{"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_count": 8, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822372", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822372.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE SITEIUOR COURT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISIANDS\n\nFILED\n\nAugust 01, 2022 04:45 PH\n51-2020-CV-00155\n\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nAND ST. JOHN\nDIVISION OF ST.\n*********************************\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF\nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF\nTHE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. ESTEIN,\nand NES, LLC, a New York Limited\nLiability Company,\n\nCIVIL NO: ST-20-CV-155\nCOMPLEX\n\nDefendants.\n\nCO-EXECUTORS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF\nIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and through their undersigned\ncounsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and\non behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC (\"NES\"), an entity administered in probate by the CoExecutors as part of the Estate, respectfully submit this Supplemental Brief in further support of\ntheir Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed in this action on May I, 2020 (the \"Motion to\nDismiss\") and in accordance with this Court's direction during the March 9, 2022 status\nconference in this matter.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nAs the Co-Executors demonstrated in their Reply Brief in Support of the Motion to\nDismiss filed in this action on September 28, 2020 (the \"Reply\"), courts around the country hold\nthat indemnification for individuals convicted of criminal behavior violates public policy\n\nEFTA02822372\n\n", "char_count": 1498}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, et al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 2\n\nbecause it would promote illegality and allow wrongdoers to cause intentional injury with\nimpunity. (Reply at 3-4, n.2.) Courts should not encourage intentional criminal wrongdoing by\nallowing a party to escape all financial consequences for those acts.\nHere, it is indisputable that the suits, proceedings and investigations for which Plaintiff\nGhislaine Maxwell demands that Defendants indemnify her are all predicated on Maxwell's own\nintentional criminal actions. (See Motion to Dismiss at 3-4, n.3 (describing the basis of civil\nsuits against Maxwell, each of which was premised on intentional abusive actions by Maxwell\nherself); Reply at 3 n.1 and Ex. D (describing and attaching Maxwell's criminal indictment in the\nSouthern District of New York).) On December 29, 2021, a jury in the United States District\nCourt for the Southern District of New York found Maxwell guilty of multiple counts of criminal\nactivity; on June 29, 2022, Judge Alison Nathan entered judgment against Maxwell for\nconspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of\na minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity and sex trafficking of an individual\nunder the age of eighteen.' For these felonies, Judge Nathan sentenced Maxwell to 20 years in\nprison followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered Maxwell to pay a fine of\n$750,000. During sentencing, Judge Nathan rejected Maxwell's argument that she was being\n\nI. See Judgment. USA v. Maxwell. No. 20-CR-00330 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 29. 2022). ECF No. 696. Judge Nathan\ndismissed two of five counts for which the jury found Maxwell guilty as multiplicative and the Government\nagreed to dismiss two perjury counts against Maxwell that Judge Nathan previously severed from the\ndetermination of the counts considered by the jury. Id.; see also Joint Letter, USA v. Marvell, (S.D.N.Y. Jan.\n10. 2022). ECF No. 574 (\"In the event the defendant's post-trial motions are denied, the Government is\nprepared to dismiss the severed perjury counts at the time of sentencing. in light of the victims' significant\ninterests in bringing closure to this matter and avoiding the trauma of testifying again.\").\n\nEFTA02822373\n\n", "char_count": 2335}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, et al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 3\n\npunished for Mr. Epstein's actions, stating \"Miss Maxwell is not punished in place of Epstein ...\nMiss Maxwell is being punished for the role that she played.\"2\nThe Court should not allow individuals (here, Maxwell) convicted of criminal acts of\nsexual violence against minors to escape the financial consequences of their actions. Because\nindemnification in this situation is contrary to public policy, and for the reasons set forth in the\nMotion to Dismiss and Reply, the Court should dismiss Maxwell's claims.3\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nPublic Policy Bars Maxwell's Claims for Indemnification Based on Contract.\nAs the Court has recognized, \"an agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to\n\nthe interests of the public . . . . The Court has a duty to refuse to enforce a contract that is\ncontrary to public policy and tends to injure the public good.\" Berne Corp. v. Government of the\nVirgin Islands, 46 V.I. 106, 115 (Super. Ct. 2004); see also Gourmet Gallery Crown Bay, Inc. v.\nCrown Bay Marina, LP., 68 V.I. 584, 601-02 (V.I. 2018) (affirming Superior Court's\ndetermination that \"rigid enforcement of private agreements that threaten the interests of third\nparties . . . is against public policy.\").\nApplying this principle to indemnification agreements, courts across the country—\nincluding in New York, the situs of the underlying civil and criminal actions against Maxwell-\n\n2. See Lauren Del Valle, Ghislainc Maxwell's Attorneys Appeal her Federal Conviction and Sentence CNN (July\n8, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/usighislaine-maxwell-appeal/index.html. The transcript from\nMaxwell's June 28. 2022 sentencing hearing is not yet publicly available on the docket. See Transcript, USA v.\nMaxwell, No. 20-CR-00330 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2022), ECF No. 737 (docket text setting August 12, 2022\ndeadline for transcription redaction requests and indicating that transcript will be available through PACER on\nOctober 20, 2022).\n3. The NES Operating Agreement (as that term is defined in the Motion to Dismiss) expressly forbids\nindemnification of Maxwell for claims that are \"the result of fraud, gross negligence, or reckless or intentional\nmisconduct.\" (NES Operating Agreement Section VI.B.I, at pp. 5-6.) As further detailed in the Motion to\nDismiss and Reply. the Court should dismiss Maxwell's claim for indemnification under the NES Operating\nAgreement based on the terms of that Agreement.\n\nEFTA02822374\n\n", "char_count": 2550}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, et al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 4\n\nroutinely hold that contractual indemnification for those found guilty of intentional criminal\nwrongdoing is unenforceable as against public policy because it would promote illegality and\nallow a wrongdoer to cause criminal injury with impunity. See, e.g., Homesite Ins. Co. of the\nMidwest v. Frost, No. CV 20-00024-M-DLC, 2020 WL 5369847, at *5 (D. Mont. Sept. 8, 2020)\n(\"in Montana there is an unmistakable public policy against . . . indemnification for criminal\nacts.\"); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-201-TWT, 2019 BL 223294, at *11\n(N.D. Ga. Jun. 14, 2019) (if the Plaintiff is ultimately found to have been criminally negligent,\nthen public policy would preclude indemnification.\"); Utica First Ins. Co. v. Maclean, No.\nCIV.A. 08-1138, 2009 WL 415988, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2009) (\"[rlequiring an insurance\ncompany to defend or indemnify its insured for . .. criminal acts would also violate public policy\nin Pennsylvania.\"); BDO Seidman, LLP v. Harris, 379 III. App. 3d 918, 925 (III. App. Ct. 2008)\n(itlaken together, the stipulation of facts pursuant to the PTD agreement shows that plaintiff\nengaged in conduct which constituted misprision of felony by knowingly concealing the felony\nfraud of its client, SBU. Under New York public policy. . . indemnification for such criminal\nconduct is barred by public policy.\"); Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 750 (Cob. App. 2002)\n(\"[plublic policy prohibits indemnifying a party for damages resulting from intentional or willful\nwrongful acts.\") (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 8 (\"a\ncontract or bond by which one party undertakes to indemnify the other against the consequences\nof an illegal act is generally held illegal and void.\"). And Virgin Islands statutory law regarding\nindemnification likewise indicates that indemnification for willful or wanton acts is\ninappropriate.\n\n10 V.I.C. § 101 (providing for indemnification of law enforcement officers\n\nunless, inter alia, the officer seeks indemnification for \"any willful or wanton act\").\n\nEFTA02822375\n\n", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, a al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 5\n\nThe Court should follow the holdings of Virgin Islands courts, the great majority of\ncourts in other jurisdictions and legal treatises to find that public policy requires rejection of\ncontractual indemnification for claims or expenses arising from Maxwell's criminal actions here.\nTo hold otherwise would be to encourage individuals like Maxwell — a convicted felon — to\nengage in crimes victimizing minors with the knowledge that they can offload to others the\nfinancial repercussions of their actions and are entitled to incur whatever costs they deem\nnecessary in order to hide from criminal or other repercussions.4\nIL\n\nPublic Policy Also Bars Maxwell's Claims for Promissory Estoppel or Common\nLaw Indemnification.\nThe public policy concerns that bar enforcement of contractual indemnification for those\n\nfound guilty of intentional criminal acts apply with equal force to common law indemnification\nor indemnification based on promissory estoppel. Both of these doctrines arise in equity and are\nbased on concepts of restitution and unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp.,\n66 V.I. 23, 46 (Super. Ct. 2017) (\"[t]he right to indemnity ... is a common law equitable remedy\n. . . .\"); Appleton v. Harrigan, No. ST-10-CV-275, 2012 WL 13219651, at •5 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 6,\n2012) (\"Mike a claim of unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy.\").\nEquity does not condone a criminal actor receiving financial immunity from the consequences of\nher crimes. Indemnification based on either promissory estoppel or common law is not viable\n\n4. The few cases suggesting that contractual indemnification for intentional wrongdoing may be possible are\nreadily distinguishable from the situation here, with such cases generally both requiring provisions that clearly\nand unambiguously express the indemnitor's intention to provide indemnity for intentional acts and involving\nsituations where the indemnified party's actions could not be proven to be intentional, much less criminal. See.\ne.g., Gibbs-Alfano v. Burton, 281 F.3d 12, 22-23 (2d Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that contractual\nindemnification for intentional acts is unenforceable, but finding that the indemnification clause in question was\nenforceable because there was no finding or factually strong suggestion that the indemnified party's actions\nwere intentional). Here. Maxwell does not allege any contractual provisions that clearly and unambiguously\ncall for indemnification of intentional or criminal acts and, as discussed further in the Motion to Dismiss, the\nReply and by the New York court handling the criminal case against Maxwell. the allegations against Maxwell\nare based on her own intentional criminal actions.\n\nEFTA02822376\n\n", "char_count": 2854}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, et al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 6\n\n(and violates public policy) where, as here, the indemnitee has been convicted of an intentional\ncriminal act. Courts cannot enforce a judgment upholding a[n] agreement in law or in equity that\nis against public policy.\" Cruse v. Callwood, 55 V.I. 999, 1003 (D.V.I. 2010) (parties to a\npyramid scheme cannot recover on a theory of restitution when they were aware of the nature of\nthe scheme); see also, e.g., Willie, 66 V.I. at 92 (Virgin Islands recognizes common law\nindemnification \"where an innocent party is held vicariously liable for the actions of the true\ntortfeasor\") (emphasis in original); Equitex, 60 P.3d at 750 (rejecting a promissory estoppel\nclaim for indemnification because \"equitable doctrines such as promissory estoppel may not be\nused to enforce an agreement in favor of a wrongdoer\").\nResearch has not identified any case that permitted indemnification pursuant to\npromissory estoppel or common law where, as here, the purported indemnitee has been\nconvicted of an intentional criminal act. This long-standing judicial stricture, as well as the\nequitable nature of both promissory estoppel and common law indemnification, public policy\nand the facts of this case all strongly suggest that the Court should not be the first to permit\ncommon law indemnification for one found guilty of intentional criminal acts. The crimes for\nwhich Maxwell stands convicted are based on her own affirmative criminal behavior. As Judge\nNathan in the District Court for the Southern District of New York stated in sentencing Maxwell\nto 20 years in prison for her crimes, \"Miss Maxwell is not punished in place of Epstein . . . Miss\nMaxwell is being punished for the role that she played.\"5 Maxwell cannot employ equitable\ndoctrines to escape the financial consequences of her intentional criminal acts.\n\n5. See supra n. 2.\n\nEFTA02822377\n\n", "char_count": 1974}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, a\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 7\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth herein and in the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss and Reply in\nSupport of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.\nRespectfully,\n/s/ Shari N. D'Andrade\nSHARI N. D'AND_\nRADEt ESQ\nKROBLIN, ESQ.\nV.I. Bar Nos. 1221 & 966\nKELLERHALS\nKamm PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\n9053 Estate M,\nSuite 101\n,\nV.I.\nSt.\n00802\nTelephone: (340) 779-2564\nFacsimile: (888) 316-9269\nEmail: ckroblin@kellfer.com\nsdandrade@kellfer.com\n\nDated: August 1, 2022\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 1, 2022, I caused a true and exact copy of the\nforegoing Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, which complies with the page\nor word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), to be served via VUEFS upon:\nKyle R. Waldner, Esq.\nQuintairos, Prieto,\n& Boyer, P.A.\n9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor\nMiami, FL 33156\nkwaldnereqpwblaw.com\nCarol\ne\nEsq.\nAril\nA l !Erg.\nAssistant Attorney General\nVirgin Islands Department of Justice\nOffice of the Attorney General\n34-38 Kronprindsens Gade\nSt.\nU.S. Virgin Islands 00802\n\nEFTA02822378\n\n", "char_count": 1221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822372", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein, a al.\nSupplemental Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nC. Rhea, Esq.\nC. Rhea, P.C.\n1533 Appling Dr.\nMt. Pleasant, S.C. 29464\ngrhea@rpwb.com\n\nCivil No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 8\n\n/s/ Shari N. D'Andrade\n\nEFTA02822379\n\n", "char_count": 253}]}