{"efta_number": "EFTA02777738", "page_count": 3, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02777738", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02777738.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02777738", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\nTroutman Sanders LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\ntroutman.com\n\nDocument 17\n\nFiled 01/24/20\n\nPage 1 of 3\n\ntroutmar?\nsanders\n\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nbennet.moskowitz@troutman.com\n\nJanuary 24, 2020\nECF\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nThurgood Marshall\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\nRe:\n\nv. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as the\nexecutors of the Estate of Jeffrey Edward Epstein, and Ghislaine Maxwell,\n19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDear Judge Schofield:\nWe represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (together, the \"Co-Executors\"), in the above-referenced action. We write\npursuant to Your Honor's Individual Rule III(C)(2) to request a conference on and to explain the\nbases for the Co-Executors' anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss\n(\"Plaintiff\")\nthe time-barred claims and demand for punitive damages in Plaintiff\nComplaint (ECF No. 1). We propose the following briefing schedule: moving brief by February\n24, 2020; opposition brief by March 25, 2020; and reply brief by April 8. 2020.\n1. Plaintiff is a Texas resident who alleges Decedent committed torts against her in\nthe 1990's, primarily in New Mexico; Plaintiff's causes of action based on torts in\nNew Mexico expired by 1999.\nPlaintiff, a Texas citizen and resident, alleges that, in 1995 and/or 1996, when she was 16, Mr.\nEpstein (\"Decedent\"), now deceased, committed sexual offenses against her in New York and\nNew Mexico. (Compl. 11111, 18, 53-54, 58, 67.) Plaintiff asserts three causes of action — battery,\nfalse imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress — and demands punitive\ndamages. (Id. ¶¶ 79-94, p. 18.)\nNew York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202, provides that when a non-New York resident such\nas Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York (here, New Mexico), the\ncomplaint must be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction\nwhere the claim accrued.' New Mexico law provides a 3-year statute of limitations for claims\nsounding in personal injury (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); and minors have 1-year from reaching the age\nof majority to commence such actions (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-10).\n\nI \"In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202.\" Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche\nBank Nat? Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).\n41220547v1\n\nEFTA02777738\n\n", "char_count": 2500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777738", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 17\n\nFiled 01/24/20\n\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nJanuary 24. 2020\nPage 2\n\nPage 2 of 3\n\ntroutmariP\nsanders\n\nTherefore, under New Mexico law, Plaintiff's causes of action based on events occurring there\nexpired by sometime in 1999. Per CPLR § 202, those claims, including Plaintiff's cause of\naction for false imprisonment in its entirety, are untimely.\n2. Plaintiff's attempts to plead around the statute of limitations fail.\nPlaintiff erroneously alleges her claims are timely per CPLR § 215(8)(a), her claims were\nequitably tolled, and that the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of\nlimitations defense. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-15.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\nFirst, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown\nthat a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the\nevent or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have\nat least one year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action\"\n(emphasis added). Decedent's criminal indictment (the \"Indictment\") attached to Plaintiff's\nComplaint does not concern Plaintiff's allegations. Rather, the Indictment charges Decedent\nsexually abused minor girls from 2002 to 2005 in New York and Florida. (Compl., Ex. A at ¶¶ 1,\n2.)\nPlaintiff alleges the torts against her occurred in 1995 and/or 1996, mostly in New Mexico.\nTherefore, this action and the Indictment arise from different occurrences.\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8)(a) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262 AD2d\n595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of February\n26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those two\ndays that criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallina v. Thatcher, No.\n52980/2017, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR §\n215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil\naction occurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of N.Y., 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 201829, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) inapplicable to claims against\ncivil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events\ngave rise to both actions). Plaintiff alleges a far more tenuous connection to the Indictment than\nthe criminal-civil links unsuccessfully asserted in those cases.\nSecond, even if § 215(8)(a) applies, which it does not, Plaintiff's claims for torts occurring in\nNew Mexico are still untimely per N.M. Stat. § 37.1-8 and CPLR § 202.\nThird, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify\nequitable tolling or estoppel. Equitable tolling is only applied where a plaintiff is \"prevented in\nsome extraordinary way from exercising h[er] rights.\" Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 10-cv2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by,\n2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nUnder this doctrine, a court may, \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow exceptions to\nthe statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.'\" Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). \"That\nthe doctrine is to be employed only sparingly -- in 'extraordinary and 'compelling' circumstances\n-- is reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is\n\nEFTA02777739\n\n", "char_count": 3618}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02777738", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDocument 17\n\nFiled 01/24/20\n\nHon. Lorna G. Schofield\nJanuary 24. 2020\nPage 3\n\nPage 3 of 3\n\ntroutmariP\n\nsanders\n\njustified.\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A\nlate-filing party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable\ndiligence\" in pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at *32 (citation omitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists but the\ndefendant's conduct causes her to delay in bringing her lawsuit. Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n101744, at '5 (citation omitted). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant\nmade a definite misrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe the plaintiff would rely on it;\nand (ii) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment. Id. (citation\nomitted). Tolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a\ndefendant that prevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).\nPlaintiff's threadbare allegations of \"deception,\" \"threats\" and the like (Compl. ¶16) do not\nestablish \"extraordinary\" circumstances justifying tolling. Nor has Plaintiff alleged (i) that\nDecedent made a misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii)\nthat Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her detriment.\nPlaintiff's own allegations refute any notion that she was prevented from exercising her rights.\nRather, Plaintiff's allegations establish she was both willing and able to come forward about the\nalleged wrongdoing—she disclosed it long ago to Vanity Fair Magazine (Id. ¶ 75). There is no\n\"extraordinary\" basis to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a\nstatute of limitations defense given these allegations.\n3. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.2\nPlaintiff's punitive damages claim must be dismissed as a matter of law. Neither New Mexico\nlaw nor New York law permits punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See\nJaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994) (\"punishment and\ndeterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate\");\nNY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (\"an action may be brought or continued against the personal\nrepresentative of the decedent, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties\nadjudged in any such action brought to recover damages for personal injury.\"). That is the law in\nmost jurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a\n(punitive damages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor).\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\n2 Courts in this District regularly dismiss punitive damages claims.\n\nSee The Cookware Co. (USA). LW v.\nAustin, 15-5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (dismissing punitive\ndamages claim without leave to replead); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., 03-6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n13227, at '25.26 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2004) (dismissing punitive damages claims not statutorily available).\n\nEFTA02777740\n\n", "char_count": 3263}]}