVISION OF ST.\n\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\n*********************************\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF\nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF\nTHE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. ESTEIN,\nand NES, LLC, a New York Limited\nLiability Company,\n\nCIVIL NO: ST-20-CV-155\nCOMPLEX\n\nDefendants.\n\nCO-EXECUTORS'MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE OR,\nALTERNATIVELY, TO COMPEL HER TO APPEAR PRO SE\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and through their undersigned\ncounsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and\non behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC (\"NES\"), an entity administered in probate by the CoExecutors as part of the Estate (collectively, \"Defendants\"), respectfully submit this motion to\ndismiss for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), or\nalternatively to compel Plaintiff to appear pro se so that the action may proceed so that the pending\nmotion to dismiss can be adjudicated.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n14411959\n\nEFTA02822421\n\n", "char_count": 1310}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Plaintiff Ghislaine Maxwell (\"Maxwell\") brings this action against Defendants seeking\ncommon law and contractual indemnification for attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in\nunsuccessfully defending herself in a criminal prosecution brought in the Southern District of New\nYork. On September 7, 2022, the Court permitted Maxwell's counsel to withdraw and ordered\nMaxwell to obtain new counsel within 60 days, and entered a stay of the proceedings. Maxwell\ndid not obtain new counsel within the designated period, nor in the following four months. At a\nhearing on March 17, 2023, Maxwell was again ordered to obtain new counsel within 60 days, but\nagain failed to do so then or in the months following. Despite the Court's order and despite that\nshe, as the plaintiff, initiated this action, Maxwell has not obtained new counsel and has not entered\nher appearance pro se. Her refusal to follow court orders and to prosecute this case warrants\ndismissal pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Procedure 41(b). Specifically, under the factors\narticulated by the Virgin Islands Supreme Court in Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53 V.I.\n505, 510 (V.I. 2010), the Court should dismiss Maxwell's claim because: (1) Maxwell is\npersonally responsible for obtaining counsel in this matter, (2) Defendants are prejudiced by\nMaxwell's dilatory conduct as it has stalled this action for over a year; (3) Maxwell has a history\nof dilatory conduct as she has now disregarded two Court orders; (4) Maxwell's conduct is willful\nas she is aware of the Court's orders and has neither followed them nor, if she cannot afford new\ncounsel, appeared pro se; (5) dismissal is an appropriate sanction; and (6) Maxwell's\nindemnification claims fail on their face. Thus, for the reasons set forth in this brief, the Court\nshould dismiss the Complaint under Rule 41(b) or order her to appear pro se within 30 days so that\nthe case may proceed.\nBACKGROUND\n\n2\n\nEFTA02822422\n\n", "char_count": 1951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "On March 12, 2020, Maxwell instituted this action against the Estate and NES, seeking\ncontractual and common law indemnification of attorneys' fees and other costs incurred as a result\nofher criminal prosecution in the Southern District ofNew York. Maxwell alleges that these costs\nwere incurred \"by reason of her prior employment relationship with Jeffrey E. Epstein and his\naffiliated businesses.\" Compl. ¶ 1. On May 1, 2020, the Estate and NES moved to dismiss\nMaxwell's complaint pursuant to Virgin Islands Rule of Civil Procedure 12(6)(6) because (I)\nMaxwell's claim against the Co-Executors was premature; and (2) Maxwell's indemnification\nclaims are barred by NES's 2014 operating agreement. On June I, 2020, the parties jointly moved\nfor a stay of the action until the statutory one-year waiting period elapsed on September 7, 2020.\nThe Court granted the parties' motion, and a stay was entered. The stay was lifted on September\n8, 2020, and Maxwell filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss. On September 11, 2020, the\nCo-Executors of the Estate formally rejected Maxwell's claim for indemnification. Subsequently,\nDefendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss, arguing that Maxwell's claims for\nindemnification were unripe until judgments were rendered in the civil and criminal actions\npending against her in New York, as indemnity would not apply if judgment were rendered against\nher.\nOn December 29, 2021, a jury found Maxwell guilty of multiple crimes, including\nconspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of\na minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of an individual under\nthe age of eighteen. U.S. District Judge Alison Nathan sentenced Maxwell to 20 years in prison\nfollowed by five years of supervised release, and ordered Maxwell to pay a fine of $750,000 for\n\n3\n\nEFTA02822423\n\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "these offenses.' During the sentencing proceeding, Judge Nathan rejected Maxwell's argument\nthat she was being punished for Epstein's actions, stating that the evidence at trial established that\nMaxwell \"was instrumental in the abuse of several underage girls,\" and that Maxwell was \"not\npunished in place of Epstein . . . Ms. Maxwell is being punished for the role that she played.\"'\nOn July 1, 2022, the Court requested additional briefing on the Defendants' motion to\ndismiss the complaint in this action. Specifically, the Court sought further briefing on the\nDefendants' argument that Maxwell's common law and contractual indemnification claims were\nbarred by public policy in light of her criminal convictions. In accordance with the Court's order,\nDefendants further briefed the issue, and Maxwell filed a response. Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6)\nmotion to dismiss remains pending before this Court.\nSubsequently, Maxwell's attorney moved to withdraw as counsel from this proceeding.\nThe Court granted the motion on September 7, 2022, ordered Maxwell to obtain new counsel\nwithin 60 days, and entered a stay. Maxwell failed to comply with the Court's order. At a hearing\non March 17, 2023, Maxwell was again ordered to obtain new counsel within 60 days. She has\nagain failed to do so. Maxwell's failure to comply with the Court's orders warrants dismissal\npursuant to Rule 41(b) or, at a minimum, the issuance of an order compelling her to appear pro se\nso that the motion to dismiss can be resolved.\n\nI See Judgment, USA v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-00330 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2022), ECF No. 696.\nJudge Nathan dismissed two of five counts for which the jury found Maxwell guilty as\nmultiplicative, and the Government agreed to dismiss two perjury counts against Maxwell that\nJudge Nathan previously severed from the determination of the counts considered by the jury. Id.\n2 Transcript at 89:8-25, USA v. Maxwell, No. 20-CR-00330 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2022), ECF No.\n\n779.\n4\n\nEFTA02822424\n\n", "char_count": 1980}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "ARGUMENT\nMaxwell's counsel withdrew from his representation over one year ago, and since that time,\nthis case has lain dormant. Though the Court has granted her ample time to find new counsel and\nordered her to do so, Maxwell has not done so. Additionally, to the extent Maxwell is unable to\nretain new counsel, nothing precludes her from litigating her claims pro se, but she has thus far\ndeclined to do so. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Maxwell's Complaint pursuant to Rule\n41(b).\nUnder Rule 41(b), dismissal is warranted if the \"plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply\nwith these rules or a court order.\" In weighing dismissal under Rule 41(b), the trial court considers\nsix factors: \"(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary\ncaused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of\ndilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the\neffectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions;\nand (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.\" Halliday v. Footlocker Specialty, Inc., 53\nV.I. 505, 510 (V.I. 2010). The court does not have to conclude that all six factors weigh against\nthe opposing party in order to find that dismissal is warranted. Nolasco Comms., Inc. v. Bonneville\nGrp. V.I. Corp., No. SX-15-CV-0220, 2019 WL 937584, at *1 (V.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019).\nHere, all six factors weigh in favor of dismissal: (1) Maxwell is personally responsible for\nobtaining counsel in this matter or, if she lacks the resources to do so, entering an appearance pro\nse; (2) Defendants are prejudiced by Maxwell's dilatory conduct as it has stalled this action for\nover a year; (3) Maxwell has a history of dilatory conduct in that she has now disregarded two of\nthe Court's orders; (4) Maxwell's conduct is willful as she is aware of the Court's orders and\ndisregarded them; (5) dismissal is an appropr\n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822421/4 or ?id=EFTA02822421&page=4]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Maxwell's indemnification claims fail on their face. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss\nMaxwell's Complaint.\n1. Maxwell Is Personally Responsible for Obtaining Counsel or Appearing Pro Se.\nAs a litigant, Maxwell is responsible for retaining her own counsel or, if she is without the\nmeans to engage counsel, to move forward on a pro se basis. Where the plaintiff is personally\nresponsible for failing to comply with a Court order rather than her attorney, this factor weighs in\nfavor of dismissal. Carroll v. Sharkey, No. ST-18-CV-212, 2020 WL 8457889, at *2 (V.I. Super.\nCt. Jan. 21, 2020); Nolasco Comm., Inc., 2019 WL 937584, at *2. There is no question that\nMaxwell is ultimately responsible for securing representation in this matter. Additionally, as\nevidenced by the docketed notice of receipt and her presence at the March 17, 2023 hearing,\nMaxwell is aware of her previous counsel's withdrawal and the Court's orders directing her to\nobtain new counsel. Nonetheless, she has failed to comply and has made no attempt to appear pro\nse.' Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.\n2. Defendants Are Prejudiced by Maxwell's Dilatory Conduct.\nMaxwell's dilatory conduct is prejudicial to Defendants. \"Prejudice to the opposing party\nis generally demonstrated by either increased expense to the opposing party arising from the extra\ncosts associated with filings responding to dilatory behavior or increased difficulty in the opposing\nparties' ability to present or defend their claim(s) due to the improper behavior.\" Hassan v.\nBrian/Bryan =,\n\nNo. SX-2017-CV-302, 2023 WL 3246697, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. May 1,\n\n3 The Rules make clear that Maxwell is responsible for informing the Court whether she wishes to\nproceed pro se. Rule 3-1(c) provides that if a party's representation changes, either by obtaining\nnew counsel or proceeding on a pro se basis, the party \"is personally responsible\" for alerting the\ncourt when such changes occur by filing a notice with updated contact informatio\n... [truncated, 2185 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822421/5 or ?id=EFTA02822421&page=5]", "char_count": 2185}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "2023) (quoting Molloy v. Independence Blue Cross, 56 V.I. 155, 189 (V.I. 2012)). Here,\nMaxwell's failure to follow the Court's orders and either retain new counsel or appear pro se has\nresulted in a one-year delay in this matter. Maxwell's claims arise from events that occurred dating\nback to 2009. See Compl. ¶ 19. As time passes, evidence could be lost, memories will fade, and\nwitnesses may become unavailable. If Maxwell is permitted to further delay this case, it will make\nit more difficult for Defendants to refute her claims. Moreover, Defendants, as Co-Executors to\nthe Estate, are seeking to complete probate and to bring the Estate to a close. While this matter\nremains pending, the Co-Executors are barred from doing so. As such, this factor weighs in favor\nof dismissal.\n3. Maxwell Has a History of Dilatoriness.\nMaxwell has a history of dilatoriness as evidenced by her two-time failure to comply with\nthe Court's orders. Indeed, where a litigant has failed to respond to multiple court orders, courts\nhave concluded there is a history of dilatoriness that warrants dismissal. Carroll, 2020 WL\n8457889, at *3. Maxwell has now disregarded two court orders and has taken no action to\nprosecute her claim since September 2022. As a result, this case has been stagnant for more than\na year. Therefore, Maxwell's history of dilatory conduct warrants dismissal.\n4. Maxwell's Conduct is Willful.\nMaxwell's failure to comply with the Court's orders is willful, which weighs in favor of\ndismissal. Willful or bad faith conduct is \"deliberate and contumacious.\" Nolasco Comms. Inc.,\n2019 WL 937584, at *2. As discussed, Maxwell is aware of the Court's orders and has not\ncomplied, requested additional time to comply, or taken any steps to appear pro se.\n\nThis\n\ndemonstrates that her failure to comply with the Court's orders is willful. See Carroll, 2020 WL\n8457889, at *3 (finding that the plaintiff's conduct was willful where the plaintiff failed to retain\n7\n\nEFTA02822427\n\n", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "new counsel or appear pro se seven months after being ordered to do so). Even if her failure to\nobtain new counsel is due to her incarceration, nothing prevents Maxwell from entering an\nappearance and litigating her claims pro se. See id.;\n\nv.\n\n, 14 V.I. 466, 471 (D.V.I.\n\n1977) (noting that individuals have a constitutional right to represent themselves). Nonetheless,\nshe has not done so and has instead disregarded the Court's orders and let her action languish at\nthe expense of Defendants. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.\n5. Dismissal Is an Appropriate Sanction for Maxwell's Failure to Comply with the\nCourt's Orders.\nDismissal is an appropriate sanction for Maxwell's failure to comply with the Court orders\nbecause alternative sanctions would not be effective in this matter. Alternate sanctions typically\nconsidered by courts include \"excluding evidence, precluding witnesses, striking portions of the\npleadings, or imposing monetary sanctions.\" Hassan, 2023 WL 3246697, at *3. However, where\nthere is \"a lack[] of clear interest on Plaintiff's part to pursue [her] case,\" other sanctions are not\nappropriate, and dismissal is warranted. Id.; see also\n\nv. Gov't of the V.I., No. 2007-35,\n\n2011 WL 2650637, at *4 (D.V.I. July 6, 2011) (\"Where as here, a party, rather than an attorney,\nis the cause of undue delay, alternative sanctions often prove unsuccessful.\"). Here, Maxwell has\nbeen granted ample time to retain new counsel or to prosecute her claim pro se. Her failure to do\nso demonstrates a lack of interest on her part to pursue her claims. Accordingly, this factor weighs\nin favor of dismissal.\n6. Maxwell's Contractual and Common Law Indemnification Claims Fail on the\nMerits.\nFinally, because Maxwell's common law and contractual indemnification claims are not\nviable, her Complaint should be dismissed. \"A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious\nwhen the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or\n8\n\nEFT\n... [truncated, 2011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822421/7 or ?id=EFTA02822421&page=7]", "char_count": 2011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "would constitute a complete defense.\" Hassan, 2023 WL 3246697, at *4.\n\nAs briefed in\n\nDefendants' Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, both\ncontractual and common law indemnification for individuals convicted of intentional criminal\nconduct violates public policy because it would promote illegality and allow wrongdoers to cause\ninjury with impunity. Courts across the country routinely hold that contractual indemnification\nfor those found guilty of intentional criminal acts is unenforceable as against public policy. See,\ne.g., Homesite Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Frost, No. CV 20-00024-M-DLC, 2020 WL 5369847, at\n*5 (D. Mont. Sept. 8, 2020) (\"in Montana there is an unmistakable public policy against . . .\nindemnification for criminal acts.\"); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT,\n2019 BL 223294, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Jun. 14, 2019) (\"if the Plaintiff is ultimately found to have been\ncriminally negligent, then public policy would preclude indemnification.\"); Utica First Ins. Co. v.\nMaclean, No. CIV.A. 08-1138, 2009 WL 415988, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2009) (\"[r]equiring an\ninsurance company to defend or indemnify its insured for . . . criminal acts would also violate\npublic policy in Pennsylvania.'); BDO Seidman, LLP v. Harris, 379 III. App. 3d 918, 925 (III.\nApp. Ct. 2008) (\"[t]aken together, the stipulation of facts pursuant to the PTD agreement shows\nthat plaintiff engaged in conduct which constituted misprision of felony by knowingly concealing\nthe felony fraud of its client, SBU. Under New York public policy. . . indemnification for such\ncriminal conduct is barred by public policy.\"); Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 750 (Colo.\nApp. 2002) (\"[p]ublic policy prohibits indemnifying a party for damages resulting from intentional\nor willful wrongful acts.\") (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 8\n(\"a contract or bond by which one party undertakes to indemnify the other against t\n... [truncated, 2196 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822421/8 or ?id=EFTA02822421&page=8]", "char_count": 2196}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Additionally, the public policy concerns that bar enforcement of contractual\nindemnification for those convicted of intentional criminal acts apply with equal force to common\nlaw indemnification claims or indemnification based on promissory estoppel. Both of these are\nequitable doctrines. See, e.g., Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.I. 23, 46 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2017)\n(\"[t]he right to indemnity . . . is a common law equitable remedy . . . .\"); Appleton v. Harrigan,\nNo. ST-10-CV-275, 2012 WL 13219651, at •5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012) (\"[I]ike a claim of\nunjust enrichment, promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy.\"). Equity does not condone a\ncriminal actor receiving financial immunity from the consequences of her crimes. Indemnification\nbased on either promissory estoppel or common law is not viable (and violates public policy)\nwhere, as here, the indemnitee has been convicted of an intentional criminal act. Courts cannot\nenforce a judgment upholding a[n] agreement in law or in equity that is against public policy.\"\nCruse v. Cawood, 55 V.I. 999, 1003 (D.V.I. 2010) (parties to a pyramid scheme cannot recover\non a theory of restitution when they were aware of the nature of the scheme); see also, e.g., Willie,\n66 V.I. at 92 (Virgin Islands recognizes common law indemnification \"where an innocent party is\nheld vicariously liable for the actions of the true tortfeasor\") (emphasis in original); Equitex, 60\nP.3d at 750 (rejecting a promissory estoppel claim for indemnification because \"equitable\ndoctrines such as promissory estoppel may not be used to enforce an agreement in favor of a\nwrongdoer\").\n\nAccordingly, Maxwell's common law indemnification claims are similarly\n\nprecluded by her criminal conviction. Thus, the final factor weighs in favor of dismissal.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint. In the alternative, if\nthe Court is not inclined to dismiss the Complaint, Maxwell should be ordered to appear pro se\nwithin 30 days or \n... [truncated, 2051 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822421/9 or ?id=EFTA02822421&page=9]", "char_count": 2051}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Respectfully,\nDated: September 19, 2023\n\n/s/\n\nKroblin\nKROBLIN, ESQ.\nSHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ\nV.I. Bar Nos. 966 & 1221\nKELLERHALS\nKROBLIN PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\nSuite 101\n9053 Estate M,\nSt. M,\nV.I. 00802\nTelephone: (340) 779-2564\nEmail: ckroblin@kellfer.com\nsdandradeekellfer.com\nCounsel for Executor Darren K. Indyke, the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein, and NES, LLC\n\nDated September 19, 2023\n\n/s/Daniel H. Weiner\nDANIEL H. WEINER\nV.I. Bar No. PHV4223\nHUGHES HUBBARD &\nLLP\nOne Battery Park Plaza\nNew York, New York 10004\nTelephone: (212) 837-6460\nFacsimile: (212) 299-6460\ndaniel.weiner@hugheshubbard.com\nCounsel for the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein\n\nDated September 19, 2023\n\nC. Rhea\nC. Rhea, Esq.\nVI Bar No. 220\nC. Rhea, PC\n1533 Appling Drive\nMount Pleasant, SC 29464\nTelephone: 340-244-8768\ngrhea@rpwb.com\nCounsel for Executor Richard D. Kahn\n\nDated September 19, 2023\n\n/s/ Daniel S. Ruzumna\nDaniel S. Ruzumna, Esq.\nV.I. Bar No. PHV4357\nPatterson Belknap\n& Taylor, LLP\n1133 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York New York 10583\nTelephone: (212) 336-2034\nEmail: druzumna@pbwt.com\nCounsel for Executor Richard D. Kahn\n11\n\nEFTA02822431\n\n", "char_count": 1137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822421", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 20, 2023, I will cause a true and exact copy of\nthe foregoing Motion to Dismiss, which complies with the page or word limitation set forth in\nRule 6-1(e), to be served via First-Class Mail return receipt requested upon:\n\nMs. Ghislaine Maxwell\nRegister Number 02879-509\nFCI Tallahassee\nP O Box 5000\nTallahassee FL 32314\n/s/\n\nKroblin\n\n12\n\nEFTA02822432\n\n", "char_count": 409}]}