{"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_count": 16, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02819221", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02819221.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 1 of 16\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\nv.\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DCF)\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors of\nthe ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR\nMOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02819221\n\n", "char_count": 543}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 2 of 16\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nI\n\nARGUMENT\n\nI\n\nA.\n\nPlaintiff has the procedural burden backwards: she fails to meet her\nburden to allege facts sufficient to invoke an extraordinary exception to\nthe statute of limitations\n1.\n\n2.\n\n1\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) because she fails to\npresent a criminal indictment that arises from Decedent's alleged\nconduct towards her\n\n1\n\nPlaintiff bears the burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances;\nshe fails to meet this burden\n\n2\n\nB.\n\nThis motion is proper and timely regardless of its title.\n\n6\n\nC.\n\nThere is no basis to disregard black letter New York law applying the law\nof the place of alleged torts to the issue of punitive damages.\n\n7\n\nEven if USVI law applies, which it does not, it follows the majority rule\nprohibiting recovery of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate\n\n9\n\nD.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n10\n\nEFTA02819222\n\n", "char_count": 969}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 3 of 16\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAbercrombie v. College,\n438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)\n\n3\n\nAmusement Indus. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n7\n\nBlissett v. Eisenstnidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n8\n\nBooth v. Bowen,\nNo. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\n\n10\n\nBrandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd.,\n24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Tern Ct. 1989)\n\n10\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n5\n\nBurrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co.,\n226 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)\n\n7\n\nCerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC,\nNo. 07 Civ. 7998 (HB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28999 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,\n2008)\n\n7\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1999)\n\n2\n\nv. Christian,\n46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005)\n\n10\n\nv. M,\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) ...............................................6\nDeutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.,\n723 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n8\n\nFairley v.\n09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.)\n(Gardephe, J.)\n\n3\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019).\n\n.4, 5\n\nii\n\nEFTA02819223\n\n", "char_count": 1237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 4 of 16\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct.\n23, 2018)\n\n2\n\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n5\n\nGatlin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)..\n\n5\n\nGov't of Virgin Islands v.\nNo. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014)\n\n10\n\nGuidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp.,\nNo. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)\n\n8\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n5\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009)\n\n10\n\nHirsch v. Rehs Galleries, Inc.,\nNo. 18-CV-11864 (VSB), 2020 WL 917213 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2020)\n\n5\n\nHunter v. Palisades Acquistion XVI, LLC,\n2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189902 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)\n\n7\n\nIsaac v. Crichlow,\n63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n10\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n3\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\n97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998)\n\n6\n\nIn re Merrill\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig.,\n851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n7\n\nNash v. Coram Healthcare Corp.,\nNo. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,\n1996)\n\n7\n\nNat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\nNo. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,\n2019)\n\n8, 9\n\niii\n\nEFTA02819224\n\n", "char_count": 1421}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 5 of 16\n\nOkyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC,\n961 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n\n7\n\nOrtiz v. Cornetta,\n867 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1989)\n\n5\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n,\n69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n10\n\nPowell v. Chi-Co's Distrib.,\nNo. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014)\n\n10\n\nSIB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n\n6\n\nSt.\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows,\n15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Ten. Ct. 1979)\n\n10\n\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt,\nNo. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n8\n\nStenberg v. Carhart,\n530 U.S. 914 (2000)\n\n10\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC V. Austin,\nNo. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n(Batts, J.)\n\n6\n\nv. Rijos,\n780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D.V.I. 2011)\n\n10\n\nZimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch.,\n888 F. Supp. 2d 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n5\n\nStatutes\nEPTL §11-3.2(a)(1)\n\n7, 8\n\nOther Authorities\nC.\n\n& A.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.)\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a)\n\n6\n1, 2, 3\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)\n\n3\n\n2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)\n\n10\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2)\n\n10\niv\n\nEFTA02819225\n\n", "char_count": 1277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 6 of 16\n\nThe Co-Executors' submit this reply memorandum of law in support of their motion to\ndismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1).\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to depart from well-established\nlaw to resuscitate her claims that expired fifteen years ago. First Plaintiff asks the Court to\ndisregard basic principles of statutory interpretation and numerous cases applying CPLR §\n215(8)(a) by holding that, unless a criminal indictment expressly rules out that it arises from the\nsame event as a civil action, then a plaintiff in the civil action may invoke that rule to revive a\ntime-barred claim. Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to disregard Second Circuit authority holding\nthat it is Plaintiffs burden to allege \"extraordinary circumstances\" to toll the statutes of limitations.\nThird while conceding that courts generally apply the law of the place of a tort to the issue of\npunitive damages, Plaintiff nonetheless urges this Court to create a new rule whereby, if an alleged\ntortfeasor's will is being probated in a jurisdiction that has nothing to do with the tort, the law of\nthe probate jurisdiction should apply. Plaintiffs requests are baseless.\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nPlaintiff has the procedural burden backwards: she fails to meet her burden to\nallege facts sufficient to invoke an extraordinary exception to the statute of\nlimitations.\nI.\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) because she fails to present a\ncriminal indictment that arises from Decedent's alleged conduct towards her.\n\nPlaintiff's central premise in arguing for application of CPLR § 215(8)(a) to this action,\nnotwithstanding the Indictment charges sex-trafficking of minors while Plaintiff alleges she was\nabused by Decedent as an adult, is that the \"pattern described in the Indictment matches\n\nCapitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Co-Executors'\nmoving brie\n... [truncated, 2018 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/5 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=5]", "char_count": 2018}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 7 of 16\n\n[Plaintiff's] experience.\" (Op. Br. p. 5.) Even assuming that is correct, it does not render CPLR §\n215(8)(a) applicable. Rather, to invoke CPLR § 215(8Xa), Plaintiff is required to establish the\nIndictment and this action arise from the same \"event or occurrence\"—i.e., what Decedent\nallegedly did to her. Plaintiff fails to do this.\nThe Indictment has nothing to do with Plaintiff, even if it concerns her alleged abuser and\ndescribes a \"pattern\" similar to what she described. There is no legal authority that permits a civil\nPlaintiff to interpret CPLR § 215(8)(a) in such an open-ended manner. Plaintiff's assertion that\nthe Indictment \"was not restricted to minors\" (Op. Br. p. 8) defies a plain reading of it. Plaintiff's\nreliance on an FBI press release (id.) is unconvincing in light of the language in the Indictment\nitself: it alleges that Decedent sexually trafficked \"minor girls\" (Compl., Ex. A at 1 1 (emphasis\nadded)), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking of \"minors\" (Id., Ex. A at ¶J2 - 4, 6, 8,\nI1- 15, 18 - 20, 22).\nThe cases cited in the Co-Executors' moving brief confirm that, even where it is undisputed\nthat the subject criminal indictment concerns the civil plaintiff and the same kind of conduct\nalleged in the plaintiff's civil complaint, CPLR § 215(8)(a) still does not apply where the\nindictment and civil action arise from different events or occurrences—i.e., the express limitation\nset forth in the text of CPLR § 215(8Xa). (See Op. Br. pp. 5-6 (citing Chrislodoulou v. Terdentan,\n262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc.\nLEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018).\nPlaintiff's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that they \"focused on events\nthat occurred on specific dates\" (Op. Br. p. 8) is based on Plaintiff's dubious assertion that, because\nthe Indictment at issue here \"was not limited to a specific day or \n... [truncated, 2146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/6 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=6]", "char_count": 2146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 8 of 16\n\ninvoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). Such a reading renders the limitation set forth in CPLR § 215(8Xa)\nmeaningless and does not comport with the rationale set forth in the cited decisions.\nPlaintiff once again relies on Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019),\nnotwithstanding that the Co-Executors already showed that Kashef, which concerned a conspiracy\nbetween BNP and Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions, is factually distinguishable from this action.\n(Mov. Br. p. 7.) Plaintiff's decision to cite Kashef again shows that she has not located any relevant\nauthority to rebut the cases the Co-Executors cited.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff bears the burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances; she fails to\nmeet this burden.\n\nPlaintiff misstates the burden on this motion by asserting \"Defendants have failed to meet\ntheir burden of showing that [she] will be unable to invoke equitable estoppel and ... tolling.\" (Op.\nBr. p. 2.) As explained in the Co-Executors' moving brief, the burden is on Plaintiff to sufficiently\nallege \"extraordinary circumstances\" to invoke these doctrines. (Mov. Br. pp. 9-10.)\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff does not even attempt to address many of the cases that\nthe Co-Executors cite on this point, including Abercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243\n(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (\"without adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore cannot\ndefeat a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds\"), and this Court's decision in\nFairley v.\n\n09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536, at *16 (Mar. 15, 2011\n\nS.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.) (finding equitable tolling did not apply and granting defendants' Fed. R.\nCiv. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaint on statute of limitations grounds).\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff attempts to paint a more\ndetailed picture of why she waited 15 years to bring this action than she did in her Complaint.\nH\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/7 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=7]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 9 of 16\n\nDecedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it; and does\nnot allege she reasonably relied on any misrepresentation by Decedent to her detriment.\nRather, excluding vague allegations concerning Decedent's alleged misconduct directed at\nsome unidentified set of alleged victims that does not include Plaintiff (see.. e.g., Compl. 1 26\n(\"[Decedent] ... continued to manipulate the victims\"), Plaintiff merely asserts the following\nallegations concerning events allegedly occurring in 2002: (Compl. 1 50) Epstein told Plaintiff:\n\"Don't do anything I wouldn't do\"; (Compl. 1 51) Plaintiff was a \"scared because she recognized\nthat [Decedent] was a very powerful person\"; (Compl. 1 52) \"[Decedent] made very clear to\n[Plaintiff] that he was incredibly wealthy, powerful, and regularly in contact with world leaders ...\nhe had photographs displayed of significant political figures to ensure that any young female\nentering the home would know that he had extensive government connections ... [Decedent] was\nnot to be disobeyed and he made clear by his words and actions that there would be consequences\nif Teresa did not comply with his demands.\"; and (Compl. 1 53) when Plaintiff returned to\nCalifornia, \"she received an e-mail from one of [Decedent's] co-conspirators thanking her for\nvisiting New York and letting her know that [he] and his co-conspirators would need to decide\nwhether or not they wanted to hire her. She did not respond to the e-mail.\"\nNone of these allegations fills the holes in the required elements of equitable tolling and\nestoppel described above. Nor does a belief that someone is \"wealthy, powerful and regularly in\ncontact with world leaders\" come close to constituting an \"exceptional\" set of circumstances that\njustify permitted Plaintiff to pursue this action that expired 15 years ago.\nNot a single case Plaintiff cites supports a finding that her allegations are \"\n... [truncated, 2226 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/8 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=8]", "char_count": 2226}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 10 of 16\n\nthat her allegations fall short. In that matter, the court found the plaintiffs \"alleged extraordinary\ncircumstances that could warrant the application of equitable tolling: they were drugged,\nkidnapped, flown to Belarus, held captive, and tortured for 383 and 483 days, respectively.\" Id. at\n*5. There are no such allegations here.\nOther cases Plaintiff cites likewise support the conclusion she has not met her burden. See\nZimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F. Supp. 2d 317, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (plaintiffs\nalleged school engaged in affirmative course of conduct during period of limitations to deceive\nplaintiffs into believing they had no claim); Gotlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL\n1154817, at •30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) (plaintiffs in medical malpractice action alleged\ndefendants failed to provide them with, and intentionally and fraudulently attempted to discourage\nand prevent them from obtaining, their medical records); Gem Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219\nN.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966) (plaintiff was allowed to invoke equitable estoppel against a\nbookkeeper who had used his position to carefully conceal his theft of the plaintiffs money);\nv. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2002) (employee argued his medical\ncondition prevented him from timely filing his complaint); Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d\n325, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (plaintiff filed her lawsuit less than a year after leaving a home where\nwas allegedly forced to work without pay as a servant). Other cases Plaintiff cites do not even\naddress the issues on this motion.2\nPlaintiff's reliance on\n\nv. M,\n\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811, at ■11\n\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) — to support her assertion that reasonable fear of retaliation \"may be\n\n2 See Hirsch v. Rehs Galleries, Inc., No. 18-CV-11864 (VSB), 2020 WL 917213 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.\n26, 2020) (does not address equitable tolling or estoppel); Ortiz v. Cornetta, 86\n... [truncated, 2121 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/9 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=9]", "char_count": 2121}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 11 of 16\n\nsufficient\" to warrant equitable tolling (Op. Br. p. 16) — is misleading. In that action, the court\ngranted a pro se prisoner leave to allege facts sufficient to show he pursued his claims with\nreasonable diligence. Id. at *39. However, the court was very clear that its findings were based on\nplaintiff's incarceration and pro se status. See id. at *35, 39 (\"in the orison context, reasonable\nfear of retaliation may be sufficient\"; \"given Plaintiffs pro se status ... the Court is hesitant to\ndismiss [his] claims\"). Plaintiff is not a prisoner or pro se; so\nB.\n\nis inapplicable.\n\nThis motion is proper and timely regardless of its title.\nPlaintiff's argument that the Co-Executors may only move to strike her punitive damages\n\nclaim (Op. Br. pp. 2-3) is both wrong and irrelevant. \"[T]he technical name given to a motion\nchallenging a pleading is of little importance ... as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can\nresult from treating a motion that has been inaccurately denominated a motion to strike as a motion\nto dismiss the complaint.\" See C.\n\n& A. =,\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.).\n\nCourts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss punitive damages. See, e.g., The\nCookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at *17\n(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without\nleave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and\ndid not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004\nU.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to\ndismiss punitive damages claims which were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97\nCiv. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting\nmotion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, e\n... [truncated, 2313 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/10 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=10]", "char_count": 2313}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 12 of 16\n\nRate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendant's motion to strike\nsections of first amended complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Coram Healthcare\nCorp., No. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996)\n(\"The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted.\"); Cerveceria\nModelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07 Civ. 7998 (HB), 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS\n28999, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008) (\"Because Defendant has failed to allege that Plaintiff's\nconduct was egregious and directed at the public generally, its claim for punitive damages cannot\nproceed.\"). Therefore, whether the Co-Executors' motion is deemed one to dismiss or strike, the\nCourt should dispose of Plaintiff's punitive damages claim.3\nC.\n\nThere is no basis to disregard black-letter New York law applying the law of the\nplace of alleged torts to the issue of punitive damages.\nPlaintiff's argument that \"New York choice-of-law-rules\" dictate the application of USVI\n\nlaw to the issue of punitive damages (Op. Br. p. 3) is wrong for two independent reasons. First\nPlaintiff alleges the acts and omissions giving rise to her causes of action occurred entirely in New\nYork. (Comp/.'H 15, 22.) Therefore, New York law applies to the issue of punitive damages. See\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist LEXIS\n60272, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (\"Because punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law\n\n; Plaintiff cites Amusement Indus. v. Stem, 693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). However, that\ncourt acknowledged a plaintiffs demand for punitive damages may be stricken where, as here, it\nis prohibited by law. Id. at 318 n.5 (citing Burrell v. State Fann & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 427,\n440 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). Further, neither that case nor the others Plaintiff cites in support of her\nargument that str\n... [truncated, 2523 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/11 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=11]", "char_count": 2523}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 13 of 16\n\nof the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.\") (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis\nPharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels\nCorp., No. 95-CV-9006, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)).\nSecond, Plaintiff may not avail herself of parts of NY EPTL § II-3.2(a)(1) while\ndisregarding others. Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to apply the first sentence of § 11-3.2(a)(1),\npermitting her to bring this case, but to disregard the very next sentence precluding punitive\ndamages. At least one New York federal court expressly rejected such an \"anomalous situation.\"\nSee Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)) (\"Mt would be an anomalous\nsituation indeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this ... action ... because of [§] 113.2(a)( I ), while at the same time he was allowed to recover ... punitive damages, which clearly is\nbeyond the scope of relief which that statute authorizes.\").\nPlaintiff's premise used to gin up a purported connection to the USVI in this action -- that\nDecedent \"chose to probate his Estate\" there and had abused other victims (but not Plaintiff) there\n(Op. Br. p. 20)-- is specious. Plaintiff sues for damages based on torts that occurred in New York.\nFurther, she chose to sue in New York. Therefore, the Court should reject Plaintiff's assertion that\n\"[w]hereas the [USVI] has a strong interest in applying its law on punitive damages, New York\nhas no conceivable interest in denying the [USVI] from advancing that interest\" (Op. Br. p. 20).\nThe USVI has no interest in applying its punitive damages laws to alleged torts that took place in\nNew York.\nThe sole connection to the USVI is that the Decedent's Estate is being probated there, 18\nyears after the alleged tortious conduct took place -- a connection much weaker than the one\ndeemed \"tenuous\" in Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v.\n... [truncated, 2150 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/12 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=12]", "char_count": 2150}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 14 of 16\n\nframework of Adelson, New York, not the USVI, has the greater interest in applying its laws and\npolicies concerning Plaintiff's improper claim for punitive damages.\nPlaintiff's reliance on Adelson is based on a misinterpretation of that action. In Adelson,\nthe National Jewish Democratic Council and its chair sued Sheldon G. Adelson for damages based\non Adelson's prior filing of a defamation suit against them in the same court pursuant to Nevada\nlaw. Id. at *1-2. The court had dismissed Adelson's prior action pursuant to Nevada's anti-SLAPP\nstatute, which has its own punitive damages provision. Id. at *1-2, 11. In the action against\nAdelson, the court held that Nevada had a much stronger interest in applying its punitive damages\nlaw because Adelson had previously attempted to use Nevada's defamation law to chill First\nAmendment rights. Id. at *14. By contrast, \"New York's interest [was] relatively attenuated\" in\nthe second action because \"[i]ts sole connection to this suit [was] that the suit was filed here.\" Id.\nat *15. Here, the situation is effectively the opposite, given the strong New York connection.\nD.\n\nEven if USVI law applies, which it does not, it follows the majority rule prohibiting\nrecovery of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate.\nAs an initial matter, Plaintiff does not dispute that New York law bars her punitive damages\n\nclaim. Should the Court find New York law applies, which it does, then Plaintiffs punitive\ndamages claim should be dismissed.\nEven if the Court finds USVI law applies to Plaintiff's punitive damages claim, which it\ndoes not, the result is the same. USVI courts apply a \"Banks analysis\" to determine U.S.V.I.\ncommon law, including consideration of three non-dispositive factors: (1) whether USVI courts\nhave previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other\njurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which approach represe\n... [truncated, 2558 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/13 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=13]", "char_count": 2558}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 15 of 16\n\ndamages are not available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate: (1) previously, USVI courts\nfavorably cited the Restatement section barring punitive damages against estates. See, e.g.,\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV. 2006217, 2008 WL 220067, at *5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008) (considering the inverse issue); (2) a majority\nof U.S. jurisdictions preclude awards of punitive damages based on wrongful acts of decedents,\nsee 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015) (IA] majority of jurisdictions\nwill not award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.\" (citation omitted); and (3)\nPost-Banks, USVI have found the Restatement § 908 is \"the soundest rule.\"4-5\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above and in the Co-Executors' moving brief, the Co-Executors\nrespectfully request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, together with such\nother and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\n4 Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n(citing\nv. Christian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V etpE. Div. 2005), Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 2015\nV.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015), St.\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows, 15 V.I. 435 i\\I. I'err.\nCt. 1979), Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Tern Ct. 1989), and\nv.\nRijos, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011)); Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14,\n2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at *5 n.13 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (\"Applying a Banks analysis,\nthe Court finds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this\njurisdiction.\").\n3 Plaintiff argues that the USVI Attorney General's request for punitive damages in a USVI\nCriminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act lawsuit against Decedent's Estate shows the\nthird Banks factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor. However, that the USVI Attorney G\n... [truncated, 2319 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819221/14 or ?id=EFTA02819221&page=14]", "char_count": 2319}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819221", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 31 Filed 03/20/20 Page 16 of 16\n\nDated: New York, New York\nMarch 20, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n212.704.6000\n\nBy:/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\n11\n\nEFTA02819236\n\n", "char_count": 296}]}