{"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_count": 27, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02778021", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02778021.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 1 of 27\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nX\n\nPlaintiff,\nv.\n19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors\nof the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendants.\nX\n\nCORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER\n\nEFTA02778021\n\n", "char_count": 442}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 2 of 27\n\nTable of Contents\n\nTable of Contents\n\nii\n\nTable of Authorities\n\niii\n\nIntroduction\n\n1\n\nBackground\n\n1\n\nArgument\n\n3\n\nI.\n\nII.\n\nThe complaint, filed nearly three decades after the events it alleges, is barred by the statute\nof limitations.\n3\nA. Standard of review.\n\n4\n\nB. The complaint is untimely under New Mexico and New York law.\n\n4\n\nC. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law.\n\n6\n\ni. CPLR § 215(8Xa) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims\n\n6\n\nii. CPLR § 2141 does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's claims.\n\n6\n\niii. Plaintiff has not plausibly plead equitable tolling or estoppel.\n\n18\n\nIf not dismissed, the case against Ms. Maxwell should be transferred to the District of New\nMexico.\n20\n\nConclusion\n\n21\n\nCertificate of Service\n\n22\n\nEFTA02778022\n\n", "char_count": 838}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 3 of 27\n\nTable of Authorities\nCases\nAm. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2004)\n\n7\n\nAshcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n4\n\nDennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,\n729789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n\nF. Supp. 3d\n\nNo. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL\n4, 17\n\nDoe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015)\n\n13\n\nFerro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961)\n\n19\n\nv. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 2007)\n\n10\n\nGallewski v. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950)\nGeiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)\n\n13, 14, 16\n5, 11, 18, 19\n\nGuaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)\n\n5\n\nv. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267 (N.Y. 1922)\nHymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)\n\n12\n13, 14, 16\n\nIn re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)\n\n4\n\nIn re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y.\n2014)\n\n15\n\nIn re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227 (N.Y. 2017)\n16, 17\n\n12,\n\nJang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016)\n\n18\n\nKnickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)\n\n13\n\nLubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222 (N.Y. 2019)\n\n11\n\nMajewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998)\n\n7\n\niii\n\nEFTA02778023\n\n\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF  Document 75  N.Y. Penal Law § 130  Filed 05/20/20  Page 5 of 27  7, 8, 10, 11  N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12Xb)  8, 9  N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1Xm)  9  New York Penal Law § 130  7, 10  Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. I2(b)(3)  20  v  EFTA02778025", "char_count": 1801}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 4 of 27\n\nMatter ofMcCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. 3rd Dept. 1953)... 13, 14,\n16\nOchre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture Planning & Design, P.C., No. 12 CIV. 2837 KBF, 2012\nWL 6082387 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012)\n19\nPeople v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992)\nv. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924)\nv. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995)\n\n7\n13, 16\n19\n\nSlusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 P.3d 524 (N.M. App. 2013)\n\n20\n\nStafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1981)\n\n5\n\nStuan v. Aim Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1998)\n\n5, 11\n\nSweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742\n14\n(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018)\nTouche\n\n& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)\n\nZwnpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 2006)\n\n9\n15, 18\n\nStatutes\n28 U.S.C.\n\n1391(b)\n\n20\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)\n\n20\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)\n\n20\n\nCPLR § 202\n\npassim\n\nCVA § 214-g\n\n10\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-8\n\n5\n\nN.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6\n\n12\n\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(1)(5)(a)\n\n8\n\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a)\n\n8, 9\n\nN.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a\n\n9\n\niv\n\nEFTA02778024\n\n", "char_count": 1163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 5 of 27\n\n7, 8, 10, 11\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12Xb)\n\n8, 9\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1Xm)\n\n9\n\nNew York Penal Law § 130\n\n7, 10\n\nRules\nFed. R. Civ. P. I2(b)(3)\n\n20\n\nv\n\nEFTA02778025\n\n", "char_count": 270}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 6 of 27\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell moves this Court for an order dismissing this case or\ntransferring the case against her to the District of New Mexico.\nINTRODUCTION\nPlaintiff's complaint is years too late, lacks the required specificity, and is filed in the\nwrong court. It describes events that allegedly occurred nearly three decades ago, and it details\nalleged conduct by Mr. Epstein while referring to Ms. Maxwell as an afterthought. When it does\nallege conduct by Ms. Maxwell, it alleges conduct that occurred in New Mexico, not New York.\nThis Court should dismiss or transfer the case against Ms. Maxwell to New Mexico.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff claims that when she was either fifteen or sixteen years old, in 1995 or 1996, Mr.\nEpstein lured her to New York based on a promise of helping her get into college. Compl.fi 4!,\n51. With no alleged involvement of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein bought Plaintiff a plane ticket\nfrom Arizona to New York. Id.151. Plaintiffs sister,\n\nwas at the time purportedly\n\nworking for Mr. Epstein as a purchaser of art. Id.146.\nPlaintiff claims that in New York, Mr. Epstein took her and her sister to a movie. Id.\n\nII 53-54. With no involvement or participation of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein allegedly groped\nPlaintiff during the movie.\n\n54. Plaintiff returned to Arizona shortly after. Id. J 55.\n\nSometime later, in the spring of 19%, Mr. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother in Arizona\nand proposed to sponsor a trip for Plaintiff to his ranch in New Mexico. Id.157. Mr. Epstein told\nPlaintiff's mother that his ranch was the site of an educational program for high school students.\nId.\n\n56-57. According to the complaint, Mr. Epstein represented that Ms. Maxwell would be\n\nPlaintiff's chaperone. Id. 91 57. Mr. Epstein again bought a plane ticket for Plaintiff, mailing it to\n58. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell contacted\n\nPlaintiff or her mother or arranged for Plaintiff's travel. See id.\n\n1\n... [truncated, 2053 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/5 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=5]", "char_count": 2053}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 7 of 27\n\nWhen Plaintiff arrived at the ranch, she claims she was the only student there. The\ncomplaint alleges that at the ranch, Ms. Maxwell pressured Plaintiff to give Mr. Epstein foot\nmassages. Id.1 59. It also alleges that Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell took her to see a movie,\nduring which Mr. Epstein touched her body against her will. Id.1 60-61. The complaint does not\nallege that Ms. Maxwell touched Plaintiff or that she knew of Mr. Epstein's alleged touching.\nUpon returning to the ranch, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell persuaded her to remove\nall her clothes so Ms. Maxwell could give Plaintiff a massage. Id.1 62. Plaintiff alleges that Ms.\nMaxwell massaged Plaintiff and touched her intimate parts \"against her will for the sexual\nbenefit of Maxwell and Epstein.\" Id.\n\n63-64, 65.\n\nThe following morning, Mr. Epstein allegedly got into bed with Plaintiff to \"cuddle\" and\n\"physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body (including his genitals)\nagainst\" her. Id.1 67. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or\nparticipated in this incident or knew of it. See id. Plaintiff then returned to Arizona. Id. 1 70.\nPlaintiff's complaint next devotes several paragraphs to describing the alleged sexual\nassault of her sister, •\n\nat an Epstein property in Ohio. Id. ¶ 71-76. According to the\n\ncomplaint, after the assault Ms. Maxwell threatened\n\non behalf of Mr. Epstein,\n\ntelling her: \"We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever\nmake will be burned. Your career is burned.\" Id.1 72. This allegation is demonstrably false.\nSpeaking for herself in 1996,\n\napparently told police that Mr. Epstein \"call[ed] her\n\nand stated he was going to burn [her] painting and send her poloroids (sic) of the burnt\npaintings.\" There was no mention in the police report of Ms. Maxwell. See Ex. 1 (Aug. 29, 1996\nPolice Report by\n\n. In any event, the complaint is d\n... [truncated, 2087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/6 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=6]", "char_count": 2087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nThe complaint alleges that\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 8 of 27\n\nreported the Ohio incident to both the NYPD's\n\nSixth Precinct and to the FBI, neither of which took any action. Id. 1 73.' At that point,\nspoke with Plaintiff, who allegedly told Maria of the events in New York and New\nMexico. Id. fl 73-74. The sisters claim they took their story to Vanity Fair Magazine, which\nPlaintiff says declined to publish a story only after Mr. Epstein (but not Ms. Maxwell)\n\"threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats.\" Id.175.\nPlaintiff never claims she had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell after\nreturning to Arizona from New Mexico, and she does not allege that Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell\never threatened her or coerced her not to report her allegations. Yet, Plaintiff claims that \"[o]ut of\nfear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's great power,\nwealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, [she] did not tell anyone [other than her\nsister] about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will.\" Id. 11[ 70. Plaintiff's failure, for\nnearly thirty years, to file this lawsuit, was allegedly a product of \"the fact that state and federal\nauthorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein.\" Id.1 76.\nPlaintiff finally filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2019. Doc. 1. It alleges battery, false\nimprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nTHE COMPLAINT, FILED NEARLY THREE DECADES AFTER THE\nEVENTS IT ALLEGES, IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF\nLIMITATIONS.\n\nPlaintiff's complaint is years too late. The complaint limits its allegations of tortious\nconduct by Ms. Maxwell to conduct allegedly occurring in New Mexico nearly three decades\nago: Ms. Maxwell allegedly committed battery against Plaintiff in New Mexico in the spring of\n\nCuriously,\nSixth Precinct report makes no mention of any alleged assaults by\nMr. Epstein or\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/7 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=7]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 9 of 27\n\n1996 by touching her intimate parts against her will during a massage at Mr. Epstein's ranch;\nMs. Maxwell falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at the New Mexico ranch; and together, this conduct\ninflicted emotional distress.\nThe complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in Mr.\nEpstein's \"recruitment\" of Plaintiff to New York in late 1995/early 1996 or the alleged groping\nof Plaintiff at a New York movie theater. Nor does the complaint allege that Ms. Maxwell ever\nthreatened or coerced Plaintiff into not filing a complaint. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege that\nMs. Maxwell ever contacted her in the nearly three decades since she was in New Mexico.\nA.\n\nStandard of review.\n\nIn assessing a motion to dismiss, this Court need only assume the truth of the wellpleaded factual contentions in Plaintiff's complaint. In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust\n332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing conspiracy and antitrust claims as\nimplausible). It should disregard Plaintiff's conclusory allegations as well as those that\nimproperly lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662,\n678 (2009); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate\nwhen, as here, the complaint fails to allege timely claims for relief that are plausible on their\nface. See Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,\n\nF. Supp. 3d _, No. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020\n\nWL 729789, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely to\nsurvive a motion to dismiss).\nB.\n\nThe complaint is tintimel:s Under New Mexico and New York law.\n\nThe complaint alleges that Ms. Maxwell committed three torts against Plaintiff in New\nMexico. While New York's \"borrowing statute\" allows non-residents like Plaintiff to sue in New\nYork courts for torts occurring outside New York, the claims must be timely under both New\n\n4\n\nEFTA02778029\n\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 10 of 27\n\nYork law the law in the state where the tort allegedly occurred. Because all three causes of action\nare untimely under New Mexico and New York law, the complaint must be dismissed.\nWhen, as here, \"jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in\nNew York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations.\" Smart v.\nAm. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326\nU.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)). \"New York courts generally apply New York's statutes of limitations,\neven when the injury giving rise to the action occurred outside New York.\" Id. (citing Stafford v.\nInternational Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981)).\n\"This general rule, however, is subject to a traditional statutory exception, New York's\n'borrowing' statute, C.P.L.R. § 202.\" Id. New York's borrowing statute permits a resident of\nanother state (here, Texas)2 to sue in New York for torts occurring outside New York (here, New\nMexico) if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the tort\noccurred (again, New Mexico). CPLR § 202. The purpose of CPLR § 202 is to prevent \"forum\nshopping by plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period.\" Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627.\nNew Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat.\n§ 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to begin such an action,\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. At the latest, Plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's\nclaims are untimely under New Mexico law and, thus, they are time-barred under CPLR § 202.\nSimilarly, under New York law, a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and\nintentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the\nclaim's accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 171\n(S.D.N.Y. 2019). \n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/9 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=9]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 11 of 27\n\naccrued. Thus, unless New York law revives Plaintiff's untimely claims or tolls the statute of\nlimitations, dismissal is required.\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law.\n\nPlaintiff, in her pm-motion response, did not deny that her claims are untimely under\nNew Mexico Law. Doc. 48, at 3. Instead, Plaintiff contends that CPLR § 202 does not apply\nbecause New York's Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 2I4-g, \"provides for a revival window\nof civil claims '(n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to\nthe contrary.'\" /d.3 Plaintiff's complaint also points to CPLR § 215(8Xa). As explained below,\nhowever, neither provision saves Plaintiff's untimely complaint.\ni.\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims.\n\nPlaintiff's complaint points to CPLR § 215(8)(a), which in some cases allows a plaintiff\nto pursue otherwise untimely claims if she files them within one year of the termination of a\ncriminal action against the defendant, if the criminal action concerned the same \"event or\noccurrence\" as the civil complaint. Compl. fl 82, 87, 93. But that provision does not apply here\nbecause Ms. Maxwell was never indicted, only Mr. Epstein was, and because the Epstein\nindictment did not concern the \"event or occurrence\" from which this civil complaint arises.4\nff.\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's claims.\n\nThe CVA, CPLR § 214-g, purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries\n\"suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute\" a sexual offense under New York penal\nlaw. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired nearly thirty years ago. The\nattempt fails because: (1) CPLR § 214-g does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell; (2)\n\n3 Plaintiff has not claimed that New Mexico has a revival statute.\n'The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and\nFlorida. Com\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/10 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=10]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 12 of 27\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, under which\nPlaintiff must prove her claims are timely under New Mexico law (which concededly they are\nnot); and (3) even if CPLR § 214-g does apply, its application to Maxwell is unconstitutional.\na.\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not apply to Ms. Maxwell.\n\nCPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because the conduct alleged\nagainst her occurred in New Mexico, outside New York, and therefore \"would [not] constitute\" a\nsexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. CPLR § 214-g says:\nNotwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of\nlimitation to the contrary . . . every civil claim or cause of action\nbrought against any party . . . as a result of conduct which would\nconstitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty\nof the penal law [N.Y. Penal Law § 130] committed against a child\nless than eighteen years of age . . . is hereby revived, and action\nthereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and\nnot later than one year and six months after the effective date of this\nsection.\n\"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the\nintent of the Legislature.\" Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978, 980\n(N.Y. 1998). \"As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point\nin any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain\nmeaning thereof.\" Id. \"A court cannot amend a statute by adding words that are not there.\" Am.\nTransit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (N.Y. 2004).\nThe plain and unambiguous language of CPLR § 214-g shows it does not apply to\nPlaintiff's untimely complaint. For it to apply, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell must arise\nfrom \"conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130.\nMs. Maxw\n... [truncated, 2275 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/11 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=11]", "char_count": 2275}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 13 of 27\n\ncriminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has\nterritorial jurisdiction.\"). Because the complaint concerns conduct allegedly committed in New\nMexico, Ms. Maxwell's purported conduct \"would [not] constitute a sexual offense as defined\nin\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130.\nHad the New York State Assembly intended otherwise—that is, had the State Assembly\nintended to revive claims for conduct occurring outside New York that, if committed within this\nstate, would have constituted as defined in penal law N.Y. Penal Law § 130—it knew how to do\nso. In fact, the State Assembly could have done what it routinely does: include language making\nclear an intent for the statute to apply to conduct occurring outside New York.\nTake New York law defining professional misconduct by physicians. It provides that it is\nprofessional misconduct to be\n9.(a) ... convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under:\n(i) New York state law or,\n(ii) federal law or,\n(iii) the law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within\nthis state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law.\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that conduct\noccurring outside New York can constitute professional misconduct within New York.\nThe examples abound. E.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(l)(5)(a) (defining as professional\nmisconduct \"[b]eing convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under: (i) New York\nState law or, (ii) Federal law or, (iii) The law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed\nwithin this state, would have constituted a crime under New York State law\" (emphasis added));\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b) (\"When a licensee has pleaded or been found guilty or\nconvicted of committing an act constituting a felony under New York state law or federal law, or\n\n8\n\nEFTA02778033\n\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 14 of 27\n\nthe law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a\nfelony under New York state law . . .\" (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m)\n(authorizing suspension of a license if the licensee \"is convicted of certain crimes and the ...\nconviction [is] under (i) New York state law; (ii) federal law; or (iii) the law of another\njurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constitutedprofessional\nmisconduct under New York state law\" (emphasis added)).\nThe State Assembly's choice not to use the conditional perfect tense (\"would have\") is\ndispositive of its intent. As the above examples show, when the State Assembly intends a law to\napply to conduct occurring out of state which, \"if committed within this state, would have\nconstituted a crime under New York state law,\" it says so expressly. See Touche\n\n& Co. v.\n\nRedington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (\"Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a\nprivate damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.\"); see, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law\n§ 6530(9)(a); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m). And the\nState Assembly easily could have done so in CPLR § 214-g, by saying that the statute revived\notherwise time-barred claims based on \"conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as\ndefined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law or, if committed within this state, would\nhave constituted a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law.\" See\nCPLR § 214-g. The legislature intentionally decided not to include this language.5\n\n5 If CPLR § 214-g had been written in the present tense, the State Assembly likewise could have\n\nshown an intent for it to apply to conduct occurring outside New York. It has done so countless\nother times. E.g., N.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a (providing that New York's human rights law \"shall\napply as hereinafte\n... [truncated, 2324 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/13 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=13]", "char_count": 2324}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 15 of 27\n\nUnlike these examples, CPLR § 214-g talks only of conduct \"which would constitute a\nsexual offense as defined in\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130. It does not speak to conduct which, if\ncommitted within New York, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article N.Y.\nPenal Law § 130. And absent that specific language—readily available to the State Assembly\nand routinely used—Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct \"would [not] constitute\" a sexual offense\nunder New York Penal Law § 130 because it occurred outside New York and in New Mexico.\nInterpreting CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would require this Court to add language\nto the statute, which this Court cannot do. See Am. Transit, 814 N.E.2d at 1192 (\"A court cannot\namend a statute by adding words that are not there.\"). The CVA, § 214-g, thus does not apply to\nthe case against Ms. Maxwell and cannot revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims.'\nb.\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing\nstatute, CPLR § 202.\n\nIn response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court, Plaintiff argued that CPLR\n§ 214-g trumps New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, because the former statute says it\napplies \"[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the\ncontrary.\" CPLR § 214-g; Doc. 48, at 3. This argument is misplaced.\nCPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 can be read together to give effect to both. See\nv. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (N.Y. 2007) (\"[W]here possible,\ncourts should harmonize all parts of a statute with each other . . . and give effect and meaning ...\nto the entire statute and every part and word thereof.\" (cleaned up)). Recall that when\n\"jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply\nthe New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations,\" including New York's borrowing\n\n6 In no case can CPLR § 214-g revive Plaintiff's false i\n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/14 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=14]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 16 of 27\n\nstatute, CPLR § 202. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 626. CPLR § 202 requires a complaint to be timely\nunder both the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (here, New Mexico).\nWhen CPLR § 214-g revives claims based upon conduct that \"would constitute a sexual\noffense as defined in\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130 \"[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which\nimposes a period of limitation to the contrary,\" CPLR § 214-g is referring to any provision of\nNew York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary. CPLR § 214-g is a New York\nstatute enacted by the New York legislature, which applies to and revives claims based on\nconduct that would violate New York penal law that would otherwise be untimely under New\nYork statutes of limitations.\nHere, as described above, CPLR § 215(3) required Plaintiff to commence her battery,\nfalse imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims within one year of\ntheir accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 171. As best, the effect of CPLR § 214-g\nin this case, then, is to excuse Plaintiff from complying with CPLR § 215(3). It revives\nPlaintiff's claims only insofar as CPLR § 215(3) barred them. By contrast, the effect of CPLR\n§ 214-g is not to revive Plaintiff's claims insofar as New Mexico law bars them.\nBut New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, requires Plaintiffs claims to be timely\nunder both New York law and New Mexico law. Thus, at best, CPLR § 214-g solves half of\nPlaintiff's problem—it might render her claims timely under New York law when they would\notherwise be untimely under CPLR § 215(3). But CPLR § 214-g cannot solve the other half of\nPlaintiff's problem—it cannot render her claims timely under New Mexico law.\nPlaintiff's argument that CPLR § 214-g trumps CPLR § 202 would lead to forum\nshopping, which is the absurd result CPLR § 202 seeks to avoid. See Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627; see\nalso Lubonly v. U.S. Bank Nat\n... [truncated, 2085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/15 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=15]", "char_count": 2085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 17 of 27\n\nstatute[s] so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law\"). If Plaintiff is right,\ncourts in New York can expect to see a flood of lawsuits concerning conduct occurring in other\nstates having little or no connection to New York. Plaintiffs will know that even if they could not\nbring a lawsuit in the state in which the conduct occurred, they can file suit in New York so long\nas there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But there's no reason to think that the New\nYork State Assembly intended to override the decisions of other state legislatures that have opted\nnot to revive expired claims based on conduct occurring within their own borders.\nAccordingly, when read together, CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 still require Plaintiff to\nshow that her claims are timely under New Mexico law, since they are based on conduct\noccurring in New Mexico. Plaintiff has not disputed that her claims are untimely under New\nMexico law, Doc. 48, at 3, and, as a result, they must be dismissed.\nc.\n\nApplying CPLR § 214-g to Ms. Maxwell would violate\ndue process.\n\nDisregarding CPLR § 202, and applying § 214-g notwithstanding the claims'\nuntimeliness under New Mexico law, violates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process.\nThe New York Constitution guarantees due process of law. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This\nguarantee constrains the State Assembly's ability to enact \"revival statutes,\" which are an\n\"extreme exercise of legislative power.\"\n\nv. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267, 267 (N.Y.\n\n1922) (Cardozo, J.). In New York, due process requires a \"weigh[ing] [of] the defendant's\ninterests in the availability of a statute of limitations defense with the need to correct an\ninjustice.\" In re World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1239 (N.Y. 2017).\nThe New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that \"a claim-revival statute will\nsatisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable\n... [truncated, 2120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/16 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=16]", "char_count": 2120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 18 of 27\n\nremedy is limited to when a \"plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner.\" Doe\nv. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015) (discussing\nNew York law); see also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Gallewski\nv. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950);\n\nv. Robins Thy Dock & Repair Co., 144\n\nN.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924); Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App.\n3rd Dept. 1953), aff'd without op., 306 N.Y. 904 (1954).\nIn\n\nv. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., the New York Court of Appeals affirmed\n\nthe constitutionality of a statute that revived the wrongful death actions of spouses of deceased\nworkers.\n\n144 N.E. at 579. There, the wife of a deceased worker began collecting\n\nworker's compensation following her husband's work-related death; this was her exclusive legal\nremedy at the time. Id. at 579—80. More than two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared\nNew York's workers' compensation law to be unconstitutional, which ended the wife's worker's\ncompensation benefit. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). By that time,\nhowever, the wife's wrongful death action was time-barred under New York law. See\n144 N.E. at 580. A claim by the wife for her husband's wrongful death also was not cognizable\nat any time during the applicable limitations period, because for that entire time worker's\ncompensation was the exclusive remedy for the husband's work-related death. Because the\nspouses of deceased workers could not have brought a timely claim for wrongful death based on\na work-related injury before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Knickerbocker Ice, the Court of\nAppeals affirmed the propriety of the revival statute. Id. at 579, 582.\nThe Court of Appeals' decision in Gallewski v. Hentz & Co. similarly addressed reviving\nformerly time-barred causes of action that claimants were effectively prevented f\n... [truncated, 2133 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/17 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=17]", "char_count": 2133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 19 of 27\n\ntoll the statute of limitations for individuals residing in Axis-occupied countries during World\nWar II comported with due process. Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 622-25. The Court noted that \"the\ncitizens and residents of occupied territory were, during such occupation, under a practical and\ntotal inability to commence action in the courts of this State to protect and effectuate their\nrights.\" id. at 625. Because these plaintiffs were unable to assert timely claims under the\napplicable limitations period, the Court of Appeals in Gallewski concluded that the legislature's\nretroactive tolling of the otherwise applicable limitations period comported with due process. Id.\nLikewise, in both Matter of McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co. and Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &\nCo., claims-revival provisions were held to comport with due process when they addressed\nclaims that could not have been timely asserted. Both cases presented claims by plaintiffs who\nwere afflicted by latent diseases where symptoms did not typically appear until after the\napplicable limitations period expired. Matter of McCann, 301 N.Y. at 511 (cassion disease is \"of\na slow-starting or insidious nature\" and \"very often ... more than twelve months elapse[s] after\nthe contraction of the disease before its presence [is] known or apparent\"); Hymowitz, 539\nN.E.2d at 1072 (the exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) by pregnant mothers causes a\nlatent injury in utero and \"many claims [are] barred by the Statute of Limitations before the\ninjury (is] discovered\"). See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1079; see also Sweener v. Saint-Gobain\nPerformance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,\n2018) (citing Hymowitz and Matter of McCann in holding that CPLR § 214-g comported with\ndue process because the claims-revival provision there allowed those \"who suffer[ed) latent\ninjuries stemming from environmental contamination() to pursue cla\n... [truncated, 2120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/18 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=18]", "char_count": 2120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 20 of 27\n\nThe New York Court of Appeals already has decided that numerous claimants asserting\nallegations of sexual abuse were not prevented from asserting their claims in a timely manner\nunder the formerly applicable limitations period. See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y.\n2006). In Zumpano, the Court addressed actions alleging clergy sexual abuse for which the\nstatute of limitations had long expired, but the plaintiffs sought equitable tolling of their\nlimitations periods and asserted equitable estoppel against defendants. Id. at 927-28. The Court\nheld, at the motion to dismiss stage, that all plaintiffs in both the individual and the 42-person\naction \"failed to satisfy th[eir] burden\" of \"establish[ing] that subsequent and specific actions by\ndefendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit.\" Id. at 929. Concluded the Court:\n[E]ach plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse he or she suffered at\nthe hands of defendant priests. Certainly they had sufficient\nknowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action against the\nindividual priests. Plaintiffs were likewise aware that the priests\nwere employees of the dioceses and could have brought actions\nagainst the dioceses, or at least investigated whether a basis for such\nactions existed.\nId. The Court thus affirmed the dismissal of both actions as time-barred.\nThe federal district court decision in World Trade Center also is instructive. While that\ndecision was ultimately vacated based only on a threshold standing issue (not presented here),\nthe court there invalidated a claims-revival provision under the New York State Constitution's\nDue Process Clause on the same basis asserted by Ms. Maxwell here. The statute at issue in that\ncase revived otherwise time-barred claims by disaster-relief workers who were injured during the\ncleanup and rescue efforts following the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack on the World Trade\nCenter. After canvassing t\n... [truncated, 2376 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/19 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=19]", "char_count": 2376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 21 of 27\n\nvacated on other grounds, 892 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2018). The district court reasoned that, unlike in\nthe Court of Appeals' precedent addressing this issue discussed above (Gallewski,\nMatter ofMcCann, and Hyinowitz), the plaintiffs in World Trade Center were protected by a rule\nthat the limitations period on their claims did not begin to run until they had discovered their\ninjuries. Id. at 475-76. They thus did not face a \"practical and total inability\" to begin a timely\nlawsuit, as in Gallewski,\n\nand other cases in which claim revival has been allowed. Id.\n\nat 474-75. The district court also noted that many plaintiffs had filed timely lawsuits. Id. at 476.\nThe claims-revival provision in the CVA is, in material respects, like the one at issue in\nWorld Trade Center. In both instances, the legislature purported to revive claims by plaintiffs\nwho were not prevented from asserting them in a timely fashion. In World Trade Center, the\ndistrict court noted that the legislature had given as its justification, among other things, that\ncertain claimants were given incorrect information about their work conditions and did not know\nthe applicable limitations periods. See id. at 475. But the court determined those were not\ngrounds for enacting a claims-revival provision because \"[t]hese rationales do not amount to the\n`exceptional circumstances' justifying the `extreme exercise of legislative power' that a revival\nstatute entails.\" Id. \"[T]hose who wished to sue were not barred from doing so.\" Id. at 476.\nHere, the legislature's attempt through CPLR § 214-g to revive formerly time-barred\nclaims based on certain alleged sexual abuse does not comport with the New York State\nConstitution's Due Process Clause, at least as applied to Ms. Maxwell. Unlike all of the previous\nsituations in which the Court of Appeals has ruled that the \"extreme\" measure of reviving claims\nsurvived due process scrutiny, Plaintiff here w\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/20 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=20]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 22 of 27\n\nTo the contrary, Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago\nto her sister and Vanity Fair Magazine and that her sister had no problem reporting her\nallegations to the NYPD and the FBI. Compl. 11 73-75. That those organizations did not respond\nas Plaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago.\nPlaintiff's conclusory and bare assertion that she was prevented from filing her claim\n\"[o]ut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's\ngreat power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her\" is not plausible. Compl.\n1 70; see Dennis, 2020 WL 729789, at *5 (to survive a motion to dismiss, complaint must\nplausibly allege that it is timely). Plaintiff admits that upon leaving the ranch in New Mexico,\nshe never again had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. And she does not allege\nthat either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her into not filing a timely\nlawsuit. The complaint is devoid of any plausible allegation that Plaintiff could not have sued\nMs. Maxwell in a timely fashion over a twenty-four (24) year period. Thus, under New York\nlaw, it would violate due process to allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's untimely claims.\nTo allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would undermine the integrity of the\njudicial system and deny Ms. Maxwell her constitutional right to defend herself. Ms. Maxwell\nwould have to rebut allegations of an individual who claims she was assaulted nearly thirty years\nago. Ms. Maxwell would also be called to answer the for conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead.\n\"[Wjeighing the defendant's interest in the availability of statute of limitations defense with the\nneed to correct an injustice,\" Matter of World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d at 1239, underscores the due\nprocess limitation that constrained the legislature's authority h\n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/21 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=21]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 23 of 27\n\nestablished a compensation fund for alleged victims, the Voluntary Claims Resolution Program\nin the U.S. Virgin Islands. Plaintiff and her sister,\n\nhave publicly provided notice\n\nof their intent to participate in the Program. So have other alleged victims of Mr. Epstein. It\nundermines the integrity of the judicial system for some individuals to participate in this\ncompensation fund while others attempt to revive long-expired claims in court.\niii.\n\nPlaintiff has not plausibly plead equitable tolling or estoppel.\n\nPlaintiff points to two other bases for the timeliness of her complaint: equitable tolling\nand equitable estoppel. Comp/. 11 16-17. Neither doctrine saves Plaintiff's complaint.\nEquitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri\nRealty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) (\"[T]he doctrine of equitable\ntolling is not available in state causes of action in New York.\"). In any event, Plaintiff's\ninvocation of the doctrine would fail for the same reasons her reliance on equitable estoppel fails.\nThese equitable doctrines require \"extraordinary\" factors that make it \"unjust\" to allow a\ndefendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires proof that a\nplaintiff was \"prevented in some extraordinary way\" from exercising her rights); Zumpano, 849\nN.E.2d at 929 (equitable estoppel requires proof that it would \"would be unjust to allow a\ndefendant to assert a statute of limitations defense\"). The doctrines should be \"invoked sparingly\nand only under exceptional circumstances.\" Geiss, 383 F. Supp. at 172.\nAs explained above, Plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to\nher filing this action within a timely fashion. \"Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and\nof a basis for a cause of action within the limitations period, and yet [s]he failed to bring a timely\nsuit.\" Jang Ho Choi,\n... [truncated, 2258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/22 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=22]", "char_count": 2258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 24 of 27\n\nPlaintiff's conclusory allegations to the contrary cannot survive a motion to dismiss?\nPlaintiff does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein threatened or coerced her into not\nfiling a lawsuit, or that she was misled as to the applicable statute of limitations. In fact, Plaintiff\ndoes not even allege any contact between herself and Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein after 1996.\nThe complaint points to nothing that actually or effectively prevented Plaintiff from filing her\nlawsuit for more than twenty years. 8\nWhat is ultimately dispositive, though, is that the complaint points to nothing Ms.\nMaxwell allegedly did in the year before its filing that prevented Plaintiff from filing the lawsuit.\nAssuming tolling could apply (which it can't), that period of tolling ended well before November\n2, 2018, one year before the complaint was filed. And because the relevant statute of limitations\nin New York is one year, CPLR § 215(3), even tolling cannot save Plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff\n\n' Plaintiff's conclusory assertion of fear of retaliation or harm to reputation cannot support\nequitable tolling or estoppel. \"New York law strongly disfavors equitable tolling based on fear of\nretaliation, except where duress is an element of the cause of action.\" Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at\n173. And \"[gear of harm to a plaintiff's career cannot justify equitably estopping a defendant\nfrom asserting a time limitation period.\" Id. (quotation omitted).\n8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant\n\"fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.\" Ferro v. Ry.\nExpress Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also\nv. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d\n83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, when Plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she\ndeceptively claims that \"Epstein and Maxwell\": \"committed\" (Compl. ¶ 13), \"recruited\" (id. ¶\n25), \"perfected\" (id\n... [truncated, 3110 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/23 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=23]", "char_count": 3110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 25 of 27\n\ncannot plausibly allege that the statute of limitations was tolled for nearly thirty years, when she\ndoesn't even allege contact with Ms. Maxwell after leaving the New Mexico ranch in 1996.9\nII.\n\nIF NOT DISMISSED, THE CASE AGAINST MS. MAXWELL SHOULD\nBE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.\n\nThe Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for Plaintiff's claims against\nMs. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for \"improper\nvenue\"). Title 28, subsection 1391(bX1) does not authorize venue here because Ms. Maxwell is\nnot a resident of New York, nor apparently is the Estate of Mr. Epstein. And subsection (b)(2)\nalso does not authorize venue here because the allegations against Ms. Maxwell concern conduct\noccurring exclusively in New Mexico and not New York: Ms. Maxwell allegedly sexually\nassaulted plaintiff in New Mexico (battery) and held plaintiff against her will in New Mexico\n(false imprisonment), thereby inflicting emotional distress. Because Ms. Maxwell's alleged\nconduct occurred in New Mexico, venue is improper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).\nThus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 1404(a), this Court should\ndismiss the complaint or transfer the case against her to the District of New Mexico.\nAlternatively, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell should be severed from the claims\nagainst Mr. Epstein's estate. Ms. Maxwell will be prejudiced otherwise, given the allegations\nagainst Mr. Epstein and the inability of Ms. Maxwell to effectively defend herself now that Mr.\nEpstein is dead. Even if venue is proper here against Mr. Epstein's estate (which is doubtful,\nsince the estate is apparently a resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands), it is improper in the case\nagainst Ms. Maxwell. The case against Ms. Maxwell should proceed, if at all, in New Mexico.\n\nThe result is the same if New Mexico law applies to Plaintiff's as\n... [truncated, 2216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02778021/24 or ?id=EFTA02778021&page=24]", "char_count": 2216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 26 of 27\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor these reasons, this Court should dismiss the case or transfer the case against Ms.\nMaxwell to the District of New Mexico.\nDated: May 20, 2020.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Laura A. Menninger\nLaura A. Menninger (Us,.\nHADDON,\nAND\n150 East 10 Avenue\nDenver, CO 80203\nPhone: 303.831.7364\nFax:\n303.832.2628\nlmenninger@hmflaw.com\n\nP.C.\n\nAttorney for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n21\n\nEFTA02778046\n\n", "char_count": 469}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02778021", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 75\n\nFiled 05/20/20\n\nPage 27 of 27\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on May 20, 2020, I filed this Corrected Memorandum of Law in Support of\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of Court through CM/ECF,\nwhich will send notice of the filing to all parties of record.\n/s/ Nicole\n\n22\n\nEFTA02778047\n\n", "char_count": 363}]}