{"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_count": 15, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02822253", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02822253.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "IN THE SUPERIORCOIVT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\n\nFILED\nSeptember 08, 2020\n\nTAMARA CHARLES\nCLERK OF THE COURT\n\nIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nAND ST. JOHN\nDIVISION OF ST.\nCIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\n\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY\nE. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his\ncapacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE\nOF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LW, a\nNew York Limited Liability Company,\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS\nPlaintiff GHISLAINE MAXWELL (\"Plaintiff'), by counsel, pursuant to V.I.R.Civ.P. 12,\nhereby opposes the Motion to Dismiss' (the \"Motion to Dismiss\") filed by Defendants DARREN\nK. INDYKE (\"Indyke\") and RICHARD D. KAHN (\"Kahn\") (collectively, the \"Co-Executors\"),\nin their capacity as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and on behalf\nof the Estate and NES, LLC (\"NES\").\nL\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nDefendants' Motion to dismiss must be denied because its primary basis is now moot and\n\nit secondary arguments have no sufficient basis.\nFirst, Co-Executors' argument that Plaintiffs claim against them is premature in\nviolation of 15 V.I.0 § 606(a) is no longer viable. While the Co-Executors argue that they may\n\nThe Motion to Dismiss is cited herein by page number as \"MTD.\"\n\nEFTA02822253\n\n", "char_count": 1372}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 2 of 14\nnot be sued until the expiration of twelve months from the granting of letters testamentary, that\ntime has now passed. Under the Virgin Islands Supreme Court's ruling in Ottley v. Estate ofBell,\n61 V.I. 480 (2014), this action may proceed against the Co-Executors.\nNext, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff's claim for common law indemnification is\npremature on the grounds that a judgment has not yet been rendered against her likewise must\nfail. Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts supporting each element of a claim for common law\nindemnification recognized in this jurisdiction.\nFinally, NES, LLC's argument that Plaintiff's claim for indemnification fails to state a\nclaim is meritless and depends entirely on irrelevant matters that fall outside the four corners of\nthe Complaint. NES, LLC improperly invites this Court to award it summary judgment on the\nmerits of Plaintiff's claim based on a company operating agreement adopted long after Plaintiff\nserved as a company manager. Because this document does not directly pertain to the allegations\nof the Complaint, this Court should exclude it from its consideration of the Motion to Dismiss\nand consider only the allegations in the Complaint (viewing these allegations and reasonable\ninferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff). Since NES, LLC does not otherwise\nargue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it upon which relief can be granted, its motion\nmust be denied.\nII.\n\nSTANDARD\nA motion to dismiss under V.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) must be decided based upon V.I. R.\n\nCiv. P. 8's pleading standards. The Virgin Islands is a \"Notice\" pleading jurisdiction. Under Rule\n8(a)(2), a claim for relief must contain \"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the\npleader is entitled to relief-because this is a notice pleading jurisdiction ... .\n\nRule 8's adoption\n\nEFTA02822254\n\n", "char_count": 1918}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 3 of 14\n\"eliminates the [federal] plausibility standard and instead will permit a complaint so long as it\nadequately alleges facts that put an accused party on notice of claims brought against it.\" Milky. Mapp, 67 V.I. 574, 585 (V.I. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);\nsee also V.I. R. Civ. P. 8, Comment (this approach \"declines to enter dismissals of cases based\non failure to allege specific facts which, if established, plausibly entitle the pleader to relief.\"). In\napplying this standard, the Court must \"'view the facts alleged in the pleadings and the\ninferences to be drawn from these facts, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.\"' Pedro v.\nRanger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 251, 264 (Super. Ct. 2019) (quoting\n\nv. AIG Ins. of\n\nP.R., 56 V.I. 558, 566 (V.I. 2012)). Rule 8 \"will permit a complaint so long as it adequately\nalleges facts that put an accused party on notice of claims brought against it[,]\"\n67 V.I. at 585, and \"declines to enter dismissals of cases based on failure to allege specific facts\nwhich, if established, plausibly entitle the pleader to relief,\" V.I. R. Civ. P. 8, Comment.\n\nIII.\n\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nThe Estate May Be Sued In Its Own Capacity And Is Properly Named As A\nDefendant\n\nDefendants suggest in a footnote that it was improper for Plaintiff to name the Estate as\ndefendant in this action because it \"does not have a separate identity and may not be sued as a\nparty.\" See MTD at 2 n.1. Defendants do not cite any provision of Virgin Islands law in support\nof this argument. In fact, there is no provision of Virgin Islands law precluding an action against\n\nEFTA02822255\n\n", "char_count": 1672}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 4 of 14\nan estate, no Virgin Islands has held that it is improper to do so, and courts in this jurisdiction\ncustomarily allow it.2\nFor example, in Ottley v. Estate of Bell, 61 V.I. 480 (2014), the Virgin Islands Supreme\nCourt addressed a lawsuit naming an estate as defendant. See id. at 486 (\"Ottley named Bell's\nestate, Eboni, and Gerard . . . as defendants in the action.\"). In deciding the appeal, the Virgin\nIslands Supreme Court held that it was permissible for the plaintiff to sue the estate. See id. at\n500 (\"Ottley correctly named Bell's estate as the defendant, and although not necessary,\nadditionally listed the two heirs entitled to inherit her interest in the property.\"). Consistent with\nthis decision, Courts in the Virgin Islands have commonly recognized estates as legal entities\nthat can sue and be sued. See, e.g., Laforce v. Estate of Laforce, 2019 WL 7987454, at *2 (V.I.\nSuper. Dec. 27, 2019); Garvey v. Estate of Moorhead, 2016 WL 9503603, at *2 (V.I. Super.\nAug. 1, 2016); Kalloo v. Estate of Small, 2015 WL 1514572, at *1 (V.I. Mar. 27, 2015);\nGuardian Ins. Co. v. Estate of Knight-David, 2015 WL 5782098, at *1 (V.I. Super. Sept. 30,\n2015); Estate of Ludington v. Jaber, 2011 WL 1304470, at *1 (V.I. Mar. 22, 2011). These\ndecisions thus demonstrate that the Estate is properly subject to suit in this case.\nIn sum, Defendants' argument that the Estate may not be sued as a party is unsupported\nby any law, is inconsistent with the law and practice of this jurisdiction, and must be rejected.\n\n2 Defendants' sole citation in support of their argument is to an American Jurisprudence\ntreatise—which in turn relies on a single Illinois state court opinion from 1981—that clearly does\nnot reflect the law or practice of this jurisdiction.\n\nEFTA02822256\n\n", "char_count": 1812}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 5 of 14\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Not Premature\ni.\n\nPlaintiff's claims against the Co-Executors are ripe and\nmay proceed\n\nFirst, the Co-Executors argue that Plaintiff's claim against them is premature in violation\nof 15 V.I.0 § 606(a). See MTD at 4. This statute provides that\n[a]n action may be commenced against an executor or\nadministrator at any time after the expiration of twelve months\nfrom the granting of letters testamentary or of administration and\nuntil the final settlement of the estate and discharge of such\nexecutor or administrator from the trust, and not otherwise.\nCiting this provision, the Co-Executors argue that Plaintiff may not maintain an action against\nthem \"until September 6, 2020.\" See MTD at 4. Since this date has now passed, the CoExecutors argument under 15 V.I.0 § 606 is now moot.\nFurther, the fact that Plaintiff commenced this action before the conclusion of the twelvemonth letters testamentary period does not require dismissal. Facing this exact scenario, the\nVirgin Islands Supreme Court in Ottley v. Estate of Bell held that the Superior Court erred in\ndismissing a complaint for failure to comply with 15 V.I.0 § 606 where the claim had ripened by\nthe time the trial court dismissed it. 2014 WL 5471948, at *6 (\"Because Ottley could have\nimmediately refiled the complaint, and the law does not generally require a useless act, the\nSuperior Court erred in dismissing Ottley's complaint for the $60,000 debt on the basis of\nnoncompliance with section 606(b).\") Thus, even assuming Plaintiff was not in compliance with\nSection 606(a) at the time she filed her Complaint, Plaintiff's claims against the Co-Executors\nare now ripe by the Co-Executors' own measure and may proceed.;\n\n15 V.I.C. § 606(b) further provides that \"[a]n action against an executor or\nadministrator shall not be commenced until the claim of the plaintiff has been duly presented to\n3\n\nEFTA02822257\n\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 6 of 14\nii.\n\nPlaintiff's common-law claim for indemnification is ripe\nand may proceed\n\nSecond, Defendants suggest in a footnote that Plaintiff's common-law claim for\nindemnification is premature on the grounds that \"a party may not assert a common-law claim\nfor indemnification in a separate action before a judgment has been rendered against her.\" See\nMTD at 6 n.5.\nDefendants cite one case for this proposition, Willie v. Amerada Hess Corp., 2017 WL\n772808 (V.I. Super. Feb. 28, 2017). That case flatly contradicts Defendants' suggestion and\nplainly does not require dismissal of Plaintiff's claim here. In fact, Willie expressly allows a\nparty to ` lead\" a common law indemnification claim before a judgment has been rendered. Id.,\nat *30 (\"The Court also agrees that before a party can prevail on, but not plead, a common law\nindemnification claim, there must have been a determination that the person who initially\nbrought suit (in this case, Mr. Willie) was in fact injured.\") (Emphasis added.) Indeed, courts in\nthis jurisdiction commonly allow claims for indemnification to proceed despite the absence of\nany underlying judgment. Vandenhouten v. Olde Towne Tours, LLC, 2009 WL 1956360, at *5\n(D.V.I. July 8, 2009) (\"there is no merit to Francis's contention that any indemnity claim against\nhim must await a determination that Olde Towne is liable to the Vandenhoutens\");\n\nv.\n\nSunrise Med. (US), LLC, 2013 WL 3775461, at *6 (D.V.I. July 17, 2013).\nUnder Willie, upon which Defendants rely,\n[t]o state a claim for common law indemnification, the indemnitee\nmust allege that (1) it has been or may be sued (2) for damages, (3)\nproximately caused by the indemnitor's actions or inactions, and\nsuch executor or administrator and by him disallowed.\" Defendants do not—and could not—\nclaim that Plaintiff is in violation of this provision. Here, Plaintiff submitted a claim to the Estate\nand the Estate did not honor it. Compl. 11 28-29.\n\nEFTA02822258\n\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 7 of 14\n(4) but for the relationship between the indemnitee and the\nindemnitor, the indemnitee would not have been sued or found\nliable.\nWillie, 2017 WL 772808, at *42 (emphasis added).4\nHere, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts supporting each of these elements. First,\nPlaintiff alleges that she \"has incurred and will continue to incur significant legal fees, personal\n\nPlaintiff does not necessarily concede that Willie properly states the elements of a\ncommon law indemnification claim in this jurisdiction. The Willie opinion, more than anything,\ndemonstrates that this is not a settled area of law because the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has\nnot yet spoken to the issue. In Willie, the Superior Court recognizes that a \"key difference\"\nbetween the Restatement (Second) of Tort and the Restatement (Third) of Tort regarding\n\"Apportionment of Liability\" centers on whether a pre-judgment claim is ultimately viable, and\nthat the Restatement (Third) allows such claims while the earlier restatement does not. Id. at 30\n(citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22(a)). Nevertheless, the\nSuperior Court in Willie ultimately held that it would require an underlying judgment before\nentering any judgment on the merits on a common law claim for indemnification.\nThe Superior Court reached the opposite conclusion in In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos\nLitig. Series, 2006 WL 1084317 (V.I. Super. Mar. 6, 2006). In Manbodh, the Superior Court\n(through now-Justice, Hon. Maria Cabret) held that the rule for common law indemnification\nclaims contained in the Restatement (Third) of Tort is the majority rule and the best rule for the\nUSVI:\nIn sum, while both the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement\n(Third) contain more modern approaches to common law\ncontribution and indemnification, the Restatement (Third)\nrepresents the current majority substantive law. In the Restatement\n(Third), the drafters promote the interests of both flexibili\n... [truncated, 2749 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822253/6 or ?id=EFTA02822253&page=6]", "char_count": 2749}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 8 of 14\nsecurity costs, and other costs in connection with legal suits, proceedings, and investigations\nrelating to Epstein, his affiliated businesses, and his alleged victims.\" Compl. 1 25. Second,\nPlaintiff alleges that she \"incurred these legal fees and expenses as a direct result of Epstein's\nacts and/or omissions.\" Compl. 1 43. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that \"[t]he suits, proceedings,\nand/or investigations for which Maxwell seeks indemnification were instituted against Maxwell\nsolely because she was an employee of Epstein and his affiliated businesses.\" Comp1.1 42.\nFor all of the foregoing masons, Plaintiff's claim for common law indemnification is\nviable.\nC.\n\nNES, LLC's Request That The Court Consider Matters Outside The\nPleadings Should Be Rejected\n\nDefendants argue that Plaintiff's claim for indemnification against NES, LLC fails\nbecause \"NES has no obligation to indemnify [Plaintiff] for or advance her fees and expenses\"\nunder the \"Operating Agreement of NES, LLC dated January 1, 2014\" (hereinafter, the \"2014\nOperating Agreement\"). See MTD at 6. While Plaintiff did not expressly reference or premise\nher claims on the 2014 Operating Agreement, Defendants submit a copy of this Operating\nAgreement with its Opposition and invites the Court to consider it as part of the \"pleadings.\" See\nMTD at 6. In other words, NES, LLC seeks judgment on the merits of this claim based entirely\non matters outside the pleadings.\nIn ruling on a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief, courts\n'assume all reasonable factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all fair inferences\nfrom such allegations.'\" Arno v. Hess Corp., 2019 WL 5295588, at *14 (citation omitted). \"The\nbasic purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint to state an\n\nEFTA02822260\n\n", "char_count": 1871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 9 of 14\nactionable claim, not to test the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.\" Id. (emphasis\nadded) (citation omitted).\n\"[C]ourts [in the Virgin Islands] have the discretion to exclude extra-pleading materials\nattached to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief.\" Stanley v. Virgin Islands\nBureau of Corr., 2020 WL 1639902, at •4 (V.I. Super. Apr. 1, 2020) (citing Howell v. U.S.V.I.\nPolice Dep't, 67 V.I. 149, 158 n.4 (Super. Ct. 2016)). In Howell, the defendant submitted two\ndocuments with its pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Howell, 67 V.I. 149,\n158 n.4. Finding that those documents \"[did] not directly pertain to any allegation asserted in the\ncomplaint\" and \"[were] not relevant to deciding the present motion to dismiss,\" the Court did not\nconvert the motion to a motion for summary judgment and decided the motion based on the\nallegations in the complaint. /d.\nHere, Defendants fail to demonstrate the relevance of its extraneous submission.\nDefendants ask this Court to accept, without a verified statements, that the 2014 Operating\nAgreement is the controlling document here. Indeed, the document raises more questions than it\nanswers. According to the first page of the 2014 Operating Agreement, NES, LLC was formed in\n1998. Presumably, there exist earlier operating agreements relating to the company. Plaintiff may\nenjoy rights under prior LLC operating agreements. See, e.g., Branin v.\n\nRoe Inv. Counsel,\n\nLLC, 2014 WL 2961084, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (finding that an enforceable right to\n5 The rules in fact require the Court to reject Defendants' unverified statements regarding\n\nthe 2014 Operating Agreement and otherwise. See V.1.R.Civ.P. 6-1(d) (requiring that \"thenavailable\" affidavits and other documents supporting a party's position to be filed simultaneously\nwith a motion that contains allegations of fact not appearing of record). For example, Defendants\napparently ask the \n... [truncated, 2220 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822253/8 or ?id=EFTA02822253&page=8]", "char_count": 2220}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 10 of 14\nindemnification can vest in accordance with the terms of an operating agreement such that it may\nnot thereafter be rescinded by a later amendment to the agreement).\nFurther Plaintiff was a manager of the LLC during the mid-2000s, well before the\neffective date of the 2014 Operating Agreement. Compl. III 15; 46. The company thus had a\ndifferent management structure, and surely a different operating agreement, at the time that\nPlaintiff was a company manager. Plaintiff is entitled to discover all circumstances surrounding\nthe company and its indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies over time, including\nany in effect during her time as manager, before she is required to respond to Defendants'\nmotion seeking judgment on the merits of the claim. Plaintiff is not able to do so now due to the\nEstate's refusal to voluntarily provide any documents relating to the company. See Compl. 151\n(\"By ... letter dated November 22, 2019 [to the Co-Executors], Maxwell requested copies of\ndocuments setting forth applicable indemnification and/or advancement rights and policies,\nincluding any operating agreements for NES, LLC, and never received a response.\")\nDefendants themselves suggest that the Court should consider the 2014 Operating\nAgreement pursuant to the so-called \"incorporation-by-reference\" doctrine, claiming that\nPlaintiff \"expressly incorporates by reference NES's corporate organizational documents in her\nComplaint.\" See MTD at 6 n.6. This doctrine is not applicable here.6 The \"incorporation-byreference\" doctrine allows a court to \"review the actual document referenced in the complaint\"\n6 The \"incorporation-by-reference\" doctrine has not been expressly adopted by the Virgin\n\nIslands Supreme Court, has not been widely embraced in the Virgin Islands, and Defendants\nultimately fail to establish that this jurisdiction should recognize this common law rule. See Gov't\nof the V.I. v. =,\n2014 WL 702639, at *3 (V.I. Feb 24, 2014\n... [truncated, 2241 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822253/9 or ?id=EFTA02822253&page=9]", "char_count": 2241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 11 of 14\nto ensure that language has not been taken out of context. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. v.\nDaniel, 2020 WL 1819622, at *8 (V.I. Super. Apr. 8, 2020) (emphasis added). Unlike the Hess\ncase, upon which Defendants rely, Plaintiff's Complaint does not expressly reference the 2014\nOperating Agreement, which is, in any event, not relevant to the claims hem. Plaintiff did not\nincorporate by reference any particular version of the operating agreement because she was\nunable to do so. The operative operating agreements are not in her possession. Plaintiff asked\nthe Estate for documents pertaining to NES, LLC before commencing this action but was\nrefused. The \"incorporation-by-reference\" doctrine is therefore inapplicable here.?\nFinally, in the event that this Court elects to consider the extraneous documents submitted\nby Defendants with their Motion to Dismiss, thereby converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion\nfor summary judgment, Plaintiff asks that she have a reasonable opportunity to conduct the\ndiscovery described herein. Rule 12(d) provides that:\nIf, on a motion under Rule 12(6)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the\npleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the\nmotion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule\n56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to\npresent all the material that is pertinent to the motion.\n\n7 To the extent Defendants suggest that the 2014 Operating Agreement is not a \"matter\n\noutside the pleading\" for some other reason, any such suggestion too must fail. \"[Ably written or\noral evidence introduced challenging the pleadings that `does not merely reiterate what is said in\nthe pleadings, will constitute a matter outside the pleading for the purpose of triggering a\nconversion, if not excluded?\" Raymond v. Assefa, 2017 WL 5303467, at *3 (V.I. Super. Nov. 8,\n2017) (citing In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litigation Series, 47 V.I. 375, 382 (V.I. Super\n2006. A court may only consi\n... [truncated, 2397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822253/10 or ?id=EFTA02822253&page=10]", "char_count": 2397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 12 of 14\nV.I.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (emphasis added). The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has repeatedly\nreinforced the requirement that a non-moving party have notice and a fair opportunity to be\nheard with respect to any grounds for summary judgment raised sua sponte. United Corp. v.\nHamed, 2016 WL 154893, at •5 (V.I. Jan. 12, 2016); Raymond v. Assefa, 2017 WL 5303467, at\n•3 (V.I. Super. Nov. 8, 2017) (listing Virgin Islands Supreme Court cases). Failure to give a nonmoving party adequate notice before conversion constitutes reversible error. Stanley, 2020 WL\n1639902, at *5.\nHere, NES, LLC may not be permitted to obtain a summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim\nfor indemnification before Plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to conduct essential discovery.\nNES, LLC has not moved to dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff failed to state a claim for\nrelief. Instead, NES, LLC seeks judgment on the merits. The applicable rules of procedure\ncontemplate that a party may conduct necessary discovery before a response to a Rule 56 motion\nmust be made. See, e.g., V.I.R.Civ.P. 56(d) (\"If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration\nthat, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may\n... defer considering the motion or deny it; ... allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to\ntake discovery; or ... issue any other appropriate order.\").8 Here, this necessary discovery is\nexclusively in the possession of NES, LLC and the other Defendants. The Court should therefore\ndeny NES, LLC's Rule 56 motion so that the parties can conduct discovery on the issues\npresented therein.\nIn sum, because the 2014 Operating Agreement does not \"directly pertain to any\nallegation asserted in the [Clomplaint,\" the Court should exclude it from its consideration of the\n8 Plaintiff reserves the right to file a motion pursuant to V.I.R.Civ.P. 56(d) in the event\n\nthat Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is converted to a Rule 56\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02822253/11 or ?id=EFTA02822253&page=11]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 13 of 14\nMotion to Dismiss and consider only the allegations in the Complaint. See Howell, supra, at 158\nn.4 (emphasis added). In the event the Court elects to consider this agreement and converts the\nMotion to Dismiss to a Rule 56 motion, Plaintiff asks that consideration of such motion be\ndeferred until she can conduct necessary discovery.\nIV.\n\nCONCLUSION\nDefendants' arguments in support of dismissal lack legal support and must fail. Their\n\nMotion to Dismiss therefore should be denied.\n\nDated: September 8, 2020\nQUINTAIROS, PRIETO,\n& BOYER, P.A.\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff\n9300 S. Dadeland Blvd., 4th Floor\nMiami, FL 33156\nT: (340) 693-0230\nF: (340) 693-0300\n\nBy:\n\n/s/ Kyle R. Waldner\nKyle R. Waldner, Esq.\nkwaldner@emblaw.com\nV.I. Bar No.: 1038\n\nEFTA02822265\n\n", "char_count": 798}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "CIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nPage 14 of 14\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, which complies with\nthe word and page requirements of V.I.R.Civ.P. 6-1(e), was served via email and U.S. Mail this\n8th day of September, 2020 to:\nKroblin, Esq.\nKELLERHALS\nKROBLIN PLLC\nPalms Professional Building\n9053 Estate M,\nSuite 101\n, V.1.00802\nSt.\nckroblin@kellfer.com\nAriel M. =,\nEsq. (AAG)\nVIRGIN ISLANDS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nOffice of the Attorney General\n34-38 Kronprindsens Gade\nSt.\nU.S. Virgin Islands 00802\n\nIs/ Kyle R. Waldner\nKyle R. Waldner, Esq.\nkwaldner@cumblaw.com\nV.I. Bar No.: 1038\n\nEFTA02822266\n\n", "char_count": 649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02822253", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\nDIVISION OF ST.\nAND ST. JOHN\nCIVIL CASE NO.: ST-20-CV-155\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\n\nESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDARREN K. INDYKE, in his capacity as\nEXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY\nE. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. KAHN, in his\ncapacity as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE\nOF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, and NES, LW, a\nNew York Limited Liability Company,\nDefendants.\n\nORDER\nThis matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (the \"Motion\") filed by\nDefendants DARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in their capacity as Co-Executors\nof the Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Estate\"), and on behalf of the Estate, and NES, LLC\n(\"NES\"). The Court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby\nORDERED, that the Motion is hereby DENIED; and it is further\nORDERED, that a certified copy of this Order shall be distributed to counsel of record.\n\nDated:\nATTEST:\nTamara Charles\nClerk of the Court\nBy:\nDated:\n\nJUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT\nOF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS\n\nEFTA02822267\n\n", "char_count": 1008}]}