{"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_count": 32, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02777958", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02777958.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 1 of 32\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nX\n\nPlaintiff,\nv.\n19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors\nof the ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN, and GHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendants.\nX\n\nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GHISLAINE\nMAXWELL'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR TO TRANSFER\n\nEFTA02777958\n\n", "char_count": 432}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 2 of 32\n\nTable of Contents\nTable of Contents\n\nii\n\nTable of Authorities\n\niii\n\nIntroduction\n\n1\n\nBackground\n\n1\n\nArgument\n\n4\n\nI. The complaint, filed nearly three decades after the events it alleges, is barred by the statute\n4\nof limitations.\nA. Standard of review\n\n5\n\nB. The complaint is untimely under both New Mexico and New York law\n\n5\n\nC. Plaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law.\n\n7\n\ni. CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not revive Plaintiff's untimely claims\n\n7\n\nii.CPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaintiff's untimely claims\n\n8\n\niii. Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. 22\nII. If not dismissed, the case against Ms. Maxwell should be transferred to the District of\nNew Mexico.\n\n24\n\nConclusion\n\n26\n\nCertificate of Service\n\n27\n\nii\n\nEFTA02777959\n\n", "char_count": 871}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 3 of 32\n\nTable of Authorities\nCases\nAm. Transit Ins. Co. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2004)\n\n9\n\nAshcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n5\n\nBell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n5\n\nDoe v. Hanford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015)\n\n15\n\nDennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,\n729789 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n\nF. Supp. 3d\n\nNo. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL\n5, 21\n\nFerro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.24 847 (2d Cir. 1961)\n\n23\n13, 14\n\nv. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 2007)\nGallewski v. Heitz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950)\n\n15, 16, 17, 19, 20\n\nGeiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)\n\n7, 15, 22, 23\n\nGuaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)\n\n6\n\nv. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267 (N.Y. 1922)\nHymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)\n\n15\n15, 17, 18, 19, 21\n\nIn re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)\n\n5\n\nIn re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y.\n2014)\n19, 20\nIn re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227 (N.Y. 2017) .... 15,\n20, 21\nJang Hoi Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016)\n\n22, 23\n\nKnickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)\n\n16\n\nLubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat? Ass'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222 (N.Y. 2019)\n\n14\n\nMajewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 6% N.E.2d 978 (N.Y. 1998)\n\n9\n\niii\n\nEFTA02777960\n\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 4 of 32\n\nMauer ofMcCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. 3rd Dept. 1953)... 16, 17,\n18, 19, 21\nNetzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)\n\n23\n\nOchre LLC v. Rockwell Architecture Planning & Design, P.C., No. 12 C1V. 2837 KBF, 2012\nWL 6082387 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012)\n23\nPeople v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357 (N.Y. 1992)\nv. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144 N.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924)\nv. Abruzzi), 49 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1995)\n\n10\n15, 16, 19, 20\n23\n\nSlusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 P.3d 524 (N.M. App. 2013)\n\n24\n\nStafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1981)\n\n6\n\nStuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1998)\n\n5, 6, 13, 14\n\nSweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17-CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742\n(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018)\n18\nTouche\n\n& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)\n\nZumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y. 2006)\n\n11\n18, 22, 23\n\nStatutes\n28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)\n\n25\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)\n\n25\n\n28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)\n\n25\n\nCPLR § 202\n\npassim\n\nCPLR § 214-g\n\npassim\n\nCPLR § 215(3)\n\npassim\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a)\n\n7, 8\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-8\n\n6\n\nN.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(12-b)\n\n12\n\niv\n\nEFTA02777961\n\n", "char_count": 1244}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 5 of 32\n\nN.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6\n\n15\n\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6509(1)(5)(a)\n\n10\n\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a)\n\n10, 11\n\nN.Y. Exec. Law § 298-a\n\n12\n\nN.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(4)(a), (e)\n\nII\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130\n\n9, 10, 12. 13\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b)\n\n10. 1 1\n\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m)\n\nI1\n\nRules\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3)\n\n24, 25\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)\n\n5\n\nEFTA02777962\n\n", "char_count": 443}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 6 of 32\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell, through counsel, moves this Court for an order dismissing\nthis case or transferring the case against Ms. Maxwell to the District of New Mexico. As grounds\nfor this request, Ms. Maxwell states as follows:\nINTRODUCTION\nPlaintiff's complaint is years too late, lacks the required specificity, and is filed in the\nwrong court. It describes events that allegedly occurred nearly three decades ago, and it details\nalleged conduct by Mr. Epstein while referring to Ms. Maxwell as an afterthought. When the\ncomplaint does allege conduct by Ms. Maxwell, it alleges conduct that occurred in New Mexico,\nnot New York. This Court, therefore, should dismiss the complaint or transfer the case against\nMs. Maxwell to the District of New Mexico.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff claims that when she was either fifteen or sixteen years old, in 1995 or 1996. Mr.\nEpstein lured her to New York based on a promise of helping her get into college. Comp/. TR 41.\n51. With no alleged involvement of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein bought Plaintiff a plane ticket\nfrom Arizona to New York. Id. 1 51. Plaintiff's sister,\n\nwas at the time purportedly\n\nworking for Mr. Epstein as a purchaser of art. Id. 946.\nPlaintiff claims that in New York, Mr. Epstein took her and her sister to a movie. Id.\n11 53-54. With no involvement or participation of Ms. Maxwell, Mr. Epstein allegedly groped\nPlaintiff during the movie. Id. 1 54. Plaintiff returned to Arizona shortly after. Id. 1 55.\nSometime later, in the spring of 1996, Mr. Epstein called Plaintiff's mother in Arizona\nand proposed to sponsor a trip for Plaintiff to his ranch in New Mexico. Id.1 57. Mr. Epstein told\nPlaintiff's mother that his ranch was the site of an educational program for high school students.\nId. 99 56-57. According to the complaint, Mr. Epstein represented that Ms. Maxwell would be\nPlaintiff's chaperone. Id. 1 57. Mr. Epstein again bought a plane ticket for Plaintif\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/5 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=5]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 7 of 32\n\nher mother in Arizona. Id. 1 58. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell contacted\nPlaintiff or her mother or arranged for Plaintiff's travel.\nWhen Plaintiff arrived at the ranch, she claims she was the only student there. The\ncomplaint alleges that at the ranch, Ms. Maxwell pressured Plaintiff to give Mr. Epstein foot\nmassages.' Id. 1 59. It also alleges that Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell took her to see a movie,\nduring which Mr. Epstein touched her body against her will. Id. I 60-61. The complaint does not\nallege that Ms. Maxwell touched Plaintiff during the movie or even that she knew of Mr.\nEpstein's alleged touching.\nUpon returning to the ranch, Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell persuaded her to remove\nall her clothes so Ms. Maxwell could give Plaintiff a massage. Id. 1 62. Plaintiff alleges that Ms.\nMaxwell massaged Plaintiff and touched her intimate parts \"against her will for the sexual\nbenefit of Maxwell and Epstein.\" Id.1 63-64. Plaintiff claims that Ms. Maxwell \"exposed [her]\nbreasts and groped her.\" Id.1 65.\nThe following morning, Mr. Epstein allegedly got into bed with Plaintiff to \"cuddle\" and,\nwithout her consent, \"physically restrained her with his arms and proceeded to press his body\n(including his genitals) against\" her. Id. 1 67. The complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell\nwas involved or participated in this incident or had knowledge of it.\nPlaintiff then returned to Arizona. Id. 1 70.\nPlaintiff's complaint next devotes several paragraphs to describing the alleged sexual\nassault of her sister,\n\nat an Epstein property in Ohio. Id. 1 71-76. According to the\n\ncomplaint, after the assault Ms. Maxwell threatened\n\non behalf of Mr. Epstein,\n\n' To be clear, Ms. Maxwell denies that she had any involvement in any of the activity alleged in\nthe Complaint.\n2\n\nEFTA02777964\n\n", "char_count": 1891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 8 of 32\n\ntelling her \"We're going to burn all your art. And I just want you to know that anything you ever\nmake will be burned. Your career is burned.\" Id. 1 72. This allegation is demonstrably false.\nSpeaking for herself in 1996,\n\napparently told police that Mr. Epstein \"call[ed] her\n\nand stated he was going to burn [her] painting and send her poloroids (sic) of the burnt\npaintings.\" There was no mention in the police report of Ms. Maxwell. See Ex. 1 (Aug. 29, 1996\nPolice Report by\n\n. In any event, the complaint is devoid of any allegation that Ms.\n\nMaxwell ever threatened Plaintiff.\nThe complaint alleges that\n\nreported the Ohio incident to both the NYPD's\n\nSixth Precinct and to the FBI, neither of which took any action. Id. 173.2 At that point,\nspoke with Plaintiff, who allegedly told Maria of the events in New York and New\nMexico. Id. II 73-74. The sisters claim they took their story to Vanity Fair Magazine, which\nPlaintiff says declined to publish a story only after Mr. Epstein (but not Ms. Maxwell)\n\"threatened and intimidated the magazine and Vanity Fair bent to those threats.\" Id.1 75.\nPlaintiff never claims she herself had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell\nafter returning to Arizona from New Mexico, and she does not allege that Mr. Epstein or Ms.\nMaxwell ever threatened her or coerced her not to report her allegations. Nevertheless, Plaintiff\nclaims that \"[o]ut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and\nMaxwell's great power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her, [she] did not tell\nanyone [other than her sister] about Epstein and Maxwell touching her against her will.\" Id. I 70.\nPlaintiff's failure, for nearly thirty years, to file this lawsuit, was allegedly a product of \"the fact\n\nSixth Precinct report makes no mention of any alleged assaults by\n2 Curiously,\nJeffrey Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. Ex. 1.\n3\n\nEFTA02777965\n\n", "char_count": 1978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 9 of 32\n\nthat state and federal authorities, as well as the media, were not taking action against Epstein.\"\nId.176.\nPlaintiff finally filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2019. Doc. 1. It alleges battery, false\nimprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nTHE COMPLAINT, FILED NEARLY THREE DECADES AFTER THE\nEVENTS IT ALLEGES, IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF\nLIMITATIONS.\n\nPlaintiff's complaint is years too late. The complaint limits its allegations of tortious\nconduct by Ms. Maxwell to conduct allegedly occurring in New Mexico nearly three decades\nago: Ms. Maxwell allegedly committed battery against Plaintiff in New Mexico in the spring of\n1996 by touching her intimate parts against her will during a massage at Mr. Epstein's ranch;\nMs. Maxwell falsely imprisoned Plaintiff at the New Mexico ranch; and together, this conduct\ninflicted emotional distress.\nThe complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell was involved or participated in Mr.\nEpstein's \"recruitment\" of Plaintiff to New York in late 1995/early 1996 or the alleged groping\nof Plaintiff at a New York movie theater.\nNor does the complaint allege that Ms. Maxwell ever threatened or coerced Plaintiff into\nnot filing a complaint. In fact, the complaint does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein\never contacted her in the nearly three decades since she was in New Mexico. The complaint\ntherefore is untimely and should be dismissed.\n\n4\n\nEFTA02777966\n\n", "char_count": 1511}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nA.\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 10 of 32\n\nStandard of review.\n\nIn assessing a motion to dismiss, this Court need only assume the truth of the wellpleaded factual contentions in Plaintiff's complaint. In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust\nLitig., 332 F. Supp. 3d 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing conspiracy and antitrust claims as\nimplausible). It should disregard Plaintiff's conclusory allegations as well as those that\nimproperly lump together Ms. Maxwell with Mr. Epstein. See Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662,\n678 (2009) (conclusory allegations cannot state a claim for relief); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly,\n550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (\"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his\n`entitle[ment) to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions.\" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.\n8(a)(2))).\nDismissal is appropriate when, as here. the complaint fails to allege timely claims for\nrelief that are plausible on their face. See Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,\n\nF. Supp. 3d\n\nNo. 16-CV-6496 (LAK), 2020 WL 729789, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020) (to survive a motion\nto dismiss, the complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely).\nB.\n\nThe complaint is untimely under both New Mexico and New York\nlaw.\n\nThe complaint alleges that Ms. Maxwell committed three torts against Plaintiff in New\nMexico. While New York's \"borrowing statute\" allows non-residents like Plaintiff to sue in New\nYork courts for torts occurring outside of New York, the claims must be timely under both New\nYork law the law in the state where the tort allegedly occurred for the suit to proceed. Because\nall three causes of action are untimely under New Mexico and New York law, the complaint\nmust be dismissed\nWhen, as here, \"jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in\nNew York must apply the New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations.\" Stuart v.\n\n5\n\nEFTA02777967\n\n", "char_count": 1936}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 11 of 32\n\nAm. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326\nU.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)). \"New York courts generally apply New York's statutes of limitations,\neven when the injury giving rise to the action occurred outside New York.\" Id. (citing Stafford v.\nInternational Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981)).\n\"This general rule, however, is subject to a traditional statutory exception, New York's\n'borrowing' statute, C.P.L.R. § 202.\" Id. New York's borrowing statute permits a resident of\nanother state (here, Texas)3 to sue in New York for tons occurring outside New York (here, New\nMexico) only if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in which the\ntort occurred (again, New Mexico). The purpose of CPLR § 202 is to prevent \"forum shopping\nby plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period.\" Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627.\nThe borrowing statute says:\nAn action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state\ncannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the\nlaws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause\nof action accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in\nfavor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the\nstate shall apply.\nCPLR § 202.\nNew Mexico has a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat.\n§ 37-1-8, and minors have one year from reaching the age of majority to begin such an action,\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-10. Thus, at the latest, Plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's\nclaims are time-barred under New Mexico law and, as a result, they are time-barred under CPLR\n§ 202.\nSimilarly, under New York law, a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and\nintentional infliction of emotional distress must commence her action within one year of the\n\n3 Plaintiff says she is a resident of Texas. Compl. 1 8.\n\n6\n\nEFTA0\n... [truncated, 2009 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/10 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=10]", "char_count": 2009}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 12 of 32\n\nclaim's accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 171\n(S.D.N.Y. 2019). The complaint here was filed nearly three decades after Plaintiff's claims\naccrued. Thus, unless New York law revives Plaintiff's untimely claims or tolls the statute of\nlimitations, dismissal is required.\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's claims cannot be revived under New York law.\n\nIn response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court identifying this problem,\nPlaintiff did not deny that her claims are untimely under New Mexico Law. Doc. 48, at 3.\nInstead, Plaintiff contends that CPLR § 202 does not apply because New York's Child Victims\nAct (CVA), CPLR § 214-g, \"provides for a revival window of civil claims `[n]otwithstanding\nany provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the contrary.\" Id.' Plaintiff's\ncomplaint also points to CPLR § 215(8)(a). As explained below, however, neither provision\nsaves Plaintiff's untimely complaint.\ni.\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa) does not Ms\n\nC Plaintill's tint iinch\n\nclaims.\n\nAs one basis for reviving Plaintiff's stale claims, the complaint points to CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a), which in some cases allows a plaintiff to pursue otherwise untimely claims if she\nfiles them within one year of the termination of a criminal action against the defendant. Compl.\nif 82, 87, 93. But that provision does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell.\nUnder CPLR § 215(8)(a), \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same\ndefendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a [battery or\nfalse imprisonment] claim ... arises,\" the plaintiff has at least one year from \"[t]he termination\nof the criminal action\" to file her otherwise time-barred claim against the \"same defendant.\"\n(Emphases added).\n\n'\n\nPlaintiff has not claimed that New Mexico has a revival statute.\n7\n\nEFTA02777969\n\n", "char_count": 1933}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 13 of 32\n\nHere, the government indicted only Mr. Epstein, and so Ms. Maxwell is not the \"same\ndefendant\" against whom there was a \"criminal action.\" And the indictment against Mr. Epstein\ndid not concern the \"event or occurrence\" from which Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell\narise. The indictment charged conduct by Mr. Epstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and\nFlorida. Compl. Ex. A. Plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Maxwell concerns conduct allegedly\noccurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico. Compl.\n\n57-70. CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not help\n\nPlaintiff.\nPlaintiff does not appear to dispute any of this. Instead, although her complaint cites\nCPLR § 215(8)(a), in response to Ms. Maxwell's pre-motion letter to this Court Plaintiff invoked\nonly CPLR § 214-g and equitable tolling/estoppel.\nAs explained below, however, Plaintiff's invocation of that provision and those doctrines\nfail.\nii.\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not and cannot revive Plaint ill's untimely\nclaims.\n\nThe CVA, CPLR § 2I4-g, purports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries\n\"suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute\" a sexual offense under New York penal\nlaw. Plaintiff invokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired nearly thirty years ago. The\nattempt fails because: (1) CPLR § 214-g does not apply to the claims against Ms. Maxwell; (2)\nCPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, under which\nPlaintiff must prove her claims are timely under New Mexico law (which they concededly are\nnot); and (3) even if CPLR § 214-g does apply, its application to Maxwell is unconstitutional.\n\n8\n\nEFTA02777970\n\n", "char_count": 1680}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\na.\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 14 of 32\n\nCPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms.\nMaxwell.\n\nCPLR § 214-g by its terms does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because the conduct alleged\nagainst her occurred in New Mexico, outside New York, and therefore \"would [not] constitute\" a\nsexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130. CPLR § 214-g says:\nNotwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of\nlimitation to the contrary . . . every civil claim or cause of action\nbrought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts or\nomissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other injury or\ncondition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a\nsexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal\nlaw [N.Y. Penal Law § 130] committed against a child less than\neighteen years of age .. . is hereby revived, and action thereon may\nbe commenced not earlier than six months after, and not later than\none year and six months after the effective date of this section.\nCPLR § 214-g.\n\"It is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the\nintent of the Legislature.\" Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist, 696 N.E.2d 978, 980\n(N.Y. 1998). \"As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point\nin any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain\nmeaning thereof \" Id. The court must give a statute is plain and natural meaning. Am. Transit Ins.\nCo. v. Sartor, 814 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (N.Y. 2004). \"A court cannot amend a statute by adding\nwords that are not there.\" Id.\nThe plain and unambiguous language of CPLR § 214-g shows it does not apply to\nPlaintiff's untimely complaint. For it to apply, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell must arise\nfrom \"conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of\nthe penal law [N.Y. Penal Law § 130].\"\nUnder the plain\n... [truncated, 2174 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/13 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=13]", "char_count": 2174}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 15 of 32\n\ncommitted in New York. See People v. McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992)\n(\"Because the State only has power to enact and enforce criminal laws within its territorial\nborders, there can be no criminal offense unless it has territorial jurisdiction.\"). Because the\ncomplaint concerns conduct allegedly committed in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell's purported\nconduct \"would [not] constitute a sexual offense as defined in [N.Y. Penal Law § 130].\"\nHad the New York State Assembly intended otherwise—that is, had the State Assembly\nintended to revive claims for conduct occurring outside New York that, if committed within this\nstate, would have constituted as defined in penal law N.Y. Penal Law § 130—it knew how to do\nso. In fact, the State Assembly could have done what it routinely does: include language making\nclear an intent that the statute apply to conduct occurring outside New York.\nTake New York law defining professional misconduct by physicians. It provides that it is\nprofessional misconduct to be\n9.(a) ... convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under:\n(i) New York state law or,\n(ii) federal law or,\n(iii) the law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed within\nthis state, would have constituted a crime under New York state law.\nN.Y. Educ. Law § 6530(9)(a) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that conduct\noccurring outside New York can constitute professional misconduct within New York.\nThe examples abound. E.g., N.Y. Educ. law § 6509(1)(5)(a) (defining as professional\nmisconduct \"[b]eing convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under: (i) New York\nState law or, (ii) Federal law or, (iii) The law of another jurisdiction and which, if committed\nwithin this state, would have constituted a crime under New York State law\" (emphasis added));\nN.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(b) (\"When a licensee has pleaded or been found guilty or\n\n10\n\nEFTA02777972\n\n", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 16 of 32\n\nconvicted of committing an act constituting a felony under New York state law or federal law, or\nthe law of another jurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constituted a\nfelony under New York state law ...\" (emphasis added)); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m)\n(authorizing suspension of a license if the licensee \"is convicted of certain crimes and the ...\nconviction [is] under (i) New York state law; (ii) federal law; or (iii) the law of another\njurisdiction which, if committed within this state, would have constitutedprofessional\nmisconduct under New York state law\" (emphasis added)).\nThe State Assembly's choice not to use the conditional perfect tense (\"would have\") is\ndispositive of its intent. As the above examples show, when the State Assembly intends a law to\napply to conduct occurring out of state which, \"if committed within this state, would have\nconstituted a crime under New York state law,\" it says so expressly. See Touche\n\n& Co. v.\n\nRedington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (\"Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a\nprivate damage remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.\"); see, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law\n§ 6530(9)(a); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 230(12)(6); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3510(1)(m). And the\nState Assembly easily could have done so in CPLR § 214-g, by saying that the statute revived\notherwise time-barred claims based on \"conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as\ndefined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law or, if committed within this state, would\nhave constituted a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law.\" See\nCPLR § 214-g? The legislature intentionally decided not to include this language.\n\n5 If CPLR § 214-g had been written in the present tense, the State Assembly likewise could have\n\nshown an intent for it to apply to conduct occurring outside New York. It has done so countless\nother times. E.g.,\n... [truncated, 2472 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/15 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=15]", "char_count": 2472}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 17 of 32\n\nUnlike these examples, CPLR § 214-g talks only of conduct \"which would constitute a\nsexual offense as defined in article [N.Y. Penal Law § 130].\" It does not speak to conduct which,\nif committed within New York, would have constituted a sexual offense as defined in article\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130. And absent that specific language—readily available to the State\nAssembly and routinely used—Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct \"would [not] constitute\" a sexual\noffense under New York Penal Law § 130 because it occurred outside New York and in New\nMexico. New York penal law does not reach New Mexico. See McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d at 1359.\nInterpreting CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would require this Court to add language\nto the statute, which this Court cannot do. See Am. Transit, 814 N.E.2d at 1192 (\"A court cannot\namend a statute by adding words that are not there.\"). The CVA, § 214-g, thus does not apply to\nthe case against Ms. Maxwell and cannot revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims.6\nb.\n\nCPLR § 214-g does not trump New York's borrowing\nstatute, CPLR § 202.\n\nIn response to Ms. Maxwell's pm-motion letter to this Court, Plaintiff argued that CPLR\n§ 214-g trumps New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, because the former statute says it\n\nstate, district, or territory of the United States and classified as a felony therein which if'\ncommitted within this state, would constitute a felony in this state' (emphasis added)); N.Y.\nExec. Law § 298-a (providing that New York's human rights law \"shall apply as hereinafter\nprovided to an act committed outside this state against a resident of this state or against a\ncorporation organized under the laws of this state or authorized to do business in this state, if\nsuch act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if committed within this state\n(emphasis added)); N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 3(12-b) (providing that \"felony\" under New\nYork's Alcohol Bev\n... [truncated, 2700 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/16 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=16]", "char_count": 2700}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 18 of 32\n\napplies \"[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the\ncontrary.\" CPLR § 214-g; Doc. 48, at 3. This argument is misplaced.\nCPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 can be read together to give effect to both. See\nv. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 877 N.E.2d 281, 286-87 (N.Y. 2007) (\"[W]here possible,\ncourts should harmonize all parts of a statute with each other . . . and give effect and meaning ...\nto the entire statute and every part and word thereof.\" (cleaned up)). Recall that when\n'jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citizenship, a federal court sitting in New York must apply\nthe New York choice-of-law rules and statutes of limitations,\" including New York's borrowing\nstatute, CPLR § 202. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 626. New York's borrowing statute requires a complaint\nto be timely under both the laws of New York and the state in which the tort occurred (here,\nNew Mexico).\nWhen CPLR § 214-g revives claims based upon conduct that \"would constitute a sexual\noffense as defined in\" N.Y. Penal Law § 130 \"[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which\nimposes a period of limitation to the contrary,\" CPLR § 214-g is referring to any provision of\nNew York law that imposes a period of limitation to the contrary. CPLR § 214-g is a New York\nstatute enacted by the New York legislature, which applies to and revives claims based on\nconduct that would violate New York penal law that would otherwise be untimely under New\nYork statutes of limitations.\nHere, as described above, CPLR § 215(3) required Plaintiff to commence her battery,\nfalse imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims within one year of\ntheir accrual. CPLR § 215(3); Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at 171. The effect of CPLR § 214-g in this\ncase, then, is to excuse Plaintiff from failing to comply with CPLR § 215(3). It revives Plaintiff's\n\n13\n\nEFTA02777975\n\n", "char_count": 1948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 19 of 32\n\nclaims only insofar as CPLR § 215(3) barred them. By contrast, the effect of CPLR § 214-g is\nnot to revive Plaintiff's claims insofar as New Mexico law bars them.\nBut New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, requires Plaintiff's claims to be timely\nunder both New York law and New Mexico law. At best, CPLR § 214-g solves half of Plaintiff's\nproblem—it might render her claims timely under New York law when they would otherwise be\nuntimely under CPLR § 215(3). But CPLR § 214-g cannot solve the other half of Plaintiff's\nproblem—it cannot render her claims timely under New Mexico law.\nIn this way, CPLR § 202 and CPLR § 214-g can be harmonized.\n\n, 877 N.E.2d\n\nat 286-87. The latter revives claims that a New York statute of limitations would render\nuntimely, while the former still requires that when suing in New York for a tort committed in\nanother state, the lawsuit must be timely under the law of the state in which the tort occurred.\nPlaintiff's argument that CPLR § 214-g trumps CPLR § 202 would lead to forum\nshopping, which is the absurd result CPLR § 202 seeks to avoid. Stuart, 158 F.3d at 627 (CPLR\n§ 202 prevents \"forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking the holy grail of the longer period\");\nLubonty v. U.S. Bank Nat? Ass 'n, 139 N.E.3d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 2019) (courts must \"interpret a\nstatute so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law\"). If Plaintiff is right,\ncourts in New York can expect to see a flood of lawsuits concerning conduct occurring in other\nstates having little or no connection to New York. Plaintiffs will know that even if they could not\nbring a lawsuit in the state in which the conduct occurred, they can file suit in New York so long\nas there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But there's no reason to think that the New\nYork State Assembly intended to override the decisions of other state legislatures that have\nconcluded, in their considered judgment, not \n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/18 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=18]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 20 of 32\n\nAccordingly, when read together, CPLR § 214-g and CPLR § 202 still require Plaintiff to\nshow that her claims are timely under New Mexico law, since they are based on conduct\noccurring in New Mexico. Plaintiff has not disputed that her claims are untimely under New\nMexico law, Doc. 48, at 3, and, as a result, they must be dismissed.\nc.\n\nApplying CPLR § 214-g to Ms. Maxwell would violate\ndue process.\n\nDisregarding CPLR § 202, and applying § 214-g notwithstanding the claims'\nuntimeliness under New Mexico law, violates Ms. Maxwell's right to due process.\nThe New York Constitution guarantees due process of law. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (\"No\nperson shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.\"). This guarantee\nconstrains the State Assembly's ability to enact \"revival statutes,\" which are an \"extreme\nexercise of legislative power.\"\n\nv. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267, 267 (N.Y. 1922)\n\n(Cardozo, J.). In New York, due process requires a \"functionalist approach\" to revival statutes,\none that \"weighs the defendant's interests in the availability of a statute of limitations defense\nwith the need to correct an injustice.\" /n re World Trade Or. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site\nLitig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1239 (N.Y. 2017).\nThe New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that \"a claim-revival statute will\nsatisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable\nresponse in order to remedy an injustice.\" /d. at 1243. The injustice subject to this extraordinary\nremedy is limited to when a \"plaintiff could not have brought an action in a timely manner.\" Doe\nv. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 512 n.58 (Conn. 2015) (discussing\nNew York law); see also Hytnowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Gallewski\nv. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 1950);\n\nv. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144\n\n15\n\nEFTA02777977\n\n", "char_count": 1978}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 21 of 32\n\nN.E. 579 (N.Y. 1924); Matter ofMcCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App.\n3rd Dept. 1953), aff'd without op., 306 N.Y. 904 (1954).\nIn\n\nv. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., the New York Court of Appeals affirmed\n\nthe constitutionality of a statute that revived the wrongful death actions of spouses of deceased\nworkers.\n\n144 N.E. at 579. There, the wife of a deceased worker began collecting\n\nworker's compensation following her husband's work-related death; this was her exclusive legal\nremedy at the time. Id. at 579—80. More than two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared\nNew York's workers' compensation law to be unconstitutional, which ended the wife's worker's\ncompensation benefit. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). By that time,\nhowever, the wife's wrongful death action was time-barred under New York law. See\n\n,\n\n144 N.E. at 580. A claim by the wife for her husband's wrongful death also was not cognizable\nat any time during the applicable limitations period, because for that entire time worker's\ncompensation was the exclusive remedy for the husband's work-related death. The legislature\nenacted a provision to address this catch-22, creating a one-year period for plaintiffs to begin a\nnegligence action, even if it were otherwise time-barred, to seek compensation that was formerly\navailable exclusively under the then-defunct worker's compensation law. Id. at 580-82. Because\nthe spouses of deceased workers could not have brought a timely claim for wrongful death based\non a work-related injury before the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Knickerbocker Ice, the\nlegislature revived such claims for a one-year period. See id. at 582. The Court of Appeals\naffirmed the propriety of the revival statute. Id. at 579.\nThe Court of Appeals' decision in Gallewski v. Hentz & Co. similarly addressed reviving\nformerly time-barred causes of action that claimants were effectively \n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/20 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=20]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 22 of 32\n\ntoll the statute of limitations for individuals residing in Axis-occupied countries during World\nWar II comported with due process. Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 622-25. The Court noted that \"the\ncitizens and residents of occupied territory were, during such occupation, under a practical and\ntotal inability to commence action in the courts of this State to protect and effectuate their\nrights.\" Id. at 625. Because these plaintiffs were unable to assert timely claims under the\napplicable limitations period, the Court of Appeals in Gallewski concluded that the legislature's\nretroactive tolling of the otherwise applicable limitations period comported with due process. Id.\n(\"To permit the Statute of Limitations to run against [plaintiffs'] claims during the continuance\nof such inability [to sue] would not accord with elementary notions of justice and fairness.\").\nLikewise, in both Matter ofMcCann v. Walsh Constr. Co. and Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &\nCo., claims-revival provisions were held to comport with due process when they addressed\nclaims that could not have been timely asserted. Both cases presented claims by plaintiffs who\nwere afflicted by latent diseases where symptoms did not typically appear until after the\napplicable limitations period expired. Matter ofMcCann, 301 N.Y. at 511 (cassion disease is \"of\na slow-starting or insidious nature\" and \"very often ... more than twelve months elapse[s] after\nthe contraction of the disease before its presence [is] known or apparent\"); Hymowitz, 539\nN.E.2d at 1072 (the exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) by pregnant mothers causes a\nlatent injury in utero and \"many claims [are] barred by the Statute of Limitations before the\ninjury [is] discovered\"). In both instances, the legislature changed the rule regarding the timing\nof a claim's accrual, so that the limitations period did not start until the claimant was aware of\nthe disease. At the same time, the \n... [truncated, 2271 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/21 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=21]", "char_count": 2271}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 23 of 32\n\na cause of action accrued—\"prevented the bringing of timely claims for recovery.\" Hymowitz,\n539 N.E.2d at 1079; see also Sweener v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 1:17CV-0532, 2019 WL 748742, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2018) (citing Hymowitz and Matter of\nMcCann as addressing claims-revival provisions for \"latent personal injuries\" in holding that\nCPLR § 214-g comported with due process because the claims-revival provision there allowed\nthose \"who suffer[ed] latent injuries stemming from environmental contamination() to pursue\nclaims that would otherwise be time-barred simply because a defendant's tortious conduct was\nunknown\").\nThe New York Court of Appeals already has decided that numerous claimants asserting\nallegations of sexual abuse were not prevented from asserting their claims in a timely manner\nunder the formerly applicable limitations period. See Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926 (N.Y.\n2006). In Zumpano, the Court addressed two actions, one brought by an individual plaintiff and\nthe other by 42 plaintiffs. Id. at 927-28. Both complaints alleged clergy sexual abuse for which\nthe statute of limitations had long expired, but the plaintiffs sought equitable tolling of their\nlimitations periods and asserted equitable estoppel against defendants. Defendants moved to\ndismiss. While the Court of Appeals observed that the alleged conduct was \"reprehensible,\" it\nrejected plaintiffs' arguments. Id. at 931. The Court held that all plaintiffs in both the individual\nand the 42-person action \"failed to satisfy th[eir] burden\" of \"establish[ing] that subsequent and\nspecific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit.\" Id. at 929. The\nCourt ruled, at the motion to dismiss stage, that the plaintiffs had the practical ability to timely\nsue their individual abusers and the entities that employed them because each plaintiff was aware\nof the allegedly abusive conduct:\n[E]ach\n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/22 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=22]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 24 of 32\n\nknowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action against the\nindividual priests. Plaintiffs were likewise aware that the priests\nwere employees of the dioceses and could have brought actions\nagainst the dioceses, or at least investigated whether a basis for such\nactions existed.\nId.; see also id. at 930 (noting that \"plaintiffs were fully aware that they had been abused\"). The\nCourt thus affirmed the dismissal of both actions as time-barred.\nThe federal district court decision in World Trade Center also is instructive. While that\ndecision was ultimately vacated based only on a threshold standing issue (not presented here),\nthe court there invalidated a claims-revival provision under the New York State Constitution's\nDue Process Clause on the same basis asserted by Ms. Maxwell here. The statute at issue in that\ncase revived otherwise time-barred claims by disaster-relief workers who were injured during the\ncleanup and rescue efforts following the September 11, 2011 terrorist attack on the World Trade\nCenter. After canvassing the Court of Appeals' case law on the issue, the district court held that\nthis claims-revival provision did not fit within the \"narrow exception for revival statutes, and is\nunconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution.\" In re World\nTrade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),\nvacated on other grounds, 892 F.3d 108 (24 Cir. 2018). The district court reasoned that, unlike in\nthe Court of Appeals' precedent addressing this issue discussed above (Gallewski,\n\n,\n\nMauer ofMcCann, and Hymowitz), the plaintiffs in World Trade Center were protected by a rule\nthat the limitations period on their claims did not begin to run until they had discovered their\ninjuries. See id. at 475-76. They thus did not face a \"practical and total inability\" to begin a\ntimely lawsuit, as in Gallewski and\n\nand the other \n... [truncated, 2184 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/23 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=23]", "char_count": 2184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 25 of 32\n\nThe claims-revival provision in the CVA is, in material respects, like the one at issue in\nWorld Trade Center. In both instances, the legislature purported to revive claims by plaintiffs\nwho were not prevented from asserting them in a timely fashion. In World Trade Center, the\ndistrict court noted that the legislature had given as its justification, among other things, that\ncertain claimants were given incorrect information about their work conditions and did not know\nthe applicable limitations periods. See id. at 475. But the district court determined those were\nimpermissible grounds for enacting a claims-revival provision because \"[tjhese rationales do not\namount to the 'exceptional circumstances' justifying the `extreme exercise of legislative power'\nthat a revival statute entails.\" Id. \"Here, those who wished to sue were not barred from doing so.\"\nId. at 476.\nHere, the legislature's attempt through CPLR § 214-g to revive, for a one-year period,\nformerly time-barred claims based on certain alleged sexual abuse does not comport with the\nNew York State Constitution's Due Process Clause, at least as applied to Ms. Maxwell. Unlike\nall of the previous situations in which the Court of Appeals has ruled that the \"extreme\" measure\nof reviving claims survived due process scrutiny, Plaintiff here was not prevented from asserting\ntimely claims.\nTo the contrary, Plaintiff admits she had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago\nto Vanity Fair Magazine and that her sister had no problem reporting her allegations to the\nNYPD and the FBI. Compl. In 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as Plaintiff\nwished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago.\nMoreover, unlike in Touc, Plaintiff's claims were not barred by law in 1995/1996. Nor\nwas Plaintiff geographically and practically prevented from filing a lawsuit, like the plaintiffs\nwho were unable to return to the U.S\n... [truncated, 2074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/24 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=24]", "char_count": 2074}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 26 of 32\n\nMatter ofMcCann and Hymowitz, it is not as if Plaintiff's injuries did not manifest during the\napplicable limitations period; Plaintiff claims to have been injured immediately.\nPlaintiff's conclusory and bare assertion that she was prevented from filing her claim\nlolut of fear of what could happen to her and her family because of Epstein and Maxwell's\ngreat power, wealth, and connections that they had displayed to her\" is not plausible. Compl.\n1 70; see Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2020 WL 729789, at *5 (to survive a motion to\ndismiss, complaint must plausibly allege that it is timely). Plaintiff admits that upon leaving the\nranch in New Mexico, she never again had contact with either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. And\nshe does not allege that either Mr. Epstein or Ms. Maxwell ever threatened her or coerced her\ninto not filing a timely lawsuit. The complaint is devoid of any plausible allegation that Plaintiff\ncould not have sued Ms. Maxwell in a timely fashion over a twenty-four (24) year period. And\nfor that reason, under New York law, it would violate due process to allow CPLR § 214-g to\nrevive Plaintiff's untimely claims against Ms. Maxwell.\nTo allow CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's claims would undermine the integrity of the\njudicial system and deny Ms. Maxwell her constitutional right to defend herself. Ms. Maxwell\nwould have to rebut allegations of an individual who claims she was assaulted nearly thirty years\nago. Ms. Maxwell would also be called to answer the for conduct of Mr. Epstein, who is dead.\n\"[W]eighing the defendant's interest in the availability of statute of limitations defense with the\nneed to correct an injustice,\" Matter of World Trade Ctr., 89 N.E.3d at 1239, underscores the due\nprocess limitation that constrained the legislature's authority here.\nFinally, there are strong, actual, not merely hypothetical, reliance interests at issue on the\nstatutes of limitations that \n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/25 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=25]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 27 of 32\n\nis already participating in the Program,\n\nin the U.S. Virgin Island. Plaintiff's sister,\n\nand Plaintiff apparently intends to as well. So have other alleged victims of Mr. Epstein. It\nundermines the integrity of the judicial system for some individuals to participate in this\ncompensation fund while others attempt to revive long-expired claims in court.\nFor these reasons, applying CPLR § 214-g to revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims\nviolates Ms. Maxwell's constitutional right to due process.\nill.\n\nPlaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or\nequitable estoppel.\n\nPlaintiff points to two other bases for the timeliness of her complaint: equitable tolling\nand equitable estoppel. Compl. yy 16-17. Neither doctrine saves Plaintiff's complaint.\nEquitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi Choi v. Beautri\nRealty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (N.Y. App. 1st Dept. 2016) (\"[T]he doctrine of equitable\ntolling is not available in state causes of action in New York.\"). Even if it were available,\nPlaintiff's invocation of the doctrine would fail for the same reasons her reliance on equitable\nestoppel fails.\nThese equitable doctrines require \"extraordinary\" factors that make it \"unjust\" to allow a\ndefendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling requires proof that a\nplaintiff was \"prevented in some extraordinary way\" from exercising her rights); Zumpano, 849\nN.E.2d at 929 (equitable estoppel requires proof that it would \"would be unjust to allow a\ndefendant to assert a statute of limitations defense\"). The doctrines should be \"invoked sparingly\nand only under exceptional circumstances.\" Geiss, 383 F. Supp. at 172.\nAs explained above, Plaintiff's own complaint proves that there was no impediment to\nher filing this action within a timely fashion. \"Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the facts and\nof a basis for a cause of action withi\n... [truncated, 2084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/26 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=26]", "char_count": 2084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 28 of 32\n\nsuit.\" Jang Ho Choi, 135 A.D.3d at 452. As in Zumpano v. Quinn, \"plaintiff was aware of the\nsexual abuse ... she [allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] .... Certainly [she] had\nsufficient knowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action....\"\nPlaintiff's conclusory allegations to the contrary cannot survive a motion to dismiss.7\nPlaintiff does not allege that Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein threatened or coerced her into not\nfiling a lawsuit, or that she was misled as to the applicable statute of limitations. In fact, Plaintiff\ndoes not even allege any contact between herself and Ms. Maxwell or Mr. Epstein after 1996.8\nThe complaint points to nothing that actually or effectively prevented Plaintiff from filing her\nlawsuit for more than twenty years.\nWhat is ultimately dispositive, though, is that the complaint points to nothing Ms.\nMaxwell allegedly did in the year before its filing that prevented Plaintiff from filing the lawsuit.\n\n7 Plaintiff's conclusory assertion of fear of retaliation or harm to reputation cannot support\nequitable tolling or estoppel. \"New York law strongly disfavors equitable tolling based on fear of\nretaliation, except where duress is an element of the cause of action.\" Geiss, 383 F. Supp. 3d at\n173. And \"[f]ear of harm to a plaintiff's career cannot justify equitably estopping a defendant\nfrom asserting a time limitation period.\" Id. (quoting Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc.,\n963 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant\n\"fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.\" Ferro v. Ry.\nExpress Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also\nv. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d\n83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, when Plaintiff has no facts to allege against Ms. Maxwell, she\ndeceptively claims that \"Epstein and Maxwell\": \"committed\" (Compl. 13),\n... [truncated, 3156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/27 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=27]", "char_count": 3156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 29 of 32\n\nAssuming tolling could apply (which it can't), that period of tolling ended well before November\n2, 2018, one year before the complaint was filed. And because the relevant statute of limitations\nin New York is one year, CPLR § 215(3), even tolling cannot save Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff\ncannot plausibly allege that the statute of limitations was tolled for nearly thirty years, when she\ndoesn't even allege that she had contact with Ms. Maxwell ever again once she left the New\nMexico ranch in 1996. Tolling doctrines are not never ending.9\nII.\n\nIF NOT DISMISSED, THE CASE AGAINST MS. MAXWELL SHOULD\nBE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO.\n\nThe Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for Plaintiff's claims against\nMs. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) (authorizing a motion to dismiss for \"improper\nvenue\").\nSection 1391 of Title 18 provides:\n(b) Venue in general. -- A civil action may be brought in -(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all\ndefendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;\n(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or\nomissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of\nproperty that is the subject of the action is situated.\n\n9 The result is the same if New Mexico law applies to Plaintiff's assertion of equitable tolling\nand estoppel. See Slusser v. Vantage Builders, Inc., 306 P.3d 524, 531 (N.M. App. 2013)\n(\"Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements:\n(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance\nstood in his way.\"); id. at 533 (\"Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the party estopped from\nasserting a statute of limitations must have (I) made a statement or action that amounted to a\nfalse representation or concealment of material facts, or intended to convey facts that\n... [truncated, 2431 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/28 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=28]", "char_count": 2431}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 30 of 32\n\nSubsection (b)(1) does not authorize venue here because Ms. Maxwell is not a resident of New\nYork, nor apparently is the Estate of Mr. Epstein. And subsection (b)(2) also does not authorize\nvenue here because the allegations against Ms. Maxwell concern conduct occurring exclusively\nin New Mexico and not New York: Ms. Maxwell allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff in New\nMexico (battery) and held plaintiff against her will in New Mexico (false imprisonment), thereby\nintentionally inflicting emotional distress. Because Ms. Maxwell's allegedly tortious conduct\noccurred in New Mexico, venue is improper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).\nUnder Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(6)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), this Court should dismiss the\ncomplaint against Ms. Maxwell. At the very least, the case against her should be transferred to\nthe District of New Mexico. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (\"The district court of a district in which is\nfiled a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest\nof justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.\");\nsee also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (\"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of\njustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it\nmight have been brought. . . .\").\nAlternatively, Plaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell should be severed from the claims\nagainst Mr. Epstein's estate. Ms. Maxwell will be prejudiced otherwise, given the allegations\nagainst Mr. Epstein and the inability of Ms. Maxwell to effectively defend herself now that Mr.\nEpstein is dead. Even if venue is proper here in the case against Mr. Epstein's estate (which is\ndoubtful, since Mr. Epstein's estate is apparently a resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands), it is\nimproper in the case against Ms. Maxwell. The case against Ms. Maxwell should proceed, if at\nall,\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02777958/29 or ?id=EFTA02777958&page=29]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 31 of 32\n\nCONCLUSION\nFor these reasons, this Court should dismiss the case or transfer the case against Ms.\nMaxwell to the District of New Mexico.\nDated: May 14, 2020.\n\nRespectfully submitted.\n\n/s/ Laura A. Menninger\nLaura A. Mekaier (Lisa)\nHADDON,\nAND\n150 East 10 Avenue\nDenver, CO 80203\nPhone: 303.831.7364\nFax:\n303.832.2628\nlmenninger@hmflaw.com\n\nP.C.\n\nAttorneyfor Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n26\n\nEFTA02777988\n\n", "char_count": 467}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777958", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 70\n\nFiled 05/14/20\n\nPage 32 of 32\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that on May 14, 2020, I filed this Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant\nGhislaine Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss with the Clerk of Court through CMJECF, which will\nsend notice of the filing to all parties of record.\n/s/ Nicole\n\n27\n\nEFTA02777989\n\n", "char_count": 353}]}