{"efta_number": "EFTA02777760", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02777760", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02777760.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02777760", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "BSFI\n\nCase 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 22\n\nFiled 01/31/20\n\nPage 1 of 4\n\nBOIES\nSCHILLER\nFLEXNER\nTelephone: (212) 446-2300\nEmail: jischiller@bsfllp.com\n\nJanuary 31, 2020\nVIA ECF\nThe Honorable Lorna G. Schofield\nDistrict Court Judge\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, NY 10007\nRe:\n\nv. In vke et al. Case No. 19-cv-10475\n\nDear Judge Schofield,\nPursuant to Individual Rules III.A.1 and III.C.2, Plaintiff\nhereby responds\nto Defendants' request for a pm-motion conference in connection with their anticipated motion to\ndismiss. Dkt. 17. Plaintiff's claims are timely under New York's statutes of limitation and the\ndoctrine of equitable estoppel, and Defendants' proposed motion \"to dismiss\" Plaintiff's request\nfor punitive damages is procedurally improper. For the following masons, the Court should deny\nDefendants' anticipated motion in its entirety.'\nI.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under New York lArn.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are timely under the Child Victims Act (CVA), CPLR § 214-g, which\nsays that:\n[E]very civil claim or cause of action brought against any party alleging intentional\nor negligent acts or omissions by a person for physical, psychological, or other\ninjury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual\noffense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against\na child less than eighteen years of age, . . . is hereby revived, and action thereon\nmay be commenced . . . not later than one year and six months after the effective\ndate of this section.\nThe Complaint alleges that Epstein and Maxwell's actions constitute sexual offenses under Article\n130 of the Penal Law, and that those actions were committed against Plaintiff when she was 16\nyears old. Compl. 11 80, 81. Further, Plaintiff filed the Complaint approximately three months\nafter the CVA's revival period began on August 14, 2019, well within the one-year window.\nDefendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiffs' claims are\ntherefore timely.\n\nTo the extent the Court allows Defendants to file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests 30 days from the\ndate of Defendants' motion to file an opposition, with Defendants' reply brief due 10 days thereafter.\n\nBOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards. Now York. NY 10001 (t) 212446 2300 I (0 212 446 2350 1 www bsfIlp corn\n\nEFTA02777760\n\n", "char_count": 2414}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777760", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 22\n\nFiled 01/31/20\n\nPage 2 of 4\n\nBSF\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under New York's CPLR § 215(8)(a), which provides:\n\"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced\nwith respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the\nplaintiff shall have at least one yearfrom the termination of the criminal action . . . to commence\nthe civil action.\" (Emphasis added). Here, Epstein's criminal action in this District terminated on\nAugust 29, 2019. Compl. 1 40. Because Plaintiff filed the Complaint less than three months later,\nthe action is timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a). Defendants' arguments against CPLR § 2 I 5(8)(a)'s\napplication to these facts are meritless.\nFirst, Defendants' argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply because Plaintiff was\nnot named as a victim in Epstein's indictment is incorrect. New York courts have held that CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) is \"plain, clear and unambiguous\" that it does not require that the plaintiff be \"the\nvictim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed.\" Clemens v. Nealon, 202\nA.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).\nSecond, Defendants' narrow construction of § 215(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\" language\nis improper, especially in light of the breadth of Epstein's indictment. The charges were not limited\nto crimes committed against specific victims. For example, the overt acts alleged for the sex\ntrafficking conspiracy charge were enticing and recruiting multiple victims, \"including minor\nvictims identified herein.\" Compl., Ex. A (S.D.N.Y Indictment) 1 22(a) (emphasis added). As\nanother example, the Indictment's sex trafficking count charged Epstein with the sex trafficking\nof \"numerous individuals . . . including but not limited to Minor Victim-1.\" Id. 1 24. The\nIndictment was targeted at Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme as a whole, and that scheme is the\nevent or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil claims arose. See Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53, 56-57, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (guilty plea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being\ncommitted in Sudan\" allowed victims of the atrocities in Sudan use 215(8)(a) because causes of\naction arose out of defendant's general conspiracy with Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions put in place\nto stop atrocities). Because Plaintiff's claims arise out of this common scheme, they fall within\nCPLR § 215(8)(a).\nThe cases Defendants cite are inapposite because the criminal charges in those cases were\nmuch narrower than Epstein's, and related to events that occurred on specified dates. See\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 A.D.2d 595, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (prosecution commenced\nonly in connection with events on February 26, 1993 and December 28,1993); Gilliam v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at •3 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (indictment\n\"charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates\"). Epstein's Indictment\nwas much broader, covering sexual abuse that occurred \"over the course of many years\" \"from at\nleast in or about 2002, up to and including at least in or about 2005.\" S.D.N.Y. Indictment ¶1 I2, 8, 20, 24 (emphases added). Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under CPLR § 215(8)(a)\nbecause the scheme the Indictment targeted is the event or occurrence from which Plaintiff's civil\nclaims arise.\nDefendants also assert that Plaintiff's claims are untimely under New York's borrowing\nstatute, CPLR § 202. This argument fails for two reasons. First, CPLR § 202 only applies if a\nPlaintiff's cause of action accrues outside of New York. But the term \"accrued\" in CPLR § 202\nmeans \"the time when, and the place where, the plaintiff first had the right to bring the cause of\naction.\" Glob. Fin. Corp. v. Triarc Corp., 715 N.E.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. 1999) (emphasis added).\n\nEFTA02777761\n\n\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF  Document 22  Filed 01/31/20  Page 4 of 4  BSF Respectfully submitted.  Is/Joshua L Schiller David Boies, Esq. Joshua I. Schiller. Esq. Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. cc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)  EFTA02777763", "char_count": 4145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777760", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 22\n\nFiled 01/31/20\n\nPage 3 of 4\n\nBSF\nEpstein first injured Plaintiff in New York when he forcibly touched her in a movie theater when\nshe was a minor. Compl. 1 54. Plaintiff's claims therefore accrued in New York, and CPLR §\n202 does not apply.\nSecond, even if New York's borrowing statute did apply and Plaintiff's claims were\notherwise untimely, they would still not be barred because the CVA provides for a revival window\nof civil claims \"[n]otwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of limitation to the\ncontrary.\" CPLR § 214-g. Again, Defendants do not contest the CVA's applicability to Plaintiff's\nclaims. Because CPLR § 202 would impose a period of limitation contrary to the CVA, it does\nnot apply to Plaintiff's claims and those claims are not subject to any New Mexico statute of\nlimitations.\nH.\n\nPlaintiff Has Sufficienth Pled Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel and Tolling.\n\nEven if Plaintiffs claims were otherwise time-barred under New York's statutes of\nlimitation (they are not), they would still be timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.\nDefendants assert that Plaintiff \"fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances\nsufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\" Dkt. 17 at 2. But the Complaint alleges in detail\nthe methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators used to deter\ntheir victims from seeking justice. Equitable estoppel applies \"where it would be unjust to allow\na defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense,\" Zumpano v. Quinn, 849 N.E.2d 926, 929\n(N.Y. 2006), due to \"deception, concealment, threats, or other misconduct,\" Zoe G. v. Frederick\nF.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The Complaint alleges that Epstein and his\nco-conspirators manipulated their victims using \"financial power, promises, and threats to ensure\nthat the victim returned as directed and remained compliant with their demands\"; that Plaintiff did\nnot immediately tell anyone about the sexual assaults out of fear for herself and her family; and\nthat Defendants repeatedly threatened Plaintiff's sister to try to prevent her from reporting their\ncrimes. Compl. If 31, 70, 72, 76. The allegations concerning Epstein's purposeful silencing of\nhis victims (and Plaintiff specifically) easily provide the requisite \"extraordinary circumstances\"\nfor equitable tolling.\nBecause equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are fact-specific doctrines, Defendants'\nattempt to resolve the issue at the motion to dismiss stage is inappropriate, and any motion\nchallenging whether or not those doctrines apply should be reserved until after the parties have\nconducted discovery. See, e.g., Carelock v. United States, 2015 WL 5000816, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.\nAug. 20, 2015).\nIII.\n\nThe Court Should Address Punitive Damages After Discovery\n\nFederal Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state a\nclaim upon which relief can be granted.\" Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's\nclaim for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's clams (battery and intentional\ninfliction of emotion distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the allegations in the\nComplaint. The issue of what type of damages to which Plaintiff is entitled should therefore be\ndealt with at a later stage of this litigation. See, e.g., Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F.\nSupp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying \"motion to 'dismiss' plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages as procedurally premature\").\n\nEFTA02777762\n\n", "char_count": 3604}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777760", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 22\n\nFiled 01/31/20\n\nPage 4 of 4\n\nBSF\nRespectfully submitted.\n\nIs/Joshua L Schiller\nDavid Boies, Esq.\nJoshua I. Schiller. Esq.\nSigrid S. McCawley, Esq.\ncc: Counsel of Record (via ECF)\n\nEFTA02777763\n\n", "char_count": 235}]}