{"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_count": 18, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02819169", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02819169.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 1 of 18\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\nv.\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10476 (PGG) (DCF)\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors of\nthe ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR\nMOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02819169\n\n", "char_count": 537}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 2 of 18\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nii\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2\n\nI.\n\n2\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her In 2002, When She Was 22\n\n4\n\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nState A Claim\n\n4\n\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's causes of action expired in 2005 at the latest\n\n4\n\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's attempts to invoke extraordinary statute of limitations\nexceptions fail.\n\n4\n\ni.\nii.\nD.\n\nCPLR § 2I5(8Xa) is inapplicable because the Indictment\nconcerned sex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff.\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\"\ncircumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel\n\nPlaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n4\n\n11\n13\n\nEFTA02819170\n\n", "char_count": 944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 3 of 18\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAbercrombie v. College,\n438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)\n\n11\n\nAshcroft v. Igbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly,\n550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n4\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8Xa)\n\n5, 6\n\nConklin v. Maidenbaum,\n12-cv- 3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013)\n(Ramos, J.)\n\n10\n\nCrucible Materials Corp. v. N.Y. Power Auth.,\n50 A.D.3d 1353 (Third Dept. 2008)\n\n8\n\nFairley v. MI,\n09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.)\n(Gardephe, J.)\n\n8\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct.\n23, 2018)\n\n5, 6\n\nGraham v.\n224 F.R.D. 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n12\n\nKashefv. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n7\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\n97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.)\n\n12\n\nMcElligott v. City o.TN. Y,\n15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017)\n\n5\n\nv. Consumers Discrib. Co.,\n648 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.)\n\n12\n\nii\n\nEFTA02819171\n\n", "char_count": 1166}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 4 of 18\n\nSJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Edw.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n(Buchwald, J.)\n\n11\n\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt.,\nNo. 14-cv-0463, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n12\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin,\nNo. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n(Batts, J.)\n\n11\n\nViti v. Guardian Life his. Co. of Am.,\n10-cv- 2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,\n2012)\n\n8\n\nYesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya,\nNo. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744 (E.D.N.Y.\n2010)\n\n9\n\nStatutes\nEPTL § 11-3.2 (aX1)\n\n12\n\nNew York Estates, Powers And Trusts Law\n\n2\n\nOther Authorities\n97 NY Jur Statutes § 185\n\n7\n\nCPLR § 214(5)\n\nI, 4\n\nCPLR § 215(3)\n\n1, 4\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa)\n\npassim\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6)\n\nI, 8\n\niii\n\nEFTA02819172\n\n", "char_count": 905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 5 of 18\n\nDefendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Co-Executors\") submit this Memorandum of Law in Support of their\nMotion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint\n(ECF No. 1) with prejudice because it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages\nbecause it is prohibited by statute.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nThis action is time-bared. Plaintiff alleges that Jeffrey E. Epstein (\"Decedent\"), now\ndeceased, sexually assaulted her in 2002 in New York, when she was 22. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11, 36,\n49.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action -- battery and intentional infliction of emotional\ndistress -- and demands punitive damages. (Id. ¶y 57 — 66, p. 14.)\nUnder New York law, causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within\none year of accrual (CPLR § 215(3)); and claims sounding in personal injury, within three years\n(CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims expired in 2005 at the latest.\nIn apparent recognition that her claims are time-barred, Plaintiff erroneously alleges that\nher claims are timely pursuant to CPLR § 215(8Xa),I l her claims were equitably tolled, and that\nthe Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense (Compl.\n¶¶ 12-14). Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\nCPLR § 2I5(8)(a) does not apply here because Decedent's criminal indictment (the\n\"Indictment\"), which concerns alleged sexual trafficking of minors, has nothing to do with\nPlaintiff, who alleges sexual assault when she was an adult. Plaintiff also fails to meet her\nburden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\n\nI. CPLR § 2 I5(8Xa) provides: \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been\ncommenced with respect to the event or occurrencefrom which a claim governed by this secti\n... [truncated, 2167 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/4 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=4]", "char_count": 2167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 6 of 18\n\nPlaintiff's demand for punitive damages must also be dismissed as a matter of law. New\nYork Estates, Powers And Trusts Law expressly bars recovery of punitive damages in a personal\ninjury action brought to recover damages from a decedent tortfeasor's estate—i.e., exactly what\nPlaintiff attempts to do here.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nI.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her In 2002, When She Was 22\nMuch of Plaintiff's Complaint consists of allegations about Decedent's conduct that has\n\nno connection to Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Compl.11 4-10.) With respect to what allegedly happened\nto her, Plaintiff, who claims Ohio citizenship and residency, essentially claims that, \"[i]n or\naround September 2002,\" she was living in California and working to obtain her certificate in\nmassage therapy when a fellow student arranged for her to meet Decedent's employee about the\npossibility of working as a \"traveling masseuse\" for a \"wealthy couple.\" (Id.\n\n36-38.)\n\nAccording to Plaintiff, Decedent's employee told Plaintiff the position would involve Plaintiff\nbeing taken to lavish parties, receiving expensive clothes and international travel. (k/. 1 38.)\nPlaintiff alleges that, two weeks after meeting Decedent's employee to discuss the\nposition, Plaintiff traveled from California to New York City to meet with the couple which\nincluded Decedent, during which visit Plaintiff agreed to give Decedent a foot massage. (Id.\n11 39-46). Plaintiff alleges that Decedent pressed his foot against \"intimate parts of [Plaintiff's]\nbody\" and \"abruptly grabbed [Plaintiff] and proceeded to sexually assault her against her will\"\nafter she got up to leave the room. (Id. ¶146-49.)\nPlaintiff alleges that she then returned to California, failed to finish massage therapy\n\"with the same certification that she initially set out to achieve\" and \"ended up leaving California\nand moving back to Ohio a few short months after the assault.\" (Id154).\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/5 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=5]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 7 of 18\n\nassault \"deeply affected\" her and \"continues to cause her significant distress and harm\" (id.1\n55).\nApparently recognizing that her claims are time-barred per the applicable statute of\nlimitations, Plaintiff alleges a few generic legal conclusions that also appear in other time-barred\ncomplaints against the Co-Executors that Plaintiff's counsel has filed in this District on behalf of\nother individuals. Thus, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion:\n•\n\nThis action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides\nthat a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action\nagainst the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or\noccurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against [Decedent]\nwith respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise\nwas terminated on August 29, 2019. (Id.1 12.)\n\n•\n\nAny statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims is tolled due to the continuous\nand active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that\n[Decedent] and his co-conspirators used to silence his victims, including Plaintiff.\n[Decedent]'s actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this lawsuit\nbefore his death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that [Decedent] and his coconspirators would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. (Id.\n1 13.)\n\n•\n\nDefendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nAllowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. [Decedent] and his co-conspirators\nintimidated each of his victims into silence by threatening their lives and their\nlivelihoods, and therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before his\ndeath. By using threats, along with his wealth and power, [Decedent] was able to\nescape punishment for his crimes against countless young w\n... [truncated, 2240 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/6 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=6]", "char_count": 2240}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 8 of 18\n\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nState A Claim\n\n\"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,\naccepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Ashcroft v. Juba!, 556\nU.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a Court must normally accept as true all well-pleaded factual\nallegations in a complaint and draw all inferences in a plaintiff's favor, those principles are\n\"inapplicable to legal conclusions.\" Id. at 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550\nU.S. 544, 555, 556 (2007)). Thus, a pleading that offers only \"labels and conclusions\" or \"a\nformulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555\n(2007).\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's causes of action expired in 2005 at the latest\n\nThe Complaint alleges torts sounding in battery that occurred in New York in 2002.\n(Comp!. fl 1, 11, 36, 39, 49.) Under New York law, causes of action sounding in battery must\nbe commenced within one year of accrual (CPLR § 215(3)); and claims sounding in personal\ninjury, within three years (CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims expired in 2005 at the\nlatest.\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's attempts to invoke extraordinary statute of limitations exceptions\nfail.\ni.\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable because the Indictment concerned\nsex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8Xa) provides: \"Whenever it is\nshown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the\nevent or occurrencefrom which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have\n\n4\n\nEFTA02819176\n\n", "char_count": 1838}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 9 of 18\n\nat least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action\"\n(emphasis added).\nDecedent's Indictment, which Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint, was not commenced\nwith respect to Plaintiff. Rather, the Indictment alleges that Decedent sexually trafficked \"minor\ngirls\" (Compl., Ex. A at ¶ 1 (emphasis added)), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking\nof \"minors\" (Id., Ex. A at ¶¶2 - 4, 6, 8, 11- 15, 18 - 20, 22). Because Plaintiff alleges she was 22\nwhen Decedent assaulted her on a single occasion (k/.11 11, 36, 49), this action and the\nIndictment arise from different events or occurrences.\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8Xa) applied only to claims based on events\nof February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of\nthose two days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallina v.\nThatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23,\n2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those\nalleged in civil action occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City ofN.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LGS),\n2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable\nto claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action,\nnotwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions).\nCanino is especially instructive. In that case, an individual sued an attorney for battery\nand other claims based on the core allegation that, over the course of two years, the attorney\ncommitted various sexual misconduct against the plaintiff, including sexual assault. 2018 N.Y.\nMisc. LEXIS 8435, at * I. Defendant had also been criminally charged with forceable touching\n\n5\n\nEFTA02819177\n\n", "char_count": 1963}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 10 of 18\n\nfor incidents that occurred with the plaintiff in 2017. Id. at *3. The court dismissed as timebarred plaintiff's battery counts based on incidents alleged to have occurred in 2016. Id. at *2-3.\nIn doing so, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied to the\n2016 incidents, finding:\nPlaintiff argues that the July and October 2016 incidents are part of the same\nongoing course of events as the February, March and May 2017 incidents\nand should therefore be deemed timely commenced ... the case law does\nnot support Plaintiffs interpretation of ... CPLR §215(8)(a). The criminal\ninstruments ... demonstrate that Defendant was charged for incidents\noccurring on three (3) specific dates ... Pursuant to CPLR §215(8)(a),\ntolling would apply only to claims based on these dates, \"because it was\nonly in connection with the events of these [three] days that a criminal\nprosecution was commenced against the defendant.\" Christodoulou v.\nTerdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 [2d Dept. 1999]. As criminal charges were\nnot commenced with respect to the July 2016 and October 2016 events, the\ntolling provisions of CPLR §215(8) do not apply. Id. at *34.\nHere, Plaintiff asserts a much more tenuous connection between this action and the\nIndictment than the one unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiff in Gallina (and the other cited\ncases). Therefore, the Court should reject Plaintiff's argument for the application of CPLR §\n215(8Xa).\nIn Plaintiff's response to Defendants' pre-motion letter, Plaintiff asserts three erroneous\narguments for application of CPLR § 215(8)(a). First, Plaintiff argues that CPLR § 215(8)(a)\ndoes not require the Indictment to expressly identify Plaintiff as one of Decedent's victims. This\nis a strawman argument: no one argues otherwise.\nHowever, Plaintiff is required to show — but is unable to show under the circumstances\nhere — that this action and the Indictment arise from the same eve\n... [truncated, 2249 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/9 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=9]", "char_count": 2249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 11 of 18\n\ndoes not allege she was a minor when Decedent sexually assaulted her. Nor does she allege\nanything establishing she was a sex trafficking victim.\nSecond, Plaintiff urges a broad construction of CPLR § 215(8Xa) that effectively rewrites\nit by rendering the limitation therein — \"with respect to the event or occurrencefrom which a\nclaim governed by this section arises\" — meaningless. Plaintiff effectively argues that, unless the\nIndictment expressly rules out that it arises from the same event as this action, then Plaintiff is\nentitled to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). That argument is contrary to basic principles of statutory\ninterpretation prohibiting a reading of a statute that would render its words meaningless (see 97\nNY Jur Statutes § 185), the case law cited above, a plain reading of the Indictment and common\nsense.\nPlaintiff cites a single case in support of her erroneous argument, Kashef v. BNP Paribas\nS.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019). However, Kashefis factually distinguishable. The civil and\ncriminal actions in that case both arose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan to\nviolate U.S. sanctions. id. at 63. Here, Plaintiff's allegations — that she was an adult whom\nDecedent sexually assaulted on a single occasion — do not comport with what is set forth\nrepeatedly in the Indictment—namely, an alleged scheme to traffic minors. Nor does Plaintiff\nsufficiently set forth allegations establishing she was a trafficking victim in any respect.\nTherefore, while Plaintiff may claim she too is a victim of Decedent, she is not a victim by\nreason of the events giving rise to the Indictment.\nThird Plaintiff urges that principles of statutory interpretation require the Court to\nconstrue CPLR § 215(8Xa) \"liberally.\" That is erroneous. The Court should not depart from\nbasic principles of statutory interpretation — which require it to construe CPLR § 215(8)(a)\naccording to its plain terms expressly limiti\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/10 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=10]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 12 of 18\n\nwhere, as here, an indictment charges misconduct that is different than what a civil plaintiff\nalleges. The Court may not interpret CPLR § 215(8)(a) in a manner that would render the\nlimiting clause therein meaningless.\nPlaintiff cites a single Third Department case, Crucible Materials Corp. v. N.Y. Power\nAuth., 50 A.D.3d 1353 (Third Dept. 2008), to support her assertion that the Court must permit\nher to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). Yet Crucible does not concern CPLR § 215(8)(a). Further, in\nthat case, the Third Department reaffirmed the principle that, when interpreting a statute, courts\n\"giv[e] clear effect to the plain meaning of the words employed.\" Id. at 1355-56. This is exactly\nwhat Defendants argue for here and what Plaintiff argues against—namely, a proper\ninterpretation of CPLR § 215(8Xa) that gives meaning to the words \"with respect to the event or\noccurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises.\" The Court should reject\nPlaintiff's attempt to rewrite the statute.\nii.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\"\ncircumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to\njustify tolling or equitable estoppel. \"Second Circuit cases discussing equitable tolling set a\nstringent standard for its application.\" Fairley v.\n\n09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist.\n\nLEXIS 26536, at *16 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.) (finding equitable tolling did not\napply and granting defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaint on statute of\nlimitations grounds). Equitable tolling only applies where a plaintiff is \"prevented in some\nextraordinary way from exercising h[er] rights.\" Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm., 10-cv2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted\nby, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. II, 2013) (e\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/11 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=11]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 13 of 18\n\nN.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);\nv. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)).\nUnder this doctrine, a court may, \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow\nexceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.\"' Id. (emphasis added) (citing\nYesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744,\nat *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003)). \"That the\ndoctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary' and `compelling' circumstances -is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden ofpersuasion to show that tolling is\njustified.\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A\nlate-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable\ndiligence\" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at •32 (citation\nomitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists, but the\ndefendant's conduct causes her to delay bringing suit. See Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744,\nat *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010) (citing Cerbone v. International Ladies' Garment Workers'\nUnion, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1985)). \"The rationale behind this equitable doctrine is to\nprotect the person who brings their action after it would normally be barred because she was\n'lulled' into believing that she should delay pursuing her cause of action.\" Id. (quoting In re\nHiggins, 270 B.R. 147, 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to\nshow: \"(i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact, and had reason to believe that\nthe plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on that misrepresentation to\nh[er] detriment.\" Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fail\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/12 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=12]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 14 of 18\n\nto articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit.\nSee id. at *6.\nPlaintiff does not allege any particularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from\nexercising her rights. (Compl.lrif 13-14.) Nor has Plaintiff alleged that (i) Decedent made a\nmisrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) Plaintiff\nreasonably relied on it to her detriment. Therefore, there is no \"extraordinary\" basis alleged\nsufficient to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute of\nlimitations defense.\nPlaintiff asserts in her pre-motion letter that her sole allegation that Decedent \"made clear\nto Plaintiff\" that he was wealthy and powerful, as well as her various allegations that have no\nnexus to Plaintiff (e.g., that, generally, Decedent allegedly manipulated his other unidentified\nvictims), constitute \"extraordinary circumstances\" sufficient to invoke these doctrines. (ECF\nDoc. 13, § II.) Plaintiff's assertion that such bland, sparse allegations are \"extraordinary\" is\ninconsistent with the numerous court decisions in which far stronger allegations are deemed\ninsufficient to justify equitable estoppel or tolling. See, e.g., Conklin v. Maidenbaum, 12-cv3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (Ramos, J.) (finding\nequitable tolling inapplicable and dismissing complaint notwithstanding that plaintiffs alleged\nthey reasonably relied on defendants' representations over a period spanning more than ten\nmonths and dozens of telephone calls).\nPlaintiff alternatively argues in her pre-motion letter that her entitlement to equitable\nestoppel and tolling are fact issues not subject to rulings on a motion to dismiss. (ECF Doc. 13,\n§ II.) Plaintiff misses the point. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to allege facts that support\n\n10\n\nEFTA02819182\n\n", "char_count": 1951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 15 of 18\n\ninvocation of an exception to the statute of limitations, there is no issue of fact sufficient to\ndefeat a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds:\nIf properly pled, allegations of equitable estoppel normally create questions\nof fact which cannot be determined at a motion to dismiss ... However,\nwithout adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore\ncannot defeat a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds.\nSee Dep't ofEcon. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 943\n(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing cause of action because plaintiff made no\nallegation in complaint that \"its failure to timely institute its third-party\naction was due to its justified reliance upon a misrepresentation\" by\nopposing party); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284,\n1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (\"Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant caused\nthem to delay in bringing suit on a known cause of action. On the contrary,\nplaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that they did not discover the alleged ...\nviolations until long after the limitations period had expired. Equitable\nestoppel is therefore not appropriate in this case.\").\nSee Abercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added).\nHere, as in Abercrombie, \"Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support\ninvocation of the equitable estoppel doctrine. First, Plaintiff does not identify the\nmisrepresentations or other facts demonstrating fraudulent concealment that could serve as the\nbasis for the claimed equitable estoppel. More particularly, Plaintiff has utterly failed to identify\nin the Complaint which statements led her to believe that she could delay bringing her lawsuit.\"\nId. at 266. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts that would support invocation of equitable tolling.\nThese are pleading deficiencies, not questions of fact.\nD.\n\nPlaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a \n... [truncated, 2500 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/14 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=14]", "char_count": 2500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 16 of 18\n\nbad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C.\nDept of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14,\n2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages claims because punitive\ndamages were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 11867, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for\npunitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the\nlevel necessary to award punitive damages);\n\nConsumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp. 980,\n\n981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive\ndamages).\nHere, New York law applies to the issue of punitive damages because Plaintiff alleges the\ntorts against her took place here. See Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt, No. 14-cv0463, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (\"Because punitive damages\nare conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.'\"\n(citations omitted)).\nThe New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law bars Plaintiff's punitive damages claim:\n\"For any injury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the\ndecedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action\nbrought to recover damagesfor personal injury.\" NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (aX1) (emphasis added).\nThat is the law in most U.S. jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat.\n(Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (\"Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of\na deceased tortfeasor.\"). \"Also, 'there is a strong policy against the assessment of punitive\ndamages against an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent.\"' Graham v.\n\n12\n\nEFTA02819184\n\n\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-\n... [truncated, 2287 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02819169/15 or ?id=EFTA02819169&page=15]", "char_count": 2287}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 17 of 18\n\n, 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp.\n449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).\nIn her pre-motion letter, Plaintiff does not dispute that this prohibition on punitive\ndamages in personal injury actions against a decedent tortfeasor's estate is black-letter New York\nlaw. Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to simply delay ruling on the issue of punitive damages\nuntil after discovery. However, as there are no facts that would render Plaintiffs punitive\ndamages claim proper, there is no reason to allow it to stand.\nPlaintiff seeks to delay the inevitable so she may use the prospect of punitive damages —\nclearly prohibited as they may be — as (misplaced) leverage over the Co-Executors. This would\nserve no legitimate purpose. It would also impede productive settlement discussions. Plaintiff's\npunitive damages claim, like the punitive damages claims in the cases cited above, should be\ndismissed.\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss\nPlaintiff's Complaint in its entirety, together with such other and further relief as the Court\ndeems just and proper.\n\n13\n\nEFTA02819185\n\n", "char_count": 1233}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819169", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 27 Filed 03/20/20 Page 18 of 18\n\nDated: New York, New York\nFebruary 24, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n212.704.6000\n\nBy:/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\n14\n\nEFTA02819186\n\n", "char_count": 299}]}