{"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_count": 13, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822306", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822306.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE SETERJOR COURT\nOF Till: VIRGIN VIANDS\n\nFILED\nSeptember 28, 2020\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nDIVISION OF ST.\n& ST. JOHN\n\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\nCHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF\nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in his capacity as EXECUTOR OF\nTHE ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nand NES, LLC, a New York Limited\nLiability Company\n\nCIVIL NO. ST-20-CV-155\n\nDefendants.\n\nCO-EXECUTORS' REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, by and through their undersigned\ncounsel, in their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and\non behalf of the Estate and NES, LLC (\"NES\"), an entity administered in probate by the CoExecutors as part of the Estate, respectfully submit this Reply Brief in further support of their\nMotion to Dismiss the Complaint filed in this action on May 1, 2020 (the \"Motion to Dismiss\").\nI.\n\nMAXWELL'S CLAIM FOR COMMON LAW INDEMNIFICATION IS UNRIPE\nAND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.\nMaxwell initially filed her Complaint prematurely in violation of 15 V.I.C. § 606(a).\n\n(Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, 4-6.) After forcing the Co-Executors to file the Motion to Dismiss,\nMaxwell implicitly conceded her error and, on June 1, 2020, jointly moved with the Co-Executors\nfor a stay of this action until the required one-year waiting period had passed. While the Court\ngranted the stay on August 3, 2020, and Maxwell is no longer in violation of section 606(a), her\n\nEFTA02822306\n\n", "char_count": 1579}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein et al.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 2\n\nclaim for common law indemnification remains unripe for adjudication until judgments are\nrendered in the underlying actions against her pending in New York state and federal courts.\nUnder the ripeness doctrine, courts in the Virgin Islands \"will defer from ruling on a claim\nwhen ongoing or potential future litigation precludes an informed determination of the issues.\"\nv. =,\n\n59 V.I. 611, 628 (V.I. 2013). For example, in =,\n\nthe plaintiff, a convicted\n\nfelon, pursued a legal malpractice action in Superior Court against his criminal defense attorney\nwhile his habeas corpus petitions were on appeal in federal and local courts and while the Ethics\nand Grievance Committee of the Virgin Islands Bar Association investigated the attorney's\nconduct. Id. at 615-20. After\n\nattorney moved to dismiss, the Superior Court considered\n\nclaims on their merits, ultimately granting the motion. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court\nvacated the decision, holding that the Superior Court \"committed a fundamental error\" when it\nconsidered any aspect of\n\nclaims on the merits rather than sua sponte dismissing the\n\ncomplaint for lack of ripeness. Id. at 621. Because\n\ncriminal appeal and other related\n\nactions had not yet been decided (and he still had the ability to file additional habeas petitions),\nthe Superior Court \"severely disrupted comity amongst federal and local courts by creating\ninconsistent adjudications of essentially the same factual and legal issues.\" Id. at 630.\nSimilarly, in Virgin Islands Government Hospitals and Health Facilities Corp. v.\nGovernment of the Virgin Islands, 50 V.I. 276 (V.I. 2008), the Supreme Court vacated an order\ngranting an award of attorney's fees because \"the presence of ongoing litigation precludes an\ninformed determination of whether the moving party is in fact entitled to attorney's fees under the\nrelevant law\" and \"the\n... [truncated, 2278 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/1 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=1]", "char_count": 2278}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 3\n\ndetermination of the issue would \"force this Court to assess and rule on whether Defendants'\n[underlying case] is meritorious before such a determination has been made in that case itself\" and\n\"there is a substantial possibility that the final disposition in [the underlying case] would moot this\ncause of action here, or at least substantially alter the appropriate remedy.\" No. ST-14-cv-558,\n2015 WL 3429078, at *4-5 (V.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 2015). As the Sound Solutions court found,\n\"[i]t would be improper to allow this case to proceed when the relevant facts are so unstable.\" Id.\nat *5.\nThe same reasoning applies here, where the predicate criminal and civil actions accusing\nMaxwell of sexual abuse and other misconduct are pending in front of various state and federal\ncourts.' As a matter of public policy, Maxwell cannot be indemnified for intentional wrongdoing,\nincluding criminal conduct.2\n\nAs a result, any determination of Maxwell's common law\n\nI. The Co-Executors previously described the civil actions pending against Maxwell in the New York\nstate and federal courts. (Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.3.) On June 29, 2020, Maxwell was criminally\nindicted in the Southern District of New York for conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in\nillegal sex acts, enticement of a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, conspiracy to transport\nminors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity and two counts of perjury. (See Indictment, a copy of which is attached\nhereto as Exhibit D (Exhibits A-C were attached to the original Motion to Dismiss).) Her criminal trial\nis scheduled to begin in New York federal court on July 12, 2021.\n2. As this Court has held, \"an agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the interests of the\npublic .. . . \n... [truncated, 3390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/2 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=2]", "char_count": 3390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate oPeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 4\n\nindemnification claim in this proceeding risks inconsistent adjudication, wastes judicial resources,\nand threatens to disrupt comity between New York and Virgin Islands courts. In addition, if\nMaxwell's claim is allowed to proceed, discovery and fact-finding will have to be duplicated, and\ndiscovery in this case regarding the facts and circumstances of the underlying civil and criminal\ncases against Maxwell will have to be taken while those underlying cases are ongoing. Moreover,\ncommon law indemnity may not apply at all if any of numerous different events relating to the\nunderlying proceedings occur, including if Maxwell is found (1) guilty of the crimes with which\nshe is charged, or (2) civilly liable due to her own misconduct toward young girls, rather than her\nperformance of legitimate, employment-related duties for Mr. Epstein or his affiliated businesses.\nIn these circumstances, the doctrine of ripeness requires dismissal of Maxwell's common law\nindemnification claim.3\nThe authorities Maxwell cites in her Opposition reinforce the Co-Executors' position.\nThose sources make clear that, because an indemnitee must discharge liability of the indemnitor\nin order to receive indemnification, an indemnitee may not plead a claim for common law\nindemnity unless it is (i) in the original suit, while that original suit is pending, or (ii) in a separate,\n\nif the vicariously liable person is not independently liable.\"); 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:19 (4th ed.)\n(indemnification agreements \"tending to promote a breach of duty to the public\" generally not upheld).\nCf. Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.1.23, 34 (V.1. Super. Ct. 2017) (conducting an analysis under\nBanks v. International Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011), and finding that the Virgin\nIslands recognizes common law indemnification \"when an innocent party is held vic\n... [truncated, 2797 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/3 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=3]", "char_count": 2797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 5\n\n\"subsequent suit against the indemnitor.\" Restatement (Third) of Torts § 22, cmt. i (emphasis\nadded) (listing cases); see also Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 66 V.I. 23, 30 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2017)\n(denying motion to dismiss counterclaims for common law indemnification where claims were\nbrought in original tort suit); Manbodh v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. (In re Kelvin Manbodh\nAsbestos Lit. Series), 47 V.I. 375 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2006) (in original tort action where various\nparties brought claims for common law indemnification against third-party defendants, converting\nmotions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment and holding that the Restatement (Third) of\nTorts set forth applicable law). None of these sources supports Maxwell's argument that she may\npursue this independent action for common law indemnification while the underlying actions\nagainst her—both criminal and civil—remain pending in other jurisdictions.\nIn particular, Maxwell's contention that Willie \"expressly allows a party to 'plead' a\ncommon law indemnification claim before a judgment has been rendered,\" is critically misleading\nas applied to the present facts. (See Opposition at 6.) In performing a Banks analysis to determine\nthe soundest rule for the Virgin Islands with respect to common law indemnification,' the Willie\ncourt canvassed Virgin Islands precedent since 1980, concluding that there are two types of\ncommon law indemnification cases. In the first type of indemnity case, a party may plead an\nindemnity claim before it is found liable if it does so \"through a counterclaim or third-party\ncomplaint\" in the underlying liability action. Id. This was the situation in Willie. In the second\ntype of case, a party may bring a separate claim for indemnification \"after a party has been found\nliable\" in the underlying liability action. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in\n... [truncated, 2312 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/4 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=4]", "char_count": 2312}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 6\n\nassert a claim for common law indemnification unless and until her liability has been determined\nin the underlying actions.5\nII.\n\nMAXWELL'S CLAIM AGAINST NES FAILS.6\nA. The Court Should Dismiss Maxwell's Claim Against NES as a Matter of Law.\nMaxwell alleges upon information and belief that NES's governing corporate documents\n\nentitle her to the advancement of expenses and indemnification that she now demands. (Comp!.\n\n5. All three of the other decisions cited by Plaintiff-Vandenhouten v. Olde Towne Tours, LLC, No.\n2000841, 2009 WL 1956360, at *5 (D.V.I. July 8, 2009),\nv. Sunrise Med. (US), LLC, No.\n2012/29, 2013 WL 3775461, at *6 (D.V.I. July 17, 2013) and Manbodh, 47 V.I. 392-95—are the first\ntype of case, where an indemnity claim was asserted in an existing action as a counterclaim or thirdparty claim, and are therefore inapplicable here. Moreover, while Maxwell incorrectly asserts that\nManbodh is directly contrary to the relevant holding in Willie, Manbodh says nothing about bringing a\nseparate claim for indemnification while the underlying action remains pending, and that was not the\nsituation faced by that court. Instead, Manbodh holds that the Restatement (Third) of Torts, rather than\nthe First or Second Restatements, sets forth applicable law. Id. at 392-94. As discussed above, the\nRestatement (Third) of Torts provides that a claim for indemnification may be brought in the original\nunderlying action or a subsequent suit:\nExcept when a contract for indemnity provides otherwise ... an indemnitee must extinguish the\nliability of the indemnitor to collect indemnity. The indemnitec may do so either by a settlement\nwith the plaintiff that by its terms or by application of law discharges the indemnitor from liability\nor by satisfaction of judgment that by operation of law discharges the indemnitor from liability.\n... An indemnitee\n... [truncated, 3698 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/5 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=5]", "char_count": 3698}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-15.5\nPage 7\n\n1 47.) However, when presented with the actual corporate document in question—the NES\nOperating Agreement—Maxwell ignores the effect of that document, which unambiguously\nallows NES to decline her claims for indemnification and advancement of fees and expenses. (See\nMotion to Dismiss 6—8)7 Instead, Maxwell contends that she should be allowed to conduct a\nfishing expedition in the hopes of finding some other document that might undermine the\nunambiguous language of NES's Operating Agreement. That is not the law.\nAs Maxwell acknowledges, courts deciding a motion to dismiss may consider \"items of\nunquestioned authenticity that are referred to in the challenged pleading and are integral to the\npleader's claim for relief.\" (Opposition at 11 n.7.) Put another way, this Court is free to consider\n\"documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party\nquestions, but which are not physically attached to the pleadings.\" Groff v. Cane Bay Partners VI,\nLLLP, No. SX-15-CV-127, 2017 WL 2709832, at •1-2 (V.1. Super. Ct. June 20, 2017). \"The\n\nreasoning underlying this approach is particularly sound where the exhibit being considered is the\nvery document forming the basis of a plaintiff's complaint.\" Id. at • 1.8\n\nof the estate, rather than the estate itself, as a party.\"). This principle is reflected in 15 V.1.C. § 606\n(\"Commencement of action against executor or administrator\"). While Maxwell cites cases in which\nan estate has been named as a defendant, there is no indication that the status of the estate as a entity\nwith the capacity to be sued was at issue in any of those proceedings. The Court should decline\nMaxwell's invitation to create law recognizing an estate as a separate legal entity here.\n7. The NES Operating Agreement also forbids indemnification for \"fraud, gross negligence, or reckless\nor intentional\n... [truncated, 2928 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/6 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=6]", "char_count": 2928}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein et al.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-1.55\nPage 8\n\nHere, Maxwell does not contest the authenticity of the NES Operating Agreement attached\nto the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss.9 And the NES Operating Agreement is \"integral\" to\nMaxwell's claim that she is entitled to mandatory indemnification and the advancement of fees\nand a myriad of other costs due to the \"corporate organizational documents for NES.\" (Compl.\n1 47.) Under applicable New York law,I° \"[t]he operating agreement is the primary governing\ninstrument for\" a New York LLC, and must contain \"any provision not inconsistent with law or\nits articles of organization relating to (i) the business of the LLC, (ii) the conduct of its affairs and\n(iii) the rights, powers, preferences, limitations or responsibilities of its members, managers,\nemployees or agents.\" N.Y. Limit. Liab. Co. Ch. 34, Refs & Annos § 5.1. In other words,\nMaxwell's claim for contractual indemnification is based on her allegations about the contents of\nNES's corporate organization documents and, under New York law, the NES Operating\nAgreement is NES's corporate organization document. See Groff, 2017 WL 2709832, at *1-2 (in\na case asserting claims for breach of an employment agreement and breach of the implied covenant\n\nonly selected and misleading portions of such documents could not be dismissed under Rule I2(b)(6)\neven though they would be doomed to failure.\" Id. In addition, the Court may consider \"a document\nattached to a motion to dismiss ... if the attached document is: \"(1) central to the Plaintiff's claim; and\n(2) undisputed.\" Id. (quoting Ackah v. Hershey Foods Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (M.D. Pa.\n2002)). That is the case here.\n9. While Maxwell argues that the Court cannot consider the NES Operating Agreement because \"[t]he\noperative operating agreements are not in her possession,\" there is no legal or factual basis to believe\nthat an earlier\n... [truncated, 2721 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/7 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=7]", "char_count": 2721}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 9\n\nof good faith and fair dealing, holding that the original offer letter and form employment contract\ncan be considered on motion to dismiss).\nTo the extent that Maxwell now argues that her claim for indemnification from NES is\nbased on an implied or unwritten corporate obligation that she might find evidence of, if only she\nwere allowed to rummage through NES's files, this argument is barred by the New York Statute\nof Frauds. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(2) (requiring an agreement to be in writing if \"by its\nterms is not to be performed within one year of the making thereof or the performance of which is\nnot to be completed before the end of a lifetime\" or it \"[i]s a special promise to answer for the\ndebt, default or miscarriage of another person\").\" Such an argument is also barred by the Virgin\nIslands Statute of Frauds. 28 V.I.C. § 244 (2019) (voiding any unwritten agreement that (1) \"by\nits terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof\" or (2) constitutes \"[a]\nspecial promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of another person\"); see, e.g., Guye\nv. Lutheran Soc. Servs. ofthe Virgin Islands, Inc., No. SX-10-CV-119, 2011 WL 13116070, at *34 (V.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss claim for the alleged breach of an\nemployment agreement pursuant to the Virgin Islands Statute of Frauds where plaintiff did not\nassert the existence of a valid, written agreement); Arawak Foods, Inc. v. Lawaetz, No. 764/1983,\n1985 WL 1264047, at *3 (Terr. V.I. Feb. 21, 1985) (letter stating that defendant personally\n\n11. New York limited liability companies without written operating agreements apply the default\nprovisions set forth in New York statutes, which permit—but do not require—a company to choose to\nindemnify employees under certain circumstances. See, e.g., In re Eight ofSwords, LLC, 96 A\n... [truncated, 2291 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/8 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=8]", "char_count": 2291}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 10\n\nguaranteed that a corporation's debt would be paid found insufficient to satisfy the Statute of\nFrauds). 12\nMaterials outside of the NES Operating Agreement likewise are insufficient to undermine\nthe unambiguous language of that Agreement. See, e.g., Borriello v. Loconte, No. 503180/2013,\n2014 WL 702172, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 24, 2014) (finding that, where operating agreement\nprovided for indemnification but was silent on the issue of advancement of fees, LLC members\ncould not vote to advance legal fees); N.Y. Limit. Liab. Co. Ch. 34, Refs & Annos § 5.2.2 (material\noutside of written operating agreement insufficient to find obligation in face of written operating\nagreement).\n\nFinally, Maxwell's assertions that there are \"presumably\" or \"surely\" earlier\n\noperating agreements of NES and that she \"may\" have rights pursuant to those agreements\n(Opposition at 9-10) are mere speculation—not even rising to the level of factual allegations—\ninsufficient to support her complaint. See, e.g., Brathwaite v. HD.V.I. Holding Co., Inc., No. STI6-CV-764, 2017 WL 2295123 at *2 (V.I. Super. Ct. May 24, 2017) (a complaint must \"adequately\nallgen facts that put an accused on notice of claims brought against it\") (emphasis added). 13\n\n12. To the extent that Maxwell's first cause of action is based on an alleged oral promise, it is likewise\nbarred in its entirety by the Statute of Frauds. See, e.g., MacKay v. Paesano, 185 A.D.3d 915, 916\n(N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (where breach of contract action dismissed based on Statute of Frauds,\npromissory estoppel claim also correctly dismissed as an impermissible attempt to circumvent the\nStatute of Frauds).\n13. Maxwell does not respond to that portion of the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss Count Three of her\nComplaint to the extent it seeks contractual indemnification from \"other entities\" not named as\ndefendan\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/9 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=9]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein et al.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage I I\n\nB. In the Alternative, the Court Should Convert this Motion to a Motion for\nSummary Judgment and Dismiss Maxwell's Claim Against NES.\nTo the extent that the Court concludes that it may not consider the NES Operating\nAgreement on this motion to dismiss, the Court should convert this proceeding to a motion for\nsummary judgment under Rule 12(d) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,\nStanley v. Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections, No. ST-16-MC-075, 2020 WL 1639902, at *5\n(V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2020) (holding that the notice requirement of Rule 12(d) was satisfied\nwhere moving party attached material outside of pleadings, opposing party noted that it was\noutside of pleadings and that, in consideration thereof, the Cout would convert the motion to\ndismiss to one for summary judgment, and opponent received additional time to respond in order\nto provide contrary factual materials). \"[W]hen considering a motion for summary judgment, a\ntrial judge can consider material outside the pleadings, including affidavits, responses to discovery,\nand other evidence to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact.\" Racz v. Cheetham,\nST-17-CV-461, 2019 WL 7985359, at *2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2019) (granting summary\njudgment).\nSummary judgment is appropriate where, as here, \"there is no genuine dispute as to any\nmaterial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" V.I. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a).\nOnce the party moving for summary judgment has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of\nmaterial fact, \"the responding party must introduce some evidence showing a genuine issue for\ntrial. To carry this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on its allegations alone, but must\npresent actual evidence, amounting to more than a scintilla, in support of its position.\"\n\nv.\n\nVirgin Islands Water and Power \n... [truncated, 2280 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/10 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=10]", "char_count": 2280}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 12\n\nit cannot require additional discovery without showing that \"the facts sought exist.\" Family Home\nand Finance Center, Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Morig. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008)\n(affirming grant of summary judgment despite nonmovant's argument that discovery was needed\nto oppose); see also, e.g., Carney v. U.S. Dept of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 813 (2d Cir. 1994)\n(affirming grant of summary judgment where nonmovant merely speculated about evidence that\ncould be adduced in discovery).\nAs discussed above and in the Motion to Dismiss, the language of the NES Operating\nAgreement unambiguously demonstrates that NES has no obligation to indemnify Maxwell or\nadvance her fees and expenses. (See Motion to Dismiss at 6-9 & Ex. C.) Even if Maxwell could\nadduce evidence of an implied agreement or oral promise for indemnification, such an agreement\nor promise could not give rise to an enforceable indemnification obligation. (Supra § ILA.) And\nwhile Maxwell speculates (again, without basis in law or fact) that there are \"presumably\" earlier\noperating agreements of NES and that she \"may\" have rights pursuant to those hypothetical\nagreements (Opposition at 9-10), such speculation—which does not even rise to the level of a\nfactual allegation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss—is insufficient to meet Maxwell's\nburden here. Because no genuine dispute of material fact exists and Maxwell offers nothing more\nthan her mere hope that discovery could possibly reveal something that might support her claim,\nthe Court should dismiss Maxwell's claim against NES.\nIII.\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth herein and in the Co-Executors' Motion to Dismiss, the Court\n\nshould dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.14\n\n14. In recent briefing on its motion to intervene in this action, the Government of the Virgin Islands asserts\nthat, where Maxwell's c\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822306/11 or ?id=EFTA02822306&page=11]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822306", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein etal.\nCo-Executors' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss\n\nCase No. ST-20-CV-155\nPage 13\n\nRespectfully,\n/s/\n\nKroblin\nKROBLIN, ESQ.\nANDREW W. HEYMANN, ESQ.\nWILLIAM L. BLUM, ESQ.\nSHARI N. D'ANDRADE, ESQ\nMARJORIE WHALEN, ESQ.\nV.I. Bar Nos. 966 266 136, 1221 & R2019\nKELLERHALS\nKROBLIN PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\n9053 Estate M,\nSuite 101\nSt. M,\nV.I. 00802\nTelephone: (340) 779-2564\nFacsimile: (888) 316-9269\nEmail: ckroblin@kellfer.com\naheymann@solblum.com\nwblum@solblum.com\nsdandrade@kellfer.com\nmwhalen@kellfer.com\n\nDated: September 28, 2020\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28'h day of September 2020, I caused a true and exact\ncopy of the foregoing Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, which complies with the page or\nword limitation set forth in Rule 6-1(e), to be served via VIJEFS upon:\nKyle R. Waldner,\nQuintairos, Prieto,\n& Boyer, P.A.\n9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4'h Floor\nMiami, FL 33156\nlovaldner®qpwblaw.com\n\n/s/\n\nKroblin\n\nExecutors clearly arc inadequate to represent the Government's interest in preserving Estate Funds . .\n. ,\" bizarrely accepting as gospel truth Maxwell's allegation that one of the Co-Executors orally agreed\nto indemnify her. (Gov't of the U.S. Virgin Islands' Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Intervene,\ndated September 22, 2020, at 4 (emphasis in original).) That is nonsense: as the Court is well aware,\nthe Co-Executors refused to indemnify Maxwell. Maxwell brought this action seeking to obtain\nindemnification; by this Motion, the Co-Executors seek to dismiss Maxwell's claims for\nindemnification in their entirety.\n\nEFTA02822318\n\n", "char_count": 1646}]}