{"efta_number": "EFTA02777887", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02777887", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02777887.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02777887", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 46\n\nFiled 03/27/20\n\nHaddon,\n\nII\n\nA I) D 0\n\nPage 1 of 4\n\nand\nvc\nLaura A. Menninger\n\n150 Eost 101h Avenue\nDenver, Colorado 80203\nPH 303.831.7364 rx 303.832.2628\nwww.hmfIcAv.com\nImenningerehmflow.com\n\nN\nN\n\nMarch 27, 2020\nVIA ECF\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nUnited States District Judge\nThurgood Marshall\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, New York 10007\nRe:\n\n19-cv-10475 (LGS-DCF),\n\nv. Darren K. Indyke, et at\n\nDear Judge Schofield:\nI write under Rule 111(C)(2) of your practice standards to alert you to\nGhislaine Maxwell's intended motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 12, to request a premotion conference, and to suggest a briefing schedule. Because plaintiff's complaint\ncontains so many deficiencies, Ms. Maxwell asks for leave to file a 4-page letter.\nPlaintiff's \"personal knowledge\" allegations against Ms. Maxwell are limited:\n(1) Ms. Maxwell (together with Mr. Epstein), who were \"in New York at the time,\narranged and paid for plaintiff to fly to New Mexico in the spring of 1996,\" (158),\nand (2) once in New Mexico, Ms. Maxwell allegedly held plaintiff against her will,\ntook her shopping, pressured her into giving a foot massage to Mr. Epstein, and later\nduring a massage without Mr. Epstein present, \"touched [plaintiffs] intimate parts ..\n. against her will,\" \"exposed [her] breasts and groped her.\" (11159-65). The rest of\nplaintiff's claims are upon \"information and belief' and impermissibly lump the\nallegations against Ms. Maxwell with those against Mr. Epstein.\nI. Rule 8 Requires Fair Notice to Ms. Maxwell, Not Lumping\nFed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires, at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant\n\"fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground upon which it rests.\" Ferro\nv. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1961); see also\nv.\nAbruuo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, whenever plaintiff has no facts to allege\nagainst Ms. Maxwell, she deceptively claims that \"Epstein and Maxwell\":\n\"committed\" (1 13), \"recruited\" (125), \"perfected\" (131), \"arranged\" (158),\n\"allowed\" (1 70), \"intentionally committed\" (1 80), \"intentionally and forcibly\ntouched\" (1 81), \"falsely imprisoned\" (1 85), \"brought\" and \"prevented\" (11 86),\ncommitted \"criminal acts\" (Ill 88, 94), and had a plan to \"recruit, entice and assault\"\n\nEFTA02777887\n\n", "char_count": 2330}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777887", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 46\n\nFiled 03/27/20\n\nPage 2 of 4\n\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nMarch 27, 2020\nPage 2\n(191). The impermissible lumping occurs in key areas of the complaint regarding\npersonal jurisdiction and venue, the purported nexus between New York and the\nalleged acts, and in each claim for relief. The conflation of Ms. Maxwell with Mr.\nEpstein deprives Ms. Maxwell of the ability to raise jurisdictional issues and plead\naffirmative defenses, and it does not provide fair notice of the claims or the factual\ngrounds on which the claims rest.\nII. Paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 of the Complaint Should Be Stricken under\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) as to Ms. Maxwell\nRule 12(t) provides that a Court \"may order stricken from any pleading ...\nany redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.\" The complaint\nincludes hearsay statements allegedly made by Judge Marra in an action in which\nneither Mr. Epstein nor Ms. Maxwell was a party (14); conclusory and argumentative\nstatements about Mr. Epstein's 2008 Florida prosecution (in which plaintiff was not\nalleged to be a victim and in which Ms. Maxwell was neither a suspect nor a witness)\n(TI 6,7); and allegations about Mr. Epstein's statements to the media ell 8, 9). Each\nare barred by Rule 12(0.\nIII. This Court Is the Improper Venue\nThe Southern District of New York is not the proper venue for plaintiff's\nclaims against Ms. Maxwell. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Section 1391(b)(1) of Title\n28 does not authorize venue here because not all the defendants are residents of New\nYork. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Maxwell \"is domiciled in the Southern District of\nNew York,\" 23), yet her counsel earlier informed this Court of the opposite (Doc.\n19 at 3) (\"extensive public records searches\" revealed \"properties that Maxwell sold\nin recent years, such as her New York City home on 65'h Street\"); see also\nv.\nMaxwell, 15-cv-7433 (Doc. 388 at 2-3) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2016) (Boies, Schiller\nreporting Maxwell sold her NY residence in April 2016). Indeed, it appears that none\nof the defendants is a resident of New York.\nSection 1391(6)(2) also does not authorize venue here because the claims\nagainst Ms. Maxwell all allegedly occurred in New Mexico. Paragraph 25 summarily\nclaims the alleged sexual abuse \"began and occurred in New York\" where plaintiff\nwas \"recruited . . . at the age of 16, physically molested ..., and [groomed] for sex,\"\nbut the detailed paragraphs make the opposite claim, that the alleged assault by Ms.\nMaxwell (11 58-70) occurred in New Mexico.\nIV. Plaintiff's Claims against Ms. Maxwell Are Untimely\nWhether under New Mexico or New York law, plaintiff's claims are timebarred. Plaintiff alleges Ms. Maxwell committed a singular act in New York: from\nNew York, she and Mr. Epstein allegedly \"arranged and paid for [plaintiff] to fly to\nNew Mexico in the spring of 1996\" (158). Even if true, which it is not, plaintiff's\n\nEFTA02777888\n\n", "char_count": 2931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777887", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 46\n\nFiled 03/27/20\n\nPage 3 of 4\n\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nMarch 27, 2020\nPage 3\nclaims are barred by a statute of limitations.\nPlaintiff's claims against Maxwell are untimely under New Mexico law.\nNew York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, permits a resident of another state (here,\nTexas) to sue in New York for a tort occurring outside of New York (here, New\nMexico) only if the complaint is timely under the laws of New York and the state in\nwhich the tort occurred (again, New Mexico). New Mexico has a three-year statute of\nlimitations for personal injury actions, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8, and minors have one year\nfrom reaching the age of majority to commence such an action, N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10.\nThus, at the latest, plaintiff's claims expired sometime in 1999. Plaintiff's claims are\ntime-barred under New Mexico law and, as a result, they are time-barred under CPLR\n§ 202.\nPlaintiff's claims also are untimely under New York law. Even if New\nYork law were to control the statute of limitations, which it should not, under CPLR\n§ 215(3), a plaintiff alleging battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of\nemotional distress must commence her action within one year of the claim's accrual.\nNeither basis for revival cited by plaintiff would survive a motion to dismiss.\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply to claims against Ms. Maxwell. Under that\nprovision, \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant\nhas been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a [battery or\nfalse imprisonment] claim ... arises,\" the plaintiff has at least one year from \"[t]he\ntermination of the criminal action\" to file her otherwise time-barred claim against the\n\"same defendant.\" The government indicted only Mr. Epstein, hence Ms. Maxwell is\nnot the \"same defendant\" against whom there was a \"criminal action.\" And the\nindictment against Mr. Epstein did not concern the \"event or occurrence\" from which\nplaintiff's claims against Ms. Maxwell arise. The indictment charged conduct by Mr.\nEpstein between 2002 and 2005 in New York and Florida. Plaintiff's complaint\nconcerns conduct allegedly occurring in 1995/1996 in New Mexico.\nCPLR § 214-g cannot revive plaintiff's untimely claims. CPLR § 214-g\npurports to revive otherwise time-barred claims for injuries \"suffered as a result of\nconduct which would constitute\" a sexual offense under New York law. Plaintiff\ninvokes CPLR § 214-g to save claims that expired more than twenty years ago. The\nattempt fails because CPLR § 214-g, if it even applies,' is unconstitutional. A claimrevival statute like CPLR § 214-g satisfies due process only if \"if it was enacted as a\nreasonable response in order to remedy an injustice.\" In re World Trade Or. Lower\nManhattan Disaster Site Litig., 89 N.E.3d 1227, 1243 (N.Y. 2017). Plaintiff admits\nshe had no difficulty reporting her allegations years ago to Vanity Fair Magazine, her\nII CPLR § 214-g does not apply to Ms. Maxwell because, among other reasons, the\nconduct alleged against her occurred in New Mexico, outside of New York, and\ntherefore \"would [not] constitute\" a sexual offense under New York Penal Law § 130.\n\nEFTA02777889\n\n", "char_count": 3202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777887", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "EFTA02777890\n\nDocument 46\n\nFiled 03/27/20\nPage 4 of 4\n\nCC: Counsel of Record via ECF\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nPlaintiff's complaint raises, at a minimum, those issues identified above. I\nsuggest that Ms. Maxwell file her motion by April 17, that plaintiff respond by May\nI, and that Ms. Maxwell reply by May 8.\n\nV. Briefing Schedule\n\nThis Court has wondered about resolving these issues through a motion to\ndismiss. Respectfully, it is proper to address these issues now, as have other courts,\nbecause plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law. See Geiss, Geiss v. Weinstein\nCo. Holdings LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 156, 172-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (addressing\nequitable tolling/estoppel argument and granting a motion to dismiss).\n\nPlaintiff has not and cannot plausibly plead equitable tolling or equitable\nestoppel. Equitable tolling is unavailable in New York for state claims. Jang Hoi\nChoi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 135 A.D.3d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. 1st Dep't. 2016).\nMoreover, tolling and estoppel require \"extraordinary\" factors that make it \"unjust\" to\nallow a defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense. See id. (equitable tolling\nrequires poof that a plaintiff was \"prevented in some extraordinary way\" from\nexercising her rights). As explained above, plaintiff's own complaint proves that there\nwas no impediment to her filing this action within a timely fashion. \"Plaintiff had\nsufficient knowledge of the facts and of a basis for a cause of action within the\nlimitations period, and yet Is lhe failed to bring a timely suit.\" Id. As in Zumpano v.\nQuinn, in which the plaintiff tried to revive untimely allegations of sexual assault\nagainst members of the clergy, \"plaintiff was aware of the sexual abuse ... she\n[allegedly] suffered at the hands of [Ms. Maxwell] . ... Certainly [she] had sufficient\nknowledge to bring an intentional tort cause of action....\" 849 N.E.2d 926, 929\n(N.Y. 2006). The complaint points to absolutely nothing Ms. Maxwell allegedly did—\nin the year before its filing or any other time—that prevented plaintiff from filing the\nlawsuit.\n\nsister, the NYPD, and the FBI. IN 73-75. That those organizations did not respond as\nplaintiff wished is all the more reason she should have filed this lawsuit years ago.\nAdditionally, plaintiff's false imprisonment claim is not based on \"conduct which\nwould constitute a sexual offense\" wherever it were committed, and as a result, CPLR\n§ 214-g cannot save it from being time-barred.\n\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nMarch 27, 2020\nPage 4\n\nCase 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\n", "char_count": 2557}]}