{"efta_number": "EFTA02819140", "page_count": 3, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02819140", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02819140.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02819140", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 1 of 3\n\nBSF\n\nBOIES\nSCHILLER\nFLEXNER\nTelephone: (212) 446-2300\nEmail: jischillen@bsfilp.com\nJanuary 29, 2020\n\nVIA ECF\nThe Honorable Paul G. Gardephe\nDistrict Court Judge\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District ofNew York\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\nRe:\n\nv. Indyke et A,\nCase No. 19-cv-10476\n\nDear Judge Gardephe,\nPursuant to Individual Rule IV(A), Plaintiff\nhereby responds to Defendants'\nrequest for a pre-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to dismiss. Dkt.\n12. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the doctrine of\nequitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion \"to dismiss\" Plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages is procedurally improper. For the following reasons, the Court should deny Defendants'\nanticipated motion in its entirety.\nI.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York Law.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides:\n\"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced\nwith respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the\nplaintiffshall have at least one yearfrom the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence\nthe civil action.\" (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on\nAugust 29, 2019. Compl. ¶ 35. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later,\nthe action is timely under CPLR § 2I5(8Xa). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 2I 5(8Xa)'s\napplication to these facts are meritless.\nFirst, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was\nnot named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) is \"plain, clear and unambiguous\" that it does not require that the plaintiff be \"the\nvictim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed.\" Clemens v. Nealon, 202\nA.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).\nSecond, Defendants' narrow construction of § 2I5(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\" language\nis improper, especially in light ofthe breadth ofEpstein's indictment. The charges were not limited\nto crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex\ntrafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, \"including minor\nvictims identified herein.\" Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y Indictment) ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added). As\nanother example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking\nBOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards, Now York. NY 100011(0 212446 23001(0 212 44 6 2350 1 wwwbsfl1p corn\n\nEFTA02819140\n\n", "char_count": 2742}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819140", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 2 of 3\n\nBSF\nof \"numerous individuals . . . including but not limited to Minor Victim-I.\" Id. ¶ 24. Nor did the\nIndictment describe the sex trafficking conspiracy as exclusively targeting minor victims—it\nexplicitly acknowledged that some victims were not underage at the time of the sexual abuse. Id.\n¶ II (\"[Epstein] knew that many of his New York victims were underage.\"). The Indictment was\ntargeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the event or occurrence\nfrom which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common\nscheme, they fall within CPLR § 215(8)(a).\nA recent Second Circuit opinion is instructive. In Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., the Court\nheld that BNP Paribas's (BNPP) guilty plea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being\ncommitted in Sudan and of the consequences of providing Sudan access to U.S. financial markets\"\nallowed victims who were the victims of the atrocities in Sudan to bring a civil action against\nBNPP pursuant to § 215(8)(a). 925 F.3d 53, 56-57, 62 (2d Cir. 2019). The \"event or occurrence\"\nin that case, like the one here, was a broad scheme spanning many years, rather than a single event\n(such as the rape of one victim on a specified date). The Court therefore analyzed the \"event or\noccurrence\" on a general level as \"BNPP's conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions\" for\nhumanitarian violations, id. at 62-63, and held that the victims of those humanitarian violations\ncould bring claims subject to CPLR § 213(8Xa). Just as BNPP's general conspiracy to violate\nsanctions was the relevant event or occurrence in Kashef, Epstein's wide-spread sex trafficking\nscheme is the event or occurrence at issue in Plaintiff's case for the purposes of applying\nCPLR § 215(8Xa).\nThe cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were\nmuch narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. See\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced\nonly in connection with events on February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993); Gallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at •3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment\n\"charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates\"). Epstein's S.D.N.Y\nIndictment was much broader, covering sexual abuse that occurred \"over the course of many years\"\n\"from at least in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005.\" S.D.N.Y.\nIndictment¶¶ 1-2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added). Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) because the scheme the S.D.N.Y Indictment targeted is the event or occurrence from\nwhich Plaintiff's civil claims arise.\nFinally, principles of statutory interpretation require the Court to construe CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) liberally. New York courts \"liberally construe remedial statutes in favor of the\nintended beneficiaries and consider the mischief sought to be remedied and favor the construction\nwhich will suppress the evil and advance the remedy.\" Crucible Materials Corp. v. N.Y. Power\nAuth., 50 A.D.3d 1353, 1356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Narrowly\nconstruing § 215(8Xa) to foreclose Plaintiff's claims as untimely would violate that principle.\nII.\n\nPlaintiff Has Sufficiently Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling.\n\nEven if Plaintiff's claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of\nlimitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.\nDefendants assert that Plaintiff \"fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances\nsufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\" Dkt. 12 at 3. But the Complaint alleges in detail\n\nEFTA02819141\n\n", "char_count": 3853}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819140", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 13 Filed 01/29/20 Page 3 of 3\n\nBSF\nthe methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter\ntheir victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies \"where it would be unjust to allow\na defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense,\" Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929\n(N.Y. 2006), due to \"deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct,\" Zoe G. v. Frederick\nF.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his\nco-conspirators manipulated their victims using \"financial power, promises, and threats to ensure\nthat the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands;\" made clear to\nPlaintiff \"that he was incredibly wealthy, powerful, and regularly in contact with world leaders;\"\nand attempted to contact Plaintiff after her sexual assault. Compl. ¶9 26, 52, 53. The allegations\nconcerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of his victims (and Plaintiff specifically) easily provide\nthe requisite \"extraordinary circumstances\" for equitable tolling.\nBecause equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants'\nattempt to resolve the issue at motion to dismiss is inappropriate, and any motion challenging\nwhether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have conducted\ndiscovery. See, e.g., Carelock v. UnitedStates, 2015 WL 5000816, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015).\nIII.\n\nThe Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery\n\nFederal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state a\nclaim upon which relief can be granted.\" Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's\nclaim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's clams (battery and intentional\ninfliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the\nComplaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be\ndealt with at a later stage of this litigation. See, e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F.\nSupp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying \"motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages as procedurally premature\").\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Joshua I. Schiller\nDavid Boies, Esq.\nJoshua I. Schiller, Esq.\nSigrid S. McCawley, Esq.\ncc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)\n\nEFTA02819142\n\n", "char_count": 2435}]}