{"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_count": 31, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02819189", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02819189.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 1 of 31\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO: 19-cv-10476-PGG\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN,\nin their capacities as the executors of the\nESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,\n\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO\nDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nEFTA02819189\n\n", "char_count": 413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 2 of 31\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n3\n\nARGUMENT\n\n6\n\nI. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely\n\n6\n\nA. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa)\nI. The Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\n7\n8\n\n2. Plaintiff's Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the Indictment\nConcerned.\n9\n3. Defendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) Fail\n\n11\n\nB. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Estoppel.\n\n13\n\nC. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Tolling.\n\n16\n\nII. The Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages\n\n18\n\nA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages is Procedurally Improper.\n\n18\n\nB. Plaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case\n\n19\n\nI. The Law of the Virgin Islands for Punitive Damages Governs Under New York's\nChoice-of-Law Principles.\n19\n2. Virgin Islands Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against Defendants in this\nCase\n21\na. Banks Factor One: Whether Any Virgin Islands Courts Have Adopted a Rule\n\n21\n\nb. Banks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts from Other\nJurisdictions\n\n22\n\nc. Banks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the Virgin Islands\n\n24\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n25\n\nii\n\nEFTA02819190\n\n", "char_count": 1441}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 3 of 31\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAmusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n18\n\nAshcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n6\n\nBabcock v. M,\n191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)\n\n19\n\nBanks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011)\n\n21, 25\n\nv. Parlcchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n17\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)\n\n11\n\nCIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffinan,\n948 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2020), certified question accepted, No. 36, 2020 WL 729773\n(N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n\n25\n\nClemens v. Nealon,\n202 A.D.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)\n\n7, 9\n\nCrabtree ex. Rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n23\n\nCrawford v. Daly,\n55 V.I. 66 (V.I. Super. 2010)\n\n22\n\nv.\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)\n\n16, 17\n\nEllis v. Zuck,\n546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977)\n\n23\n\nEstate of Farrell ex rel. Bennett v. M,\n770 A.2d 517 (Del. 2001)\n\n23\n\nFlight Sci., Inc. v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd.,\n647 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\n16\n\niii\n\nEFTA02819191\n\n", "char_count": 1089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 4 of 31\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-cv-0376, 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019)\n\n14. 15\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018)\n\n1I\n\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n14\n\nGotlin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (IW), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)\n\n15\n\nGov't ofthe V.I. v. =,\n60 V.I. 597 (V.I. 2016)\n\n21, 22, 24\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n17\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 VI. 619 (V.I. Super. 2009)\n\n22\n\nHaralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc.,\n31 P.3d 114 (Ariz. 2001)\n\n22\n\nHarris v. City ofNew York,\n186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)\n\n7\n\nHirsch v. Rehs Galleries, Inc.,\nNo. 18-CV-11864 (VSB), 2020 WL 917213 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2020)\n\n15\n\nHofer v. Lavender,\n679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)\n\n23\n\nHunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI,\nNo. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)\n\n18\n\nKaopuiki v. Kealoha,\n87 P.3d 910 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003)\n\n23\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n6, 9, 12\n\nKlaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,\n313 U.S. 487 (1941)\n\n19\n\nMcElligott v. City ofNew York,\n15-cv-7107, 2017 WL 6210840 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017)\n\n12\n\niv\n\nEFTA02819192\n\n", "char_count": 1255}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 5 of 31\n\nNat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\nNo. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019)\n\n20\n\nOkyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC,\n961 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n\n19\n\nOrtiz v. Cornetta,\n867 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1989)\n\n6, 15, 17\n\nPadula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp.,\n644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994)\n\n19\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, Inc.,\n69 V.I. 3 (V.I. Super. 2015)\n\n22\n\nv. Melton,\n299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982)\n\n22\n\nTillett v. Lippert,\n909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996)\n\n22\n\nTrustees of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Halcyon Constr. Corp.,\nNo. 15 CW. 1191 (PGG), 2017 WL 5643603 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (Gardephe, J.)\n\n6\n\nZimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch.,\n888 F. Supp. 2d 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n15\n\nStatutes\n22 U.S.C. § 7102\n\n10\n\nRules\nFed. It Civ. P. 12\n\n2, 6, 18\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215\n\npassim\n\nOther Authorities\nBrief of Defendants-Appellees, Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\nNo. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), ECF No. 92\n\n12\n\nComplaint, GVI v. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein,\nNo. ST-20-CV-014 (V.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020)\n\n21\n\nTranscript of Premotion Conference,\nv. Indyke, et at,\nNo. 19-cv-10475 (LOS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020)\n\n16\n\nEFTA02819193\n\n", "char_count": 1261}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 6 of 31\n\nPlaintiff MM\n\nby and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this\n\nMemorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nJeffrey Epstein was a\n\nsexual predator and billionaire who used his vast connections\n\nto powerful individuals, and seemingly unlimited wealth and resources, to create a web of\ntranscontinental sex trafficking that served himself, his co-conspirators, and some of the most\npowerful people in the world. For decades, Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited countless\nyoung women to his homes in New York, Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and elsewhere by\noffering them money to give him massages that escalated into sexual assault. He and his recruiters\ndangled money, opportunities, and celebrities in front of young women, coupled with threats, to\ngroom them and coerce them into submission. The fact that Epstein escaped punishment for his\ncountless sex crimes for decades is a testament to the success of his manipulation tactics and the\npower that he held over people, including members of the justice system that failed his victims\ntime and time again.\nEpstein and his co-conspirators recruited Plaintiff\n\nto be a part of their\n\nsex-trafficking operation when she was 22 years old. After seeking her out at her massage therapy\nschool, Epstein flew Teresa from California to New York under the guise of a traveling masseuse\njob interview. When Teresa arrived at his New York mansion, Epstein sexually assaulted her\nnumerous times. Epstein's power, wealth, connections, and intimidation tactics kept Teresa silent\nfor years. Once Epstein died, Teresa promptly filed this lawsuit against Defendants Darren K.\nIndyke and Richard D. Kahn, the co-executors of Epstein's Estate.\nDefendants contend that Teresa's claims are untimely, but wholly ignore the heavy burden\nthat they bear at this stage of the litigation. Defendants have fai\n... [truncated, 2143 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/5 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=5]", "char_count": 2143}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 7 of 31\n\naction is commenced with respect to the same event or occurrence that gives rise to a plaintiff's\ncivil claims, the plaintiff has at least one year from the termination of the criminal action to file a\ncivil action. Defendants argue that Teresa's claims do not arise from the same event or occurrence\nas Epstein's Indictment in the Southern District of New York. Compl., Ex. A (the \"Indictment\").\nTo make that argument, they attempt to separate Teresa's assault from Epstein's massive\nsex-trafficking operation, contending that because she was a young woman as opposed to a minor\ngirl at the time that she was recruited and assaulted, she was not a victim to that sex-trafficking\noperation. But the way in which Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited and assaulted Teresa\nmirrors exactly the patterns of conduct described in the Indictment. Put simply, Epstein was\nindicted for a vast and sophisticated sex-trafficking operation that undoubtedly caused Teresa's\ninjuries, and Defendants' attempts to disentangle Teresa from that operation are unpersuasive.\nSecond, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that Teresa will be unable\nto invoke equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. The circumstances of this case, including the\nmasterful scheme of threats, intimidation and coercion that Epstein and his cohorts perfected over\ndecades, resulted in countless victims remaining silent until after his death. The allegations in\nTeresa's Complaint detail that scheme not only on a general level, but also as it applied to her\nexperience. Epstein was a monster who used his power and privilege to strike fear into his victims,\nensuring that they would never take action against him. Defendants are not entitled to the benefit\nof a statute of limitations defense when it was Epstein's own misconduct that caused Teresa's\ndelay in filing suit.\nDefendants also ask this Court to \"dismiss\" Teresa's demand for punitive da\n... [truncated, 2222 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/6 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=6]", "char_count": 2222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 8 of 31\n\nnot damages, dismissed from a complaint. A motion to dismiss punitive damages is improper. In\nany event, punitive damages are available in this case. New York choice-of-law rules dictate that\nthe law of the U.S. Virgin Islands applies here on the issue of punitive damages, and Virgin Islands\nlaw would allow for punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor who spent years\ngaming the justice system to avoid punishment for countless heinous crimes and then, once he was\nabout to face real punishment, took actions to cause his own demise. The Court should deny\nDefendants' motion to dismiss in full.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nPlaintiff\n\nstory echoes the stories of many other victims of Jeffrey Epstein.\n\nIn 2002, when Teresa was a young woman studying massage at the California Healing Arts\nCollege, another female approached her and asked her if she would be interested in working as a\ntraveling masseuse. Comp]. 1 36. Teresa expressed interest, and was told to meet with\none of Epstein's well-known co-conspirators and recruiters. Id.1 37. After discussing the\njob with\n\nasked Teresa to interview with Epstein at his New York residence and\n\narranged for her travel. Id. ¶138-39.\nWhen she arrived in New York, Teresa was directed to give Ghislaine Maxwell, Epstein's\nmost well-known recruiter and co-conspirator, a massage for which she was paid $100 in cash.\nId. 11 41-43. The next day, she was instructed to go to Epstein's New York mansion to give\nEpstein a massage as well. Id. 11 44. When she arrived, Epstein escorted her to an office to perform\nthe massage. Id. ¶145-46. During the massage, Epstein began initiating contact with Teresa's\ngenitals against her will. Id. 11 46-47. Epstein also sexually assaulted Teresa after the massage\nwas over as she was trying to leave Epstein's home. Id. yy 49-50. When Teresa returned to\n\n3\n\nEFTA02819196\n\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 9 of 31\n\nCalifornia, Epstein directed one of his associates to email Teresa to try to maintain contact with\nher. Id.1 53.\nEpstein and his co-conspirators used displays of wealth and power to manipulate, scare,\nand control his victims. Id. 11 26, 41, 44, 51, 52. For example, after recruiting victims, Epstein\nand his co-conspirators made sure that victims saw photographs of Epstein with powerful political\nand social figures around his homes and noticed the opulence of his homes. Id.1 26. These tactics\nwere meant to ensure that victims knew that there would be consequences if they did not comply\nwith Epstein's demands or if they reported their abuse to the authorities or media. Id.\nUnsurprisingly, Epstein and his co-conspirators used these tactics on Teresa. When\ntold Teresa about the opportunity to interview for a job with Epstein,\n\nmade sure to describe\n\nEpstein as wealthy, worldly, and highly educated. Id.1 38. And when Teresa met Maxwell, she\nwas shown to a room where photographs of Maxwell and world leaders were prominently on\ndisplay to ensure that Teresa was aware of Maxwell's power and relationships with high-level\ngovernment officials. Id.1 41. Maxwell went on to instruct Teresa to give Epstein \"whatever he\nwants\" because Epstein \"always gets what he wants,\" and bragged about Epstein's New York\nmansion being the largest brownstone in Manhattan. Id.1 43. When she finally arrived at\nEpstein's mansion, Teresa was immediately overwhelmed by its lavishness. Id. II 44. Epstein and\nMaxwell both peppered Teresa with questions to get information about her background and to\nmake very clear that Epstein was a powerful person who should not be disobeyed. Id. 11 42, 46.\nAnd after all of those observations about Epstein and his powerful network, Epstein repeatedly\nassaulted Teresa, and then cryptically told her as he sexually assaulted her one last time, \"Don't\ndo anything I wouldn't do.\" Id.1 50.\n\n4\n\nEFTA02819197\n\n", "char_count": 2000}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 10 of 31\n\nAfter decades of escaping appropriate punishment for his extraordinarily far-reaching and\ndisturbing crimes, Epstein was indicted in the Southern District of New York in July 2019 on one\ncount of sex-trafficking conspiracy and one count of sex trafficking. The Indictment focused on\nEpstein's recruitment of victims to his New York City and Palm Beach homes to provide him with\nmassages that became sexual in nature. Indictment 1 7. The Indictment specifically described\nEpstein's modus operandi of abuse at this New York mansion. When a victim arrived at the New\nYork mansion after being recruited, she would be escorted to a room to perform a massage on\nEpstein. 14.1 9. During the massage, Epstein \"would escalate the nature and scope of physical\ncontact with his victims to include, among other things, sex acts such as groping and direct and\nindirect contact with the victim's genitals.\" Id. Epstein or one of his associates would pay the\nvictim in cash for the massage. Id.1 10. In some instances, Epstein directed his employees and\nassociates to communicate with victims to arrange for their return to the New York mansion for\nadditional sexual encounters. 14.1 II. This pattern described in the Indictment matches\nexperience, and the experiences of countless other victims who suffered abuse at the hands\nof Epstein at his homes all over the world.\nShortly after Epstein was indicted, on August 8, 2019, Epstein executed his last will and\ntestament at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, naming Defendants the executors of his Estate\nin the event of his death. Compl. 1 29. Two days later, Epstein was found dead in his jail cell.\nId.130. His last will and testament was filed in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the\nVirgin Islands on August 15, 2019. Id.131. Due to Epstein's death, the U.S. Attorney's Office\nsubmitted a proposed nolle prosequi order and Judge Richard M. Berman formally dismissed the\nindi\n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/9 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=9]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 11 of 31\n\nARGUMENT\nDefendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages should be denied. \"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. .. . A claim\nhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" Ashcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating a motion to dismiss\nbrought under Rule 12(bX6), the Court must \"accept() all factual allegations in the complaint as\ntrue and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.\" Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019).\nDrawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Defendants have failed to meet their\nburden of proving that Plaintiff's claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress\nare untimely. Further, Defendants' argument that the Court should dismiss punitive damages from\nthe Complaint is both procedurally improper and substantively incorrect.\nI.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims\nAre Untimely.\n\nBecause the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of\nproving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. See Trustees of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters\nPension Fund v. Halcyon Constr. Corp., No. 15 CIV. 1191 (PGG), 2017 WL 5643603, at *5\n(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (Gardephe, J.). A motion to dismiss based on a statute-of-limitations\ndefense \"should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set\nof facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\" Ortiz v. Comma, 867 F.2d 146,\n148 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, \"dismissal is\n... [truncated, 2119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/10 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=10]", "char_count": 2119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 12 of 31\n\n186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff's factual allegations demonstrate that\n(A) N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) applies to her claims, (B) Defendants are equitably estopped from\nasserting a statute of limitations defense, and (C) the limitations period for bringing her claims was\nequitably tolled.\nA.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).\n\nPlaintiff's claims fall squarely within N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which allowed Plaintiff\nto file her complaint within a year of the Indictment's dismissal. That provision provides that:\nWhenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same\ndefendant has been commenced with respect to the event or\noccurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the\nplaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the\ncriminal action . . . in which to commence the civil action,\nnotwithstanding that the time in which to commence such action has\nalready expired or has less than a year remaining.\nId. Section 215(8)(a)'s one-year limitations period has three requirements: \"(1) a criminal action\nhas been commenced, (2) against the same defendants, and (3) concerning the same event or\ntransaction from which the civil action arose.\" Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y.\nApp. Div. 1994). Because Plaintiff filed her complaint within one year of the termination of the\nIndictment, her claims are timely.\nDefendants' only argument to the contrary is that the Indictment did not concern the same\nevent or transaction from which Plaintiff's civil action arose because the Indictment targeted,\naccording to Defendants, some separate sex trafficking operation that only involved underage girls.\nDefs.' Mem. at 5. (\"Because Plaintiff alleges she was 22 when Decedent assaulted her . .. this\naction and the Indictment arise from different events or occurrences.\").\n\nBut Defendants\n\nmischaracterize § 215(8)(a), the applicable c\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/11 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=11]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 13 of 31\n\nI.\n\nThe Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Indictment covered the crimes Defendants committed against\nPlaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that she was over the age of 18 when they occurred. Defendants\nattempt to minimize the scope of the abuse alleged in the Indictment by focusing on its reference\nto \"minors.\" Defs.' Mem. at 5. But clinging to the use of the word \"minors\" does not change the\nnature of the vast and sophisticated operation alleged in the Indictment. Epstein's pattern and\npractice was to recruit and traffic young females with vulnerabilities that he knew he could exploit,\nand the Indictment spells out that pattern in detail. Age is not the deciding factor as to whether a\nfemale was a victim of the sex-trafficking operation or experienced the precise patterns of\nrecruitment and abuse described in the Indictment. And the fact that many of the victims were\nminors does not mean that non-minors were not victimized by Epstein's sophisticated\nsex-trafficking operation. Indeed, the Indictment explicitly states that \"many\" but not \"all\" of\nEpstein's victims were minors, demonstrating that federal prosecutors were investigating Epstein's\ncrimes against young women over the age of 18 as well. Indictment 1 11 (\"[Epstein] knew that\nmany of his New York victims were underage.\"); id.1 17 (\"JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant,\nknew that certain of his victims were underage .\n\n.\"). The FBI confirmed this understanding of\n\nthe Indictment's scope in a press release issued two days after Epstein's arrest, stating to Epstein's\nvictims: \"We want to hear from you, regardless of the age you are now, or whatever age you were\nthen, no matter where the incident took place.\" https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/jeffreyepstein-charged-manhattan-federal-court-sex-trafficking-minors (last visited March 9, 2020)\n(emphasis added).\nThe mere fact that Plaintiff was over 18 years old at the t\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/12 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=12]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 14 of 31\n\nacts described in the Indictment. Plaintiff therefore had one year from August 29, 2019, the date\non which Judge Berman formally dismissed the Indictment, to file the Complaint. Having filed\nsuit on November 12, 2019, her claims fall well within that limitations period.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the\nIndictment Concerned.\n\nEven if the Indictment for some reason was limited to Epstein's trafficking of minors (to\nthe exclusion of his other victims), Plaintiff's claims would nonetheless arise from the same \"event\nor occurrence\" for the purposes of § 215(8)(a). See, e.g., Kashef, 925 F.3d at 62 (noting that \"a\nNew York appellate court explicitly rejected the theory that the tolling provisions of CPLR 215(8)\nare exclusively for the benefit of the victims of the crime charged in the criminal proceeding\"\n(internal quotation marks omitted)); Clemens, 202 A.D.2d at 749 (holding that that § 215(8)(a) is\n\"plain, clear and unambiguous\" in that it does not require that the plaintiff be \"the victim or the\nspecific person upon whom the crime had been committed\"). Contrary to Defendants' suggestion,\nthe Court should not construe the Indictment \"narrowly,\" Defs.' Mem. at 5, where the Indictment\nitself describes a pattern of abuse spanning a number of years. Epstein repeated the same patterns\nof recruitment and abuse time and time again on countless young females, including Plaintiff. See\nIndictment 1 7 (explaining that Epstein \"perpetuated [the] abuse in similar ways\" against victims);\nid. 11 9-13 (describing Epstein's similar patterns of recruitment and abuse against victims in New\nYork). The Indictment was therefore not limited to neatly categorized events that happened on\nspecified dates—it covered a sprawling sex-trafficking operation that occurred \"over the course of\nmany years\" and affected an unspecified number of victims. Id. I I.\nDefendants' contention that the I\n... [truncated, 2263 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/13 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=13]", "char_count": 2263}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 15 of 31\n\ninto—the Complaint's allegations as to the perpetrator, the time period, the location, and the sexual\nassault all match up with the pattern described in the Indictment. Just as the Indictment alleged\nthat Epstein recruited and assaulted victims in 2002, Indictment 1 2, Plaintiff was recruited and\nassaulted in 2002. Compl. 1 36. Just as the Indictment alleged that victims were escorted to a\nroom to massage Epstein when they arrived at his New York home, Indictment 1 9. Plaintiff was\nescorted to a room to massage Epstein when she arrived at his New York home. CompI. fl 45-46.\nJust as the Indictment alleged that Epstein escalated the massages to include groping and contact\nwith the victims' genitals, Indictment ¶ 9, Epstein escalated Plaintiff's massage by groping and\ntouching her genitals. Comp1.11 46, 47, 49. And just as Epstein or one of his associates would\npay victims cash after massages, Indictment q 10, Ghislaine Maxwell paid Plaintiff cash after a\nmassage. Compl. ¶ 43. The conduct alleged in the Indictment is precisely the conduct alleged in\nthe Complaint.\nDefendants have the audacity to make a stunning contention that Plaintiff does not\n\"sufficiently set forth allegations establishing she was a trafficking victim in any respect.\" Defs.'\nMem. at 7. Defendants may be unfamiliar with the definition of sex trafficking: \"the recruitment,\nharboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the\npurpose of a commercial sex act.\" 22 U.S.C. § 7102. Epstein and his co-conspirators flew Plaintiff\nacross states lines from California to New York City for the sole purpose of sexually abusing her.\nCompl.11139, 46, 49, 51. She is therefore unquestionably a victim of sex trafficking. Defendants'\ndesperate attempt at severing Plaintiff's experience from the vast, sophisticated sex-trafficking\noperation alleged in the Indictment fails.\n\n10\n\nEFTA02819203\n\n", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 16 of 31\n\n3.\n\nDefendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. 4 215(8)(a) Fail.\n\nDefendants seek to advance a strained interpretation of § 215(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\"\nrequirement, asserting that this Court must \"apply C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) narrowly\" to limit its\navailability to the specific crimes committed against the specific victims identified in the\nIndictment. Defs.' Mem. at 4-5. But the cases that Defendants cite for that proposition are\ninapposite. In Christodoulou v. Terdeman, the Second Department held that § 215(8)(a) \"applies\nonly to those claims which are based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993,\nbecause it was only in connection with events of these two days that criminal prosecution was\ncommenced against defendant.\" 262 A.D.2d 595, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). Similarly, in\nGalling v. Thatcher, the court held that the plaintiff could not rely on § 215(8)(a) to file a civil suit\nfor assault and battery that occurred over the course of two years because the indictment \"charged\n[the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates.\" No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y.\nMisc. LEXIS 8435, at *3_4 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018).\nChristodoulou and Gallina are both readily distinguishable from Plaintiff's case. The\ncriminal actions in Christodoulou and Gallina focused on events that occurred on specified dates\n(two dates in Christodoulou and three dates in Galling:), and both Christodoulou and Gallina\nexplicitly recognized that the relevant criminal prosecutions were commenced \"only in connection\nwith the events of these [specific] days.\" See Christodoulou, 262 A.D.2d at 596; Canine', 2018\nN.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at *3-4. By contrast, the Indictment in this case was not limited to a\nspecific day or discrete event. Rather, the Indictment covered sexual abuse that occurred \"over\nthe course of many years\" \"from at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about\n2005.\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/15 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=15]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 17 of 31\n\na broad sex-trafficking scheme, while the criminal actions in Christodoulou and Gallina charged\nthe defendants with crimes stemming from isolated incidents.I\nIn contrast, the Second Circuit's opinion in Kashef controls, and demonstrates why\nPlaintiff's claims fall within § 215(8)(a) here. In Kashef, BNP Paribas (\"BNPP\") entered a guilty\nplea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan and of the consequences\nof providing Sudan access to U.S. financial markets.\" Kashef, 925 F.3d at 56. The plaintiffs,\nSudanese victims of mass rape, torture, deliberate infection with HIV. and other atrocities, filed a\ncomplaint against BNPP within a year of the judgment of conviction, contending that their claims\nwere timely under C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a). Id. at 57, 62-63. BNPP attempted to argue—similar to\nDefendants' argument here—that § 215(8)(a) did not apply because the plaintiffs \"played no role\nin the proceedings surrounding BNP Paribas's plea agreement,\" the criminal action \"required no\ninvestigation of or briefing on any injuries sustained by Plaintiffs,\" and the facts in the criminal\ncase and the civil case were not \"identical.\" Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 51-52, Kashef\nv. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), ECF No. 92.\nThe Second Circuit rejected BNPP's argument, and instead held that the \"event or\noccurrence\" for § 215(8) purposes was more generally \"BNPP's conspiracy with Sudan to violate\nU.S. sanctions\" for humanitarian violations. 925 F.3d at 62-63. The Court therefore held that the\nvictims of those humanitarian violations could bring timely claims under § 215(8)(a). Id. That\nconspiracy, like the one here, was a broad scheme spanning many years, rather than a single event\n(such as the assault of one victim on a specified date). Just as BNPP's general conspiracy to violate\n\nDefendants also cite McElligott v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 7107 (LGS), 2017 WL\n621084\n... [truncated, 2226 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/16 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=16]", "char_count": 2226}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 18 of 31\n\nsanctions was the relevant event or occurrence in Kashef, Epstein's widespread sex-trafficking\nscheme is the event or occurrence at issue in Plaintiff's case for the purposes of applying\n§ 215(8)(a).\nDefendants argue that a broader reading of § 215(8)(a) would somehow render the \"event\nor occurrence\" limitation meaningless. Defs.' Mem. at 7. But Plaintiff is not asking, for example,\nfor the Court to hold that any person with a tangential connection to Epstein's sex-trafficking\noperation may avail of § 215(8)(a). Rather, the Court should hold that Plaintiff's claims in this\nmatter arise from the same \"event or occurrence\" as the Indictment because the perpetrator is the\nsame, the location is the same, and, most importantly, the pattern of misconduct is the same.\nDefendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that Plaintiff's claims do not arise from the\nsame event or occurrence as the Indictment, and therefore that § 215(8)(a) does not apply to her\nclaims.\nB.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Estoppel.\n\nEven if the Court were to hold that C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) does not apply to Plaintiff's claims,\nit should hold that they are still timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Complaint\nalleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his\nco-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice. If there were ever a circumstance\n\"extraordinary\" enough to justify equitable estoppel, it is Epstein's massive and sophisticated\nscheme of intimidating victims into silence. Epstein went to great lengths to threaten and\nmanipulate not only countless victims, but journalists, officials at the highest levels of our\ngovernment, and others charged with preventing and punishing sex trafficking. Not only did\nPlaintiff allege Epstein's methods of silencing his victims in her Complaint, but those methods\nha\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/17 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=17]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 19 of 31\n\nbelieve that filing this suit during Epstein's lifetime would have had severely negative (even\nlife-threatening) consequences for her. She therefore did not take action until after she knew that\nEpstein was dead, and timely filed her claim approximately three months later. Plaintiff's\nallegations relating to equitable estoppel are therefore sufficient to defeat Defendants' Motion to\nDismiss.\nDefendants' contend that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only to situations in\nwhich the defendant makes a misrepresentation of fact. Defs.' Mem. at 9-11. But \"courts have\nlong had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the\nStatute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative wrongdoing—a carefully concealed\ncrime here—which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the\ninstitution of the legal proceeding.\" Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y.\n1966). A defendant is therefore equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense\nif the defendant \"wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by\ndeception, concealment, threats or other misconduct.\" Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 14-CV-0376\n(BMC), 2019 WL 3035124, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).\nAssuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and drawing all inferences\nin her favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded misconduct that should equitably estop Defendants\nfrom asserting a statute of limitations defense.\n\nPlaintiff was terrified of Epstein and the\n\nco-conspirators that aided him in keeping his vast network of victims quiet. For example, Plaintiff\nalleged that Epstein and Maxwell intimidated her with multiple reminders of their vast wealth such\nas, for example, butlers and photographs with government officials. Compl. II 38, 41, 43, 44, 51,\n52. Epstei\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/18 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=18]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 20 of 31\n\nattempted to contact Plaintiff again once she returned home in an effort to normalize the abuse and\nassert control over Plaintiff. Id. 1 53.\nPlaintiff's allegations are more than sufficient to allow her claims to proceed under an\nequitable estoppel theory at this early stage of the litigation, especially in light of the Defendants'\nheavy burden. \"The pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . do not\ncompel a litigant to anticipate potential affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and\nto affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of such defenses.\" Hirsch v. Rehs Galleries, Inc., No.\n18-CV-11864 (VSB), 2020 WL 917213, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2020) (internal quotation marks\nand citation omitted). The burden is therefore on Defendants to show \"beyond doubt that [Plaintiff]\ncan prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim[s] which would entitle [her] to relief.\" Ortiz,\n867 F.2d at 148 (citation omitted). And when defendants cannot do so, courts applying New York\nlaw have reserved the highly factual issue of equitable estoppel for summary judgment after\ndiscovery or for a jury. See, e.g., Funk, 2019 WL 3035124, at *2 (denying motion to dismiss and\nreserving issue of equitable estoppel for a jury where it was \"far from clear . . . that plaintiffs'\nclaims are time barred, as they have alleged extraordinary circumstances that could warrant the\napplication of equitable tolling\"); Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F. Supp. 2d\n317, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that, although \"plaintiffs' estoppel claim faces several\nhurdles... the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to warrant the denial of the defendants'\nmotions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds\"); Gotlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899\n(ILG), 2006 WL 1154817, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) (\"A vast majority of the cases on\nequitable estoppel permit plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss o\n... [truncated, 2050 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/19 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=19]", "char_count": 2050}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 21 of 31\n\nquestion until some discovery can be had.\").2 Defendants have failed to meet their burden of\nproving that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts demonstrating her entitlement to equitably estopping\nDefendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nC.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Tolling.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. While equitable\nestoppel focuses on a defendant's affirmative misconduct, equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiff\nand applies as a matter of fairness where the plaintiff has been \"prevented in some extraordinary\nway from exercising [her] rights.\" Flight Set, Inc. v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd., 647 F. Supp. 2d\n285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff's\nfear of retaliation prevented her from filing her claims prior to Epstein's death.\nDefendants' contention that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting equitable tolling\nis incorrect. Defs.' Mem. at 9. A \"reasonable fear of retaliation may be sufficient to constitute\nextraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling, particularly if the person threatening\nretaliation is a defendant.\"\n\nv.\n\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). The\n\n, No. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811, at *11\ncourt's reasoning applies equally in this context. Noting\n\n\"the underlying principles of equitable tolling and the realities that inmates . .. face in seeking to\nassert their rights,\" the court observed:\n[S]ustained control tends to result in adverse psychological effects\nthat invariably have behavioral consequences. When these negative\n\n2\n\nIn another victim's action against the Estate, the court recognized that the doctrines of\nequitable estoppel and equitable tolling are \"very fact specific\" and accordingly asked Defendants\nto refrain from filing a motion to dismiss prior to discovery. Transcript o\n... [truncated, 2360 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/20 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=20]", "char_count": 2360}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 22 of 31\n\npsychological effects of imprisonment become chronic and deeply\ninternalized, inmates experience: . . . hypervigilance, interpersonal\ndistrust and suspicion of threat or personal risk; emotional\nover-control, alienation and psychological distancing as a defense\nagainst exploitation and awareness of the riskiness and\nunpredictability of emotional investments in relationships; social\nwithdrawal and isolation; . . . diminished sense of self-worth and\npersonal value; and posttraumatic stress reactions to the pains of\nimprisonment. Retaliation and fear of retaliation are natural\nconsequences of this unique psychological environment.\nId. at *10 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nEpstein's pattern of controlling, manipulating, and intimidating his victims caused similar\npsychological effects in his countless victims, which in turn caused severe fear of retaliation. And\nPlaintiff alleges that Epstein's abuse and psychological manipulation had similar effects on her.\nCompl. 11 51, 52, 60, 66. The court should therefore extend equitable tolling to reach fear of\nretaliation in the context of Epstein's sexual abuse of and control over his victims, including\nPlaintiff.\nIn any event, as with equitable estoppel, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of\nproving \"beyond doubt that [Plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim[s] which\nwould entitle [her] to relief.\" Ortiz, 867 F.2d at 148 (citation omitted). The application of\nequitable tolling is a factual issue, and Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to defeat Defendants'\nMotion to Dismiss. See, e.g.,\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n(finding that an evidentiary hearing was appropriate to determine whether the limitations period\nwas equitably tolled); Cuobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d 325, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that\n\"the application of the tolling doctrine . . . is a question appropr\n... [truncated, 2334 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/21 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=21]", "char_count": 2334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 23 of 31\n\nPlaintiff can prove no set of facts demonstrating her entitlement to equitable tolling of the\nlimitations period in this case.\nII.\n\nThe Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive\nDamages.\n\nDefendants' argument that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law\nis incorrect. Not only are such damages available, they are ripe for use in this case. Beyond the\nprocedural impropriety ofDefendants' purported motion to dismiss punitive damages—that on its\nown warrants its denial—under New York choice-of-law principles the law of the Virgin Islands\napplies to the issue of punitive damages. Under Virgin Islands law, a court may allow for punitive\ndamages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, especially when that tortfeasor went to great\nlengths during his life to avoid punishment for causing immeasurable harm to countless victims.\nA.\n\nDefendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages is Procedurally\nImproper.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Court should not decide whether punitive damages are available at\nthis early stage. A motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for determining the availability of\npunitive damages. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state\na claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, \"[a] motion to\ndismiss is addressed to a 'claim'—not to a form of damages.\" Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss\nPlaintiff's request for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's claims (for battery\nand intentional infliction of emotional distress), and does not relate to the sufficiency of the\nallegations in the Complaint. The issue of what types of damages Plaintiff is entitled to should\ntherefore be dealt with at a later stage. See, e.g., Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, No. 16 Civ.\n877\n... [truncated, 2107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/22 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=22]", "char_count": 2107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 24 of 31\n\nform of damages, not an independent cause of action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the\nform of punitive damages is procedurally premature.\" (internal quotation marks and citation\nomitted)); Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n(\"Because there is 'no independent cause of action for punitive damages under New York law,'\nwe deny defendant's motion to 'dismiss' plaintiffs request for punitive damages as procedurally\npremature.\" (citation omitted)).\nB.\n\nPlaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case.\n\nEven if a motion to dismiss punitive damages were an adequate way to address this issue,\nDefendants' motion still fails. Plaintiff may recover punitive damages because the Virgin Islands\nhave the strongest interest in whether punitive damages are available in this case.; And, under\nVirgin Islands law, Plaintiff can recover punitive damages.\n1.\n\nThe Law of the Virgin Islands for Punitive Damages Governs Under New\nYork's Choice-of-Law Principles.\n\nFederal courts look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in deciding choice-of-law\ndisputes. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). \"In the context of\ntort law, New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions\nhas the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation. The greater interest is determined\nby an evaluation of the facts or contacts which relate to the purpose of the particular law in\nconflict.\" Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994) (internal quotation\nmarks and alterations omitted). New York courts seek \"[j]ustice, fairness and the best practical\nresult.\" Babcock v. M,\n\n191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).\n\n3\n\nAs explained below, under the doctrine of depecage New York law still governs as to the\nunderlying claims and as to compensatory damages.\n19\n\nEFTA02819212\n\n", "char_count": 1974}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 25 of 31\n\n\"Punitive damages are conduct regulating,\" and lujnder the doctrine of depecage, then,\nthe choice-of law analysis for punitive damages is distinct from the analysis for compensatory\ndamages.\" Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL\n4805719, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). While the law of the place of the tort generally applies\nto conduct regulating law, \"under New York law—for punitive damages in particular—a court\nmust consider the object or purpose of the wrongdoing to be punished and give controlling weight\nto the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue\npresented.\" Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). \"Punitive damages are designed\nto punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff, and so the choice-of-law inquiry for\npunitive damages provisions is necessarily 'defendant-focused.\"' Id.\nAlthough Defendants correctly note that the law of the jurisdiction of where the ton\noccurred generally applies, in this case the Virgin Islands have a stronger interest in the resolution\nof whether punitive damages can be awarded in this case. Defs.' Mem. at 12. This being a\n\"defendant-focused\" analysis, Adelson, 2019 WL 4805719, at *6, the Virgin Islands' interest in\napplying its law on punitive damages is greater than New York's. Epstein was domiciled in the\nVirgin Islands, not New York. Compl. 1 18; see also Adelson, 2019 WL 4805719, at *6 (finding\nthat a litigant's domicile points in favor of applying that domicile's law on punitive damages).\nEpstein also had a private island in the Virgins Islands, where he abused countless young females.\nCompl. 1 23. Defendants then chose to probate his Estate in and under the laws of the Virgin\nIslands. Id.1 31. Having availed themselves of all of the benefits and protections that Virgin\nIslands probate and estate law have to offer, Defendants cannot also s\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/24 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=24]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 26 of 31\n\nsuch, New York's choice-of-law rules dictate the application of Virgin Islands law to the issue of\npunitive damages.°\n2.\n\nVirgin Islands Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against\nDefendants in this Case.\n\nVirgin Islands law would allow for an award of punitive damages in this case. When\ndetermining how best to apply common law, courts in the Virgin Islands apply what is known as\nthe Banks analysis. See Gov't of the V.I. v. =,\n\n60 V.I. 597, 600, 602 (2016); Banks v. Intl\n\nRental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). As part of the Banks analysis, the Virgin Islands\nSupreme Court has \"instructed that, instead of mechanistically following the Restatements, courts\nshould consider three non-dispositive factors to determine Virgin Islands common law:\n(1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position\ntaken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which approach\nrepresents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands.\" M,\n\n60 V.I. at 600 (internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted). Under the Banks analysis, given the extraordinary nature of this case, Plaintiff\ncan pursue punitive damages against Defendants.\na.\n\nBanks Factor One: Whether Any Virgin Islands Courts Have\nAdopted a Rule\n\nVirgin Islands courts have not adopted a rule as to whether a plaintiff can pursue punitive\ndamages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor who went to great lengths to avoid punishment\nfor his crimes, including by taking his own life. Cases addressing the availability of punitive\ndamages have been limited to specific and inapplicable instances. See, e.g., Crawford v. Daly,\n\nAs an indication of the Virgin Islands' interest in matters concerning Epstein's Estate, the\nAttorney General of the United States Virgin Islands filed suit against the Estate on January 15,\n2020, seeking, among other things, punitive damages. Complaint, GVI v. Estate of Jeff\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/25 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=25]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 27 of 31\n\n55 V.I. 66, 91 (Super. Ct. 2010) (estate could pursue punitive damages as part of the Virgin Islands'\nsurvival statute);\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (Super. Ct. 2009) (\"[P]unitive\n\ndamages are not available in wrongful death actions in the Virgin Islands.\"). Although Defendants\ncite to the Second Restatement of Tons' position that \"[p]unitive damages are not awarded against\nthe representatives of a deceased tortfeasor,\" Defs.' Mem. at 12, the Restatement's position is\nincluded only in its commentary and is not binding on Virgin Islands courts. See\n\n, 60 V.I.\n\nat 600 (instructing not to \"mechanistically\" follow the Restatements). And although some Virgin\nIslands trial courts have cited to the Restatement, those courts were not faced with the question at\nissue in this case: whether punitive damages are available against an estate. See, e.g., Pappas\nv. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, Inc., 69 V.I. 3, 6 & n.8 (V.I. Super. 2015) (recognizing\nthat, in a case not involving an estate, the Second Restatement of Tons allows for punitive damages\nto punish \"outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct\"). Given\nthe lack of any established rule in the Virgins Islands governing this case, this Banks factor is\nneutral.\nb.\n\nBanks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts\nfrom Other Jurisdictions\n\nAs to the second Banks factor, numerous courts have held that plaintiffs may recover\npunitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. See, e.g., Haralson v. Fisher\nSurveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (concluding that \"there are situations in which it\nwould be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to express society's disapproval of outrageous\nconduct by rendering such an award against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor\" (internal quotation\nmarks omitted)); Tiller v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 1996) (rejecting \"the reasoning\n... [truncated, 2208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/26 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=26]", "char_count": 2208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 28 of 31\n\nequally important functions and are supported by public policy interests going beyond simple\npunishment of the wrongdoer.\"). Those courts have reasoned that punitive damages do not only\nserve to punish wrongdoers, but also to \"motivate others not to engage in similar action in the\nfuture.\" Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910, 928 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003).5 In this case, general\ndeterrence is of the utmost importance—Epstein spent decades abusing countless young women\nand girls, intimidating them into silence, and gaming the justice system with his wealth and power\nto avoid punishment. No person should be able to commit such acts while at the same time\nconsidering themselves to be above the law.\nEven courts that generally do not allow for punitive damages against a deceased\ntortfeasor's estate have expressly acknowledged that punitive damages might be available where,\nas here, the deceased tortfeasor takes his own life \"as an escape from punitive damages.\" Crabtree\nex. Rd. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005) (\"If we ever encounter a case\nwhere a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own death as an escape from punitive damages\nincident to some intentional tort, we can address that issue at that time.\"). Here, it is undisputed\nthat punitive damages would have been available against Epstein if he were still alive. But Epstein\nspent his life using his power, wealth, and intimidation to avoid proportionate punishment for his\ncountless crimes. See Compl. If 8, 14. And once he was finally imprisoned pending trial in New\n\nSee also, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643, 644-45 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying Alabama law\nand allowing punitive damages against an estate because \"punitive damages are viewed as\naccomplishing not only punishment to the wrongdoer ... but also as providing deterrents to others\nsimilar/\nfrom taking steps of the character condemned\"); Estate of Farrell ex rel. Bennett\nv.\n77\n... [truncated, 2490 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/27 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=27]", "char_count": 2490}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 29 of 31\n\nYork for his sex-trafficking operation, he signed his will and then almost immediately caused his\nown demise. See id. II 29, 30. Given the unique facts surrounding Epstein's crimes and death,\nand the need to deter others from committing such heinous crimes against young women and then\nusing power to avoid the consequences, the second Banks factor weighs heavily in favor of\nallowing for punitive damages under these facts.\nc.\n\nBanks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the Virgin Islands\n\nAlthough none of the three Banks factors is dispositive, the third factor—\"which approach\nrepresents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands\"—is the most important. See=,\n\n60 V.I.\n\nat 600. The soundest rule for the Virgin Islands is to allow for punitive damages against an estate\nin circumstances as extraordinary as those in this case. Here, the deceased tortfeasor spent his life\navoiding punishment, used wealth, power, intimidation, and threats to prevent his victims from\nseeking justice, and then caused his own demise once he was about to face real punishment for his\ncountless crimes. Allowing for punitive damages in this case would be in line with the general\ndeterrence principle behind punitive damages because it would deter others from manipulating the\njustice system and silencing victims of sexual abuse to avoid punishment. The rule would also be\nconsistent with the cases suggesting that punitive damages against the estate of a deceased\ntortfeasor may be available if the tortfeasor committed suicide to avoid punishment. The absence\nof any Virgin Islands law to the contrary, and the extraordinary nature of Epstein's transcontinental\nsex-trafficking enterprise, counsel in favor of such a rule.6 New York has no interest in stymieing\nthe application of Virgin Islands law in such a limited and extraordinary instance.\n\n6\n\nTo the extent necessary, \"Wire Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may answer questions\nof law \n... [truncated, 2315 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819189/28 or ?id=EFTA02819189&page=28]", "char_count": 2315}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 30 of 31\n\nHere, New York's choice-of-law rules point to Virgin Islands law on whether Plaintiff can\nrecover punitive damages, and Virgin Islands law would allow for such recovery. The Court\nshould therefore deny Defendants' motion to dismiss punitive damages.\nCONCLUSION\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss\nPlaintiff's Complaint.\n\nof the Supreme Court.\" Banks, 55 V.I. at 972 (internal citations omitted). Because the issue would\nbe a matter of first impression in the Virgin Islands, and given the split in common law authorities\nconcerning the as ai lability of the punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, the Court\nshould certify the question to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands if it deems it necessary to\nresolve the issue at this early stage of the case. See CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffinan, 948 F.3d 529,\n537 (2d Cir. 2020), certified question accepted, No. 36, 2020 WL 729773 (N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n(certifying questions where no precedent from state's highest court is available, and the state court\nwas better situated to make \"value judgments and important public policy choices\").\n25\n\nEFTA02819218\n\n", "char_count": 1238}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819189", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 29 Filed 03/20/20 Page 31 of 31\n\nDated: March 9, 2020\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n/s/ Joshua I. Schiller\nDavid Boies\nBOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n333 Main Street\nArmonk, NY 10504\n(914) 749-8200\nSigrid McCawley\n(Pro Hac Vice)\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200\nFt. Lauderdale, FL 33301\n(954) 356-0011\nJoshua I. Schiller\nAndrew Villacastin\nSabina MarieIla\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards\nNew York, NY 10001\n(212) 446-2300\n\nCounselfor Plaintiff\n\n26\n\nEFTA02819219\n\n", "char_count": 527}]}