{"efta_number": "EFTA02819136", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02819136", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02819136.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02819136", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 1 of 4\nTroutman Sanders LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\ntroutman.com\n\ntroutmar?\nsanders\n\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nbennet.moskowitz@troutman.com\n\nJanuary 24, 2020\nECF\nHon. Paul G. Gardephe\nThurgood Marshall\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square, Room 2204\nNew York, New York 10007\nRe:\n\nv. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Executors of the Estate\nof Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF\n\nDear Judge Gardephe:\nWe represent Defendants Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (together, the \"Co-Executors\"), in the above-referenced action. We write\npursuant to Your Honor's Individual Rules 1(A) and IV(A) to request a pre-motion conference on\nors anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff\n(\"Plaintiff\") Complaint (ECF No. 1) because it is time-barred, and Plaintiff's\ndemand for punitive damages because it is prohibited as a matter of law.\n1. Plaintiff alleges Decedent assaulted Plaintiff in 2002 when she was 22 years old.\nPlaintiff alleges that Mr. Epstein (\"Decedent\"), now deceased, sexually assaulted Plaintiff in\n2002 in New York when she was 22. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11, 36, 49.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of\naction -- battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress -- and demands punitive\ndamages. (Id. ¶¶ 57 — 66, p. 14.)\n2. Plaintiff's causes of action are time-barred.\nThe Complaint alleges torts that occurred in New York in 2002. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11, 36, 39, 49).\nUnder New York law, causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year\nof accrual (CPLR § 215(3)); and claims sounding in personal injury, within three years (CPLR §\n214(5)). Therefore, Plaintiffs claims expired in 2005 at the latest.\n3. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statutes of limitations fail.\nIn apparent recognition her claims are time-barred, Plaintiff erroneously alleges that her claims\nare timely pursuant to CPLR § 215(8)(a), her claims were equitably tolled, and that the CoExecutors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense (Compl. at ¶¶\n12 - 14). Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\n\n41215546v2\n\nEFTA02819136\n\n", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819136", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 2 of 4\nJanuary 24, 2020\nPage 2\n\ntroutmarif\nsanders\n\nFirst, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is\nshown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to\nthe event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall\nhave at least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil\naction\" (emphasis added).\nDecedent's criminal indictment (the \"Indictment\") which Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint, was\nnot commenced with respect to Plaintiff. Rather, the Indictment alleges that Decedent sexually\nabused \"minor girls\" (Compl., Ex. A at ¶ 1 (emphasis added)), stating throughout that it\nconcerns sex trafficking of \"minors\" (Id., Ex. A at ¶¶2 - 4, 6, 8, 11- 15, 18 - 20, 22). Because\nPlaintiff alleges she was 22 when Decedent assaulted her (Id. ¶¶ 11, 36, 49), this action and the\nIndictment arise from different events or occurrences.\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoutou v. Terdeman, 262\nA.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of\nFebruary 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of\nthose two days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gaffina v.\nThatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23,\n2018) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those\nalleged in civil action occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LGS),\n2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829, at •13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable\nto claims against civil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action,\nnotwithstanding same events gave rise to both actions).\nGaffina is especially instructive. In Gaffina, an individual sued an attorney for battery and other\nclaims based on the core allegation that, over the courts of 2 years, the attorney committed\nvarious sexual misconduct against the plaintiff including sexual assault. 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS\n8435, at *1. Defendant had also been criminally charged with forceable touching for incidents\nthat occurred with the plaintiff in 2017. Id. at *3. The court dismissed as time-barred plaintiff's\nbattery counts based on incidents alleged to have occurred in 2016. Id. at '2-3. The court\nrejected plaintiffs argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied to the 2016 incidents, finding:\nPlaintiff argues that the July and October 2016 incidents are part of the same\nongoing course of events as the February, March and May 2017 incidents and\nshould therefore be deemed timely commenced ... the case law does not support\nPlaintiff's interpretation of ... CPLR §215(8)(a). The criminal instruments ...\ndemonstrate that Defendant was charged for incidents occurring on three (3)\nspecific dates ... Pursuant to CPLR §215(8)(a), tolling would apply only to claims\nbased on these dates, \"because it was only in connection with the events of\nthese [three] days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against the\ndefendant.\" Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 [2d Dept. 1999]. As\ncriminal charges were not commenced with respect to the July 2016 and October\n2016 events, the tolling provisions of CPLR §215(8) do not apply. Id. at '3.4.\nPlaintiff asserts a much weaker connection between this action and the Indictment than the one\nunsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiff in Gatlin (or the other cited cases). Therefore, the Court\nshould reject Plaintiff's argument for the application of CPLR § 215(8)(a).\n\nEFTA02819137\n\n", "char_count": 3704}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819136", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 3 of 4\n20\nJanuary 24\nPage 3\n, 20\n\ntroutmariP\n\nsanders\n\nSecond, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to\njustify tolling or equitable estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is\n\"prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising tier] rights.\" Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.\nof Am., 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at '30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,\n2012),lied\nby, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added)\n(citing\nv. N\nN.Y.C.\n1of Corr., 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152, at *2\n(S.D.N.Y. 2010);\nNyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under this doctrine, a\ncourt may, \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to the statute of\nlimitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yesh Diamonds, Inc. v.\nYashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at '2 (E.D.N.Y. 2010);\nIn re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003)). \"That the doctrine is to be employed\nonly sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances -- is reflected in the fact that\nthe plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is justified.\" Id. (emphasis added)\n(citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A late-filing party seeking equitable\ntolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable diligence\" in pursuing her claims\nduring the period she seeks to toll. Id. at '32 (citation omitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists, but the\ndefendant's conduct causes her to delay bringing suit. See Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n101744, at '5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010) (citing Cerbone v. International Ladies' Garment\nWorkers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1985)). \"The rationale behind this equitable doctrine is\nto protect the person who brings their action after it would normally be barred because she was\n'lulled' into believing that she should delay pursuing her cause of action.\" Id. (quoting In re\nHiggins, 270 B.R. 147, 158 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to\nshow: \"(i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation of fact, and had reason to believe\nthat the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on that misrepresentation\nto h[erl detriment.\" Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails\nto articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit.\nSee id. at '6.\nPlaintiff does not allege any particularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from exercising\nher rights. (Compl. ¶1 13-14.) Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) Decedent made a misrepresentation\nto her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her\ndetriment. There is no \"extraordinary\" basis alleged to toll the statute of limitations or estop the\nCo-Executors from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\n4. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.\nCourts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss claims for punitive damages. See, e.g.,\nSee, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n177691, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive\ndamages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad faith conduct\nwere conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at '25.26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald,\nJ.) (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages claims because punitive damages were not\nstatutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *26\n(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages\nbecause even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise to the level necessary to\n\nEFTA02819138\n\n", "char_count": 4116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02819136", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10476-PGG-DCF Document 12 Filed 01/24/20 Page 4 of 4\nJanuary 24, 2020\nPage 4\n\ntroutmaril\nsanders\n\naward punitive damages);\nv. Consumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp. 980, 981, 984\n(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages).\nFurther, New York law applies to the issue of punitive damages because Plaintiff alleges the\ntorts took place there. See Starr lndem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463,\n2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (\"Because punitive damages are\nconduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.\"'\n(citations omitted)).\nThe New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law bars Plaintiff's punitive damages claim: \"For any\ninjury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the\ndecedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action\nbrought to recover damages for personal injury.\" NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (emphasis added).\nThat is the law in most U.S. jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second)\nOf Torts § 908 cmt. a (\"Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a\ndeceased tortfeasor.\"). \"Also, 'there is a strong policy against the assessment of punitive\ngainst an estate on account of wrongful conduct of the decedent.- Graham v.\n, 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp.\n449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)). Because there are no facts that would render Plaintiff's punitive\ndamages claim proper, there is no reason to allow it to stand.\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\n\nEFTA02819139\n\n", "char_count": 1710}]}