{"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_count": 25, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02778180", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02778180.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 1 of 25\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff;\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN\nin their capacities as the executors of the ESTATE\nOF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN, and\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER\n\nEFTA02778180\n\n", "char_count": 443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 2 of 25\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2\n\nARGUMENT\n\n4\n\nI. Maxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely.\n\n4\n\nA. The Child Victims Act Revived Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell\n\n5\n\nI. The Child Victims Act Applies to Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell.\n\n5\n\na. Maxwell Committed a Sexual Offense Under the Penal Law.\n\n5\n\nb. The CVA is Not Limited to Acts Occurring in New York\n\n6\n\n2. The Child Victims Act is Constitutional\nB. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims.\n\n9\n13\n\nI. The Child Victims Act Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. 202.\n\n13\n\n2. Plaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue \"Without the State\" of New York.\n\n14\n\nC. Maxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke Equitable\nEstoppel\n\n15\n\nH. Venue is Proper in this District\n\n17\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n20\n\nii\n\nEFTA02778181\n\n", "char_count": 939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 3 of 25\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\n2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp.,\n144 A.D.3d 122 (1st Dep't 2016)\n\n14\n\nAshcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,\n550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n12\n\nBrass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc.,\n987 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1993)\n\n12\n\nCartier v. Micha, Inc.,\nNo. Civ. 4699 (DC), 2007 WL 1187188 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007)\n\n18\n\nChilders v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp.,\n36 F. Supp. 3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)\n\n4, 17\n\nCutCo Indus. v. Naughton,\n806 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1986)\n\n18\n\nDoe v. HartfordRoman Catholic Diocese Corp.,\n119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015)\n\n9, 11, 12\n\nEspinal v. Lee,\nNo. 13 Civ. 8692, 2014 WL 5643418 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014)\n\n8\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019)\n\n16\n\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n16\n\nv. Dershowitz,\nNo. 19 Civ. 3377, 2020 WL 2123214 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020)\n\n5, 9\n\nGlob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp.,\n715 N.E.2d 482 (N.Y. 1999)\n\n15\n\nGodin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)\n\n17\n\nGulfIns. Co. v. Glasbrenner,\n417 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2005)\n\n18, 19\n\niii\n\nEFTA02778182\n\n", "char_count": 1208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 4 of 25\n\nHarris v. City of New York,\n186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)\n\n4\n\nHVT, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,\n15 Civ. 5867 (MKB), 2018 WL 3134414 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018)\n\n11\n\nIn Re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.,\n66 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)\n\n10\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n4\n\nKosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C.,\n274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001)\n\n17\n\nMatter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig.,\n89 N.E.3d 1227 (N.Y. 2017)\n\n10, 12\n\nOneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cty.,\n665 F.3d 408 (2d Cir. 2011)\n\n11\n\nPeople v. Carvajal,\n845 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 2005)\n\n7, 8\n\nPeople v. Margulies,\n121 A.D.3d 461 (1st Dep't 2014)\n\n8\n\nPeople v. McLaughlin,\n606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992)\n\n7\n\nPersh v. Petersen,\nNo. 15 CIV. 1414 LGS, 2015 WL 5326173 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2015)\nv. Audio Active Ltd.,\n494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007)\n\n18, 19\n18\n\nSanderson v. Horse Cave Theatre 76,\n881 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n19\n\nTorrey v. Portville Cent. Sch.,\n66 Misc. 3d 1225(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020)\n\n11\n\nStatutes\n18, 19\n\n18 U.S.C. § 1391\nCPL 20.20\n\n8, 9\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-g\n\n5, 6, 13\niv\n\nEFTA02778183\n\n", "char_count": 1224}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 5 of 25\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. 202\n\n13, 15\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130\n\n5, 6, 9\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 20.00\n\n9\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230\n\n7\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510\n\n7\n\nN.Y. Stat. Law § 76\n\n14\n\nOther Authorities\nArticle 1, New York Constitution\n\n11\n\nN.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 S.B. 2440, 242nd Legis. Sess. (Jan. 26, 2019)\n\n5, 10, 14\n\nRules\nRule 12(bX3)\n\n18\n\nv\n\nEFTA02778184\n\n", "char_count": 421}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nPlaintiff\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 6 of 25\n\nby and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this\n\nMemorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss or to\nTransfer. ECF No. 69.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nMaxwell claims that she is being \"called to answer ... for the conduct of Mr. Epstein, who\nis dead.\" Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss\nor to Transfer (\"Maxwell Mem.\") at 17, ECF. No. 60. That is false. This action seeks relief from\nMaxwell for her own criminal conduct against Plaintiff, and her attempts to characterize herself as\na present-but-innocent bystander in Epstein's sex-trafficking conspiracy paint a false picture. For\ndecades, Ghislaine Maxwell recruited countless young women and children for Jeffrey Epstein,\nforced them to massage both her and Epstein, and those massages later escalated into sexual\nassaults.\n\nwas one of Maxwell's and Epstein's minor victims. Epstein and Maxwell\n\noffered to help Annie get into college, but instead sexually trafficked and assaulted her.\nAnnie's claims are timely both under explicit provisions of New York law, as well as the\ndoctrine of equitable estoppel through the Complaint's allegations about the methods that Epstein,\nMaxwell, and their co-conspirators used to silence their victims (including Annie) for decades.\nMaxwell contends that Annie's claims are untimely, but ignores the plain language of several New\nYork statutes, while simultaneously drawing comparisons to irrelevant issues in an attempt to mask\nher flawed arguments. Nevertheless, Maxwell wholly ignores her burden to prove her statute of\nlimitations affirmative defense at this stage of the litigation, and her arguments are meritless. First,\nthe Child Victims Act (\"CVA\") revived Annie's claims against Maxwell. Second, New York's\nborrowing statute is no bather to Annie's claims against Maxwell—the CVA precludes the\nborrowing statute's appli\n... [truncated, 2191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/5 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=5]", "char_count": 2191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 7 of 25\n\ninvoke equitable estoppel, a highly factual doctrine. Finally, Maxwell's argument that venue is\nimproper is meritless given her and this action's connections to this District. The Court should\ndeny Maxwell's motion in its entirety.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nWhen\n\nwas an underage teenager, her sister, Maria, met Jeffrey Epstein and\n\nGhislaine Maxwell at an art show and accepted a job offer to purchase art for Epstein. ECF No. 1\n(\"Compl.\") ¶¶ 42, 43, 45, 46. Maria also worked in Epstein's New York mansion, and noticed\nthat Maxwell regularly brought school-aged girls to the home purportedly to \"interview\" for\nVictoria's Secret modeling positions. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Maxwell also told Maria that she needed \"to\ngo get girls for Jeffrey.\" Id. ¶ 47.\nEventually, Epstein began taking an interest in Annie and asked Maria questions about\nAnnie. Id. ¶ 50. Epstein offered to help get Annie into college, and flew her to New York. Id.\n¶ 51. During Annie's trip to New York, Epstein spoiled Annie and Maria, giving Annie money to\nbuy a dress and having them driven around in a limousine. Id. ¶ 52. Later in the trip, Epstein took\nAnnie and Maria to a movie theater, sat in between the two sisters, and caressed various parts of\nAnnie's body against her will when Maria was not looking. Id. ¶¶ 53-54.\nAfter Annie's trip to New York, Epstein began calling Annie's mother to discuss Annie's\neducation, and convinced her to send Annie to an event for high school students at Epstein's ranch\nin New Mexico. Id. ¶ 57. In describing the event, he explained that Maxwell would be on the\nranch with the students, too. Id. Epstein and Maxwell then arranged and paid for Annie's travel\nto New Mexico. Id. ¶ 58. When Annie arrived in New Mexico, Epstein's driver picked her up\nfrom the airport and brought her to Epstein's 10,000-acre, remote ranch. Id. Annie quickly\nrealized that she was the only student at the \"event,\" and was completely alone with Eps\n... [truncated, 2117 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/6 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=6]", "char_count": 2117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 8 of 25\n\nbuying her gifts, being friendly and charming, and taking her to the movies. Id. 111159-60. Epstein\nand Maxwell attempted to normalize sexual behavior for Annie by fondling each other in front of\nAnnie, pressuring Annie to give Epstein a foot massage, and again caressing and petting Annie in\na movie theater. Id.\nAt Epstein's ranch, and after taking Annie to the movies, Maxwell pressured Annie into\nletting her give Annie a massage. Id. ¶ 62. Maxwell directed Annie to take off her clothes and lay\non a massage table, touched intimate parts of Annie's body with the door open so that Epstein\ncould watch, and exposed and groped Annie's breasts. Id. ¶¶ 62-65. Annie was terrified, but felt\ntrapped at Epstein's massive ranch with no way of leaving or contacting her family. Id. ¶ 66. To\nmake matters worse, the next morning, Epstein got into Annie's bed to \"cuddle\" and pressed his\ngenitals against her. Id. ¶ 67.\nWhen Annie resumed home, she did not tell anyone about the sexual assaults out of fear of\nEpstein and Maxwell's power, wealth, and connections. Id. ¶ 70. But, eventually, Annie learned\nthat Epstein and Maxwell had also assaulted her sister Maria, that they called Maria and threatened\nto burn all of her art, and that Maria attempted to report Epstein and Maxwell to the NYPD but\nwas ignored. Id. 111171-74. In an effort to stop the abuse, Annie and Maria then attempted to share\ntheir stories with Vanity Fair, but Epstein threatened and silenced the magazine. Id. ¶ 75. Epstein\nand Maxwell continued to threaten Maria after they learned about the communications to Vanity\nFair. Id. ¶ 76. Annie and Maria thereafter lived in fear of Epstein and Maxwell due to their clear\npower and ability to silence them, the media, and law enforcement. Id. ¶ 76.\nAfter Epstein's death, Annie filed this lawsuit against Epstein and Maxwell on November\n12, 2019. ECF No. 1. Maxwell's counsel refused to accept service on her beha\n... [truncated, 2133 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/7 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=7]", "char_count": 2133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 9 of 25\n\nEventually, on March 4, 2020, four months after Annie filed the Complaint, Maxwell's counsel\nentered an appearance. ECF No. 32. Maxwell filed the present motion to dismiss on May 20,\n2020, despite the Court's suggestion that the motion would likely not be meritorious. Tr. of Apr.\n16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 3:22-24, ECF No. 54.\nARGUMENT\nMaxwell's motion to dismiss or to transfer her should be denied. \"To survive a motion to\ndismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to\nrelief that is plausible on its face. . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads\nfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable\nfor the misconduct alleged.\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks\nomitted). The Court must \"accept[] all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw[] all\nreasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.\" Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 58 (2d\nCir. 2019).\nDrawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Maxwell has failed to meet her\nburden of proving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Further, Maxwell's arguments that venue\nis not proper in this District are meritless.\nI.\n\nMaxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are\nUntimely.\n\nBecause the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Maxwell bears the burden of\nproving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. See Childers v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 36\nF. Supp. 3d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). \"[A] complaint does not need to anticipate potential\naffirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance\nof such defenses.\" Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \"dismissal is\nappropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.\" Harris v. City ofNew York,\n186 F\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/8 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=8]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 10 of 25\n\n(A) her claims are timely under the Child Victims Act, (B) C.P.L.R. 202 does not apply to her\nclaims, and (C) Maxwell is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nA.\n\nThe Child Victims Act Revived Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell.\n\nThe CVA squarely applies to Maxwell's conduct against Plaintiff and therefore revives\nPlaintiff's claims against Maxwell. The CVA created a one-year window, starting on August 14,\n2019, for victims of childhood sexual abuse to bring otherwise time-barred claims for conduct\n\"which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law.\"\nC.P.L.R. 214-g. In enacting the CVA, the New York State Legislature sought to curtail restrictive\nstatutes of limitation and allow survivors of child sexual abuse \"to sue or press charges against\ntheir abusers, who remain hidden from law enforcement and pose a persistent threat to public\nsafety.\" N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 S.B. 2440, 242nd Legis. Sess. (Jan. 26, 2019). For the following\nreasons, the CVA both (1) applies to Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell and (2) is constitutional\non its face and as applied to Maxwell.\nI.\n\nThe Child Victims Act Applies to Plaintiff's Claims Against Maxwell.\n\nThe CVA was designed to revive claims such as Plaintiff's claims that Maxwell sexually\nassaulted her when she was 16 years old. Maxwell's argument that the CVA does not apply to her\nhas no foundation in law or reality—her conduct against Plaintiff falls squarely within the language\nof the CVA.\na.\n\nMaxwell Committed a Sexual Offense Under the Penal Law.\n\nFirst, Maxwell's conduct against Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint amounts to one or\nmore sexual offense for purposes of applying the CVA. The CVA uses Article 130 of New York's\nPenal Law as a guidepost in defining sexual offenses. C.P.L.R. 214-g;\n\nv. Dershowitz, No.\n\n19 Civ. 3377, 2020 WL 2123214, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2020) (\"Mhe C\n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/9 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=9]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 11 of 25\n\nrevived.\"). Because Plaintiff alleges that Maxwell's conduct constituted a sexual offense under\nArticle 130 when Plaintiff was a child and that she suffered injury as a result of that offense, the\nCVA revives her claims. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 81. In addition to directly alleging that Maxwell's conduct\nviolated one or more sections of Article 130, the Complaint also includes factual allegations\nsufficient to give rise to the inference that Maxwell committed such sexual offenses against\nPlaintiff. Compare id.164 (\"Maxwell touched intimate parts of Annie's body against her will for\nthe sexual benefit of Maxwell and Epstein.\"), and id.165 (\"Maxwell exposed Annie's breasts and\ngroped her.\"), wit!: N.Y. Penal Law § 130.52 (defining forcible touching as when a defendant\n\"forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading\nor abusing such person, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor's sexual desire\"), andid. § 130.55\n(defining sexual abuse in the third degree as when a defendant \"subjects another person to sexual\ncontact without the latter's consent. . . .\"). Maxwell's conduct therefore amounts to one or more\nsexual offenses, and the CVA applies to revive Plaintiff's claims against her.\nb.\n\nThe CVA is Not Limited to Acts Occurring in New York.\n\nSecond, the text of the CVA does not limit the conduct that it covers to sexual offenses that\nphysically occurred in New York. The plain language of the CVA requires only four things: (1)\nan allegation of an intentional or negligent act or omission; (2) for \"physical, psychological, or\nother injury or condition;\" (3) \"suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual\noffense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law;\" (4) \"committed against a child\nless than eighteen years of age.\" C.P.L.R. 214-g. If the Legislature intended to cover only conduct\nthat physically occurred in New York, it wo\n... [truncated, 2321 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/10 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=10]", "char_count": 2321}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 12 of 25\n\nalleges that she sexually assaulted her in New Mexico. Maxwell Mem. at 7-8. She bases this\nargument on a contention that New York Penal Law only jurisdictionally reaches acts physically\ncommitted in New York, and her conduct therefore could not have constituted a sexual offense as\ndefined in the Penal Law. Id. But Maxwell's argument—cited without any relevant, substantive\nsupport—is wrong.\nMaxwell cites to a host of inapplicable statutes' and one case—People v. McLaughlin—to\nargue that \"[b]ecause the State only has the power to enact and enforce criminal laws within its\nterritorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has territorial jurisdiction.\" 606\nN.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992). Notably missing from her argument, however, is the New York\nCriminal Procedure Law that sets the territorial jurisdiction of New York Penal Law. \"CPL 20.20\nhas codified the general principle that, for New York to exercise criminal jurisdiction, some alleged\nconduct or consequence of that conduct must have occurred in the state.\" People v. Carvajal, 845\nN.E.2d 1225, 1230-33 (N.Y. 2005) (emphasis added) (finding that New York criminal law\nextended to a defendant arrested in California who was involved in a trans-continental drug\ntrafficking ring because the \"defendant conspired in New York with his New York cohorts to bring\ncocaine to New York\"); see also McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d at 1359 (\"The general rule in New York\n\nMaxwell provides a list of statutes in an attempt to show that if the New York Legislature\nwanted to revive claims for conduct occurring outside of New York, it could have done so more\nexplicitly. Maxwell Mem. at 8-10. Ranging from the suspension of certain licenses for radiologic\ntechnologists, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510, to issues concerning a state board for professional\nmisconduct, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230, those statutes are irrelevant. The cited statutes merely\nprovide that if a per\n... [truncated, 2522 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/11 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=11]", "char_count": 2522}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 13 of 25\n\nis that, for the State to have criminal jurisdiction, either the alleged conduct or some consequence\nof it must of occurred within the State.\" (emphasis added) (citing CPL 20.20)).\nIn relevant part, CPL 20.20(1)(c) provides that a person may be convicted in a New York\ncriminal court under New York Penal Law if the person conspired to commit an offense in New\nYork. Cantata!, 845 N.E.2d at 1230 (\"Plainly, jurisdiction over an offense exists based on a\nconspiracy occurring in New York to commit that offense.\"); see also Espinal v. Lee, No. 13 Civ.\n8692, 2014 WL 5643418, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2014) (finding that although the murder at\nissue occurred out of state, petitioner was subject to New York criminal jurisdiction because his\n\"conversations that took place in New York were sufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit\nthe murder-for-hire\"); People v. Margulies, 121 A.D.3d 461, 462 (1st Dep't 2014) (\"The evidence\nestablished the geographic jurisdiction of New York State and New York County over each of the\noffenses, based on defendant's acts and those of his accomplice, notwithstanding that defendant\nwas physically located in Ohio during most of the events in question.\").\nHere, the Complaint contains facts sufficient to give rise to the inference that Maxwell\nbegan planning and conspiring with Epstein to assault Plaintiff in New York. New York was the\nepicenter of Epstein and Maxwell's sex-trafficking operation. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 46, 47. Specifically,\nPlaintiff alleges that Maxwell and Epstein ran a sex-trafficking network out of Epstein's home in\nNew York for years, in furtherance of which Maxwell would \"go get girls for Jeffrey,\" as she told\nPlaintiff's sister. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5, 10-14, 27. Maxwell and Epstein learned about Plaintiff in New\nYork, and Plaintiff traveled there at Epstein's direction. Id. ¶¶ 50-51, 57-58. While in New York,\nEpstein told Plaintiff's mother that Maxwell would chaperon\n... [truncated, 2150 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/12 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=12]", "char_count": 2150}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 14 of 25\n\npaid for Annie to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996\" so that she could be abused by Maxwell\nand Epstein in the solitude ofEpstein's massive ranch. Id. 1 58.\nFurther, N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 provides that when one \"solicits, requests, commands,\nimportunes, or intentionally aids\" someone else in violating a provision of the Penal Law, that\nperson is criminally liable for the underlying crime. In addition to containing sufficient facts to\ngive rise to the inference that Maxwell began conspiring to sexually assault Plaintiff while\nMaxwell was in New York, the Complaint also contains facts sufficient to show that Maxwell\naided Epstein when he sexually assaulted Plaintiff in New York. Compl. y¶ 10-12, 53-54, 81.\nUnder § 20.00, Maxwell therefore could have been held criminally liable for any forcible touching\nunder Article 130 that Epstein committed against Plaintiff in New York.\nMaxwell's argument that her crimes in New Mexico are outside the jurisdictional reach of\nNew York Penal law is meritless under both CPL 20.20 and N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00. Her conduct\nin this case therefore constituted one or more sexual offenses under Article 130, and the CVA\napplies to Plaintiffs claims.\n2.\n\nThe Child Victims Act is Constitutional.\n\nMaxwell's challenge to the CVA's constitutionality is equally meritless.\n\nMaxwell\n\ncontends that the CVA violates her due process rights because claim-revival statutes are an\n\"exceptional remedy\" valid only when a \"plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely\nmanner.\" Maxwell Mem. at 13 (citing Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d\n462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015)). This argument is incorrect, misleading. and relies on outdated law.\nIn the past, \"New York courts have looked upon claim-revival provisions skeptically, only\nupholding them in circumstances where a given plaintiff could not have brought an action in\na timely manner.\"\n\n, 2020 WL 2123214, at *2. \n... [truncated, 2059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/13 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=13]", "char_count": 2059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 15 of 25\n\nYork Courts' historical skepticism of claim-revival provisions appears to be just that: historical.\"\nId.\nAs Maxwell herself contends, the New York Court of Appeals recently held that a\nclaim-revival statute will \"not run afoul of New York's due process clause if it merely 'was a\nreasonable measure to address an injustice.'\" Id. (citing Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower\nManhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (N.Y. 2017)); see also Maxwell Mem. at\n12-13. Maxwell's argument that claim-revival provisions are constitutional only in \"exceptional\ncircumstances\" is therefore not the law. Maxwell Mem. at 16. The New York Court of Appeals\nexplicitly rejected the higher \"exceptional\" circumstances standard for constitutionality used by\nthe district court in the case Maxwell cites as authoritative, In Re World Trade Ctr. Lower\nManhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), and instead adopted a\n\"reasonableness\" standard. Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89\nN.E.3d at 1243.\nThe CVA's revival window easily meets such a reasonableness standard. In passing the\nCVA, the New York Legislature highlighted that \"New York is one of the worst states in the nation\nfor survivors of child sexual abuse,\" and that \"thousands of survivors are unable to sue or press\ncharges against their abusers\" because of New York's \"restrictive\" statute of limitations. N.Y.\nComm. Rep., 2019 S.B. 2440. Having identified the grave injustices faced by victims of child\nabuse, New York revived previously expired claims. As to reasonableness, the legislature stressed\nthat the age at which most survivors report or come to terms with their abuse \"has been estimated\nto be as high as 52 years old on average,\" and also the \"persistent threat to public safety\" from\nchild abusers. Id. Thus, given the time it takes child victims to come to terms with their abuse,\nthe CVA was a reason\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/14 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=14]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 16 of 25\n\nIn fact, one New York state court recently upheld the constitutionality of the CVA, ruling\nthat the CVA properly revived a plaintiff's claims against her former school district for sexual\nabuse by one of her teachers. See Torrey v. Portville Cent. Sch., 66 Misc. 3d 1225(A) (N.Y. Sup.\nCt. 2020). The court held that because the CVA was \"a reasonable response to remedy an\ninjustice,\" it did \"not violate [defendant's] right to due process\" and was thereby valid under the\nNew York State Constitution. Id. New York courts have interpreted due process, enshrined in\nArticle I, § 6 of the New York Constitution, to be coextensive with its federal counterpart. HVT,\nInc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 15 Civ. 5867 (MICB), 2018 WL 3134414, at •2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.\nFeb. 15, 2018) (citing Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison Cty., 665 F.3d 408, 427 (2d Cir.\n2011)). Consequently, if the CVA does not violate Maxwell's due process rights under the New\nYork Constitution, it does not violate her rights under the United States Constitution. See HVT,\n2018 WL 3134414, at *2 n.2.\nOther states, including Connecticut, have also specifically upheld claim-revival statutes for\nvictims of childhood sexual abuse, including in a case that Maxwell incorrectly cites as supporting\nher proposition that claim-revival statutes are only constitutional if a \"plaintiff could not have\nbrought an action in a timely manner.\" Maxwell Mem. at 13 (citing Hartford Roman Catholic\nDiocese Corp., 119 A.3d at 512 n.58). In that case, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that\nchildren who are victims of sexual abuse cannot bring claims in a timely manner because child\nabuse can take years for a victim to come to terms with, and therefore the revival of otherwise\ntime-barred claims was a \"rational response by the legislature to the exceptional circumstances\nand potential for injustice faced by adults who fall victim to sexual abuse as a child.\" Hartfo\n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/15 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=15]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 17 of 25\n\nto the injustice faced by child victims of sexual abuse, such as Plaintiff, the statute is constitutional.\nSee Matter of World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d at 1243.\nMaxwell makes several additional arguments that have no basis in law. She asserts that\nPlaintiff's allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that her claims are timely, and therefore that\nallowing a revival of her claims under the CVA would be unconstitutional. Maxwell Mem. at 17.\nBut this argument is entirely circular: Plaintiff did plausibly allege that her claims are timely by\nciting the CVA, which revives claims that would otherwise be untimely. Plaintiff was not required\nto also plead that the CVA is constitutional; to survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff need only\nallege \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its\nface.\" Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).\nMaxwell next points to Epstein's death as somehow bearing on the constitutionality of the\nCVA because Maxwell would be \"called to answer for the conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead.\"\nMaxwell Mem. at 17. To state the obvious, Maxwell and the Estate are separate parties in this\nmatter, and Plaintiff has brought a claim against Maxwell because of Maxwell's own conduct\nagainst her when she was a minor. Compl. 11 10-12, 29, 31, 57-58. Maxwell is fully capable of\nanswering for her own conduct, and the timing of this action has no discernable, constitutional\nbearing on her ability to do so.\nFinally, Maxwell points to several facts about a voluntary claims administration program\nthat go beyond the four corners of Plaintiff's Complaint as evidence that this lawsuit \"undermines\nthe integrity of the judicial system.\" Maxwell Mem. at 17-18. Citing those facts in briefing the\npresent motion to dismiss is wholly inappropriate. See Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d\n142, 150 (2d C\n... [truncated, 2194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/16 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=16]", "char_count": 2194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 18 of 25\n\nMoreover, the voluntary program that Maxwell cites is just that: voluntary. Plaintiff's potential\nparticipation in a voluntary claims administration program would not undermine the \"integrity of\nthe judicial system.\" Rather, it is Maxwell's suggestion that the courthouse doors must be closed\nto Plaintiff due to the existence of a voluntary program that would undermine judicial integrity.\nFor the foregoing reasons, Maxwell's argument that the application of the CVA is unconstitutional\nas applied in this case and on its face is meritless.\nB.\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims.\n\nMaxwell also argues that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred under New York's borrowing\nstatute. But New York's borrowing statute, C.P.L.R. 202 does not apply to or bar Plaintiff's\nclaims. C.P.L.R. 202 provides that when a plaintiff was a non-New York resident when her cause\nof action accrued and her cause of action accrued \"without the state\" of New York, New York\n\"borrows\" the statute of limitations of the jurisdiction where the claim arose if shorter than New\nYork's. But that statute is inapplicable here for two independent reasons: (1) the CVA explicitly\nrevives Plaintiff's claims and precludes the application of any other statute of limitation, and\n(2) Plaintiff's claims did not accrue \"without the state\" of New York.\nI.\n\nThe Child Victims Act Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. 202.\n\nUnder principles of statutory interpretation, the borrowing statute does not apply to this\ncase, which is governed by the CVA. The New York Legislature included language in the CVA\nthat explicitly precludes the borrowing statute's application by providing for a revival window of\ncivil claims \"[n]otwithstanding any provision oflaw which imposes a period of limitation to the\ncontrary.\" C.P.L.R. 214-g (emphasis added).\nBecause the borrowing statute is a provision of law that imposes a period of limitation\ncontrary to th\n... [truncated, 2198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/17 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=17]", "char_count": 2198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 19 of 25\n\n144 A.D.3d 122, 127 (1st Dep't 2016) (\"The borrowing statute is itself a part of New York's\nprocedural law and is a statute of limitations in its own right .. .\"). The Court need go no further\nto find that the CVA precludes the application of the borrowing statute. See N.Y. Stat. Law § 76\n(\"Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the\nlegislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of interpretation.\"). The legislative history\nof the CVA also supports such a reading. For example, the New York Senate Report on the CVA\nexplained that the CVA would allow \"for time-barred actions in which [childhood sexual abuse]\nis alleged to be revived, and not be barred by any statute of limitation ... otherwise existing in\nlaw.\" N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. 2440 (emphases added).\nMaxwell's contention that the CVA's \"notwithstanding\" clause refers only to \"any\nprovision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary\" is unsupported.\nMaxwell Mem. at 11. As Maxwell herself argues in her brief, the Court cannot add language to a\nstatute, id. at 9-10, yet that is what Maxwell is asking the Court to do here. But even if Maxwell's\ninsertion of the phrase \"New York\" into the CVA's \"notwithstanding\" clause was appropriate, the\nborrowing statute is a provision of New York law that imposes a period of limitation contrary to\nthe CVA's clear language. See 2138747 Ontario, Inc., 144 A.D.3d at 127. The \"notwithstanding\"\nlanguage of the CVA therefore expressly encompasses New York's borrowing statute and\nprecludes its application in this case.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue \"Without the State\" of New York.\n\nSecond, the borrowing statute does not apply to this case because it only applies to claims\n\"accruing without the state [of New York].\" Plaintiff's claims did not \"accrue without the state.\"\nMaxwell's contention that the borrowing sta\n... [truncated, 2260 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/18 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=18]", "char_count": 2260}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 20 of 25\n\ncrimes that Maxwell committed against Plaintiff are not limited to an isolated sexual assault in\nNew Mexico. As described in Section\n\nsupra, Maxwell and Epstein planned and initiated\n\nthe trafficking of Plaintiff that resulted in numerous instances of abuse in New York, Compl.\n¶¶ 10-12, 29, 31, 57-58, which also served as the epicenter of Epstein and Maxwell's sextrafficking conspiracy, id. ¶l 29, 46, 51, 53, 56-58.; Compl., Ex. A ¶¶ 1-2, 8-13. Plaintiff's own\nsister witnessed Maxwell recruiting numerous school-aged girls in New York before Plaintiff was\nflown to New York. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47.\nA cause of action accrues at \"the time when, and the place where, the plaintiff first had the\nright to bring the cause of action.\" Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 484 (N.Y.\n1999). Maxwell began forming an intent and plan to batter, groom, abuse, and inflict emotional\ndistress on Annie in New York long before Plaintiff arrived in New Mexico. Plaintiff's claims\nagainst Maxwell therefore did not accrue \"without the state\" of New York; New York is where\nher story began.\nC.\n\nMaxwell Has Not Met Her Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot\nInvoke Equitable Estoppel.\n\nEven if the Court were to hold that the CVA does not apply to Plaintiff's claims, or that\nC.P.L.R. 202 does, it should hold that they are still timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.2\nMaxwell contends that \"equitable doctrines require `extraordinary' factors that make it 'unjust' to\nallow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense.\" Maxwell Mem. at 18. But this case\nis extraordinary, and \"courts have long had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion\nof the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative\n\n2\n\nTo the extent the doctrine of equitable tolling is unavailable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has\nsufficiently plead conduct to equitably estop the defendants fr\n... [truncated, 2080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/19 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=19]", "char_count": 2080}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 21 of 25\n\nwrongdoing—a carefully concealed crime here—which produced the long delay between the\naccrual of the cause of action and the institution of the legal proceeding.\" Gen. Stencils, Inc. v.\nChiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966). A defendant is therefore equitably estopped from\nasserting a statute of limitations defense if the defendant \"wrongfully induced the plaintiff to\nrefrain from timely commencing an action by deception, concealment, threats or other\nmisconduct.\" Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.\nJuly 11, 2019) (internal citation omitted).\nAssuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and drawing all inferences\nin her favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded misconduct that equitably estops Maxwell from\nasserting a statute of limitations defense. Maxwell oversaw Epstein's massive sex-trafficking\nnetwork and procured a plethora of underage girls for his abuse. Compl. 1110-12. Plaintiff was\none of those underage girls, and after she escaped Maxwell and Epstein, the two made sure that\nshe could not speak out. Maxwell and Epstein's display of great power, wealth, and connections\nwas purposefully designed to instill fear in their victims and caused Plaintiff to initially not tell\nanyone what had happened at Epstein's New York home and New Mexico ranch. Id. ¶ 70.\nEventually, Plaintiff told her sister what happened, and the two tried to share their stories with law\nenforcement and a magazine; however, Epstein threatened and intimated the magazine into not\nreporting Plaintiff's allegations. Id. ¶ 75. Maxwell and Epstein then embarked on a campaign of\nthreats against Plaintiff's sister, which instilled even more fear in Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff's\nfear was further exacerbated by the unwillingness of state and federal authorities, as well as the\nmedia, to take any action against Epstein. Id.\nPlaintiff's allegations are therefore more th\n... [truncated, 2165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/20 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=20]", "char_count": 2165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 22 of 25\n\nPlaintiff was not required to \"affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of Maxwell's statute of\nlimitations defense. Childers, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 315 (internal quotation marks and citation\nomitted). Further, \"[w]hether equitable estoppel applies in a given case is ultimately a question of\nfact.\" Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 2001).\nCourts applying New York law have therefore reserved the highly factual issue of equitable\nestoppel for after discovery. See, e.g., Gotlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL\n1154817, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) (\"A vast majority of the cases on equitable estoppel\npermit plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, deferring the question until some\ndiscovery can be had.\").\nIn fact, this Court has already recognized that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and\nequitable tolling are \"very fact specific\" and accordingly asked both Epstein's Estate and Maxwell\nto refrain from filing a motion to dismiss prior to discovery. Tr. of Mar. 5, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf.\nat 3:4-8, ECF No. 39; Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 5:4-7, ECF No. 54 (\"And with\nrespect to the statute of limitations, as I said in the last conference, it strikes me that that question\nraises a host of factual issues, and it would be better resolved after some discovery.\"). Maxwell\nhas therefore failed to meet her burden of proving that Plaintiff cannot invoke equitable estoppel\nin this litigation.\nII.\n\nVenue is Proper in this District.\n\nVenue is proper in this judicial district, which served as the hub of Maxwell and Epstein's\ncrimes against Plaintiff and the countless others that they abused and trafficked. Venue is proper\nin \"a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim\noccurred.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1391(6)(2). On a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule\n12(bX3), if the Cou\n... [truncated, 2191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/21 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=21]", "char_count": 2191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 23 of 25\n\n(citing CutCo Indus. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1986)). \"In analyzing whether\nthe plaintiff has made the requisite prima fade showing that venue is proper, [the Court must] view\nall the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff.\"\n\nv. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384\n\n(2d Cir. 2007). Here, viewing the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most favorable to\nPlaintiff, Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that venue is proper in the Southern District of\nNew York because a substantial part of the events underlying Plaintiff's claims occurred there.\nMaxwell's contention that this District is an improper venue because Plaintiff's allegations\n\"concern conduct occurring exclusively in New Mexico\" is incorrect and ignores key facts alleged\nin the Complaint. Maxwell Mem. at 20. \"Determining whether events are sufficiently substantial\nto support venue is not achieved by simply adding up the number of contacts. Rather, the\nputatively substantial acts must bear a close nexus to the claims in issue.\" Carder v. Micha, Inc.,\nNo. Civ. 4699 (DC), 2007 WL 1187188, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2007) (internal quotation marks\nand citations omitted). Further, venue may be proper in multiple districts \"as long as\n'a substantial part' of the underlying events took place in those districts.\" Gulf Ins. Co., 417 F.3d\nat 356. Accordingly, this Court has found a close nexus and thereby proper venue when the idea\nand plan for the actions that gave rise to the complaint originated in New York, even if the plan\nwas executed elsewhere. See Penh v. Petersen, No. 15 CIV. 1414 LGS, 2015 WL 5326173, at\n*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2015) (Schofield, J.) (holding that venue was proper in a breach contract\naction because the \"terms of [the contract] were negotiated and discussed in substantial part in\nNew York,\" and the details were finalized there).\nAs alleged in the Complaint, Maxwell and Epstein operated a \n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/22 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=22]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 24 of 25\n\nCity. Id. ¶¶ 50, 58. Epstein then, through the ruse of wanting to help her get into college, flew\nPlaintiff to New York City, where during her stay he first engaged in non-consensual physical\ncontact with her. Id. ¶¶ 51-54. Following Plaintiff's visit, Maxwell and Epstein conspired in New\nYork City to lure Plaintiff to Epstein's ranch in New Mexico so that they could abuse her further.\nSee id. ¶¶ 56-58. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother from New York City and told her that Maxwell\nwould chaperone her in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 57. Once Plaintiff's mother assented, \"Epstein and\nMaxwell, who were in New York at the time, arranged and paid for Annie to fly to New Mexico\nin the spring of 1996\" where she was isolated at Epstein's massive ranch and abused by both adults.\nId. ¶ 58. This District thus has a \"close nexus\" to Plaintiff's claims because the idea and plan to\nassault Plaintiff were developed here. See Persh, 2015 WL 5326173 at •4. Venue is thus proper\nunder § 1391(1)(2) because a \"substantial part of the underlying events\" took place in New York\nCity. GulfIns. Co., 417 F.3d at 355; see also Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020 Pre-Motion Conf. at 4:24-5:3,\nECF No. 54 (\"Mt seems to me that the matters alleged are alleged to be in the Southern District\nof New York . . . as well as in New Mexico.\").\nPlaintiff also alleges that Maxwell is a New York citizen domiciled in the Southern District\nof New York, Compl. ¶ 21, and therefore venue is additionally proper under 28 U.S.C. § 139/ (b)( I )\nbecause all Defendants are residents of New York. In Maxwell's brief, she states that she does\nnot, in fact, reside in New York, but does not submit any documentary evidence to support that\ncontention, nor does she state where she resides or when she stopped residing in New York.\nMaxwell Mem. at 20. Such a conclusory statement in an unworn legal brief is not enough to rebut\nPlaintiff's prima facie showing that Maxwell is a residen\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778180/23 or ?id=EFTA02778180&page=23]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778180", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 83\n\nFiled 06/19/20\n\nPage 25 of 25\n\nmust take all allegations in the complaint as true, unless contradicted by defendants' affidavits.\")\n(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Venue is therefore proper in this District under\nboth § 1391(bX1) and § 1391(b)(2).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion\nto Dismiss or to Transfer.\n\nDated: June 19, 2020\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley\nDavid Boies\nBOILS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n333 Main Street\nArmonk, NY 10504\n(914) 749-8200\nSigrid S. McCawley\n(Pro Hac Vice)\nBOILS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200\nFt. Lauderdale, FL 33301\n(954) 356-0011\nJoshua I. Schiller\nAndrew Villacastin\nSabina Marietta\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards\nNew York, NY 10001\n(212) 446-2300\n\nCounselfor Plainta=\n\n20\n\nEFTA02778204\n\n", "char_count": 893}]}