{"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_count": 54, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02807221", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02807221.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR\n\nDocument 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 1 of 54\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nJANE DOE 1, Individually and on\nBehalf of All Others Similarly\nSituated,\n\n22-cv-10018 (JSR)\n\nPlaintiff,\n-vDEUTSCHE BANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,\nDEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW YORK BRANCH,\nDEUTSCHE\nBANK\nTRUST\nCOMPANY\nAMERICAS,\nDefendants.\n\nJANE DOE 1, Individually and on\nBehalf of All Others Similarly\nSituated,\n\n22-cv-10019 (JSR)\n\nPlaintiff,\n-vJP\n\nCHASE BANK, N.A.,\nDefendant.\n\nGOVERNMENT OF THE\nVIRGIN ISLANDS,\n\nUNITED\n\nSTATES\n\n22-cv-10904 (JSR)\nOPINION AND ORDER\n\nPlaintiff,\n-vJP\n\nCHASE BANK, N.A.,\nDefendant.\n\n1\n\nEFTA02807221\n\n", "char_count": 642}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 2 of 54\n\nJED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.:\nThe plaintiffs in these three related cases are two anonymous\nwomen, referred to here as \"JPM Jane Doe\" and \"DB Jane Doe,\" and\nthe Government of the United States Virgin Islands (the \"USVI\").\nPlaintiffs claim that defendants JP\nand\n\nthe\n\nrelated\n\nChase Bank, N.A. (\"JP\nentities\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nAktiengesellschaft, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, and Deutsche\nBank Trust Company Americas (collectively, \"Deutsche Bank\") are\nlegally liable for their alleged facilitation of Jeffrey Epstein's\nsex crimes.\nOn February 1, 2023, and February 7, 2023, defendants filed\nmotions to dismiss the operative complaints in each case. After\nfull consideration of the parties' written submissions and oral\narguments, the Court granted those motions in part and denied those\nmotions in part by a \"bottom-line order\" dated March 20, 2023.\nThis\n\nOpinion\n\nreconfirms\n\nthe\n\nCourt's\n\nrulings\n\nand\n\nexplains\n\nthe\n\nreasoning behind them.\nI.\n\nPlaintiffs' Allegations'\n\nI In this Opinion, the First Amended Complaint in Jane Doe v. Deutsche\nBank Aktiengesellschaft et al., 22-cv-10018, is abbreviated as \"DB Jane Doe\nFAC\"; that in tN.A.,\n22-cv-10019, is abbreviated\nas \"JPM Jane Doe FAC\"; and that in Government of the United States Virgin\nIslands v. JP\nChase Bank, N.A., 22-cv-10904, is abbreviated as \"USVI\nFAC.\" The JPM Jane Doe FAC incorporates by reference all allegations in the\nUSVI FAC. See JPM Dane Doe FAC, at 48 n. 1.\n\n2\n\nEFTA02807222\n\n", "char_count": 1514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 3 of 54\n\nA. Jeffrey Epstein's Sex-Trafficking Operation\n\nPlaintiffs allege that between 2006 and 2018, DB Jane Doe and\nJPM Jane Doe were Jeffrey Epstein's sex slaves. He raped them\nrepeatedly, and he sexually abused them in other ways as well. JPM\nJane Doe FAC, 1 99; DB Jane Doe FAC, 1 128. He kept them in his\nthrall through a combination of promises, payments, and threats:\npromises to advance their careers and educations, payments in cash\nand in kind, and threats to destroy them if they did not obey his\ndemands. JPM Jane Doe FAC, 11 70, 96, 111; DB Jane Doe FAC, 5 139,\n143.\nThese\n\nJane\n\nDoes\n\nwere\n\nnot\n\nalone.\n\nPlaintiffs\n\nallege\n\nthat\n\nbeginning in 1998 and continuing until 2019, over two decades\nlater, Epstein ran an organization that recruited hundreds of young\nwomen and girls and coerced them into performing sex acts. JPM\nJane Doe FAC, 911 62, 67, 76; DB Jane Doe FAC, 51 39, 40, 88.\nTypically, Epstein would lure a victim to one of his residences by\npromising to grant a wish, would then pressure her into performing\nmassages that became increasingly sexual, and then would force her\nto participate in sex acts on a continuing basis. JPM Jane Doe\nFAC, 1 66; DB Jane Doe FAC, 1 107.\nCash was the lifeblood of Epstein's operation. Victims were\npaid hundreds of dollars, in cash, each time Epstein abused them;\nand they were also paid hundreds of dollars, in cash, for each\n\n3\n\nEFTA02807223\n\n", "char_count": 1463}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 4 of 54\n\nadditional victim that they recruited. JPM Jane Doe FAC, II 66,\n68; DB Jane Doe FAC, 95 52-53, 115. At times, plaintiffs allege,\nEpstein dispensed thousands of dollars in cash every day to his\nvictims, amounting to, on average 5200,000 per year. DB Jane Doe\nFAC, II 54, 280-81; USVI FAC, 1 80. Epstein could not have run his\noperation, plaintiffs claim, without ready access to cash through\nthe banking system.\n\nB. ,.ag\n\nAlleed Involvement\n\nJP\nas\n\nearly\n\nbegan to serve as Jeffrey Epstein's principal bank\nas\n\n1998.\n\nJPM\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nFAC,\n\n91\n\n41;\n\nUSVI\n\nFAC,\n\nI\n\n41.\n\nEventually, both Epstein and at least a dozen entities affiliated\nwith Epstein and his operation maintained bank accounts with JP\n. USVI FAC, 1 27. These accounts, plaintiffs allege, were\nhighly lucrative for JP\n\nand essential to Jeffrey Epstein's\n\nsex-trafficking operation.\nSpecifically,\n\nplaintiffs\n\nallege\n\nthat\n\nJP\n\nsupported\n\nEpstein's sex-trafficking operation in four different ways. First,\nthey allege that JP\n\nenabled Epstein to access the large\n\nquantities of cash that fueled his operation. JPM Jane Doe FAC, 5\n45; USVI FAC, 1 103. Second, they allege that JP\n\nassisted\n\nEpstein with \"structuring\" his cash withdrawals so as to elude\nsuspicion.\n\nJPM\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nFAC,\n\n91\n\nplaintiffs allege that JP\n\n179;\n\nUSVI\n\nFAC,\n\n91\n\n67.\n\nThird,\n\ndid not timely file suspicious\n\n4\n\nEFTA02807224\n\n", "char_count": 1428}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 5 of 54\n\nactivity reports (\"SARs\") that would have alerted authorities to\nJeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking operation. JPM Jane Doe FAC, ¶1\n180-81; USVI FAC, 11 74-75. In particular, plaintiffs allege that\ndelayed filing SARs for \"thousands of transactions . .\n\nJP\n\n. totaling more than $1 billion, including payments to dozens of\nwomen, often with Eastern European surnames.\" USVI\nFinally, plaintiffs allege that a JP\n\nFAC, 1 75.\n\nsubsidiary, Highbridge\n\nCapital Management, transported young women and girls from Florida\nto Epstein in New York, on the company's private jet. JPM Jane Doe\nFAC, 1 170.\nAccording to the plaintiffs, by no later than 2006, JP\neither actually knew or should have known that it was supporting\na sexual predator. JPM Jane Doe FAC, 11 190, 196. In 2006, police\nreports and news articles revealed that Epstein had sexually abused\ndozens of young women and girls. Id at 190. In 2008, Epstein pled\nguilty\n\nto\n\nsex\n\noffenses,\n\nincluding\n\nsoliciting\n\na\n\nminor\n\nfor\n\nprostitution, and he registered as a sex offender. USVI FAC, 1 38.\nFollowing Epstein's guilty plea, dozens of public lawsuits were\nfiled against him,\n\nwhich\n\nincluded detailed\n\naccusations of his\n\nsexual abuse of young women and girls. JPM Jane Doe FAC, 11 207209. While JP\n\nallegedly\n\nwas aware of several of these\n\naccusations, JP\n\nnonetheless continued to bank Epstein. USVI\n\nFAC, 1 44.\n\n5\n\nEFTA02807225\n\n", "char_count": 1452}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 6 of 54\n\nAfter Epstein was released from prison, accusations that he\ntrafficked young women and girls continued to surface. Plaintiffs\nallege that employees within JP\n\nwould occasionally report\n\nthese accusations to their superiors and\n\nwould ask whether JP\n\nshould maintain its relationship with Epstein. In 2010, for\nexample,\n\nJP\n\nrisk\n\nmanagement\n\ndivision\n\nallegations against Epstein: \"See below\ninvestigation\n\nrelated\n\nto\n\nnew\n\nnew allegations of an\n\ntrafficking\n\nchild\n\ndiscussed\n\n-\n\nare\n\nyou\n\nstill\n\ncomfortable with this client who is now a registered sex offender?\"\nUSVI FAC, ¶ 45. In January 2011, JP\n\ndirector of anti-\n\nmoney laundering compliance requested re-approval for the bank's\nrelationship with Epstein from JP\n\nthen-General Counsel\n\n\"in light of the new allegations of human trafficking . . .\" Id.\nat ¶ 46.\nAnd there were other alleged red flags. Epstein and/or his\nassociates are alleged to have made significant cash withdrawals\nfrom JP\n\naccounts with no known payee. USVI FAC, 1 67. For\n\nexample, Hyperion Air, Inc. -- the Epstein-controlled company that\nowned Epstein's private jet -- issued over $547,000 in checks\npayable to cash purportedly for \"fuel expenses when traveling to\nforeign countries.\" Id. Additionally, JP\nname\n\nof\n\npayments\n\nEpstein's\n\naffiliated\n\nwithout\n\nclear\n\ncharitable\n\na\n\npurposes.\n\nFor\n\naccounts in the\n\ncharitable\n\nconnection\nexample,\n\nto\n\norganizations\nthose\n\nEpstein\n\nmade\n\norganizations'\nand/or\n\nhis\n\n6\n\nEFTA02807226\n\n", "char_count": 1528}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 7 of 54\n\nrepresentative\n\nused\n\nthe\n\nC.O.U.Q.\n\nFoundation\n\naccount\n\nto\n\npay\n\n$29,464.66 to three young women, including two people known to be\nEpstein's victims. USVI FAC, 1 68.\nOne final source of JP\n\nalleged knowledge is James\n\n(\"Jes\") Staley.2 Circa 2000, Mr. Staley headed JP\n\nprivate\n\nbanking division, and he began to service Epstein's account. JPM\nJane Doe FAC, 1 131. Mr. Staley is alleged to have developed a\nclose personal friendship with Epstein. Indeed, Mr. Staley once\nwrote to Epstein, \"I deeply appreciate our friendship. I have few\nso profound.\" USVI FAC, 1 56. Later, while Epstein was still a JP\nclient, Mr. Staley was promoted to be CEO of JP\n\nAsset\n\nManagement.\nPlaintiffs allege that Mr. Staley had first-hand knowledge of\nJeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking operation. Mr. Staley is alleged\nto\n\nhave visited Epstein's residences several times\n\nwhile that\n\noperation was ongoing, and, during these visits, observed JPM Jane\nDoe \"as a sexual trafficking and abuse victim.\" JPM Jane Doe FAC,\n1 115. On\n\nDecember 5, 2009, one day after Mr. Staley visited\n\nEpstein in New York, Epstein emailed Mr. Staley to say, \"you were\nwith Larry, and I had to put up with . . .\" and attached a picture\nof a young woman in a sexually suggestive pose. USVI FAC, 1 58. On\n\n2 On March 8, 2023, JP\nimpled Mr. Staley as a third-party defendant\nin both cases against it. Mr. Staley did not participate in briefing and argument\non JP\nmotion to dismiss. Mr. Staley's own motion to dismiss JP\nclaims against him is currently sub judice.\n\n7\n\nEFTA02807227\n\n", "char_count": 1603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 8 of 54\n\nDecember\n\n20, 2009,\n\nEpstein\n\nsent\n\nto\n\nMr.\n\nStaley\n\nan\n\nemail\n\nthat\n\nconsisted entirely of a picture of a young woman. Id. at I 59.\nPlaintiffs further allege that Mr. Staley himself abused some\nof Epstein's victims, including JPM Jane Doe herself. JPM Jane Doe\nclaims that \"one of Epstein's friends\" -- whom she later identified\nas Mr. Staley -- \"used aggressive force in his sexual assault of\nher and informed [JPM Jane Doe] that he had Epstein's permission\nto do what he wanted to her.\" JPM Jane Doe FAC, I 107.3 And the\nUSVI\n\nasserts\n\nthat\n\nit\n\npossesses\n\nemail\n\ncorrespondence\n\nbetween\n\nEpstein and Mr. Staley which suggests, albeit cryptically, that\nMr. Staley had sexual encounters while visiting Epstein. In July\n2010, Mr. Staley emailed Epstein, \"That was fun. Say hi to Snow\n.\" To which Epstein responded: \"[W]hat character would you\nlike next?\" Mr. Staley answered: \"Beauty and the Beast.\" USVI FAC,\nI 61.\n\nC. Deutsche Bank's Alleged Involvement\n\nIn 2013, a JP\n\ncompliance officer terminated JP\n\nrelationship with Epstein. USVI FAC, I 63. Epstein then went on\nthe market for a new bank.\nShortly before then, Paul Morris, a banker with JP\nhad\n\nserviced\n\nEpstein's\n\naccounts,\n\nleft\n\nJP\n\nand\n\nwho\njoined\n\n3 Counsel for Jane Doe identified this executive as Jes Staley at oral\nargument on JP\nmotion to dismiss.\n\n8\n\nEFTA02807228\n\n", "char_count": 1401}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 9 of 54\n\nDeutsche Bank. DB Jane Doe FAC, at 9 202. Mr. Morris suggested to\nDeutsche Bank's senior management that a relationship with Epstein\ncould be very lucrative: banking Epstein could generate millions\nof dollars in fees, and it could also lead to further relationships\nwith Epstein's wealthy friends. Id.\nDeutsche Bank took on Epstein as a client on August 19, 2013.\nDB Jane Doe FAC, 4 210. Eventually, Epstein, his related entities,\nand his associates opened and funded more than 40 accounts at\nDeutsche Bank, which held more than $110 million in assets. Id.\nat 1 210.\nDB\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nalleges\n\nthat Epstein\n\nused\n\naccounts much as he did his accounts with JP\n\nhis\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\n. He used them\n\nto withdraw cash to pay off his victims and associates. Id. at 15\n52-53, 115. He solicited Deutsche\n\nBank's advice about how to\n\nstructure his withdrawals so as to evade notice. Id. at 914 229239.\n\nAnd\n\nhe\n\nwas shielded\n\nby\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank's failure to file\n\nsuspicious activity reports. Id. at II 324.\nDB Jane Doe likewise alleges that Deutsche Bank either knew\nor should have known that Epstein used his Deutsche Bank accounts\nto power his sex-trafficking operation. In April 2013, after Mr.\nMorris\n\nproposed\n\ntaking\n\non\n\nEpstein\n\nas\n\na\n\nclient,\n\na\n\njunior\n\nrelationship coordinator assigned to the Epstein account prepared\na memorandum which noted various risks posed by a relationship\nwith Jeffrey Epstein. This memorandum noted that \"Epstein was\n\n9\n\nEFTA02807229\n\n", "char_count": 1528}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 10 of 54\n\ncharged with soliciting an underage prostitution [sic] in 2007,\"\nthat \"[h]e served 13 months out of his 18-month sentence,\" and\nthat \"[h]e was accused of paying young woman [sic] for massages\nin his Florida home.\" Id. at 1 52. Around the same time, a Deutsche\nBank\n\ncompliance\n\nofficer\n\nperformed\n\nbackground\n\nchecks\n\non\n\nthe\n\nbeneficiaries of one of Epstein's entities, the Butterfly Trust.\nId. at 1 216. This check revealed that one of the beneficiaries,\n, was named as one of Epstein's co-conspirators in a\nrelated criminal case. Id.\nOnce\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nbegan\n\nto\n\nserve as Epstein's\n\nbank, it\n\nallegedly continued to receive red flags. Between 2014 and 2015,\nDB's\n\nAnti-Financial\n\nCrime\n\ndepartment\n\nalerted\n\nDB's\n\nsenior\n\nmanagement to issues concerning Jeffrey Epstein's sex trafficking.\nDB Jane Doe\n\nFAC, 1 206. In May 2018, one of Deutsche Bank's\n\ncompliance\n\nofficers\n\nEpstein's\n\naccount\n\nasked\n\nabout\n\na\n\nrelationship\n\npayments\n\nmanager\n\nto \"accounts\n\nof\n\nassigned\nwomen\n\nto\n\nwith\n\nEastern European surnames at a Russian Bank.\" An accountant at\nDeutsche Bank, who was looped into the conversation, replied that\nthe money was \"SENT TO A FRIEND FOR TUITION FOR SCHOOL.\" Id. at 1\n226. The compliance officer did not ask any follow-up questions,\nand the transaction\n\nwas cleared. Id. at 1 227. And Epstein's\n\npersonal attorney withdrew over $800,000 in cash on Epstein's\nbehalf over a four-year period, on multiple occasions asking about\nthe maximum amount that could be withdrawn without triggering a\n\n10\n\nEFTA02807230\n\n", "char_count": 1595}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 11of 54\n\nreporting\n\nrequirement.\n\nId. at 59 231-32.\n\nThe attorney's\n\nonly\n\nexplanation for these withdrawals was that Epstein needed cash\nfor travel, tipping, and expenses. Id.\n\nD. Plaintiffs' Claims\n\nIn total, plaintiffs assert 28 claims against the defendants.\nSeveral of these claims are brought under the federal Trafficking\nVictims Protection ACT (\"TVPA\"). Others assert violations of the\nfederal\n\nRacketeering\n\n(\"RICO\") and the\n\nInfluenced\n\nand\n\nCorrupt\n\nOrganizations\n\nAct\n\nUSVI's territorial-law analogue to RICO, the\n\nVirgin Islands Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act\n(\"CICO\"). A final statutory claim alleges a violation of the Virgin\nIslands\n\nConsumer\n\nFraud\n\nand\n\nDeceptive\n\nBusiness\n\nPractices\n\nAct\n\n(\"CFDBPA\"). Plaintiffs assert a variety of state tort claims as\nwell.\nII.\n\nDiscussion\n\"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain\n\nsufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to\nrelief that is plausible on its face.'\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556\nU.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.\n544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court\n\"accept(s) the complaint's factual allegations as true and draw(s)\nall reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.\"\n\nMedia\n\nCorp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2017).\n\n11\n\nEFTA02807231\n\n", "char_count": 1398}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 12 of 54\n\nThe Court begins by discussing three threshold issues that\ncould, potentially, bar multiple claims asserted by two of the\nplaintiffs. It then discusses each surviving claim that defendants\nseek to dismiss.\n\nA. Threshold Issues\n\n1. Release by Settlement Agreement\nOn April 28, 2022, DB Jane Doe resolved her claims against\nJeffrey Epstein's estate by signing a settlement agreement (the\n\"Settlement Agreement\"). Deutsche Bank was not a party to this\nagreement. Nonetheless, Deutsche Bank argues that it is a thirdparty beneficiary of that agreement, and that, as such, it is\nentitled under the terms of that agreement to dismissal of the\ninstant claims.\nThe first issue raised by Deutsche Bank's argument is whether\nthe Court may even entertain it at this juncture. Asserting that\na\n\nplaintiff's claim\n\nis barred\n\nby\n\nagreement is an\n\naffirmative\n\ndefense, and affirmative defenses usually cannot be considered on\na motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Deckard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307\nF.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2002) (\"A motion to dismiss was improper\nsince release is an affirmative defense, and the existence of a\ndefense\n\ndoes\n\nnot\n\nundercut\n\nthe\n\nadequacy\n\nof\n\nthe\n\nclaim.\").\n\nNonetheless, this bar is not absolute. For example, the Court may\nconsider any affirmative defense that \"appears on the face of the\n\n12\n\nEFTA02807232\n\n", "char_count": 1390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 13 of 54\n\ncomplaint.\" Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74\n(2d Cir. 1998). More generally, the Court retains discretion to\nconsider even at this early stage an affirmative defense that\npresents a straightforward issue of law, such as a statute of\nlimitations defense where the relevant facts are not in dispute.\nSee, e.g., Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir.\n1999).\nWhile the Settlement Agreement is not mentioned in DB Jane\nDoe's complaint, the Court finds nonetheless that Deutsche Bank's\nargument\n\nis\n\nappropriately\n\nconsidered\n\nat\n\nauthenticity of the Settlement Agreement is\n\nthis\n\nstage.\n\nThe\n\nnot disputed, and\n\nneither party has suggested that extrinsic evidence would inform\nthe Court's interpretation of it. Thus, Deutsche Bank's argument\npresents an unfettered question of law that can be resolved on a\nmotion\n\nto dismiss and should\n\nnot be deferred. See\n\nv.\n\nAndrew, 579 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (considering a\nsimilar settlement agreement on a motion to dismiss).\nTurning now to the merits of Deutsche Bank's argument, the\nCourt first notes that this argument succeeds only if the parties\nto the Settlement Agreement intended for Deutsche Bank to benefit\nfrom it. See Port Chester Elec. Const. Co. v. Atlas, 357 N.E.2d\n983, 985-86 (N.Y. 1976) (\"It is old law that a third party may sue\nas a beneficiary on a contract made for his benefit. However, an\nintent to benefit the third party must be shown . . . .\"); Suffolk\n\n13\n\nEFTA02807233\n\n", "char_count": 1555}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 14 of 54\n\nCnty. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)\n(\"It is ancient law in New York that to succeed on a third party\nbeneficiary theory, a non-party must be the intended beneficiary\nof the contract, not an incidental beneficiary to whom no duty is\nowed.\"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §\n\n302. In\n\ngeneral, such an intent can be found only when \"the language of\nthe\n\ncontract\n\n.\n\n.\n\n.\n\nclearly\n\nevidences\n\nan\n\nintent\n\nenforcement by the third party.\" Fourth Ocean\n\nto\n\npermit\n\nPutnam Corp. v.\n\nInterstate Wrecking Co., 485 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1985).\nDeutsche Bank claims that the Settlement Agreement evidences\nsuch an intent because it is styled a \"broad release\" of claims\nagainst \"any entities or individuals who are or have ever been\nengaged\n\nby\n\n(whether\n\nas\n\nindependent\n\ncontractors or otherwise),\n\nemployed by, or worked in any capacity for\" Jeffrey Epstein. See\nDeclaration of David B. Hennes in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A\n(\"Settlement Agreement\"), at p. 2. Since, Deutsche Bank argues, DB\nJane Doe's own theory of her case is that Deutsche Bank was both\n\"engaged by\" and in some sense \"worked . . . for\" Epstein, Deutsche\nBank is covered by the Settlement Agreement.4\n\n4 Deutsche Bank also argues that since the Epstein estate paid a large\namount of money -- $7.4 million -- to DB Jane Doe pursuant to the Settlement\nAgreement, the Settlement Agreement was intended to resolve a broad class of\nclaims potentially asserted by DB Jane Doe, including claims against Deutsche\nBank. But this argument is sheer speculation at best and hardly sufficient to\nmeet the high standard for evidencing third-party beneficiary status.\n\n14\n\nEFTA02807234\n\n", "char_count": 1750}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 15 of 54\n\nBut the terms \"engaged by\" and \"worked . . . for\" must be\nread in the context of the agreement as a whole. And another\nprovision of the Settlement Agreement plainly indicates that it\nwas not intended to preclude claims against financial institutions\nthat provided services to Epstein. Specifically, the Settlement\nAgreement states, \"[T]he\n\nparties do\n\nnot believe\n\nreasonable\n\nthat\n\nGeneral\n\ninterpretation\n\nthis\n\nconstrued to release James (\"Jes\") Staley,\n\nthere is any\n\nRelease\n\ncould\n\nbe\n\nBlack, or their\n\nrespective entity affiliations.\" Settlement Agreement, at p. 4\n(emphasis supplied). Jes Staley was employed by JP\n\nwhich\n\nprovided financial services to Jeffrey Epstein. In effect, this\ndemonstrates the parties' agreement that the Settlement Agreement\nwas\n\nnever\n\nintended\n\nto\n\nrelease\n\nclaims\n\nagainst\n\nfinancial\n\ninstitutions that provided services for Epstein and, indeed, could\nnot even be reasonably interpreted as such.5\nRead as a whole, therefore, the Settlement Agreement does not\n\"clearly evidence\" an intent to benefit Deutsche Bank. Thus, the\n\n5 At oral argument, counsel for Deutsche Bank argued that the carve-out\nfor Jes Staley and JP\nshould not be read to limit the Settlement\nAgreement's release as to other financial institutions, because Jes Staley had\na distinctive relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, as Epstein's personal friend.\nSee Conference of Mar. 13, 2023, Tr. 10:2-7. But Mr. Staley's alleged friendship\nwith Epstein does not undercut the significance of the parties' statement about\nthe interpretation of the General Release. If Deutsche Bank's interpretation of\nthe General Release were correct, it would presumptively bar claims against all\nfinancial institutions that provided services to Epstein, whether linked to him\nby personal friendship or not. The parties to the Settlement Agreement expressly\nindicated that this interpretation would be unreasonable.\n\n15\n\nEFTA02807235\n\n", "char_count": 1984}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 16 of 54\n\nCourt finds that Deutsche Bank is not a third-party beneficiary of\nthat agreement, and DB Jane Doe's claims are not barred by it.\n2. Parens Patriae Standing\nThe next two threshold issues concern whether the USVI can\nassert claims under the TVPA. The first such issue is whether the\nUSVI has standing to assert such claims.\nThe USVI asserts that it has standing as parens patriae. There\ncan be no doubt that Congress intended to grant it such standing.\nOne section of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, codified at\n18 U.S.C. § 1595(d), reads:\nIn any case in which the attorney general of a State has\nreason to believe that an interest of the residents of that\nState has been or is threatened or adversely affected by any\nperson who violates section 1591, the attorney general of the\nState, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action against\nsuch person on behalf of the residents of the State in an\nappropriate district court of the United States to obtain\nappropriate relief. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d).6\nCongress, however, does not have final word. Article III of\nthe\n\nConstitution\n\nhas\n\nbeen\n\nrequirements for standing\n\ninterpreted\n\nto sue in\n\nto\n\nfederal\n\nimpose\n\ndistinct\n\ncourt, and\n\nthose\n\nrequirements are not \"automatically\" satisfied \"whenever a statute\n\n6 Emphasis supplied. In this section, \"State\" includes the USVI. 22 U.S.C.\n§ 7102(13).\n\n16\n\nEFTA02807236\n\n", "char_count": 1435}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 17 of 54\n\ngrants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that\nperson to sue to vindicate that right.\" Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,\n578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). To establish\nArticle III standing, any plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered\nan injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or\nimminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant;\nand (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial\nrelief. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).\nStates and territories that seek to sue parens patriae must also\n(1) allege an injury to a quasi-sovereign interest that affects a\nsufficiently substantial segment of its population and (2) seek\nrelief to the territory's injury that would be unavailable to\nindividual plaintiffs. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex\nrel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). Nonetheless, even though\nCongress's creation of a statutory right of action does not settle\nwhether these requirements are satisfied, it is \"instructive.\"\nSpokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. \"Congress may elevate harms that exist in\nthe real world before Congress recognized them to actionable legal\nstatus.\" Id. (cleaned up).\nJP\n\nchallenges the USVI's parens patriae standing. It\n\nargues, first, that to the extent that the USVI sues on behalf of\nEpstein's victims who resided in the USVI, that interest is not\n\"distinct from the interests of particular private parties\" and\ntherefore cannot be a basis for parens patriae standing. Def's\n\n17\n\nEFTA02807237\n\n", "char_count": 1598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 18 of 54\n\nMem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 6. But, second, to the\nextent that the USVI seeks to vindicate a more generalized interest\n-- such as an interest in \"assuring its residents it will act to\nprotect them from the harmful effects of criminal sex-trafficking\nenterprises flourishing in the Islands that are their home,\" Mem.\nof Law. in Opp. to Def's Mot. to Dismiss, at pp. 9-10 -- this\ninterest,\n\nJP\n\nsays,\n\nis\n\ninsufficiently\n\nconcrete\n\nand\n\nobjection.\n\nThe\n\nparticularized.\nHowever,\n\nJP\n\noverstates\n\nthe\n\nsecond\n\nUSVI's asserted interest in \"assuring its residents it will act to\nprotect them from the harmful effects of criminal sex-trafficking\nenterprises flourishing in the Islands that are their home\" is\nindeed\n\ngeneral\n\n(as\n\nall\n\ninterests\n\nthat\n\nground\n\nparens\n\npatriae\n\nstanding must be); but it directly parallels the interest that\nPuerto Rico successfully asserted in Snapp, which was an interest\nin \"assuring its residents that it will act to protect them from\n. . . the harmful effects of discrimination.\" Snapp, 458 U.S. at\n609.\nIndeed, the similarities between the interest asserted by the\nUSVI\n\nhere\n\nand\n\nthat\n\nasserted\n\nby\n\nPuerto\n\nRico\n\nin\n\nSnapp\n\nare\n\nconsiderable. Like the discrimination that was at stake in Snapp,\nsex-trafficking is a problem that might well re-occur, especially\nin a remote an isolated territory such as the USVI. Additionally,\nsex-trafficking is a problem that the USVI would, if it could,\n\n18\n\nEFTA02807238\n\n", "char_count": 1527}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 19 of 54\n\n\"likely\n\nattempt\n\nto\n\naddress\n\nthrough\n\nits\n\nsovereign\n\nlawmaking\n\npowers.\" Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607.\nSnapp remains a leading case -- perhaps the leading case -on parens patriae standing. Since the interest asserted by the\nUSVI here is directly analogous to the interest that provided\nparens\n\npatriae\n\nstanding\n\nin\n\nSnapp,\n\nthe\n\nUSVI\n\nhas\n\nArticle\n\nIII\n\nstanding.\n3. Retroactivity of 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d)\nThe last threshold issue, which similarly affects whether the\nUSVI can assert a TVPA claim, is whether the applicable statutory\nprovision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d) applies retroactively. While the\nstatute\n\nproviding\n\na\n\nfederal\n\ncivil\n\nremedy\n\nfor\n\nvictims\n\nof\n\nsex\n\ntrafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, was mostly enacted in 2003, the\n\"parens patriae\" subdivision, section 1595(d), was not added until\n2018, approximately five\n\nyears after JP\n\nrelationship with Jeffrey Epstein. JP\n\nterminated its\nargues that Section\n\n1595(d) does not apply retroactively and, therefore, does\n\nnot\n\nprovide the USVI with a right to assert the parens patriae TVPA\nclaim alleged in the USVI's complaint.\nAs a general matter, federal courts apply a two-prong test to\ndetermine whether statutes apply retroactively. Landgraf v. USI\nFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); Velez v.\n\n693 F.3d\n\n308, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2012). The first step is to ask \"whether\nCongress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.\"\n\n19\n\nEFTA02807239\n\n", "char_count": 1473}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 20 of 54\n\nLandgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; Velez, 693 F.3d at 325. If Congress is\nsilent, a court must ask \"whether [the statute] would impair rights\na party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for\npast conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions\nalready completed.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; Velez, 693 F.3d at\n325.\nSince Congress did not expressly indicate whether section\n1595(d) applies retroactively, the precise issue before the Court\nis whether section 1595(d) increased parties' liabilities for past\nconduct to such an extent that it does not apply retroactively. To\naddress that question, the Court must consider whether section\n1595(d) so greatly increased the likelihood that defendants would\nface suit that it is equivalent to a new cause of action. Section\n1595(d) does not, in itself, impose any legal liability; it merely\nallows a new group of people -- state attorneys general -- to\nvindicate liabilities that already existed. Cf. Hughes Aircraft\nCo.\n\nv.\n\nU.S.\n\nex\n\nrel.\n\nSchumer,\n\n520\n\nU.S.\n\n939,\n\n950\n\n(1997),\n\n(distinguishing a statute that \"essentially creates a new cause of\naction\" from one that creates \"an increased likelihood that an\nexisting\n\ncause\n\nof\n\naction\n\nwill\n\nbe\n\npursued\").\n\nNonetheless,\n\nby\n\nconferring a right of action on \"an expanded universe of plaintiffs\nwith different incentives,\" id. at 950, a statute can so greatly\nincrease the likelihood of suit that it is functionally equivalent\nto a new cause of action. Determining whether a statute does this\n\n20\n\nEFTA02807240\n\n", "char_count": 1597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 21of 54\n\ndemands \"a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new\nprovision\n\nattaches\n\nnew\n\nlegal consequences\n\nto events\n\ncompleted\n\nbefore its enactment.\" I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001)\n(cleaned up). The Court's judgment should be guided by \"familiar\nconsiderations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled\nexpectations.\"\n\nv. Radix, 527 U.S. 343, 345 (1999).\n\nApplying this standard, the Court finds that section 1595(d)\napplies\n\nretroactively. State\n\nattorneys general do indeed\n\nhave\n\nsomewhat different incentives to bring suit than private citizens;\npresumably, that is one reason why Congress added section 1595(d).\nSo there likely will be some cases in\n\nwhich a state attorney\n\ngeneral files a civil action under the TVPA even though individual\nvictims of human trafficking would not.\nBut section 1595(d) only authorizes state attorneys general\nto vindicate the interests of their individual residents, acting\nas\n\nparens\n\npatriae.\n\nThis\n\nlimits\n\nthe\n\nincremental\n\nexposure\n\nof\n\ndefendants in two ways. First, section 1595(d) confers a right of\naction on only a small number of new plaintiffs in each case: the\nattorneys general of each state whose residents have been harmed\nby\n\na\n\nparticular\n\nsex\n\ntrafficking\n\nventure.\n\nSecond,\n\nand\n\nmore\n\nimportant, the quasi-sovereign interests that give states standing\nto sue under section 1595(d) are tied to injuries that would give\nindividual plaintiffs a right to sue under section 1595(a). For\n\n21\n\nEFTA02807241\n\n", "char_count": 1552}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 22 of 54\n\nboth of these reasons, section 1595(d) increases the likelihood of\nsuit to a relatively small degree.\nA comparison to the facts of Hughes, is instructive. Hughes\nconsidered the inverse of the facts presented here. Prior to a\n1986\n\namendment,\n\nthe\n\nFalse\n\nClaims\n\nAct\n\ndid\n\nnot\n\npermit\n\nprivate\n\nrelators to sue on behalf of the Government when their suits were\nbased on information already in the Government's possession. Id.\nat 941. (The Government, by contrast, could sue on its own behalf.)\nA 1986 amendment eliminated that precondition for private parties\nto sue. Thus, the 1986 amendment to the False Claims Act enabled\ncountless private parties to sue under circumstances in which,\npreviously, only the Government could sue. The statutory amendment\nconsidered in Hughes, therefore, expanded the likelihood of suit\ndramatically.\nThe Second Circuit's decision in Velez is not to the contrary.\nIn Velez, the Second Circuit rejected a plaintiff's claim that the\nTVPA's private right of action -- 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) -- applies\nretroactively. Applying this right of action retroactively, the\nSecond Circuit held, would \"represent[] a significant expansion of\ncivil liability.\" Velez, 693 F.3d at 325; see also Hughes, 520\nU.S. at 939 (\"The extension of an FCA cause of action to private\nparties\n\nin\n\nforeclosed .\n\ncircumstances\n\nwhere\n\nthe\n\naction\n\nwas\n\npreviously\n\nessentially creates a new cause of action . . .\n\n.\"); Doe v. Siddig, 810 F.Supp.2d 127, 135 (D.D.C.2011) (rejecting\n\n22\n\nEFTA02807242\n\n", "char_count": 1568}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 23 of 54\n\nthe retroactive applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) because it\n\"represented a significant expansion of civil liability\").\nBut there is a crucial difference between Velez and the USVI's\nclaim against JP\n\n. Before Congress established a private\n\nright of action under the TVPA, the TVPA was a purely criminal\nstatute. Thus, when Congress added a private right of action to\nthe TVPA in 2003, it added civil liability to a statute that\npreviously only imposed criminal sanctions. That act did indeed\n\"represent a significant expansion of civil liability.\" Velez, 693\nF.3d at 325. By contrast, in 2018, when Congress empowered state\nattorneys general to assert TVPA claims, it merely gave a new set\nof plaintiffs the right to vindicate potential liabilities which\nalready existed. Put another way, 18 U.S.0 § 1595(d) did not expand\nany party's liability; it merely made it more likely that such\nliability would actually be assessed. Cf. Hughes, 520 U.S. at 950\n(distinguishing a statute that \"essentially creates a new cause of\naction\" from one that creates \"an increased likelihood that an\nexisting cause of action will be pursued\"). Velez, therefore, does\nnot control.\n\nB. TVPA Participation Liability\n\nHaving disposed of these threshold issues, the Court now turns\nto the plaintiffs' individual claims. Each plaintiff claims that\nJP\n\nor Deutsche Bank participated in Jeffrey Epstein's sex-\n\n23\n\nEFTA02807243\n\n", "char_count": 1474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 24 of 54\n\ntrafficking venture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). This\nclaim involves three elements. First,\n\nthe defendant must have\n\nparticipated in a commercial sex trafficking venture. Second, the\ndefendant must have known (or recklessly disregarded) that force,\nfraud, or coercion would be used in the sex-trafficking venture.\nFinally, the defendant must have benefited from its participation\nin the venture.\n1. Participation\nJP\n\nand\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nargue\n\nthat\n\nthey\n\ndid\n\nnot\n\nparticipate in Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture because\nthey merely provided their usual banking services to him and his\naffiliated\n\nentities.\n\n\"participate\"\n\nin\n\nThat,\n\nthe\n\nthey\n\nunder\n\nventure\n\nrequires \"specific conduct\n\ncontend,\nthe\n\nthat furthered\n\nis\n\nnot\n\nTVPA.\nthe\n\nenough\n\nto\n\nParticipation\n\nsex\n\ntrafficking\n\nventure,\" Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 524 (S.D.N.Y.\n2018) -- \"more than just passive facilitation, but some level of\nactive engagement.\" G.G. v. Salesforce.com, 603 F. Supp. 3d 626,\n644\n\n(N.D.\n\nI11.\n\n2022).\n\nSimply\n\ndefendants\n\nsay,\n\ndoes\n\nnot\n\nproviding\n\nrise\n\nto\n\nthe\n\ntheir\n\nusual\n\nlevel\n\nof\n\nservices,\n\nsuch\n\nactive\n\nengagement. See Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp.\n3d 156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Salesforce.com, 603 F. Supp. 3d at\n648.\nBut\n\neven\n\nif\n\nparticipation\n\nrequires\n\nsuch\n\nengagement,\n\nplaintiffs adequately allege that defendants so participated in\n\n24\n\nEFTA02807244\n\n", "char_count": 1486}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 25 of 54\n\nJeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. JPM Jane Doe and the\nUSVI allege, inter alia, that JP\ncash\n\nwithdrawals\n\nso\n\nthat\n\nassisted with \"structuring\"\n\nthose\n\nwithdrawals\n\nwould\n\nnot\n\nappear\n\nsuspicious. JPM Jane Doe FAC, 1$ 179, 189. They allege that JP\ndelayed\n\nfiling\n\nsuspicious\n\nactivity\n\nreports\n\nconcerning\n\nEpstein's activities. Id. at III 180-81; USVI FAC, IT 74-75. And\nactually trafficked women and girls for\n\nthey allege that JP\n\nJeffrey Epstein through its subsidiary, Highbridge. JPM Jane Doe\nFAC, II 170, 176.\nSimilarly, DB Jane Doe alleges that Deutsche Bank \"concealed\nits delivery of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash to Epstein\nand\n\nhis\n\nassociates\"\n\nby\n\nwillfully\n\nfailing\n\nto\n\nfile\n\nsuspicious\n\nactivity reports, DB Jane Doe FAC, 91 324; that DB \"structured\" 97\ncash withdrawals by Epstein's co-conspirators in the amount of\n$7,500 per withdrawal to avoid alerting authorities, id. at 1 337;\nthat Deutsche Bank failed to implement oversight imposed by its\nAmericas\n\nReputational\n\nRisk\n\nCommittee,\n\nid. at 1\n\n325; and\n\nthat\n\nDeutsche Bank allowed Epstein to use its accounts \"to send dozens\nof wires, directly and indirectly, including at least 18 wires in\nthe amount of $10,000 or more to then known co-conspirators.\" Id.\nat %I 212-13. Moreover, even the cash that DB provided to Epstein,\nDB Jane Doe alleges, was unusual. Id. at 1 320 (\"It was far from\nroutine for Deutsche Bank to provide $200,000 per year in cash to\nsomeone like Epstein, who did not have an apparent need for such\n\n25\n\nEFTA02807245\n\n", "char_count": 1601}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 26 of 54\n\nextravagant sums. Moreover, the circumstances in which Epstein was\nrequesting such large amounts were far from routine and raised\nnumerous\n\nflags'—taking\n\n`red\n\nit\n\nwell\n\noutside\n\nroutine\n\ncircumstances.\").\nIn short, plaintiffs allege that both JP\n\nand Deutsche\n\nBank went well beyond merely providing their usual services to\nJeffrey Epstein and his affiliated entities. Thus, even if it is\ntrue\n\nthat \"active\n\nparticipation\" in\n\na\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nventure\n\nrequires some special tailoring of one's services to that venture,\nplaintiffs\n\nplausibly plead\n\nthat\n\nthis element\n\nof\n\nparticipation\n\nliability is satisfied.\n2. Knowledge\nThe second element of participation liability under the TVPA\nis knowledge. The defendant must either have known, or recklessly\ndisregarded the fact that, \"force, fraud, or coercion\" was used to\n\"cause [a] person to engage in a commercial sex act.\" 18 U.S.C. §\n1591(a)(2).7\n\nTo\n\nsatisfy\n\nthis\n\nelement,\n\nit\n\nnot\n\nenough\n\nfor\n\nthe\n\ndefendant to have \"only an abstract awareness of sex trafficking\nin general.\" S.J. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 3d\n147, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). Instead, the defendant must have known,\nor recklessly disregarded, that force, fraud, or coercion was used\n\n7 This particular knowledge is only necessary in the case of an adult\nvictim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2).\n26\n\nEFTA02807246\n\n", "char_count": 1414}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 27 of 54\n\nin the particular sex-trafficking venture that it is alleged to\nhave participated in. Id.\nDefendants\n\nargue\n\nthat\n\neven\n\nmore\n\nspecific\n\nknowledge\n\nis\n\nnecessary. They say that they can be held liable only if they knew\nthat\n\nforce,\n\nfraud,\n\nor coercion\n\nwas\n\nused\n\nwith\n\nrespect\n\nto\n\nthe\n\nplaintiff herself. It is true that some courts appear to have taken\nthis position in the past. See, e.g., Salesforce.com, 603 F. Supp.\n3d at 646 (\"[A] claim under [Section] 1595 requires that\n\n`the\n\ndefendant must have either actual or constructive knowledge that\nthe venture—in which it voluntarily participated and from which it\nknowingly\n\nbenefited—violated\n\nplaintiff.\");\n5579117,\n\nat\n\nLundstrom\n*8\n\n(D.\n\nv.\n\nColo.\n\n[Section\n\nChoice\nNov.\n\nHotels\n\n30,\n\n2021)\n\n1591]\n\nas\n\nInt'l\n\nInc.,\n\n(failure\n\nto\n\nthe\n\n2021\n\nWL\n\nto\n\nallege\n\ndefendant \"should have known about plaintiff's sex trafficking at\nits hotels\"); A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 484 F. Supp.\n3d 921, 938-39 (D. Or. 2020) (failure to \"allege[] facts which\nsufficiently link notice of Plaintiff['s] sex trafficking to any\nof these Defendants\"). But those decisions do not control this\nCourt, and defendants do not cite to any element of either the\ntext or the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) that\nsupports this interpretation.\nInstead, the text of section 1591(a)(2) directly supports the\nplaintiffs' interpretation of the knowledge element of their TVPA\nclaims.\n\nSection\n\n1591(a)(2)\n\nimposes\n\nliability\n\nfor\n\nknowingly\n\n27\n\nEFTA02807247\n\n", "char_count": 1577}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 28 of 54\n\nbenefiting from \"participating in\" a sex-trafficking venture. A\nsex-trafficking venture, in turn, is defined as a venture that has\n\"recruit[ed], entic[ed], harbor[ed], transport(ed],\nobtain[ed),\n\nmaintain[ed],\n\nadvertise[d],\n\nprovid[ed],\n\npatronize(ed],\n\nor\n\nsolicited] by any means a person\" that uses \"force, threats of\nforce, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means\" to\n\"cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.\" 18 U.S.C. §\n1591(a). By the express terms of the statute, then, liability is\nimposed for\n\nknowingly benefiting from\n\nparticipation\n\nin a sex-\n\ntrafficking venture, not for knowingly benefiting from the sextrafficking\n\nof\n\na\n\nparticular\n\nperson.\n\nKnowledge,\n\ntherefore,\n\nis\n\nrequired with respect to the venture, not with respect to any\nparticular person.\nPlaintiffs\n\nhave\n\npled\n\nsufficient\n\nfacts\n\nto\n\nsupport\n\ntheir\n\nallegations that JP\n\nhad such knowledge of Jeffrey Epstein's\n\nsex-trafficking\n\neither\n\ndisregarding\n\nventure,\n\nwhat\n\nwas\n\ndirectly\n\nor\n\nplainly to be seen.\n\nAs\n\nplaintiffs allege that JP\nfor sex crimes and ignored\nEpstein's\n\naccounts,\n\nwhich\n\nby\n\nrecklessly\n\ndetailed\n\nabove,\n\nwas aware of Epstein's convictions\nnumerous red flags associated with\nall\n\nsuggested\n\nthat\n\nJeffrey\n\nEpstein\n\noperated a sex-trafficking venture. Even these allegations alone\nare sufficient to support plaintiffs' allegations that JP\nknew\n\nor\n\nrecklessly\n\ndisregarded\n\nthat\n\nEpstein\n\noperated\n\nsuch\n\na\n\nventure.\n\n28\n\nEFTA02807248\n\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 29 of 54\n\nBut there is more, such\n\nas Jes Staley's alleged personal\n\nknowledge of Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. \"[W]hen an agent\nis\n\nemployed\n\nto\n\nperform\n\ncertain\n\nduties\n\nfor\n\nhis\n\nprincipal\n\nand\n\nacquires knowledge material to those duties, the agent's knowledge\nis imputed to the principal.\" Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States,\n195 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1999).8 When Epstein was JP\nhigh-level executives,\n\nclient, Mr. Staley was one of JP\n\nand his duties included overseeing Epstein's account. USVI FAC, 1\n84. And if the allegations in plaintiffs' complaints are taken as\ntrue, Mr. Staley had actual first-hand\n\nknowledge that Epstein\n\nconducted a sex-trafficking venture. In fact, JPM Jane Doe alleges\nthat Mr. Staley observed her specifically \"as a sexual trafficking\nand abuse victim.\" FAC, ¶ 115. Through attribution of Mr. Staley's\nalleged knowledge to JP\n\nthe complaints might well support\n\nan allegation that JP\n\nactually knew that Jeffrey Epstein\n\nran a sex-trafficking venture. At the very least, they sufficiently\nsupport\n\nplaintiffs'\n\nallegation\n\nthat\n\nJP\n\nrecklessly\n\ndisregarded the existence of such a venture.\nDB\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nalso\n\npleads sufficient facts\n\nto support her\n\nallegation that Deutsche Bank knew or recklessly disregarded that\nJeffrey Epstein ran a sex-trafficking venture. Before Epstein was\n\nJP\nargues that Mr. Staley's knowledge cannot be attributed to JP\nbecause he acquired it outside the scope of his employment. Def's Mem.\nof Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, 4-5. For attribution of knowledge, however,\nwhat matters is whether Mr. Staley's knowledge was material to his duties as an\nemployee, not how he came to that knowledge.\n8\n\n29\n\nEFTA02807249\n\n", "char_count": 1744}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 30 of 54\n\nonboarded\n\nat\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank,\n\nDB Jane\n\nDoe\n\nalleges,\n\nEpstein\n\nwas\n\nconvicted of soliciting a minor for prostitution. DB Jane Doe FAC,\nill 42-43, 279. Then, in November 2012, Paul Morris joined Deutsche\nBank from JP\n\n, where he had been a member of the team that\n\nserviced Epstein's account, he and brought to DB his knowledge of\nEpstein's affairs. Id. at II\n\n201. Thereafter, beginning around\n\nNovember 2013, Epstein began using Deutsche Bank accounts to send\nwire transfers to collaborators in his sex-trafficking operation,\nwhose names and alleged collaborative activity had by then been\nmade public. Id. at IT 212-16. Not much after that, in 2014 and\n2015,\n\nan\n\ninternal\n\ndepartment\n\nwithin\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nalerted\n\nmanagement about Epstein's sex trafficking. Id. at 1 231. And a\nDeutsche Bank executive is alleged to have met with Epstein and to\nhave observed victims in Epstein's home. Id. at Ili 235-36. If taken\nas true, and viewed in a light most favorably to DB Jane Doe, these\nallegations\n\nmake it\n\nplausible\n\nthat\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nknew\n\nof, or\n\nrecklessly disregarded, Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture.\nThus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have pled sufficient\nfacts to support their allegations that JP\n\nand Deutsche\n\nBank knew or recklessly disregarded that Jeffrey Epstein conducted\na sex-trafficking venture.\n3. Benefit\nThe last element of liability for participating in a sextrafficking\n\nventure\n\nis\n\nthat\n\nthe\n\ndefendant\n\nbenefited\n\nfrom\n\nits\n\n30\n\nEFTA02807250\n\n", "char_count": 1563}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 31of 54\n\nparticipation. JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank do not contest that\n\nthey received fees and other revenue from providing services to\nJeffrey Epstein and his affiliated entities. But they both assert\nthat the mere receipt of revenue does not satisfy the benefit\nrequirement. Instead, they say, plaintiffs must allege that they\nreceived revenue from Jeffrey Epstein and his affiliated entities\nin exchange for their furtherance of Epstein's sex-trafficking\nventure. See Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d\n156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"[T]here must be a causal relationship\nbetween affirmative conduct furthering the sex-trafficking venture\nand receipt of a benefit.\").\nAlthough the Court is not convinced that the benefit element\nshould be read in this way, even assuming arguendo that defendants\nare\n\ncorrect,\n\nthe\n\nplaintiffs\n\nhave\n\nhere\n\noffered\n\nsufficient\n\nallegations to satisfy this element. Indeed, JPM Jane Doe expressly\nalleges that JP\n\nchose to ignore warnings that Epstein was\n\ninvolved in sex-trafficking because JP\n\nunderstood that it\n\nwould lose a lot of money if it fired Epstein as client. JPM Jane\nDoe FAC IT 152, 173, 214. JPM Jane Doe also alleges that JP\nexecutives specifically lobbied to keep Epstein as a client despite\nreports of sex-trafficking JP\n\nrelationship with Epstein\n\nwas lucrative. Id. at II 132-33, 161, 172, 184, 213-14.\nDB Jane Doe makes similar allegations against Deutsche Bank.\nDB Jane Doe alleges that Deutsche Bank overlooked warnings that\n\n31\n\nEFTA02807251\n\n", "char_count": 1569}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 32 of 54\n\nEpstein was involved in sex-trafficking because of the \"number of\nsizable deals\" that\n\nDB obtained through its relationship\n\nwith\n\nJeffrey Epstein. DB Jane Doe FAC, 1 243. DB Jane Doe also alleges\nthat Paul Morris proposed that DB establish accounts for entities\naffiliated\n\nwith\n\nEpstein's\n\nname,\n\nEpstein's\n\nJeffrey\n\nEpstein,\n\nnot\n\nto\n\nhelp\n\nconceal\n\nboth\n\nDB's\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nventure\n\nand\n\nthe\n\naccounts\n\nin\n\nparticipation\n\nin\n\npersonal\n\nexistence\n\nof\n\nthat\n\nventure. Id. at II 205, 243. Like plaintiffs' allegations against\nJP\n\n, these allegations make it plausible that Deutsche Bank\n\nknowingly\n\nbenefited\n\nfrom\n\nfurthering\n\nJeffrey\n\nEpstein's\n\nsex-\n\ntrafficking venture.\n4. Conclusion\nIn short, the allegations in the complaints, if taken as true\nand viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, plausibly\nsupport each element\n\nof plaintiffs'\n\n1591(a)(2). Accordingly,\n\ndefendants'\n\nclaims\n\nunder\n\nmotions\n\nto\n\n18\n\nU.S.C. §\n\ndismiss\n\nthese\n\nclaims are denied.\n\nC. Liability for Obstructing TVPA Enforcement\n\nJPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe also allege that JP\n\nand\n\nDeutsche Bank obstructed the enforcement of the TVPA. 18 U.S.C. §\n1591(d) makes it unlawful to \"obstruct(), attempt[] to obstruct,\nor in any way interfere[] with or prevent[] the enforcement of\" 18\nU.S.C. § 1591(d). For a defendant to be liable for obstructing the\n\n32\n\nEFTA02807252\n\n", "char_count": 1429}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 33 of 54\n\nenforcement of the TVPA, it must (1) know of an effort to enforce\nthe TVPA and (2) intentionally obstruct or attempt to obstruct\nthat enforcement effort. See United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599,\n612 (6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs allege that JP\n\nand Deutsche\n\nBank obstructed the enforcement of the TVPA by, among other things,\nfailing to file suspicious activity reports that would have alerted\nauthorities to Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. JPM Jane Doe\nFAC, 11 476-79; DB Jane Doe FAC, ill 449-52.\nAs an initial matter, defendants argue that JPM Jane Doe and\nDB Jane Doe have no right to assert obstruction claims. The TVPA's\n\"civil remedy,\" 18 U.S.C. §\n\n1595(a), only provides a right of\n\naction to a \"victim\" of a violation of the TVPA.\n\n18 U.S.C. §\n\n1595(a). And defendants argue that JPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe\nare not the victims of any obstruction of an enforcement effort.\nThe\n\nonly\n\nvictim\n\nof\n\nsuch\n\nan\n\naction,\n\ndefendants\n\nsay,\n\nis\n\nthe\n\ngovernment that makes such an effort. See Doe v. Fitzgerald, 2022\nWL 425016, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2022) (\"The `victim' of the\nobstruction of enforcement set out in section 1591(d) is the state\nor federal government[.]\"). Thus, defendants say, the Jane Does do\nnot have a right to assert their obstruction claims.\nThe statute cannot be read in this cramped fashion. While 18\nU.S.C. § 1595(a) does not define \"victim,\" a different section of\nthe federal criminal code -- which establishes criminal procedure\nthat is generally applicable across federal crimes -- defines a\n\n33\n\nEFTA02807253\n\n", "char_count": 1614}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 34 of 54\n\n\"crime victim\" as \"a person directly and proximately harmed as a\nresult\n\nof\n\nthe\n\ncommission\n\nof\n\na\n\nFederal\n\noffense.\" 18\n\nU.S.C. §\n\n3771(e)(2)(A); see also 18 U.S.C. § 10608(e)(2) (defining a victim\nas \"a person\n\nthat has suffered direct physical, emotional, or\n\npecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime\"). This\ndefinition accords with\n\nordinary usage, which\n\nrecognizes as a\n\nvictim \"one that is injured, destroyed, or sacrificed under any of\nvarious\n\nconditions.\"\n\nVictim,\n\nMerriam-Webster's\n\nCollegiate\n\nDictionary (10th ed.). Thus, the \"victims\" of one who obstructs\nthe enforcement of the TVPA include not just the government, but\nalso include those\n\nwho suffered\n\nharm\n\nbecause the government's\n\nenforcement efforts were hindered.\nTurning now to the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the Court\nfinds that the plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to support their\nobstruction claims. JPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe allege that JP\nand Deutsche Bank, respectively, knew of investigations\ninto Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking operation and that they\nintentionally failed to file suspicious activity reports in order\nto frustrate such investigations. JPM Jane Doe FAC,\n\n187, 224,\n\n296, 356, 368, 397, 432, 438-40; DB Jane Doe FAC, 9f91 42-46, 6063, 188-99, 212-13, 445-48. Thus, the Court denies defendants'\nmotions to dismiss plaintiffs' obstruction claims.\n\n34\n\nEFTA02807254\n\n", "char_count": 1455}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 35 of 54\n\nD. TVPA Perpetrator Liability\n\nPlaintiffs'\nperpetrated\n\nallegations\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nthat\nare\n\ndefendants\n\nanother\n\nthemselves\n\nmatter.\n\nA\n\ndirect\n\nperpetrator of sex trafficking is someone who knowingly \"recruits,\nentices,\n\nharbors,\n\ntransports,\n\nprovides,\n\nobtains,\n\nadvertises,\n\nmaintains, patronizes, or solicits\" an underage person to engage\nin a commercial sex act or does the same to an adult by means of\nforce, fraud, or coercion. 18 U.S.C. §\n\n1591(a)(1). Plaintiffs'\n\nallegations do not adequately allege that either JP\n\nor\n\nDeutsche Bank did so.\nDB Jane Doe claims that Deutsche Bank's cash \"was part of the\nrecruitment' of Jane Doe and other victims.\" Pl.'s Mem. in Oppo.\nto Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, at 21. The alleged facts that Epstein\nused cash obtained from Deutsche Bank to recruit his victims, and\nthat Deutsche Bank recklessly disregarded that he was so doing,\nmight jointly render Deutsche Bank liable for participating in\nEpstein's venture (see above). But they do not make Deutsche Bank\nthe recruiter.\nJPM Jane Doe's allegations are a little more on point, but\nstill not sufficient. JPM Jane Doe alleges that JP\n\ndirectly\n\nperpetrated sex-trafficking in two ways. First, she alleges that\n\"a powerful financial executive\" at JP\n\n(later identified as\n\nJes Staley) sexually assaulted JPM Jane Doe. Second, JPM Jane Doe\n\n35\n\nEFTA02807255\n\n", "char_count": 1422}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 36 of 54\n\nalleges that JP\n\nsubsidiary, Highbridge, transported some\n\nof the victims of Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. But\neven if Mr. Staley's actions are attributable to JP\n\n, those\n\nactions do not support a perpetrator claim, because the TVPA does\nnot impose liability for sexual assault per se (a classic state\ncrime), but also requires the additional elements described above.\nSee 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).\n\nAnd JPM Jane Doe's complaint does not\n\nknew that the women and girls allegedly\n\nallege that JP\n\ntransported by Highbridge would be caused to engage in a commercial\nsex\n\nact,\n\nwhich\n\nis\n\nlikewise\n\nan\n\nessential\n\nelement\n\nof\n\na\n\nTVPA\n\nperpetrator claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).\nSince plaintiffs' allegations do not state all the elements\nof claims for perpetrating a violation of the TVPA, defendants'\nmotions to dismiss these claims are granted.\n\nE. Aiding and Abetting a Violation of the TVPA\n\nJPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe also allege that JP\n\nand\n\nDeutsche Bank, even if they were not themselves perpetrators, aided\nand abetted Jeffrey Epstein's violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).\nThey support this claim with the following train of logic. First,\nJeffrey Epstein violated 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) through his direct\nacts\n\nof\n\nsex-trafficking.\n\nSecond,\n\n18\n\nU.S.C. §\n\n2\n\nmakes\n\nanyone\n\ncriminally \"punishable as a principal\" if they aid or abet the\ncommission of an offense against the United States. Finally, 18\n\n36\n\nEFTA02807256\n\n", "char_count": 1506}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 37 of 54\n\nU.S.C. § 1595(a) provides a \"civil remedy\" to victims of the TVPA.\nIt states: \"An individual who is a victim of a violation of this\nchapter\n\nmay bring\n\na civil action\n\nagainst the\n\nperpetrator\n\n(or\n\nwhoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything\nof value from participation in a venture which that person knew or\nshould have known\n\nhas engaged in an act in violation of this\n\nchapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States\"\n(emphasis supplied). In other words, plaintiffs contend that 18\nU.S.C. § 2 (a criminal statute) is incorporated within the civil\nremedy provision of the TVPA. Since principals are subject to civil\nliability when they violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), and 18 U.S.C.\n2 puts aiders and abettors in an equivalent criminal position to\nprincipals,\n\nplaintiffs\n\ncontend\n\nthat\n\naiders\n\nand\n\nabettors\n\nare\n\nsubject to civil liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).\nPlaintiffs' claims thus hinge on a question of law: whether\nthe \"civil remedy\" provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) enables sextrafficking victims to pursue claims for aiding and abetting. The\nparties take opposing positions. Defendants argue that section\n1595(a)'s civil remedy does not apply, because aiding and abetting\nliability is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2, which is not within \"this\nchapter\" (i.e., the TVPA: 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq.). See Noble,\n335 F. Supp. 3d at 525-526 (rejecting aiding and abetting liability\nunder the TVPA). Plaintiffs, meanwhile, contend that 18 U.S.C. §\n2 is incorporated within the TVPA.\n\n37\n\nEFTA02807257\n\n", "char_count": 1606}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 38 of 54\n\nThe defendants are correct: The TVPA does not provide civil\nliability for aiding and abetting. In general, aiding and abetting\nliability should not be inferred when a statute does not expressly\nprovide for it. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate\nBank\n\nof\n\nDenver,\n\nN.A.,\n\n511\n\nU.S.\n\n164,\n\n185\n\n(1994)\n\n(\"it\n\nis\n\nnot\n\nplausible to interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an\nimplicit congressional intent to impose § 10(b) aiding and abetting\nliability.\").\n\nMoreover,\n\nneither\n\nthe\n\ntext\n\nnor\n\nthe\n\nlegislative\n\nhistory of the TVPA indicates that Congress intended to provide\ncivil liability for aiding and abetting a violation of it. In fact,\nsome\n\naspects of\n\nCongress\n\nhad\n\nthe\n\nthe\n\nTVPA's\n\nlegislative\n\nhistory\n\nopposite\n\nintention:\n\nCongress\n\nrejected defining \"participation\n\nin a\n\nsuggests\n\nthat\n\nspecifically\n\nventure\" --\n\nwhich\n\nwould\n\nentail civil liability -- so as to include aiding and abetting.\nCompare Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking\nAct of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 5, 132 Stat. 1253, 1255 (2018)\n(rejecting\n\ndefinition\n\nincluded\n\nor\n\n\"aids\n\nof\n\nabets\")\n\n\"participation\nwith\n\nH.R.\n\nin\n\n1865,\n\na\n\nventure\"\n\n115th\n\nCong.\n\nthat\n(as\n\nintroduced in House, April 3, 2017) (bill draft proposing \"aids or\nabets\" in definition of participation in a venture).\nA\n\ncomparison\n\nto Rothstein\n\nv.\n\nUBS AG\n\nis instructive. See\n\nRothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013). In Rothstein, the\nSecond Circuit considered this issue as presented by a similar\nstatute, the Anti-Terrorism Act. The Anti-Terrorism Act, like the\n\n38\n\nEFTA02807258\n\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 39 of 54\n\nTrafficking Victims Protection Act, is a largely criminal statute\nthat also provides a civil remedy for violations of it. See 18\nU.S.C. § 2333(a) (providing a private right of action). Also like\nthe Trafficking Victims Protection Act, the civil remedy provision\nof the Anti-Terrorism Act does not expressly provide liability for\naiding or abetting, but the Act is codified in Title 18 of the\nUnited States Code, section 2 of which makes any aider or abettor\n\"punishable as a principal.\" In Rothstein, the Second Circuit held\nthat 18 U.S.C. § 2333 does not provide a right of action to assert\nclaims for aiding and abetting. Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 97-98.\nRothstein's holding was supported by two premises. The court\nnoted Central Bank's general presumption that aiding and abetting\nliability should not be inferred from statutory silence. Id. at\n97. And the court also noted that other provisions of the ATA -sections that surround its civil remedy provision -- do provide\nfor aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 98. That context, the\ncourt found, suggested that Congress affirmatively rejected aiding\ncivil liability for aiding and abetting a violation of the ATA.\nSo too for the TVPA. There is a presumption that aiding and\nabetting liability should not be read into section 1595's silence,\na presumption that is confirmed by its legislative history. Since,\ntherefore, the TVPA does not provide civil liability for aiding\nand abetting\n\nunder section\n\n2, plaintiffs' aiding and abetting\n\nclaims are dismissed.\n\n39\n\nEFTA02807259\n\n", "char_count": 1597}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 40 of 54\n\nF. Attempting to Benefit from a TVPA Violation\n\nPlaintiffs\n\nalso\n\nallege\n\nthat\n\nJP\n\nand\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nattempted to benefit from a TVPA violation. A defendant is liable\nfor attempting to violate the law only if they have the specific\nintent to commit the underlying violation of the law. United States\nv. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 145 (2d Cir. 2011). But the complaints\nhere do not plead facts that support the inference that either JP\nor Deutsche Bank had this specific intention. If taken as\ntrue,\n\nplaintiffs'\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nand\n\nallegations\n\ndo\n\nsupport\n\nJP\n\nintended\n\nthe\n\nto\n\ninference\n\nprofit\n\nfrom\n\nthat\ntheir\n\nrelationships with Jeffrey Epstein, and that accomplishing that\nobject required JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank to provide banking\n\nservices that allegedly, they knew, or recklessly disregarded,\nsupported\n\nJeffrey\n\nEpstein's\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nventure.\n\ncomplaints do not support the allegation that either JP\n\nBut\n\nthe\nor\n\nDeutsche Bank acted with the specific intent of benefiting from a\nsex-trafficking venture. Thus, plaintiffs' claims for attempting\nto violate the TPVA are dismissed.\n\nG. Conspiracy to Violate the TVPA\n\nFinally, plaintiffs allege that JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank\n\nconspired with Epstein and others to violate the TVPA. \"The gist\nof conspiracy is, of course, agreement.\" United States v. BeechNut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1191 (2d Cir. 1989). To be\n\n40\n\nEFTA02807260\n\n", "char_count": 1466}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 41of 54\n\nliable, each defendant must have \"entered into a joint enterprise\nwith consciousness of its general nature and extent.\" United States\nv. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs' factual\nallegations do not support the inference that either defendant\nmade such an agreement. If the allegations in the complaints are\ntaken as true, the defendants did indeed agree to provide banking\nservices for Epstein and his affiliated entities and that they\nknew, or recklessly disregarded, would assist his sex-trafficking\nventure. But that agreement is different from an actual agreement\nto\n\nparticipate\n\nin\n\na\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nventure.\n\nPlaintiffs\n\nalso\n\nallege that the defendants covered up Epstein's sex-trafficking by\nwillfully\n\nfailing\n\nto\n\nfile\n\nsuspicious\n\nactivity\n\nreports.\n\nBut\n\nplaintiffs do not plead any facts which support the inference that\nthe defendants did so pursuant to an agreement with Epstein and/or\nothers to further his sex-trafficking operation. Thus, plaintiffs'\nconspiracy claims are dismissed.\n\nH. RICO\n\nHaving discussed plaintiffs' TVPA claims, the Court now turns\nto DB Jane Doe's claim that Deutsche Bank violated section 1962(c)\nof\n\nthe\n\nRacketeering\n\nInfluenced\n\nand\n\nCorrupt\n\nOrganizations\n\nAct\n\n(\"RICO\"), 18 U.S.C. S.§ 1961 et seq., and conspired to violate RICO\nin violation of section 1962(d).\n\n41\n\nEFTA02807261\n\n", "char_count": 1418}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 42 of 54\n\nThere can no liability under section 1962(c) if the defendant\ndid not participate in the conduct of an enterprise. See DeFalco\nv. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 306 (2d Cir. 2001) (to state a civil claim\nunder 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege that a defendant\nparticipated in \"(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a\npattern (4) of racketeering activity\") (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L.\nv. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)). To participate in a\nracketeering enterprise under the relevant provisions of RICO, a\ndefendant must \"direct the enterprise's affairs.\" Reves v. Ernst\n& Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 180 (1993). While a defendant need not\nplay the \"predominant\" part in the operation of the enterprise, it\nmust\n\n\"exert\"\n\nsome\n\n\"control\"\n\nover\n\nit.\n\nDubai\n\nIslamic\n\nBank\n\nv.\n\nCitibank, N.A., 256 F. Supp. 2d 158, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).\nWhile DB Jane Doe does not precisely define the enterprise\nthat Deutsche Bank and Jeffrey Epstein allegedly formed (and this\nitself would warrant dismissal of her RICO claims) her allegation\nappears to be that Deutsche Bank participated in Jeffrey Epstein's\nsex trafficking venture. If that is Jane Doe's allegation, her\nsubstantive civil RICO claim fails, for she has not alleged that\nDeutsche Bank controlled or directed that venture in any way.\nDB Jane Doe's RICO conspiracy claim likewise fails, for she\nhas not alleged any factual basis for a finding of a \"conscious\nagreement among the defendants.\" Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House,\nInc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1990). DB Jane Doe has not\n\n42\n\nEFTA02807262\n\n", "char_count": 1629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 43 of 54\n\npled sufficient facts to support her allegation that Deutsche Bank\nconsciously agreed to undertake racketeering activity in violation\nof section 1962 with Jeffrey Epstein. Instead, at most, she alleges\nthat Deutsche Bank acted unlawfully as part of an implicit quid\npro quo: Deutsche Bank would conceal Epstein's sex-trafficking\nventure in exchange for Epstein's lucrative fees.\nBecause DB Jane Doe fails to plausibly allege that Deutsche\nBank\n\nparticipated\n\nin\n\na\n\nviolation\n\nof section\n\n1962(c),\n\nor that\n\nDeutsche Bank consciously agreed to participate in one, Deutsche\nBank's\n\nmotion\n\nto\n\ndismiss\n\nDB\n\nJane\n\nDoe's\n\ncivil\n\nRICO\n\nclaims\n\nis\n\ngranted.\n\nI. CICO\n\nThe USVI makes a similar allegation against JP\nfails for similar reasons. The USVI claims that JP\n\n, which\nviolated\n\nthe Virgin Islands Criminally Influenced and Corrupt Organizations\nAct (\"CICO\"),\n\nthe\n\nVirgin\n\nIslands'\n\nterritorial-law\n\nanalogue\n\nto\n\nRICO. But the USVI fails to plausibly allege two of the initial\nelements of such a claim: that a criminal enterprise existed, and\nthat JP\n\nparticipated in it.\n\nThe USVI alleges that JP\n\nassociation with Jeffrey\n\nEpstein was a de facto enterprise. Any enterprise formed in this\nway -- an \"association-in-fact enterprise\" -- must have three\nfeatures: a common purpose, relationships among those associated\n\n43\n\nEFTA02807263\n\n", "char_count": 1405}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 44 of 54\n\nwith\n\nthe enterprise, and\n\nlongevity to\n\npursue\n\nthe enterprise's\n\npurpose. People v. McKenzie, 66 V.I. 3, 12 (Super. Ct. 2017).\nThe USVI, however, has failed to support its allegation that\nshared a common purpose with Jeffrey Epstein. The USVI\n\nJP\n\nshared the purpose of trafficking\n\ndoes not allege that JP\n\nor abusing Epstein's victims. Rather, the USVI alleges that the\nassociation with Epstein was simply to make\n\npurpose of JP\n\nmoney. If the USVI's allegations are taken as true, achieving that\npurpose did require JP\n\nto support Epstein's sex-trafficking\n\nventure. But neither human trafficking nor its consequences were\npart of JP\n\npurpose; JP\n\nwould have been just as\n\nhappy for Epstein's victims to escape, so long as Epstein's fees\ncontinued to roll in.\nAnd even if JP\n\ndid form an enterprise with Jeffrey\n\nEpstein, the facts in the complaint do not support the USVI's\nallegation that JP\n\nparticipated in it. Like DB Jane Doe,\n\nthe USVI does not allege that JP\n\nconducted Epstein's sex-\n\ntrafficking venture in any way. For that reason, and because the\nUSVI fails to plausibly allege an enterprise as well, JP\nmotion to dismiss the USVI's CICO claim is granted.\n\nJ. CFDBPA\n\nThe last statutory claim brought against the defendants is\nthe\n\nUSVI's\n\nclaim\n\nthat\n\nJP\n\nviolated\n\nthe\n\nVirgin\n\nIslands\n\n44\n\nEFTA02807264\n\n", "char_count": 1390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 45 of 54\n\nConsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (\"CFDBPA\").\nThe USVI alleges that JP\n\ngained an unfair advantage over\n\nother, law-abiding banks by supporting Epstein's sex-trafficking\nventure. USVI FAC, II 130-36. In exchange for JP\nthe USVI alleges, Epstein provided JP\n\nsupport,\n\nwith \"referrals of\n\nhigh-value business opportunities.\" Id. at $ 135.\nThe USVI's pleadings are threadbare. The USVI does not say\nwhich banks, in particular, were denied the \"high-value business\nopportunities\" that\n\nJP\n\nallegedly obtained. It does\n\nnot\n\ndescribe any connection between those banks and the Virgin Islands.\nAnd it does not say that these banks actually did comply with their\nlegal obligations with respect to similarly-situated customers,\nwhich is an essential aspect of the USVI's unfairness claim. Thus,\nthe USVI's allegations fall well short of making its CFBDPA claim\nplausible, and JP\n\nmotion to dismiss this claim is granted.\n\nK. Negligence\n\nJPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe and also assert several New York\nstate-law tort claims against JP\nfirst set of such claims allege that JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank. Their\nand Deutsche Bank\n\nwere negligent. They allege that the banks failed to exercise\nreasonable care to prevent physical harm and that the banks failed\nto exercise reasonable care as banking institutions providing nonroutine banking services.\n\n45\n\nEFTA02807265\n\n", "char_count": 1433}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 46 of 54\n\nUnder New\n\nYork law (as under the law of virtually every\n\nstate), there are three elements of negligence: \"(1) a duty owed\nby the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3)\ninjury proximately resulting therefrom.\"\n\nex rel.\n\nv. City of New York, 489 N.E.2d 1294 (N.Y. 1985). The parties\ncontest the first and the\n\nthird elements, duty and\n\nproximate\n\ncausation.\nJP\n\nand Deutsche Bank say that they owed no duty to\n\nJane Doe. According the banks, they had no duty to prevent Jeffrey\nEpstein from harming either Jane Doe, nor did they acquire any\nduty of care from their banking relationship with Epstein. See In\nre Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir.\n2013) (\"(B)anks and other financial institutions do not owe noncustomers a duty to protect them from the intentional torts of\ntheir customers.\").\nBut JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank, like everyone else, owed\n\nboth Jane Does the ordinary duty of reasonable care. This duty can\nextend to actions undertaken by third parties. Restatement (Third)\nof Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 19 (\"The conduct of a defendant can\nlack reasonable care insofar as it foreseeably combines with or\npermits the improper conduct of the plaintiff or a third party.\");\nv.\n\nGrand\n\nUnion\n\nCo.,\n\n197\n\nN.E.\n\n266,\n\n268-69\n\n(N.Y.\n\n1935)\n\n(defendant owes a duty to avoid injury to others \"by forces set in\nmotion\" by the defendant). Banks are not exempt from this duty.\n\n46\n\nEFTA02807266\n\n", "char_count": 1502}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 47 of 54\n\nSee Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., 110 A.D.3d 192, 206 (N.Y.\nApp. Div. 2013) (\"We do not find case law to support the argument\nthat . . . a bank can never be held liable to non-customers\"); id.\nat\n\n206\n\n(\"(A)\n\ntortfeasor's\n\ncompliance\n\nwith\n\nrelevant\n\nlaws\n\nand\n\nregulations will not insulate it from liability if it fails to act\nobjectively reasonably\"). And this duty applies when banks provide\nnonroutine services. See id. at 207 (\"Although New York does not\ngenerally recognize a duty on the part of banks to non-customers,\nthat does not mean that New York policy would prohibit recovery\nunder the alleged facts, if proven.\"). Since JPM Jane Doe and DB\nJane Doe do indeed allege that JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank helped\n\n\"set in motion\" Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture -- by\nproviding the cash that fueled it -- they plausibly assert that JP\nand Deutsche Bank owed a duty to them.\nand Deutsche Bank also contend that their conduct\n\nJP\n\nis not a proximate cause of Jane Doe's injury. When an alleged\ninjury is caused by an intervening criminal act, such as sexual\nabuse, the defendant's conduct is a proximate cause only when that\nintervening act is \"a natural and foreseeable consequence of a\ncircumstance created by (the) defendant.\" Hain v. Jamison, 68 N.E.\n3d 1233, 1236-37 (N.Y. 2016). \"[P]roximate cause will be found\nlacking where the original negligent act merely `furnished the\noccasion\n\nfor' . . .\n\nordinarily\n\n`an\n\nanticipated.'\"\n\nunrelated\nid.\n\nat\n\nact\n\n1238.\n\nto cause\n\ninjuries\n\nAnd\n\nbanks\n\nthe\n\nnot\n\nassert\n\n47\n\nEFTA02807267\n\n", "char_count": 1615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 48 of 54\n\n(rehearsing arguments considered above) that they neither knew nor\nshould have known that their services contributed to the abuse of\nthe Jane Does.\nFor the reasons already discussed above, however, JPM Jane\nDoe and DB Jane Doe allege that JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank should\n\nhave known that their banking services sustained Jeffrey Epstein's\nsex-trafficking venture. Indeed, they go further and adequately\nallege\n\nthat\n\nthe\n\ndefendants\n\nrecklessly\n\ndisregarded\n\nconstructive\n\nknowledge\n\nother\n\nvictims\n\nof\n\nwhat\n\nactually\nwas\n\nplausibly\n\nEpstein's\n\nknew\n\nplainly\n\nthis\n\nat\n\nleast\n\nseen.\n\nSuch\n\nto\n\nplaintiffs\n\nand\n\na\n\n\"natural\n\nand\n\nto\n\nmakes harm\n\nsex-trafficking\n\nor\n\nbe\n\nforeseeable\" consequence of the actions of JP\n\nand Deutsche\n\nBank.\nThus, the Court finds that JPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe\nplausibly allege both that JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank owed a duty\n\nto them, and that the banks proximately caused harm to them by\nbreaching that duty. Thus, the Court denies defendants' motions to\ndismiss plaintiffs' negligence claims.\n\nL. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress\n\nJPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe also allege that JP\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nintentionally\n\ninflicted\n\nemotional\n\ndistress\n\nand\nupon\n\nthem. The elements of such a claim under here applicable New York\nlaw are: \"(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to\n\n48\n\nEFTA02807268\n\n", "char_count": 1409}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 49 of 54\n\ncause, or the disregard of a substantial likelihood of causing,\nsevere emotional distress; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional\ndistress.\" Eskridge v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 210 A.D.3d 1056, 1057\n(N.Y. App. Div. 2022).\nAt the outset, the Court notes that this cause of action is\n\"highly\n\ndisfavored\"\n\nSlaine, 171\n\nand\n\nF. Supp. 3d\n\n\"almost\n\nnever\n\nsuccessful.\"\n\nSesto\n\nv.\n\n194, 201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). That is\n\nespecially so when, as here, the plaintiff asserts a negligence\nclaim. Since almost all conduct that amounts to the intentional\ninfliction\n\nof\n\nnegligence,\n\nIIED\n\nredundancy\n\nwith\n\nemotional\nclaims\n\ndistress\nare\n\nnegligence\n\n(\"IIED\")\n\nroutinely\n\nclaims.\n\nalso\n\nconstitutes\n\ndismissed\n\nSee,\n\ne.g.,\n\nfor\n\ntheir\n\nWolkstein\n\nv.\n\nMorgenstern, 275 A.D.2d 635, 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't. 2000)\n(\"Generally, a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress\nis not allowed if essentially duplicative of tort or contract\ncauses of action.\"); Samuel et al. v. Rockefeller Univ., 2022 WL\n2916784, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 25, 2022) (dismissing IIED claim\nas duplicative of negligence claim). So it is with the Jane Does'\nIIED claims: if the conduct of JP\n\nand Deutsche Bank was\n\nextreme and outrageous, and was intended to cause (or was made\nwith reckless disregard for) severe emotional distress, and in\nfact caused severe emotional distress -- JP\n\nand Deutsche\n\nBank were thereby also liable for negligence. This alone is likely\nsufficient grounds for dismissal.\n\n49\n\nEFTA02807269\n\n", "char_count": 1561}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 50 of 54\n\nAdditionally, the plaintiffs fail to allege that JP\nand Deutsche Bank \"intentionally directed\" their conduct at them.\nv. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 1985) (\"The\nconduct must also be intentionally directed at the plaintiff\n\n. .\n\n. .\"). None of the plaintiffs' allegations supports the inference\nthat either JP\n\nor Deutsche Bank directed their conduct at\n\nJPM Jane Doe or DB Jane Doe specifically. Instead, they are alleged\nto have financed Jeffrey Epstein, who then harmed JPM Jane Doe, DB\nJane Doe, and others. While the plaintiffs' harm might have been\na foreseeable consequence of defendants' actions, the allegations\nin\n\nthe\n\ncomplaints\n\ndo\n\nspecifically directed\n\nnot\n\nsupport\n\nthe\n\ninference\n\nthat\n\ntoward them. For both of these\n\nit\n\nwas\n\nreasons,\n\nplaintiffs' IIED claims are dismissed.\n\nM. Aiding and Abetting Battery\n\nLast, JPM Jane Doe and DB Jane Doe allege that JP\n\nand\n\nDeutsche Bank aided and abetted the battery of them. They claim\nthat Jeffrey Epstein and his associates sexually abused them\nacts that amounted to battery -- and that the defendants supported\nthose wrongs.\nUnder New York law, there are three elements of aiding and\nabetting battery: \"(1) a wrongful act producing an injury; (2) the\ndefendant's awareness of a role as a part of an overall illegal or\ntortious activity at the time he provides the assistance; and (3)\n\n50\n\nEFTA02807270\n\n", "char_count": 1448}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 51of 54\n\nthe\n\ndefendant's\n\nknowing\n\nand\n\nsubstantial\n\nassistance\n\nin\n\nthe\n\nprincipal violation.\" Scollo ex rel. Scollo v. Nunez, 847 N.Y.S.2d\n899 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff'd, 60 A.D.3d 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).\nThe\n\ndefendants\n\nprovided\n\n\"knowing\n\nfocus\nand\n\non\n\nthis\n\nsubstantial\n\nlast element:\nassistance\"\n\nwhether\nto\n\nthose\n\nthey\nwho\n\nbattered the Jane Does. \"Knowledge,\" for these purposes, is actual\nknowledge. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 292 (2d Cir.\nChase Bank v. Winnick, 406 F. Supp. 2d 247, 253\n\n2006); JP\n\nn.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (\"[T]he weight of the case law, cited above,\ndefines knowledge in the context of an aiding and abetting claim\nas actual knowledge.\"); Kolbeck v. LIT Am., Inc., 939 F. Supp.\n240, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 152 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. 1998) (\"New\nYork common law, which controls the analysis here, has not adopted\na constructive knowledge standard for imposing aiding and abetting\nliability. Rather, New York courts and federal courts in this\ndistrict,\n.\n\nhave\n\nrequired\n\nactual\n\nknowledge.\");\n\nSteinberg\n\nv.\n\n279 N.Y.S. 240, 242 (App. Div. 1967). \"Substantial\n\nassistance,\" meanwhile, requires \"commit[ting] some overt act,\neither by words or conduct, in furtherance of\" the battery of\nPlaintiff. McKiernan v. Vaccaro, 91 N.Y.S.3d 478, 481 (App. Div.\n2019); Lindsay v. Lockwood, 625 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (Sup. Ct. 1994).\nThat, in turn, requires \"intentional or deliberate acts directed\nat causing harm which would rise to the level of actionable conduct\n\n51\n\nEFTA02807271\n\n", "char_count": 1567}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 52 of 54\n\nin relation to the subject assault.\" Shea v. Cornell Univ., 192\nA.D.2d 857, 858, 596 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1993).\nAs explained above, the complaints are devoid of facts which\nand Deutsche\n\nsupport the allegation that the acts of JP\n\nBank were specifically and intentionally directed at causing harm\nto\n\nthe\n\nJane\n\nDoes.\n\nThus,\n\nthe\n\ndefendants'\n\nmotions\n\nto\n\ndismiss\n\nplaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting battery are granted.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby reconfirms its\nrulings in its \"bottom-line\" order of March 20, 2023. Defendants'\nmotions to dismiss are therefore granted in part and denied in\npart, as specified below:\nWith respect to Jane Doe v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft\net al., 22-cv-10018, the Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss\nwith respect to Counts II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, and X of the\nFirst Amended Complaint. The Court denies defendants' motion with\nrespect\n\nto\n\nCounts\n\nI,\n\nVI,\n\nXI,\n\nand\n\nXII\n\nof\n\nthe\n\nFirst\n\nAmended\n\nComplaint. Thus, for clarity, the following claims asserted by\nplaintiff\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nagainst\n\ndefendants\n\nDeutsche\n\nBank\n\nAktiengesellschaft, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch, and Deutsche\nBank Trust Company Americas remain as part of the case: (1) the\nclaim that defendants knowingly benefited from participating in a\nsex-trafficking venture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2);\n\n52\n\nEFTA02807272\n\n", "char_count": 1460}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 53 of 54\n\n(2)\n\nthe\n\nclaim\n\nthat\n\ndefendants\n\nobstructed\n\nenforcement\n\nof\n\nthe\n\nTrafficking Victims Protection Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §\n1591(d);\n\n(3)\n\nthe\n\nthat defendants\n\nclaim\n\nnegligently\n\nfailed\n\nto\n\nexercise reasonable care to prevent physical harm; and (4) the\nclaim that defendants negligently failed to exercise reasonable\ncare as a banking institution providing non-routine banking. All\nother claims are dismissed.\nWith respect to Jane Doe v. JP\n\nChase Bank, N.A., 22-\n\ncv-10019, the Court grants defendant's motion\n\nto dismiss with\n\nrespect to Counts I, II, VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the First Amended\nComplaint. The Court denies defendant's motion with respect to\nCounts III, IV, V, and X of the First Amended Complaint. Thus, for\nclarity,\n\nthe\n\nfollowing\n\nclaims\n\nagainst defendant J.P.\n\nasserted\n\nby\n\nplaintiff\n\nJane\n\nDoe\n\nChase Bank, N.A. remain as part of\n\nthe case: (1) the claim\n\nthat defendant negligently failed\n\nto\n\nexercise reasonable care to prevent physical harm; (2) the claim\nthat defendant negligently failed to exercise reasonable care as\na banking institution providing non-routine banking; (3) the claim\nthat defendant knowingly benefited from participating in a sextrafficking venture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2); and\n(4)\n\nthe\n\nclaim\n\nthat\n\ndefendant\n\nobstructed\n\nenforcement\n\nof\n\nthe\n\nTrafficking Victims Protection Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §\n1591(d). All other claims are dismissed.\n\n53\n\nEFTA02807273\n\n", "char_count": 1515}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02807221", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10904-JSR Document 130 Filed 05/01/23 Page 54 of 54\n\nWith respect to Government of the United States Virgin Islands\nv.\n\nJP\n\nChase\n\nBank,\n\nN.A.,\n\n22-cv-10904,\n\nthe\n\nCourt\n\ngrants\n\ndefendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Counts II, III, and\nIV of the First Amended Complaint. The Court denies defendant's\nmotion with respect to Count I of the First Amended Complaint.\nThus, for clarity, the claim of plaintiff the Government of the\nUnited States Virgin Islands that defendant JP\n\nChase Bank,\n\nN.A. knowingly benefited from participating in a sex-trafficking\nventure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2), remains as part\nof the case. All other claims are dismissed.\nSO ORDERED.\n\nNew York, NY\nMay ( , 2023\n\n54\n\nEFTA02807274\n\n", "char_count": 743}]}