{"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_count": 18, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822354", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822354.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE NITEIUOR COURT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISIANT6\n\nFILED\n\nAugust 01, 2022 06:00 PH\n51-2020-CV-00155\n\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nDIVISION OF ST.\nAND ST. JOHN\nCIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\n\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY\nE. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his\ncapacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE\nOF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LLC, a\nNew York Limited Liability Company,\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO COURT ORDER\nPlaintiff, GHISLAINE MAXWELL (hereinafter, \"Plaintiff\"), pursuant to this Court's\noral directive at the status conference held on March 9, 2022, hereby files her brief as to whether\nVirgin Islands public policy bars one or more of her claims in this action.\nINTRODUCTION\nThis is an action for indemnification for the attorneys' fees, security costs, costs to find\nsafe accommodation, and all other expenses Plaintiff has incurred by reason of her prior\nemployment relationship with Jeffrey E. Epstein (\"Epstein\") and his businesses. From\napproximately 1999 through at least 2006, Maxwell was employed by Epstein and several of his\nbusinesses, including NES LLC. In this capacity, Plaintiff was responsible for managing\nEpstein's properties in the U.S. Virgin Islands and elsewhere. In the wake of Epstein's 2008\nguilty plea in Florida to a felony charge of soliciting prostitution from a minor, Plaintiff has\n\nEFTA02822354\n\n", "char_count": 1501}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 2 of 18\n\nincurred legal fees and expenses in connection with various legal proceedings relating to Epstein,\nhis businesses, and his alleged victims.\nPlaintiff seeks indemnity under three distinct theories: (1) Epstein promised Plaintiff that\nhe would indemnify her for any expenses incurred by reason of her employment relationship\nwith him and his businesses, and Plaintiff relied on that promise; (2) Plaintiff is entitled to\nindemnification under a common law theory due to her employment relationship with Epstein\nand his businesses; and (3) NES, LLC (and other possible companies) must indemnify Plaintiff\nfor legal fees, personal security costs, and other expenses incurred by reason of her agency\nrelationship to NES, LLC.\nIn the briefing on Co-Executors Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn's (the \"CoExecutors\") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, the Co-Executors suggest that Plaintiff\n\"cannot be indemnified for intentional wrongdoing, including criminal conduct.\" See CoExecutors' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 2020 (the\n\"Reply\"), at pp. 3-4, n. 2. As shown below, Virgin Islands public policy does not bar Plaintiff's\nindemnity claims in this action.\nARGUMENT\nPlaintiffs' Claims May Not Be Barred as a Matter of Public\nPreliminary Stage of the Proceedings.\n\n1.\n\nA.\n\nat This\n\nVirgin Islands public policy does not necessarily bar Plaintiff's contractual\nindemnity claims.'\n\nIn support of its original argument that Plaintiff \"cannot be indemnified for intentional\nI As an initial matter, the Co-Executors' public policy defense arises in the contract law\ncontext. Therefore, it would not operate to bar Plaintiff's claims to the extent that they arise\nunder common law or general corporation law theories.\n2\n\nEFTA02822355\n\n", "char_count": 1813}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 3 of 18\n\nwrongdoing, including criminal conduct,\" the Co-Executors cite a single Virgin Islands case,\nBerne Corp. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 46 V.I. 106, 115 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2004) for the\ngeneral proposition that \"[t]he Court has a duty to refuse to enforce a contract that is contrary to\npublic policy and tends to injure the public good.\" See Reply, at pp. 3-4, n. 2. The Co-Executors\nposit that glows across the country—including in New York, where the underlying actions\nagainst Maxwell are pending—hold that indemnification for intentional wrongdoing is against\npublic policy because it would promote illegality and allow a wrongdoer to cause intentional\ninjury with impunity,\" but cite no Virgin Islands case for this proposition. Finally, the CoExecutors cite a Virgin Islands case, Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.I. 23, 34 (V.I. Super.\nCt. 2017), for the notion that the Virgin Islands recognizes common law indemnification \"when\nan innocent party is held vicariously liable for the actions of the true tortfeasor.\" See Reply, at p.\n4, n. 2 (emphasis in original). The Co-Executors cite no other Virgin Islands case, statute, rule, or\nregulation that defines relevant Virgin Islands public policy or what may be \"contrary to [its)\npublic policy.\"\nTo determine the public policy of this forum, Virgin Islands case law, statutes, rules, and\nregulations must be examined. In re Catalyst Third-Party Litig., 2020 WL 1862216, *26 (V.I.\nSuper. April 13, 2020) (citing Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding\n\nCo., 283 U.S. 353, 357\n\n(1931) (\"In determining whether the contract here in question contravenes the public policy of\nArkansas, the constitution, laws and judicial decisions of that State and as well the applicable\nprinciples of the common law are to be considered. Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine\nthe public policy of the State.\");\n\nv.\n\n, 9 V.I. 554, 558 (3d Cir. 1973) (\"I find nothing\n\nin the statutory or decisional law i\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/2 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=2]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 4 of 18\n\neven if prohibited, is against the public policy of this forum.\"' (citation omitted)). In Catalyst,\nthis Court declined to follow longstanding Third Circuit precedent — at the risk of \"disrupting the\nstate of the law\" that \"Virgin Islands companies and companies doing business in the Virgin\nIslands ha[d] come to rely on — because the Third Circuit did not consider Virgin Islands cases or\nstatutes, \"relied almost exclusively on federal precedent, even though the question at issue in\neach case involved ... Virgin Islands public policy,\" and \"did not attempt to identify the best\napproach for the Virgin Islands.\" Id.\nIn light of the following Virgin Islands public policy, which is derived from Virgin\nIslands case law, statutes, and rules, the Co-Executors are incorrect in their assertion that\nPlaintiff \"cannot be indemnified for intentional wrongdoing, including criminal conduct,\" and\ntheir reliance on the public policy of other jurisdictions is misplaced:\ni.\n\nFreedom of contract in indemnification context\n\n\"[T]he underlying purpose of contract law ... is to hold parties to their agreements so that\nthey receive the benefit of their bargains.\" Phillip v. Marsh-Monsanto, 66 V.I. 612, 621 (V.I.\n2017) (citations omitted). The Catalyst Court found that:\nVirgin Islands businesses and residents, and companies doing business in\nthe Virgin Islands, have assumed that Virgin Islands common law will let\nthem agree among themselves how to allocate responsibility for loss,\nliability, injury, and damages and further, that Virgin Islands courts would\nenforce such agreements and provide a remedy if breached. The law of\ncontracts is designed to effectuate exchanges and to protect the expectancy\ninterest of parties to private bargained-for agreements.\nCatalyst, 2020 WL 1862216, at *13 (citing Phillip, 66 V.I. at 621) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). While \"the Virgin Islands Legislature has not weighed in on indemnification\nagreements, inc\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/3 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=3]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 5 of 18\n\nparty's own negligence,\" the Virgin Islands Supreme Court promulgated a rule that potentially\nrequires a lawyer to indemnify the financial institution servicing client trust accounts even if the\ninstitution is negligent. Id. (citing V.I. S. Ct. R. 211.1.15-3(j) (\"Every lawyer or law firm\nmaintaining a trust account in the Virgin Islands shall, as a condition thereof, be conclusively\ndeemed to have consented to the reporting and production requirements by financial institutions\nmandated by Rule 211.1.15-5 and shall indemnify and hold harmless the financial institution for\nits compliance with such reporting and production requirement.\")).\nii.\n\nIndemnification among joint tortfeasors\n\nVirgin Islands courts have recognized the right to common law indemnity between joint\ntortfeasors. That is, under Virgin Island law, a party seeking indemnification is not required\nprove that it was not at fault in causing a plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Dublin v. Virgin Islands\nTel. Corp., 15 V.I. 214, 227 (Ten. V.I. June 9, 1978) (holding \"that a right to contribution or\nindemnity against a joint tortfeasor exists in the Virgin Islands.\"Xciting, inter alia, Silverlight v.\nHuggins, 10 V.I. 638 (3d Cir 1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B (Indemnity Between\nTortfeasors). Cf. 5 V.I.C. § 1451 (Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute silent on issue of\na right to indemnity among joint tortfeasors). Indeed, Virgin Islands courts have long recognized\nthat \"[t]here is no public policy which prevents judicial enforcement of an agreement to shift\nliability for the consequences of one's own negligence.\" Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v.\nFiremen's Ins. Co., 626 F. Supp. 882, 884, 22 V.I. 139, 143 (D.V.I. 1986) (citing Eastern\nAirlines, Inc. v. INA, 758 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.1985); United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 211,\n90 S.Ct. 880, 885, 25 L.Ed.2d 224 (1970)); Dominic v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 624 F.\nSupp. 117, 119 (D.V.I. 19\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/4 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=4]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 6 of 18\n\nindemnifies HOVIC against its own negligence, is void against public policy, would come as a\nsurprise to the Third Circuit. This appellate court has resolved so many disputes involving these\nagreements, that the public policy issue has long been put to rest. ... Repeatedly the circuit court\nhas held that there is no public policy which prevents judicial enforcement of an agreement to\nshift liability for the consequences of one's own negligence.\")2 See also, Catalyst, 2020 WL\n1862216. *26 (\"[T]he Court agrees that the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands is to recognize a\ncause of action for breach of an indemnification agreement. And, whether an indemnification\nagreement covers A's negligence, B's negligence, or A through Z's negligence is for the\ncontracting parties to decide.\")\nThe foregoing is consistent with the Restatement. which provided the rules of decision in\nthis jurisdiction from 1921 to 2011 (where there was no contrary local law).3 The Restatement\non indemnity does not make a distinction between negligent and intentional tortfeasors. See\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 886B; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability\n§ 22 (1999 & Supp.2006) (\"When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm\nand one of them discharges the liability of another in whole or in part by settlement ..., the person\ndischarging the liability is entitled to recover indemnity in the amount paid to the plaintiff, plus\nreasonable legal expenses. if ... the indemnitor has agreed by contract to indemnify the\nindemnitee....\"). See also\n\nr.\n\n& Co., 113 Haw. 406, 417, 153 P.3d 1091, 1102\n\n(Haw. 2007) (\"Restatement (Second) § 886B does not distinguish between intentional and other\n\n2 While the Catalyst Court criticized the reasoning employed in Hess and Dominic, they\nhave been approvingly cited over the years and remain good law.\n3 1 V.I.C. § 4; Banks v. Mel Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011).\n6\n\nEFTA\n... [truncated, 2010 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/5 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=5]", "char_count": 2010}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 7 of 18\n\nforms of tort. Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) does not foreclose a right of indemnity for\nintentional torts in the present matter.\")\nIn any event, there is no public policy, case, statute, or other provision of Virgin Islands\nlaw barring a contracting party from indemnification for an intentional or willful act.\niii.\n\nIndemnification for criminal acts under General Corporation\nLaw\n\nUnder certain circumstances, Virgin Islands law provides that indemnification may be\nappropriate even if the indemnitee has been convicted of a criminal charge. Specifically, the\nGeneral Corporation Law codified at Title 13 of the Virgin Islands Code provides in pertinent\npart that:\n(a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is\na party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending\nor completed action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal,\nadministrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the right of\nthe corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer,\nemployee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of\nthe corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another\ncorporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, against\nexpenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in\nsettlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such\naction, suit or proceeding if:\n(1) he acted:\n(A) in good faith; and\n(B) in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to\nthe best interests of the corporation; and\n(2) with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, he had no\nreasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of\nany action, suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or\nupon a plea of nob contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a\npresumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a manne\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/6 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=6]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 8 of 18\n\ncorporation, and with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had\nreasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.\n13 V.I.C. § 67a (emphasis added).\nClearly, the Virgin Islands' General Corporation Law statute reflects Virgin Islands\npublic policy and is not in violation of Virgin Islands public policy. Plaintiff here was entitled to\nrely on Epstein's promise of indemnification because it was entirely consistent with this Virgin\nIslands indemnification statute.\nB.\n\nThere is no basis to bar Plaintiff's claims as a matter of public policy at the\nRule 12 stage.\ni.\n\nPlaintiffhas no notice to date ofany extra-pleading materials the\nCo-Executors want this Court to consider in connection with their\nMotion to Dismiss.\n\nThe Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss is made pursuant to V.I. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6). \"The\nbasic purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint to state an\nactionable claim, not to test the truth of the fact alleged in the complaint.\" Arno v. Hess Corp., 71\nV.I. 463, 495, (V.I. Super. October 17, 2019) (citation omitted). Courts have the discretion to\nexclude extra-pleading materials attached to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for\nrelief, or else convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment to be able to\naddress it. Stanley v. Virgin Islands Bureau of Corr., 2020 WL 1639902, *4 (V.I. Super. April I,\n2020). If the Court ultimately chooses to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for\nsummary judgment, it must notify the parties so they can \"present all the material that is\npertinent....\" V.I. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See also United Corp. v. Named, 64 V.I. 297, 307 (V.I. 2016).\nCourts addressing the issue \"have found that failure to give adequate notice to the parties before\nconversion constitutes reversible error.\" Stanley, 2020 WL 1639902, •5 (quotation and citation\n8\n\nEFTA02822361\n\n", "char_count": 1949}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 9 of 18\n\nomitted).\nHere, in advancing their public policy argument, the Co-Executors are not challenging\nwhether Plaintiff states a claim for relief. Instead, the Co-Executors seek judgment on the merits\non the theory that Plaintiff \"cannot be indemnified for intentional wrongdoing, including\ncriminal conduct.\" The Co-Executors have not yet asked this Court to consider any specific\nextra-pleading materials that purport to establish such \"intentional wrongdoing, including\ncriminal conduct,\" despite having the burden to do so. See, e.g., Maduro v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,\n2008 WL 901525, *3 (V.I.2008) (under Virgin Islands law, the burden of proving an affirmative\ndefense in a civil case is on the defendant); Bryan v. Fawkes, 2014 WL 5409110, *26 (V.1.2014)\n(citing 5 V.I.C. § 740(5)) (the party against whom the affirmative defense is asserted is \"not\nrequired to prove a negative\").\nPlaintiff objects to the Court's consideration of any matters outside the pleadings that the\nEstate may submit with its Brief since the briefing on the motion is closed and Plaintiff will have\nbeen deprived of an opportunity to respond.\nii.\n\nThe SDNY judgment ofconviction, to the extent considered, does\nnot conclusively decide any issues presented in this action.\n\nIn considering a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, matters of\npublic record, and indisputably authentic documents that the complaint relies upon. Courts have\ndefined \"public records\" narrowly for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, which includes\n\"criminal case dispositions such as convictions or mistrials, letter decisions of government\nagencies, and published reports of administrative bodies.\" Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v.\nConsol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1197 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted); see also\nv. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d. Cir. 2014) (applying the Pension definition of public\n9\n\nEFTA02822362\n\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 10 of 18\n\nrecords narrowly and refusing to consider press releases not attached to a complaint); Bostic v.\nAT & T of Virgin Islands, 166 F. Supp. 2d 350, 354 (D.V.I. 2001). A court may then only\nconsider a criminal case conviction to establish thefact of the criminal case and conviction but\nmay not consider it for the truth of any matters asserted therein. Kramer v. Time Warner Inc.,\n937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.1991) (\"Courts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in\nother courts ... not for the truth of the matters asserted in other litigation, but rather to establish\nthe fact of such litigation and related filings.\"); Crews v. Cnty. of Nassau, 2007 WL 316568, at\n*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2007) (\"The Court takes judicial notice of certain documents and\nproceedings in the underlying criminal action only to establish the fact of such litigation,\nincluding (1) the notice of alibi dated September 27, 2005, and (2) the transcript of Crews'\nSeptember 22, 2005 arraignment in Nassau County Court\")\nIn\n\nv. Kendall Cnty., Ill., 807 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 1986), cited by the Pension\n\nCourt, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' bad faith\nprosecution claims, where the district court considered case \"dispositions\" of underlying cases\nreferenced in, but not actually filed with, the complaint. After considering these case\n\"dispositions,\" the district court found that the \"defendants have successfully prosecuted the\nplaintiffs on three obscenity charges,\" and thus found that the plaintiffs failed to set forth facts\nsupporting an inference of bad faith prosecution. Id. at 101. The\n\nCourt held that the\n\n\"district court did not err in considering these undisputed matters appearing on the public\nrecord.\" Id. 99, n.6.\nHere, assuming that the Co-Executors will offer Plaintiff's judgment of conviction in the\nU.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (\"SDNY\") in support of their public\n10\n\nEFTA02\n... [truncated, 2008 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/9 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=9]", "char_count": 2008}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 11 of 18\n\npolicy argument, the Court may only consider this record to establish the existence and\ndisposition of the SDNY proceeding. The SDNY judgment entered on June 29, 2022 here\nreflects that only Plaintiff was adjudicated guilty of offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. §\n2423, and 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See, Judgment entered June 29, 2022 in SDNY Case No. 1:20-cr00330-AJN, Document 696. While the Court might take judicial notice that Plaintiff was\nadjudicated guilty of these three offenses, the Court may not make any other findings based on\nthe SDNY judgment or draw any inferences from the SDNY judgment favorable to Defendants\nat this stage. See,\n\nsupra, at 99. See also,\n\nv. AIG Ins. Co. ofPuerto Rico, 56\n\nV.I. 558, 566 (V.I. 2012) (on Rule 12(bX6) motion, Court \"view[s] the facts alleged in the\npleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the\nplaintiff.\") Because the relevance of the SDNY disposition to this action is not apparent on its\nface, it provides no actual support for the suggestion that public policy bars the claims in this\naction.\nFurther, for a judgment to have preclusive effect and bar relitigation of an issue under\nthe doctrine of collateral estoppel, an asserting party must satisfy the following elements:\n(I) the issue to be barred is identical to an issue actually and\nnecessarily decided in the prior action; (2) the prior action was\nadjudicated in a decision that was final, valid, and on the merits; (3) the\nparty against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a\nparty to the prior action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is\nasserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior\naction.\nStewart v. Virgin Islands Bd. ofLand Use Appeals, 66 V.1.522, 549-50 (V.I. 2017) (emphasis\nadded).\nHere, the Co-Executors' have not yet identified what specific issues they contend have\n11\n\nEFTA02822364\n\n", "char_count": 1973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 12 of 18\n\nalready been decided by the SDNY that are identical in this case. In fact, the narrow issues tried\nbefore the SDNY do not necessarily overlap with Plaintiffs' claims here, which include\nindemnification for expenses incurred in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by\n(who did not testify in the SDNY proceeding), investigations relating to Epstein, and security\nservices incurred in 2019 in the wake of intense media scrutiny following Epstein's arrest. To the\nextent that Plaintiffs claims relate to expenses that Plaintiff incurred exclusively because of\nEpstein's actions, such claims would clearly not be subject to any public policy bar. Simply put,\nthe SDNY judgment of conviction does not conclusively establish any issue presented here and\nis not dispositive of this action.\nFinally, Plaintiff has appealed the SDNY conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the\nSecond Circuit. While Virgin Islands courts have not spoken on the issue, many courts have\nfound that a trial court judgment of conviction is not final for purposes of res judicata or\ncollateral estoppel when it is on appeal. See, e.g., People ex reL Gow v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa\nAna Theater, 161 Cal.Rptr. 562, 568 (Cal.Ct.App.1980);\n\nv. Transp. Ins. Co., 169\n\nGa.App. 504, 313 S.E.2d 761, 763 (Ga.Ct.App.1984); Dupre v. Floyd, 825 So.2d 1238, 1240-41\n(La.Ct.App.2002) (per curium), writ denied, 840 So.2d 546 (La.2003); Petition ofDonovan, 137\nN.H. 78, 623 A.2d 1322, 1324 (N.H.1993); Benham v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla.1990);\nMcBurney v. Aldrich, 816 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 413,\n417 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1992); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. ofPittsburgh,\n204 W.Va. 465, 513 S.E.2d 692, 703 (W.Va. 1998).\n\n12\n\nEFTA02822365\n\n", "char_count": 1810}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 13 of 18\n\nII.\n\nPlaintiff's Common Law Indemnity Claims Not Barred.\nThe Co-Executors' public policy defense does not apply to Plaintiff's common law\n\nindemnity claims since the defense allows a party to avoid enforcement of a contract.\nSee, Berne, supra, 46 V.I. at 115 (public policy is a defense to the enforceability of a contract);\nBrouillard v. DLJMortg. Cap., Inc., 63 V.I. 788, 794 (V.I. 2015) (same). In fact, as a matter of\ncommon law, the Virgin Islands courts recognize the right to indemnity between joint\ntortfeasors. See infra, Section I(A)(ii). See also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indemnity § 21 (\"Generally,\nindemnity will be granted where the indemnitee has incurred tort liability by performing an act\nnot manifestly wrong at the direction or for the benefit of, and in reliance upon, the indemnitor.\")\n(citing Horrabin v. City ofDes Moines, 198 Iowa 549, 199 N.W. 988, 38 A.L.R. 554 (1924);\nv. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 14 Wis. 2d I, 109 N.W.2d 462, 88 A.L.R.2d\n1347 (1961)). As such, Virgin Islands public policy does not impact Plaintiff's common law\nindemnity claims.\nIII.\n\nPlaintiff's Corporate Indemnity Claims Not Barred.\nNor does Virgin Islands public policy bar Plaintiff's indemnity claims that may arise\n\nunder Virgin Islands General Corporation Law. As noted above, this law provides that a\ncorporation may indemnify any person who \"was or is\" a party to a civil or criminal proceeding\nby reason of the person's relationship with the corporation \"against expenses (including\nattorneys' fees),\" incurred in connection with the proceeding if the person \"in good faith\" and \"in\na manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.\"\n13 V.I.C. § 67a(a). In the case of a \"criminal proceeding,\" the person must have had \"no\nreasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.\" Id.\n13\n\nEFTA02822366\n\n", "char_count": 1908}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 14 of 18\n\nThe termination of any action, suit or proceeding by ... conviction... shall\nnot, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good\nfaith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not\nopposed to the best interests of the corporation, and with respect to any\ncriminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his\nconduct was unlawful.\nId. (emphasis added). At this stage, the facts of Plaintiff's conduct as an agent of NES, LLC and\nbelief that she was acting in the company's interest have never been litigated. As such,\nPlaintiff's corporate indemnity claims may not be barred or adjudicated at this stage because they\nwould involve issues not actually and necessarily decided in any prior action. Stewart, 66 V.I. at\n549-50.\nIV.\n\nThe Co-Executors' Public Policy Defense Has Been Waived.\nAny objection by the Co-Executors to indemnification on grounds of public policy should\n\nbe found to have been waived by Epstein's past actions here.\nWaiver is defined as \"the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.\"\n\nv. Sharp,\n\nNo. CV 2008-0020, 2021 WL 2228492, at *11 (D.V.I. June 1, 2021), affd, No. 21-2254, 2022\nWL 2712869 (3d Cir. July 13, 2022); accord Ringo v. Southland Gaming of U.S. Virgin Islands,\nInc., No. ST-10-CV-116, 2010 WL 7746074, at *3 (V.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2010); Abramsen v.\nBedminster, 45 V.I. 3, 10 (Terr.Ct.2002). \"Waiver requires 'a clear, unequivocal, and decisive\nact of the party showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel on his part.\"' Great\nLakes Reinsurance (UK) PLC, 2013 WL 68731, at *4 (quoting Caner v. Exxon Co. USA, 177\nF.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir.1999)); accord Ringo, 2010 WL 7746074, at *3. See also Dewerd v.\nBushfteld, 993 F. Supp. 365, 369 (D.V.I. 1998) (\"Waiver ... may be shown by express\ndeclarations, or by acts and declarations manifesting an intent and purpose not to claim the\n\n14\n\nEFTA02822367\n\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 15 of 18\n\nsupposed advantage, or it may be shown by a course of acts and conduct, and in some cases will\nbe implied therefrom.\")\nWhile courts in this jurisdiction have not addressed the specific issue presented here,\ncourts in other jurisdictions have found that a party can waive a defense of contract illegality\nthrough voluntary conduct (e.g., performance of the contract) that is inconsistent with the\ndefense. See, e.g., C.R. Klewin Ne., LLC v. City of Bridgeport, 282 Conn. 54, 919 A.2d 1002\n(Conn. 2007) (City, by participating for 20 days in arbitration proceeding which took place over\na year after indictment of public official that set forth operative facts forming basis for claim that\nmunicipal public works contract was illegal, waived defense that contract, which included\narbitration provision, was illegal.). See also, AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass'n (VO) Technostroyexport\nv. Ina Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980, 981 (2d Cir. 1998) (by disavowing any illegality\nclaim \"until an adverse award was rendered,\" petitioner \"waived its right to assert the public\npolicy exception\");\n\nv. Faulkner, 114 S.E.2d 542, 543 (Ga. App. 1960) (\"If a contract be\n\nillegal as against public policy, its invalidity will be a defence while it remains unexecuted. If the\nillegal contract be in part performed and money has been paid in pursuance of it, no action will\nlie to recover the money back.\").\nHere, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint as follows:\n17.\n\nSince the time of Epstein's Florida state proceeding to the present,\nMaxwell has incurred legal fees and expenses in connection with\nvarious suits, proceedings, and investigations relating to Epstein, his\naffiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.\n\n18.\n\nConsistent with his repeated promises, Epstein indemnified Maxwell\nand advanced legal fees and settlement costs when the were\nincurred in connection with a lawsuit filed by\nagainst Epstein in 2017 (Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et al., 17-cv-00616JGK)\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822354/14 or ?id=EFTA02822354&page=14]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 16 of 18\n\n19.\n\nConsistent with his repeated promises, Epstein also paid Maxwell's\nle\nls incurred in connection with a civil suit filed by\nagainst Epstein in 2009.\n\nSee Complaint, ¶1 17-19. At this preliminary, Rule 12(bX6) stage, the Court \"must accept\n[these) factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the\nplaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff\nmay be entitled to relief.\"\nSuper. Ct. August 31, 2015);\n\nv. Treasure Bay Virgin Islands Corp., 63 V.I. 357, 360 (V.I.\nsupra, 56 V.I. at 566.\n\nBy advancing legal fees and expenses in connection with past legal proceedings, which\nwere for the benefit of Plaintiff, Epstein made it clear that he believed Plaintiff had committed no\nwrong and/or was entitled to indemnification. Any objection to the contrary should found to be\nwaived.\nV.\n\nThe Co-Executors May Not Raise Any Objection to Indemnification on Public\nPolicy Grounds Due to Unclean Hands.\nFinally, the Co-Executors should be estopped from raising any objection to\n\nindemnification on public policy grounds due to unclean hands. The \"'unclean hands' doctrine\nis based on the principle that a party who has committed wrongdoing should not be allowed to\ncome into court and request a remedy for its own personal benefit.\" In re Prosser, 2012 WL\n6737781, at *17 (Bank:. D.V.I. Dec. 20, 2012) (citing In re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525\n(3d Cir.1999); Sunshine Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. KMart Corp., 42 V.I. 397, 407, 85 F. Supp. 2d\n537, 544 (D.V.I. Jan. 27, 2000) (\"It is an ancient and established maxim of equity jurisprudence\nthat he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. If a party seeks relief in equity, he\nmust be able to show that on his part there has been honesty and fair dealing.\") (quoting\n16\n\nEFTA02822369\n\n", "char_count": 1872}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 17 of 18\n\nv. =,\n\n257 F.2d 495, 500 (3d Cir.1958)). In Sunshine Shopping, the court held that the\n\ndefendant could be precluded from raising an equitable defense to a forfeiture clause in a lease\ndue to its own \"unclean hands.\" Id.\nHere, having engaged in the wrongful conduct that caused Plaintiff to incur legal and\nother expenses in the first place, Epstein (and by association, the Estate) should not be permitted\nto prevail in this action by relying upon a salutary public policy.\nCONCLUSION\nWHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to find that Virgin Islands public\npolicy does not bar her indemnity claims in this action.\n\nDated: August 1, 2022\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nQUINTAIROS, PRIETO,\n& BOYER, P.A.\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff\n9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor\nMiami, FL 33156\nT: (340) 693-0230\nF: (340) 693-0300\n\nBy:\n\n/s/ Kyle R. Waldner\nKyle R. Waldner, Esq.\nkwaldneraamblaw.com\nV.I. Bar No.: 1038\n\n17\n\nEFTA02822370\n\n", "char_count": 973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822354", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-2020-CV-00155\nPage 18 of 18\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on August I, 2022, I filed the foregoing, which complies with\nthe page or word limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), with the Clerk of the Court using the Court's\nelectronic filing system, which will send a notice of such filing to the following:\n\nKroblin, Esq.\nKELLERHALS\nKROBLIN PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\nSuite 101\n9053 Estate M,\nSt. M,\nV.I. 00802\nckroblin@kellfer.com\nEsq. (AAG)\nAtiel M. =\nVIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nOffice of the Attorney General\n34-38 Kronprindsens Gade\nSt.\nU.S. Virgin Islands 00802\n\nC. Rhea, Esq.\nC. RHEA, PC\n1533 Appling Dr.\nMt. Pleasant, SC 29464\ngrhea@rpwb.com\n\n/s/ Kyle R. Waldner\nKyle R. Waldner, Esq.\n\n18\n\nEFTA02822371\n\n", "char_count": 759}]}