{"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_count": 63, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02758351", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02758351.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 1 of 63\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA\nJANE DOE I AND JANE DOE 2,\nPetitioners,\nvs.\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nRespondent.\n/\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nLimited Intervenor.\n/\n\nLIMITED INTERVENOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S BRIEF\nIN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED REMEDIES\n\nEFTA02758351\n\n", "char_count": 387}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 2 of 63\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nii\n\nTABLE OF CITATIONS\n\niv\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n2\n\nBACKGROUND\n\n4\n\nARGUMENT\n\n14\n\nI.\n\nII.\n\nIII.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PRECLUDE\nIMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n\n14\n\nA.\n\nMr. Epstein was not a Party to the Underlying Litigation and There is no\nJudgment Against him\n15\n\nB.\n\nThere was no Judicial Finding of \"Bad Faith\" or an \"Illegal Agreement\"\nand no Factual Basis for any Such Findings\n19\ni.\n\nMr. Epstein's Counsel Acted in Good Faith\n\n20\n\nit\n\nThe NPA is a Legal Agreement\n\n25\n\nTHE CVRA ITSELF PRECLUDES IMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS'\nPROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n\n27\n\nA.\n\nJudicial Reformation of an NPA is not an Authorized Remedy\n\n27\n\nB.\n\nThe Remedies Sought by Petitioners Against Mr. Epstein are Time-Barred\nunder the CVRA\n30\n\nPRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW PRECLUDE IMPOSITION OF\nPETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n\n33\n\nA.\n\nA Court may not Re-write an Agreement Between Two Contracting Parties\nto Eliminate all Benefits to one Party\n33\n\nB.\n\nThe General Releases Signed by Petitioners Bar Petitioners' Proposed\nEpstein Remedies\n\n37\n\n11\n\nEFTA02758352\n\n", "char_count": 1196}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 3 of 63\n\nIV.\n\nTHE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDE\nIMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n39\n\nV.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PRECLUDE IMPOSITION\nOF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n43\n\nVI.\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES IMPOSITION\nOF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n46\n\nVII. THE DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS PRECLUDES IMPOSITION OF PROPOSED\nEPSTEIN REMEDY #2\n49\nVIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED REMEDY IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY\nTHE CVRA\n50\nIX.\n\nMR. EPSTEIN ADOPTS THE ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY THE\nGOVERNMENT INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT THE REMEDY IN THIS CASE\n51\n52\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nIII\n\nEFTA02758353\n\n", "char_count": 736}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 4 of 63\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCASES\n\nPare\n\nAbbadessa v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.,\n987 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1993)\n\n34\n\nAmelia v. United States,\n732 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1984)\n\n31\n\nAmerican Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United States,\n177 F.3d 1368 (Fed.Cir. 1999)\n\n35\n\nAVVA-BC, LLC v. Amiel,\n25 So. 3d 7 (FIa. 3d DCA 2009)\n\n34\n\nBahamas Sales Associate, LLC v. Byers,\n701 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012)\n\n41\n\nBlinco v.\nTree Servicing LLC,\n400 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2005)\n\n41\n\nBorck v. Holewinski,\n459 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)\n\n33\n\nBordenkircher v. Hayes,\n434 U.S. 357 (1978)\n\n48\n\nBurnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,\n291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002)\n\n41, 42\n\nCarlisle v. United States,\n517 U.S. 416 (1996)\n\n31, 32\n\nCerniglia v. Cerniglia,\n679 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1996)\n\n38\n\nChase National Bank v. Norwalk,\n291 U.S. 431 (1934)\n\n17\n\nCommunity For Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce,\n786 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1986)\n\n46\n\nIV\n\nEFTA02758354\n\n", "char_count": 992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 5 of 63\n\nCraig v. People,\n986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999)\n\n26\n\nDigital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation,\n121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1997)\n\n50\n\nDoe No. 1 v. United States,\n749 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2014)\n\n10, 13, 16\n\nDoes v. United States,\n817 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2011)\n\n51\n\nDolan v. United States,\n560 U.S. 605 (2010)\n\n32\n\nEdward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council,\n485 U.S. 568 (1988)\n30\nEx parte Rich,\n194 S.W. 3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)\n\n27\n\nGundy v. United States,\nU.S.\n2019 WL 2527473 (June 20, 2019)\n\n22\n\nHalperin v. United States,\n610 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Fla. 1985)\n\n31\n\nHansberry v. Lee,\n311 U.S. 32 (1940)\n\n15\n\nHDR Engineering, Inc. v. R.C.T. Engineering, Inc.,\nNo. 08-81040-CIV, 2010 WL 2402908 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010)\n\n18\n\nHeckler v. Chaney,\n470 U.S. 821 (1985)\n\n46\n\nHendricks v. Stark,\n99 Fla. 277 (Fla. 1930)\n\n34\n\nHerrlein v. Kanakis,\n526 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1975)\n\n16\n\nEFTA02758355\n\n", "char_count": 1017}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 6 of 63\n\nHold v. Manzini,\n736 So. 2d 138 (FIa. 3d DCA 1999)\n\n39\n\nIn re Aiken County,\n725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir.2013)\n\n48\n\nIn re\n527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008)\n\n29\n\nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena (T-112),\n597 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2010)\n\n31\n\nIn re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litigation,\n285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)\n\n41\n\nIn re United States,\n345 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2003)\n\n46\n\nv. BellSouth Telecommunications,\n372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004)\n\n35\n\nv. Parodi,\n50 Fla. 541 (Fla. 1905)\n\n35\n\nJane Does I and 2 v. United States,\n359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019)\n\n3\n\nJelencovich v. Dodge Enterprises, Inc.,\nNo. 09-81045-CIV, 2010 WL 289300 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2010)\n\n24\n\nKlay v. All Defendants,\n389 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2004)\n\n16\n\nLaborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co. of Florida,\n827 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1987)\n24\nLandgraf v. USI Film Products,\n511 U.S. 244 (1944)\n\n17\n\nLomayaktewa v. Hathaway,\n520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975)\n\n18\n\nVI\n\nEFTA02758356\n\n", "char_count": 1040}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 7 of 63\n\nMarbury v. Madison,\n5 U.S. 137 (1803)\n\n27\n\nv. Wilks,\n490 U.S. 755 (1989)\n\n17, 18\n\nMazzoni Farms, Inc., v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.,\n671 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 2000)\n\n34, 38\n\nMulhern v. Rogers,\n636 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. Fla. 1986)\n\n38\n\nNational Advertising Co. v. City of Miami,\n402 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2005)\n\n49\n\nNew Hampshire v. Maine,\n532 U.S. 742 (2001)\n\n41, 42\n\nNorthwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO,\n451 U.S. 77 (1981)\n\n28\n\nPacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book,\n538 U.S. 401 (2003)\n\n41\n\nParklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore,\n439 U.S. 322 (1979)\n\n15\n\nPetite v. United States,\n361 U.S. 529 (1960)\n\n6\n\nPettinelli v. Danzig,\n722 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1984)\n\n38\n\nPlumpton v. Continental Acreage Development Co., Inc.,\n830 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)\n\n39\n\nPower Financial Credit Union v. National Credit Union Administration Board,\n494 Fed. Appx. 982 (11th Cir. 2012)\nRakip v. Paradise Awnings Corp.,\n514 F. App'x 917 (11th Cir. 2013)\n\n44, 45\n\n39\n\nVII\n\nEFTA02758357\n\n", "char_count": 1088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 8 of 63\n\nRyan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co.,\n81 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 1996)\n\n42\n\nSantobello v. New York,\n404 U.S. 257 (1971)\n\n43\n\nSchool District of City of Pontiac v. Secretary of U.S. Department of Education,\n584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009)\n\n18\n\nSeh Ahn Lee v. United States,\n895 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018)\n\n35\n\nSlater v. United States Steel Corp.,\n871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017)\n\n41,42\n\nState v.\n582 N.W. 2d 879 (Minn. 1998)\n\n26\n\nState v. Mazzone,\n212 W.Va. 368 (2002)\n\n27\n\nState v. Wall,\n348 N.C. 671 (1998)\n\n26, 27\n\nState of Indiana ex rel. Zoeller v. Pastick,\n696 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ind. 2010)\n\n16, 17\n\nSteans v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,\n148 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1998)\n\n17\n\nTaylor v. Sturgell,\n553 U.S. 880 (2008)\n\n16\n\nTepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co.,\n259 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)\n\n41\n\nTransamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. M,\n444 U.S. 11 (1979)\n\n28\n\nUnited States v. Al-Arian,\n514 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2008)\n\n43\n\nVIII\n\nEFTA02758358\n\n", "char_count": 1045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 9 of 63\n\nUnited States v. Armstrong,\n517 U.S. 456 (1996)\n\n48\n\nUnited States v. Baird,\n218 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2000)\n\n44\n\nUnited States v.~,\n442 U.S. 114 (1979)\n\n48\n\nUnited States v. =,\n428 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970)\n\n31\n\nUnited States v. Cox,\n342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965)\n\n46\n\nClark,\nUnited States v.\n292 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2002)\n\n32\n\nUnited States v. Fernandez,\n960 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1991)\n\n35\n\nUnited States v. Fokker Services B.V.,\n818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016)\n\n47, 48\n\nUnited States v. Harvey,\n869 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1989)\n\n43\n\nUnited States v..,\n643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011)\n\n43\n\nUnited States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,\n863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017)\n\n47\n\nUnited States v. Hunter,\n548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008)\n\n29\n\nUnited States v. Hunter,\nNo. 2:07-CR-307-DAK, 2008 WL 153785 (D.Utah Jan. 14, 2008)\n\n30\n\nUnited States v. Microsoft Corp.,\n56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)\n\n46\n\nIX\n\nEFTA02758359\n\n", "char_count": 972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 10 of 63\n\nUnited States v. Monzel,\n641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011)\n\n29, 33\n\nUnited States v. Skidmore,\n998 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1993)\n\n35\n\nUnited States v. Stolt-Nielsen,\n524 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D. Pa. 2007)\n\n44\n\nUnited States v. Tilley,\n964 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1992)\n\n44\n\nUnited States v. =,\n98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996)\n\n25, 26\n\n46\n\nWeingart v.\nO'Hare,\n654 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1981)\n\n38\n\n&\n\nWayte v. United States,\n470 U.S. 598 (1985)\n\nCONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND RULES\nU.S. Const. art. 11, § 3\n\n46, 48\n\nU.S. Const. art. III, § 2\n\n49\n\n18 U.S.C. § 1591\n\n5\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2255\n\n9\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2422\n\n5\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2423\n\n5\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)\n\n32\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3771\n\npassim\n\n28 C.F.R. § 45.10\n\n22, 45\n\nFla. Stat. § 796.03\n\n7\n\nEFTA02758360\n\n", "char_count": 806}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 11 of 63\n\nFla. Stat. § 796.07\n\n4, 7\n\nFed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)\n\n31, 32\n\nFed.R.Crim.P. 35(a)\n\n32\n\nFed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)\n\n31\n\nOTHER AUTHORITIES\nU.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), The Availability of Crime\nVictims' Rights Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004,\n(Dec. 17, 2010)\n22\nCraig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Selection and Use of Monitors in\nDeferred Prosecution Agreements and Non—Prosecution Agreements with Corporations,\n(Mar. 7, 2008)\n23\nBlack's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968)\n\n33\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)\n\n31\n\nXI\n\nEFTA02758361\n\n", "char_count": 661}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 12 of 63\n\nLimited Intervenor Jeffrey Epstein, through counsel, respectfully files this Brief in\nopposition to Petitioners' Submission on Proposed Remedies (DE 458), and in reply to the\nGovernment's Response to Petitioners' Submission on Proposed Remedies (DE 462).\nINTRODUCTION\nPetitioners are asking a federal court to do something that has never been done in\nthe history of American jurisprudence. On the basis of a judgment finding that the\ngovernment failed to comply with the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), 18 U.S.C. §\n3771, Petitioners propose several lopsided remedies that benefit the government, (DE\n462:14), and target only Mr. Epstein, a non-party to the litigation. Specifically, Petitioners\nseek: 1) a judicially-imposed reformation of the non-prosecution agreement (\"NPA\") to\nexcise only the \"immunity provisions\" and eliminate all contractual consideration provided\nby the government to induce Mr. Epstein to enter into the NPA, and 2) an advisory opinion\nthat the Constitution would permit a hypothetical future prosecution of Mr. Epstein by the\nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO-SDFL)\n(hereinafter \"Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies\"). (DE 458:4-5, 13 n.5). Neither\nproposed remedy has any principled legal basis.\nDespite having expressly invoked the financial provisions of the NPA to obtain\nmoney from Mr. Epstein, and thereafter agreed in settlement agreements to not seek any\nfurther monetary or equitable remedies against him, Petitioners urge the Court to strip Mr.\nEpstein of the only provisions of the NPA that benefit him, ten years after he fully\nperformed the NPA's obligations and endured its burdens. At the same time, Petitioners\npropose to leave intact those provisions of the NPA that benefitted them. Petitioners'\n2\n\nEFTA02758362\n\n", "char_count": 1891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 13 of 63\n\nProposed Epstein Remedies, if imposed, would punish only Mr. Epstein (a non-party)\nwhile releasing the government from its contractual obligations and allowing Petitioners\nand their counsel to retain all of their financial benefits resulting from Mr. Epstein's full\nperformance.\nPetitioners' premise for these drastic and unprecedented proposed remedies against\nMr. Epstein is the baseless conclusion that Petitioners draw from a single factual finding\nin the Court's opinion granting summary judgment against the government. (DE 435).\nQuoting directly from a stipulation between Petitioners and the government in connection\nwith summary judgment litigation to which Mr. Epstein was not even a party, this Court\nfound: \"Epstein's counsel was aware that the [USAO-SDFL] was deliberately keeping the\nNPA secret from the victims and, indeed, had sought assurances to that effect.\" Jane Does\n1 and 2 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (DE 435:8, citing\nDE 407, at ¶48). Petitioners overstate that finding to argue that Mr. Epstein was \"the\ninstigator of — the Government's CVRA violations,\" and that Mr. Epstein acted with\n\"unclean hands\" and in \"bad faith\" with the \"deliberate plan to violate the law.\"\n(DE458:16-19). No conspiracy existed, and no such conclusions can be legally or logically\ninferred from the Court's factual findings. There was no finding that Mr. Epstein was in\nany way responsible for the CVRA violation found by the Court: the government's failure\nto confer with victims prior to September 24, 2007, when the NPA was signed.\nPetitioners' proposed excision of the \"immunity provisions\" that Mr. Epstein\nbargained for, relied upon, and endured the consequences for: a) would violate Mr.\nEpstein's constitutional rights; b) is neither expressly authorized by the CVRA nor\n3\n\nEFTA02758363\n\n", "char_count": 1918}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 14 of 63\n\navailable as an inherent remedy; c) contravenes well-established principles of contract law;\nand d) is not supported by the facts. The Court should reject Petitioners' Proposed Epstein\nRemedies.\nBACKGROUND\nOn July 19, 2006, a grand jury in Florida's Fifteenth Judicial Circuit indicted Mr.\nEpstein on a single felony count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Fla. Stat. §\n796.07. See State v. Epstein, 50-2006-CF-009454-AXXX-MB. While the state charge was\npending, the Department of Justice began investigating whether Mr. Epstein's alleged\nconduct also violated federal law. The federal investigation was led by R. Alexander\nAcosta (U.S. Attorney) and a team of veteran prosecutors from the Southern District of\nFlorida, including Jeffrey Sloman (First Assistant U.S. Attorney), Matthew Menchel\n(Chief, Criminal Division), Andrew Lourie (Deputy Chief, Northern Region), AUSA\nKaren Atkinson, and AUSA Anna\n\nVillafalla. To defend against this federal\n\ninvestigation, Mr. Epstein retained counsel with expertise in federal law and federal\njurisdiction, including a former federal appellate judge, a former United States Attorney,\nformer Assistant United States Attorneys, the former Principal Deputy Chief of the DOJ\nChild Exploitation and Obscenity Section, and a Harvard Law School professor.\nCounsel for Mr. Epstein referred the federal prosecutors to evidence from the state\ninvestigation that undermined the factual and legal bases for a federal prosecution of this\nlocal Palm Beach case. Among other things, the federal prosecutors reviewed contradictory\nsworn statements given by the same witnesses, and obvious inconsistencies between the\nreports of witness statements taken by the police and their actual sworn statements. The\n4\n\nEFTA02758364\n\n", "char_count": 1849}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 15 of 63\n\nsworn statements, taken by police before defense counsel was ever retained, created other\nissues for the federal prosecutors because the statements indicated that women who were\nunder the age of 18 told police that they misrepresented their age to Mr. Epstein to gain\nentry into his home. The misrepresentations of age to Mr. Epstein negated an essential\nelement of the federal statutes under consideration. (DE 361-43:4-5). The federal\nprosecutors considered detailed statutory analyses and applicable case law which cast\ndoubt on whether: a) federal jurisdiction existed to prosecute these local offenses; b) the\nfederal statutes being contemplated for prosecution even applied to Mr. Epstein's alleged\nconduct; and c) federal jurisprudence provided precedential support for the application of\nthe federal sex offense statutes to Mr. Epstein's alleged conduct. See DE 361-46. Jeffrey\nSloman, the Former First Assistant United States Attorney who supervised the\ninvestigation, recently acknowledged that the federal prosecutors faced \"significant legal\nimpediments to prosecuting what was, at heart, a local sex abuse case.\" See Jeffrey Sloman,\nAlex Acosta Acted with Professionalism and Integrity in Handling the Jeffrey Epstein\nCase, Miami Herald Op-Ed, Feb. 15, 2019 (attached as Exhibit 1).\nAs the former Deputy Chief of the DOJ's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section,\nStephanie D. Thacker was an experienced former federal sex crimes prosecutor well versed\nin the application of federal law to alleged sex offenses. In her submission to the\ngovernment, she explained:\nThis is a case about purely local activity, involving local actors, and\naffecting local interests and thus, should be handled by local authorities.\nNonetheless, the USAO has indicated its intent to prosecute Mr. Epstein for\npurported violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2423, and 1591. However, as set\nforth in detail in prior submissions, \n... [truncated, 2062 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/14 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=14]", "char_count": 2062}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 16 of 63\n\nthe heartland of those statutes — in fact, in law, and in congressional intent.\nAs their plain text and history indicate, those statutes were designed to\naddress problems that are truly national and international in scope ... Unlike\nthe alleged conduct here, those problems unquestionably present multijurisdictional obstacles that States and localities cannot confront effectively\non their own. Mr. Epstein's conduct was purely local in nature, and the State\nof Florida and Palm Beach County are effectively prosecuting and punishing\nthat conduct.\nLetter from Stephanie D. Thacker to John Roth, Sr. Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, June\n19, 2008 (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit 2). DOJ officials who reviewed the case\nacknowledged the many \"compelling\" arguments against the government's unprecedented,\nproposed application of federal statutes. (Exh. 2, at p.6). Given the pending state charge,\nit was also necessary for the federal prosecutors to consider whether the \"Petite Policy,\"\nsee Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960), set forth at 9-2.031 of the United States\nAttorneys' Manual, required it to decline a federal prosecution for the same alleged conduct\nbeing prosecuted by the State. See DE 361-43:23.\nCounsel for the government and Mr. Epstein spent months negotiating, at armslength, a resolution of the pending state charge and threatened federal charges. No bribes\nwere paid to government officials. No threats or illegal inducements were made to them.\nNo one in the government was coerced. No one's free will was overborne. No one\nobstructed justice. The seasoned federal prosecutors were not \"wowed\" by Mr. Epstein's\ncounsel or impressed by Mr. Epstein's wealth. There was no backroom deal engineered\nby U.S. Attorney Alexander Acosta to curry favor with anyone, as has been publicly\nsuggested. The lawyers on both sides were vigorous, but cordial, advocates. Indeed, by\nour count, mor\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/15 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=15]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 17 of 63\n\neither authorized or helped negotiate the resolution of the matter. See, e.g., United States'\nSecond Supplemental Privilege Log (DE 329-1) (illustrating the number of prosecutors\ninvolved in the decision-making over the NPA).\nUltimately, the parties agreed to a non-prosecution agreement regarding the federal\ncharges, which required Mr. Epstein to plead guilty to the pending state felony charge (Fla.\nStat. § 796.07), and to a new state felony charge of violating Fla. Stat. § 796.03 (Case No.\n2008-CF-9381AXX), a charge requiring registration as a sex offender. The NPA required,\ninter alia, an 18-month sentence of incarceration, followed by 12 months of community\ncontrol, restitution, and sex offender registration. (DE 361-62). As in any hard-fought\nnegotiation, this resolution resulted, in part, from the government's recognizing weakness\nin its legal positions and the risk of litigation. See Exh. 1. According to AUSA Villafafia,\nwho was the line prosecutor in the federal investigation, the government made the decision\nto enter into the NPA out of a desire to obtain a guaranteed sentence of incarceration, the\nequivalent of uncontested financial restitution for the victims, and guaranteed sex offender\nregistration. (DE 403-19:10, ¶18).\nThe government's decision to enter into the NPA was also influenced by its\nconsideration of the privacy interests of certain of the victims. According to AUSA\nVillafafia, \"our hope was that we could set up a system that would allow these victims to\nget that restitution without having to go through what civil litigation will expose them to.\nYou have a number of girls who were very hesitant about even speaking to authorities\nabout this...\" (DE 403-19:163-64). The NPA endured multiple levels of review by career\nprosecutors both before its execution, (DE 329-1:1-6), and then after. (DE 329-1:6-18).\n7\n\nEFTA02758367\n\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 18 of 63\n\nSenior members of the DOJ, including the heads of CEOS, a high-level representative of\nthe Criminal Division and the Deputy Attorney General were consulted, received legal\nsubmissions, and fully approved the exercise of discretion by the federal prosecutors in the\nSouthern District of Florida.\nIn the end, the Executive Branch exercised in good faith the unreviewable\nprosecutorial discretion afforded to it by Article 11 of the Constitution and the CVRA itself.\nSee § 3771(d)(6) (\"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial\ndiscretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.\"). First Assistant\nU.S. Attorney Jeffrey Sloman, who oversaw the investigation, has debunked the notion that\n\"well-connected lawyers corrupted [ ] then-U.S Attorney Alex Acosta and his team into\ngiving Epstein a sweetheart deal. They did not. I would know. I was there.\" (Exh. 1).\nThe NPA is a valid and binding agreement. It contains no illegal provisions nor is\nit against public policy. As the government readily concedes, (DE 462:6-7), Mr. Epstein\nfully performed his obligations under the NPA \"in exchange for the benefits provided by\nthis agreement.\" (DE 361-62:3). He pleaded guilty to two felonies in state court, which\nresulted in his serving thirteen months in jail,' followed by a year of community control,\nand his continuous registration as a sex offender for more than ten years. Moreover, Mr.\nEpstein was required by the NPA to waive his constitutional right to contest civil liability\nas to a list prepared by the government of potential plaintiffs whose identity would be\n\n' The 13 months in jail that Mr. Epstein served on an 18-month sentence was the result of\nstandard sentence computations by jail authorities applied to Mr. Epstein in the same\nmanner as any other inmate.\n8\n\nEFTA02758368\n\n", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 19 of 63\n\nrevealed by the government to Mr. Epstein only after Mr. Epstein was incarcerated. (DE\n361-62:5, ¶7). A Special\n\n— former Chief United States District Judge Edward B.\n\n— was appointed to select an attorney-representative, Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq.,\nwhom the NPA required Mr. Epstein to pay to enable those unidentified plaintiffs to pursue\ncivil monetary claims against himself under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. (DE 362-9).\nThe State of Florida, after communicating with federal prosecutors (E.g., DE\n329:10-11; DE 361-62:3), also accepted the NPA and relied upon it. State prosecutors\nbrought a second more serious felony charge — one that required sex offender registration\n-- in order to satisfy the requirements of the NPA. A state court judge required a copy of\nthe NPA as part of the plea colloquy, (Tr. 6/30/08, at p.40) (attached as Exhibit 3), and\nviewed the NPA \"as a significant inducement in accepting this plea.\" (Exh. 3, at p. 39).\nOn June 30, 2008, Mr. Epstein began serving his state sentence. When Petitioners\nappeared at a status conference on this CVRA lawsuit on July 11, 2008, knowing that Mr.\nEpstein was already incarcerated, they chose to not proceed with the CVRA case on an\nemergency basis, (DE 15:24-25; DE 99:4), despite clear statutory provisions within the\nCVRA that required a decision to be made \"forthwith\" and that imposed other strict time\nlimits measured in hours and days, not years. Moreover, at a hearing one month later,\nPetitioners' counsel stated that \"because of the legal consequences of invalidating the\ncurrent agreement, it is likely not in [the petitioners'] interest to ask for the [rescission]\nrelief that we initially asked for.\" (DE 27:4).\nPetitioners' counsel received a copy of the NPA on August 28, 2008. (DE 435:21).\nThereafter, for nearly two years, Petitioners deliberately ceased all substantive activity in\n9\n\nEFTA02758369\n\n", "char_count": 1960}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 20 of 63\n\nthis CVRA case in favor of pursuing civil monetary damages actions against Mr. Epstein.\nTo that end, while Mr. Epstein was incarcerated, the two Petitioners, represented by the\nsame counsel as in the instant case, filed civil complaints for monetary damages against\nMr. Epstein in Palm Beach Circuit Court. See E.W. v. Epstein, Case No. 50-2008-CA028058-XXXX-MB (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir.) (Jane Doe 1); L.M. v. Epstein, Case No. 50-2008CA-028051-XXXX-MB (Fla. 15th Jud. Cir.) (Jane Doe 2). Without explanation, one of the\nPetitioners (Jane Doe 2), represented by the Scott Rothstein firm, later filed an action\nagainst Mr. Epstein in federal court based on precisely the same facts as she alleged in her\nstate court complaint. See (DE 1) in L.M. v. Epstein, Case No. 09-81092-Civ-KAM\n(S.D.Fla.). Other individuals also filed civil actions against Mr. Epstein seeking monetary\ndamages. (DE 205-6:11-12). In each of their complaints, and then in amended complaints,\nPetitioners and others specifically relied on the provisions of the NPA to obtain money\nfrom Mr. Epstein. They alleged, among other things, that Mr. Epstein: a) had entered guilty\npleas to the state crimes noted above; b) entered into the NPA with the federal government\n\"acknowledging that [Petitioner] was a victim of his conduct;\" and c) was \"estopped by his\nplea and agreement with the Federal Government from denying the acts alleged in this\nComplaint, and must effectively admit liability to the Plaintiff.\" (DE 403-16, at ¶¶18-20;\nDE 403-17, at ¶¶18-20; DE 205-6:11-12; 58-59, 89-90). Petitioners leveraged the NPA as\na valid and binding agreement by arguing that his obligations in that agreement precluded\nMr. Epstein from exercising his constitutional right to contest liability in their monetary\ndamage lawsuits. See Doe No. I v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1002 (11th Cir. 2014) (\"As\na basis for relief against Epstein in the civil suit, the v\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/19 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=19]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 21 of 63\n\nhis right to contest liability in the non-prosecution agreement.\").\nPetitioners ultimately secured substantial monetary settlements of their civil claims\nagainst Mr. Epstein in July 2010, while the CVRA case was pending against the\ngovernment. See Settlement Agreement and General Release between Jeffrey Epstein and\nJane Doe 1 (E.W.) (partially redacted) (attached as Exhibit 4); Settlement Agreement and\nGeneral Release between Jeffrey Epstein and Jane Doe 2 (L.M.) (partially redacted)\n(attached as Exhibit 5). Both settlement agreements contained the same \"General Release\"\nof Mr. Epstein which provided that Petitioners:\nHEREBY remise, release, acquit, satisfy, and forever discharge [Mr. Epstein\nand other potential defendants] from all, and all manner of, action and\nactions of [Petitioner], including State or Federal, cause and causes of action\n(common law or statutory), suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts,\nreckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies,\nagreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments,\nexecutions, claims, and demands whatsoever in law or in equity for\ncompensatory or punitive damages that said First Parties ever had or now\nhave, or that any personal representative, successor, heir, or assign of said\nFirst Parties hereafter can, shall, or may have, against Jeffrey Epstein ... for,\nupon, or by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever (whether\nknown or unknown), from the beginning of the world to the day of this\nrelease.\nSee Exh. 4, ¶2; Exh. 5, ¶2 (emphasis added). Thus, in exchange for money, Petitioners\nexpressly released Mr. Epstein from any federal claims for equitable relief by reason of\nany matter whatsoever, whether known or unknown, from the beginning of the world to\nthe day of the release. Petitioners did not carve out from the General Release an exception\nfor equitable remedies they might seek against M\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/20 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=20]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 22 of 63\n\nbetween Epstein's agents and federal prosecutors\" \"to prove a violation of her right to\nnotice by the government ...under the CVRA ...,\" and that Petitioners must provide\nadvance notice of their \"intent to so use\" that correspondence. See, e.g., Exh. 4, Addendum,\n¶3 (emphasis added); Exh. 5, Addendum, ¶3.\nOn September 8, 2010, this Court ordered the CVRA case closed \"[i]n light of the\nunderlying settlements between the victims and Mr. Epstein,\" (DE 38), and issued an Order\nto show cause why the case should not be dismissed \"for lack of prosecution\" given the\n\"lack of activity for nearly seventeen months.\" (DE 40). In an effort to revive the CVRA\nlawsuit they had abandoned, Petitioners defended their inaction by arguing that \"[i]t\nseemed reasonable to the victim[s] to resolve those [civil] cases first and then turn to the\nCVRA case...\" (DE 41:6). Petitioners acknowledged the finality of their settlement with\nMr. Epstein by contrasting him with the government, emphasizing to this Court that \"while\nthey had settled their case with Jeffrey Epstein, they had reached no settlement with the\nU.S. Attorney's Office...\" (DE 41:1) (emphasis in original). Petitioners did not reveal at\nthat time that they would later seek to engineer an end-run around the General Release\nlanguage they agreed to in connection with their monetary settlements by using a CVRA\nlawsuit against the government to obtain extraordinary equitable relief against Mr. Epstein:\njudicial reformation of the very NPA that Petitioners relied upon and sought to enforce\nagainst Mr. Epstein in their civil lawsuits.\nThereafter, for the next nine years, Petitioners litigated their CVRA case against the\ngovernment. When issues arose in that case that directly implicated Mr. Epstein's and his\ncounsel's legal privileges, they intervened for the limited purpose of asserting those\n12\n\nEFTA02758372\n\n", "char_count": 1958}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 23 of 63\n\nprivileges, both in the district court, and on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. See Doe No. 1,\nsupra. That there would be no judgment against Mr. Epstein at the end of this CVRA\nlitigation, however, was understood throughout the litigation. As the Eleventh Circuit\nobserved on appeal from this Court's order requiring disclosure of defense counsel's plea\nnegotiation correspondence, \"Epstein's only opportunity to challenge the disclosure order\nis now because there will not be an adverse judgment against him or his attorneys. The\ndistrict court instead will enter any judgment against either the victims or the United\nStates.\" See Doe No. 1, 749 F.3d at 1005 (emphasis added). Beyond that, when Mr.\nEpstein suggested he be permitted to participate in mediation in this case after this Court\nhad granted Mr. Epstein's motion for limited intervention at the remedy stage, Petitioners\nopposed that request, writing that:\nthe case has not yet reached any remedy stage where [Epstein] might have a\nmore direct interest. More important, the issues to be mediated at this stage\ninvolve the victims' pending motion for summary judgment (DE 361), which\nseeks summary judgment only against the Government — not Epstein.\n(DE 388:2) (emphasis added). Petitioners' counsel also argued during a telephone status\nconference that \"until we have certainly reached that juncture [the remedy phase], he\n[Epstein] is like any other citizen that has no interest in the case.\" (DE 461:18). Moreover,\nwhereas Petitioners supported the motion of Jane Does 3 and 4 to formally join as parties\nto the litigation, (DE 280:11), Petitioners did not file a motion to join Mr. Epstein as a\nPartY.\nOn February 21, 2019, this Court granted partial summary judgment against the\ngovernment \"to the extent that Petitioners' right to conferral under the CVRA was\n13\n\nEFTA02758373\n\n", "char_count": 1930}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 24 of 63\n\nviolated.\" (DE 435:33). As a result of that judgment against the government, Petitioners\nnow seek to impose remedies against Mr. Epstein that would deprive him of the entire\nconsideration he received in exchange for pleading guilty, serving time in jail, registering\nas a sex offender, and paying substantial money damages and fees to Petitioners and their\nattorneys. Undersigned counsel know of no precedent, ever, where a citizen who had\nfully performed his obligations under a contract with the government, and did not breach\nit, was stripped of its benefits without even being a party to the litigation, on the basis\nthat the government wasfound to have violated the statutory rights of third parties prior\nto entering into the contract. Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies should be rejected.\nARGUMENT,\nI.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PRECLUDE\nIMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN\nREMEDIES\n\nPetitioners' proposal to excise the \"immunity provisions\" from the NPA seeks a\nremedy that substantially harms Mr. Epstein and frees the government from the constraints\nof the NPA by allowing the government \"to seek prosecution of Epstein and his\ncoconspirators...\"\n\n(DE 458:22). As the government itself recognized, Petitioners'\n\nProposed Epstein Remedies reward the government, the purported CVRA offender, by\n\"allow[ing] the government to enjoy all the benefits of Epstein's compliance without\nbinding it to its commitments under the NPA.\" (DE 462:21).\nPetitioners contend that their proposed remedies against Mr. Epstein are permitted\nbecause Mr. Epstein's counsel acted in \"bad faith,\" have \"unclean hands,\" and were the\n\n14\n\nEFTA02758374\n\n", "char_count": 1745}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 25 of 63\n\n\"instigators\" of the CVRA violation, and because the NPA is an \"illegal agreement\" based\non \"illegal promises.\" (DE 458:17-19, 21). Remarkably, Petitioners argue that the\ngovernment has the \"power to provide all the various remedies being sought through the\nlawsuit...\" and \"agree to the remedies,\" (DE 458:12), as if the government has the legal\nauthority at the initiative of a third party to breach a binding contract after full performance\nby its counterparty. Petitioners have lost their way; their arguments are a distortion of the\nfacts and demonstrate a flawed understanding of principles of due process. There is neither\na legal basis nor a factual basis for any remedies that impair Mr. Epstein's rights.\nA.\n\nMr. Epstein was not a Party to the Underlying Litigation and\nThere is no Judgment Against him\n\nSummary judgment was granted against the government, not against Mr. Epstein.\nTherefore, there can be no remedy that prejudices him. Moreover, none of the Court's\nactual factual findings, nor, more importantly, any of the baseless inferences Petitioners\nseek to draw from the findings that were entered by the Court, may be applied against Mr.\nEpstein. As such, the entire premise for Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies fails.\n\"It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is\nnot bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party\nor to which he has not been made a party by service of process.\" Hansberry v. Lee, 311\nU.S. 32, 40 (1940). \"It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a\nlitigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be\nheard.\" Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979). \"A person\nwho was not a party to a suit generally has not had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate'\nIS\n\nEFTA02758375\n\n", "char_count": 1970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 26 of 63\n\nthe claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion to\nnonparties thus runs up against the `deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should\nhave his own day in court.\" Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (citation\nomitted). Contrary to Petitioners' argument that \"all of the Court's previous holdings are\nnow law of the case,\" (DE 458:13), the \"law of the case doctrine does not bind nonparties.\"\nKlay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.5 (1Id' Cir. 2004). To direct harsh remedies\nat Mr. Epstein is \"antithetical to the primary axiom of our jurisprudence that no man shall\nbe subject to judicial sanction without the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the\nclaim.\" Herrlein v. Kanakis, 526 F.2d 252, 255 (7th Cir. 1975).\nGranting extraordinary reliefagainst Mr. Epstein — reliefthat frees his adverse party,\nthe government, from its contractual obligations under the NPA -- on the basis of a\njudgment that the government did not comply with its statutory obligations would violate\nprinciples of procedural due process. Petitioners did not name or seek to join Mr. Epstein\nas a party at the liability phase. The fact that Mr. Epstein moved for limited intervention\nat the remedy stage to oppose any prejudicial and illegal relief against him is ofno moment,\nas the Eleventh Circuit has already expressly rejected Petitioners' argument that by virtue\nof his limited intervention, Mr. Epstein \"has made himself an ordinary litigant.\" Doe No.\n1, 749 F.3d at 1005; see also State of Indiana ex rel. Zoeller v. Pastick, 696 F. Supp. 2d\n970, 993 n.18 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (\"The fact that the Foundations have moved to intervene [\n] does not now mean that the Foundations have had a right to be heard as to their potential\nliability in this case. The Foundations moved explicitly 'for the limited purpose of\n\n16\n\nEFTA02758376\n\n", "char_count": 1968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 27 of 63\n\nobjecting to any relief sought against the Foundations' ... and plaintiffs have made no\nattempt to join them as parties to litigate the issue of the Foundations' liability.\").\nTo be sure, the law has been settled for thirty years that \"a party seeking a judgment\nbinding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he must be joined.\"\n\nv.\n\nWilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989), superseded by statute in not relevant part as stated in\nLandgraf v. USIFilm Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1944). As the Supreme Court stated:\nThe parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature\nand scope of relief sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief\nmight be granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of\nbringing in additional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than\nplacing on potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they acquire\nknowledge of the lawsuit.\nId. at 765; Steans v. Combined Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1998)\n(citing\n\nv. Wilks and refusing to allow an Order to bind a non-party); see also Chase\n\nNat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934) (\"The law does not impose upon any\nperson absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to\nwhich he is a stranger .... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person\nnot a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal\nrights.\"). Therefore, even assuming there was a factual basis in the record for Petitioners'\nassertions that Mr. Epstein's counsel has \"unclean hands\" and acted in \"bad faith\" — which\nthere is not, see Argument I.B., infra — those findings and conclusions cannot be applied\nagainst Mr. Epstein.\nSignificantly, Petitioners cite no case in which a Court rescinded or reformed a\ncontract to prejudice a contracting party who was not even a party to the litigation. The\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/26 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=26]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 28 of 63\n\nreason is rooted in principles of procedural due process. \"It is hornbook law that all parties\nto a contract are necessary in an action challenging its validity....\" Sch. Dist. of City of\nPontiac v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 303 (6d' Cir. 2009). \"No procedural\nprinciple is more deeply imbedded in the common law that, in an action to set aside a lease\nor a contract, all parties who may be affected by the determination of the action are\nindispensable.\" Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1975). As this\nCourt has recognized, \"a contracting party is the paradigm of an indispensable party.\"\nHDR Eng'g, Inc. v. R.C.T. Eng'g, Inc., No. 08-81040-CIV-ICAM, 2010 WL 2402908, *2\n(S.D.Fla. June 15, 2010) (citation omitted). \"Parties to a contract are indispensable when\na suit concerns the rights and obligations afforded by the contract.\" Id. When the\ngovernment moved to dismiss the CVRA lawsuit on the basis that due process precluded\nthe invalidation of Mr. Epstein's contractual rights because he was not a party, (DE 2052:5-6), Petitioners first opposed the motion and thereafter opted to not join Mr. Epstein as\na party. In so doing, Petitioners necessarily decided to forego any remedies against him.\nv. Wilks, supra.\nThe absence of any process deprived Mr. Epstein of the ability to contest numerous\nallegations and stipulations at the liability phase. For example, the Court accepted the\ngovernment's concession that Petitioners met the definition of \"crime victims\" under the\nCVRA, (DE 189:4), which requires that they have been \"directly and proximately harmed\nas a result of the commission of a Federal offense\" under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(eX2)(A)\n(emphasis added). But there was no federal charge against Mr. Epstein and no finding of\nwhich federal offense, if any, Mr. Epstein had committed against the Petitioners. The\n18\n\nEFTA02758378\n\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 29 of 63\n\nabsence of any basis to prosecute Mr. Epstein for a federal offense was a point of particular\ncontention by him during the federal investigation. As another example, at the July 11,\n2008 hearing, the government did not object to a delayed decision in this matter when\nPetitioners agreed with the Court that there was no longer an emergency and an immediate\nresolution was not necessary. (DE 15:24-27; DE 99:4). At that time, Mr. Epstein had\nalready begun serving the sentence required by the NPA and was incarcerated. The\nstipulated delay ensured that the mandatory time deadlines in the CVRA would be\nexceeded, to Mr. Epstein's detriment, because he would be forced to endure all of the\nburdens of the NPA before a decision would ever be issued in this case. See Argument\nII.B., infra. In sum, imposition of Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies would violate\nMr. Epstein's constitutional right to due process of law.\nB.\n\nThere was no Judicial Finding of \"Bad Faith\" or an \"Illegal\nAgreement\" and no Factual Basis for any Such Findings\n\nEven assuming, arguendo, that the Constitution would ever permit a finding against\nthe government to be the basis for imposition of extraordinary remedies against a nonparty, nowhere in the Court's opinion (DE 435) was there a finding that Mr. Epstein's\ncounsel acted in \"bad faith\" with the deliberate intent to violate the CVRA or that the\ngovernment's non-prosecution agreement with Mr. Epstein was an \"illegal agreement.\"\nThus, there is nofactual basis in the record for imposition of Petitioners' Proposed Epstein\nRemedies.\n\n19\n\nEFTA02758379\n\n", "char_count": 1672}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 30 of 63\n\nL\n\nMr. Epstein's Counsel Acted in Good Faith\n\nThe Court's finding that \"Epstein's counsel was aware that the [USAO-SDFL] was\ndeliberately keeping the NPA secret from the victims and, indeed, had sought assurances\nto that effect\" was based on a stipulation between Petitioners (DE 361:19 & n.62) and the\ngovernment (DE 407:7), during the liability phase of this case.2 From that stipulation,\nwhich the government had no motive to contest or clarify on Mr. Epstein's behalf,\nPetitioners now attribute to the Court findings that it did not make about the intent and\nmotives of Mr. Epstein's counsel. The Court made no such findings, and beyond that, the\nrecord conclusively refutes any bad faith.\nThe essence of the CVRA violation, as found by the Court, was that \"the\nGovernment failed to advise the victims about its intention to enter into the NPA,\" i.e.,\nbefore September 24, 2007. (DE435:32; DE435:7-8). The Court reasoned that \"the CVRA\nrequired the Government to inform Petitioners that it intended to enter into an agreement\nnot to prosecute Epstein\" and that Petitioners \"should have been notified of the\nGovernment's intention to take that course of action before it bound itself under the NPA.\"\n(DE 435:27) (emphasis added). Although the parties \"anticipate[d]\" that the NPA \"will\nnot be made part of any public record,\" (DE 361-62:6), nowhere in the record is there\n\nOn February 10, 2016, Petitioners filed a \"Consolidated Statement of Undisputed Material\nFacts\" as part of their motion for partial summary judgment, containing 157 separatelynumbered paragraphs with facts Petitioners claimed were undisputed. (DE 361:7-47).\nParagraph 48 of Petitioners' submission contains the allegation regarding the \"awareness\"\nand \"assurances.\" (DE 361:19). On June 6, 2017, the USAO-SDFL filed its response to\neach of the numbered paragraphs, (DE 407), either admitting or denying (with\namplification) those facts. Th\n... [truncated, 2104 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/29 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=29]", "char_count": 2104}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 31 of 63\n\nany evidence that Mr. Epstein's counsel, prior to September 24, 2007, urged the\ngovernment not to consult with Petitioners about the government's intentions.\nThe stipulation relies on exhibits (DE 361-63; DE361-66; DE 361-67) that do not\nsupport a finding that Mr. Epstein's counsel urged the government to conceal the NPA\nfrom Petitioners or any other victims prior to its execution. Mr. Epstein's counsel never\nconditioned his agreement to the NPA on non-disclosure to victims of the intended\nresolution. And, despite full disclosure to Petitioners during this litigation of all\ncommunications between Mr. Epstein and the government, Petitioners do not cite a single\ninstance, prior to September 24, 2007, where Mr. Epstein's counsel either mentioned the\nCVRA or urged non-disclosure to victims of the intended resolution of the matter. Rather,\nPetitioners and the government stipulated, and the Court found, as follows: \"After the NPA\nwas signed, Epstein's counsel and the [USAO-SDFL] began negotiations about whether\nthe victims would be told about the NPA.\" (DE 361-19; DE 407-7; DE 435:8-9) (emphasis\nadded). Thus, there is no record support for Petitioners' claims that Mr. Epstein was the\n\"instigator\" of the CVRA violation or that \"the parties negotiated [the NPA] in deliberate\nviolation of the victims' rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act...\" (DE 458:16)\n(emphasis added).\nAfter the NPA was signed, Mr. Epstein's counsel rightfully advocated that the\nUSAO-SDFL adhere to the \"Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness\nAssistance,\" which were issued in May 2005 (before this case). (DE 403-15). Those\nGuidelines, which the USAO-SDFL was not free to disregard, determined that the CVRA\napplied only \"if the offense is charged in Federal district court.\" (DE 408:20-21, DE 40321\n\nEFTA02758381\n\n", "char_count": 1903}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 32 of 63\n\n13; DE 403-15). The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (\"OLC\")\nconfirmed this in 2010, noting that \"the CVRA is best read as providing that the rights\nidentified in section 3771(a) are guaranteed from the time that criminal proceedings are\ninitiated (by complaint, information, or indictment) and cease to be available if all charges\nare dismissed either voluntarily or on the merits (or if the Government declines to bring\nformal charges after the filing of a complaint.).\" U.S. Department of Justice, Office of\nLegal Counsel (OLC), The Availability of Crime Victims' Rights Under the Crime\nVictims' Rights Act of 2004, 1 (Dec. 17, 2010). At the time the NPA was signed, there\nwas no case law which would even arguably challenge the DOJ's guidelines nor anything\nto suggest that, by urging the USAO-SDFL to follow its own national guidelines, Mr.\nEpstein's counsel would be acting in bad faith.3\nAlthough Mr. Epstein's counsel requested that the USAO-SDFL follow its own\nnational guidelines with respect to the CVRA after the NPA was signed, counsel also\nreiterated in December 2007 that \"we do not object (as we made clear in our letter last\nweek) that someform of notice be given to the alleged victims.\" (DE 403-15:3) (emphasis\nadded). To be sure, the NPA itself contemplated notification to the alleged victims through\n\nCVRA required the Attorney General to \"promulgate regulations to enforce the rights\nof crime victims and to ensure compliance by responsible officials with the obligations\ndescribed in law respecting crime victims.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(t)(1). The Attorney General\ndid just that. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.10. Furthermore, the CVRA provides that the Attorney\nGeneral or his/her designee shall be the \"final arbiter,\" without judicial review, of any\ncomplaints filed against responsible officials under the CVRA. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(2XD).\nThis was a proper delegation of authority. See\n... [truncated, 2236 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/31 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=31]", "char_count": 2236}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 33 of 63\n\ntheir attorney-representative who would be selected by a process that included a Special\nformer Chief Judge\n\n, who himself was notified about the NPA in October\n\n2007. (DE 361-62:5).\nThe fact that Mr. Epstein's counsel sought to keep the NPA outside the public record\nwas hardly unusual as non-prosecution agreements are not filed in any court. See Craig S.\nMorford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred\nProsecution Agreements and Non—Prosecution Agreements with Corporations, at 1 n. 2\n(Mar. 7, 2008) (with an NPA, \"formal charges are not filed and the agreement is maintained\nby the parties rather than being filed with a court\"). According to AUSA Villafatia,\nconfidentiality of an NPA is the norm, not the exception; this was no concession granted\nto Mr. Epstein. (DE 403-19:18, ¶30) (\"As courts have acknowledged, NPAs are not made\npart of a public court file but are maintained by the prosecutor's office...the assurance that\nI would not distribute...the NPA was simply an assurance that I intended to abide by Office\nand Department policy and law.\").\nThere is simply no evidence of impropriety by Mr. Epstein's counsel either before\nor after the NPA was signed. (DE 408:21-23). Rather, federal law enforcement's decision\nto not consult with Petitioners was made, not for Mr. Epstein's benefit, but rather to protect\ntheir own prosecutorial interests. (DE 14:5) (DE 403-19, ¶21) (AUSA Villafafia: \"I did\nnot want to share with victims that the Office was attempting to secure for them the ability\nto obtain monetary compensation for the harm they had suffered. I was aware that, if I\ndisclosed that and the negotiations fell through, Epstein's counsel would impeach the\nvictims and my credibility by asserting that I had told victims they could receive money\n23\n\nEFTA02758383\n\n", "char_count": 1905}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 34 of 63\n\nfor implicating Epstein.\"); (DE 403-18, ¶21) (FBI Special Agent E. Nesbitt Kuyrkendall:\n\"I was concerned that if the victims were informed of the Non-Prosecution Agreement,\nwhich included an option for victims to seek monetary damages in a civil matter, then\nEpstein's counsel would use the notifications to impeach me and the victims if a\nprosecution were to proceed in the future.\"); (DE 403-19, ¶34) (DE 408:17); (DE 427:15).\nThe CVRA imposed no obligations on Mr. Epstein to notify victims of his intent to\nenter into an NPA or to assure that the right of conferral was implemented. Responsibility\nfor compliance with the CVRA falls exclusively on the government. Knowing that the\ndecision rests squarely with the government, it cannot be bad faith for defense counsel to\nargue that the USAO-SDFL should follow its own national guidelines regarding the\ninapplicability of the CVRA to NPAs. Lawyers do not act in \"bad faith\" by making such\narguments, especially considering that there was no developed case law with respect to this\nissue. Cf. Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co. of\nFlorida, 827 F.2d 1454, 1458 (I 1'h Cir. 1987) (\"Rule 11 is intended to deter frivolous\nlawsuits, not to deter legal arguments or cases of first impression.\"); accord Jelencovich v.\nDodge Enters, Inc., No. 09-81045-civ, 2010 WL 289300 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2010) (\"While\nthe Court ultimately disagreed with Plaintiff's legal theory, this alone cannot form a basis\nfor sanctions under either Rule 11 or Section 57.105, particularly where there is a lack of\ndeveloped case law with respect to the particular theory.\"). That defense counsel advanced\nthe interests of their client is precisely what the Sixth Amendment requires.\n\n24\n\nEFTA02758384\n\n", "char_count": 1849}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 35 of 63\n\nii.\n\nThe NPA is a Legal Agreement\n\nThe Court \"simply rul[ed] that, under the facts of this case, there was a violation of\nthe victims rights under the CVRA.\" (DE 435:33). The Court did not rule that the NPA\nwas an illegal agreement. To the contrary, the Court specifically wrote that it was \"not\nruling that the decision not to prosecute was improper.\" (DE 435:32-33). Petitioners have\nnot identified a single clause within the NPA that is contrary to law, outside the\nprosecutor's authority, or against public policy. Rather, Petitioners acknowledged that the\nterms of the NPA were within the government's discretion. (DE 15:6-7, 22).\nNonetheless, Petitioners repeatedly refer to the NPA as an \"illegal agreement,\" an\n\"illegal non-prosecution agreement,\" or an agreement \"vitiated by illegality,\" in a\nmisguided effort to analogize the NPA to cases where illegal promises were not enforced\nby the courts or plea agreements were stricken for illegal provisions within the agreements\nthemselves. (DE 458:15-17). The cases cited by Petitioners are easily distinguished and\ndo not stand for the propositions for which Petitioners cite them. Rather, they stand for the\nunremarkable proposition that a court may not enforce promises or contractual terms that,\nunlike the provisions of the NPA, are illegal on their face.\nFor example, Petitioners' discussion of their primary case, United States v.\n98 F.3d 944\n\n(7th Cir. 1996), is entirely confused and off-base. In =,\n\nthe issue was\n\nwhether defendant was entitled to specifically enforce a mistaken oral representation made\nby the district court at his arraignment that the sentence on his new charges would run\nconcurrent with the parole violation sentence he was currently serving. Id. at 94546. The\ndistrict court ultimately imposed a consecutive sentence, instead of the concurrent one the\n25\n\nEFTA02758385\n\n", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 36 of 63\n\ncourt had mistakenly suggested at the arraignment, because the law required consecutive\nsentences. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant's remedy was not to\nspecifically enforce the district court's mistaken representation about concurrent sentences\nbut, rather, to seek to withdraw his plea on the basis that the mistaken representation\ninduced him to plead guilty. Id. at 947. The defendant simply chose the wrong remedy\nbecause one cannot seek to specifically enforce a sentence that is contrary to law.\nContrary to Petitioners' repeated contention, the defendant in\n\nhad not\n\n\"forfeited the right to seek specific performance\" of an illegal agreement, (DE 458:15-16;\nDE 127:9), but rather had forfeited his right to withdraw his plea by failing to seek that\nremedy when the district court did not fulfill the representation he made at the arraignment.\n98 F.3d at 947.\n\nhas nothing to do with forfeiting rights to specific\n\nperformance of an NPA or any other agreement. (DE 458:16).\nThe other cases cited by Petitioners involved plea agreements containing (or\nchallenged as containing) unlawful terms or promises that, to be performed, would have\nrequired the respective courts to impose sentences that were contrary to law. They stand\nfor the unassailable proposition, not present here, that a court cannot enforce facially\ninvalid plea agreements that contain illegal terms or omit the required components of a\nsentence. Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Colo. 1999) (court cannot enforce a plea\nagreement that waives the mandatory parole period); State v.\n\n, 582 N.W. 2d 879,\n\n881-82 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement promised a sentence that did not contain the\nstatutorily-required 10-year conditional release term); State v. Wall, 348 N.C. 671, 675-76\n(1998) (holding that court cannot enforce a plea agreement for concurrent sentence where\n26\n\nEFTA02758386\n\n", "char_count": 1970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 37 of 63\n\nlaw mandated consecutive one); Ex pane Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App.\n2006) (court cannot enforce an illegal sentence below the statutory range; remedy was for\ndefendant to withdraw his plea); State v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368, 374 (2002) (court would\nnot enforce plea agreement that called for court to unlawfully sentence the defendant by\ntreating two misdemeanor offenses as felony offenses). None of the cases stand for the\nproposition, urged by Petitioners, that the appropriate remedy for a CVRA violation is to\nexcise a legal term (i.e., the \"immunity provisions\") from the NPA. See DE 462:20 n.16.\nII.\n\nTHE CVRA ITSELF PRECLUDES IMPOSITION OF\nPETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\n\nPetitioners argue that because the CVRA does not expressly exclude the judicial\nreformation of a non-prosecution agreement as a possible remedy, the CVRA impliedly\nauthorizes that remedy. (DE 458:8, 10). The Government's Response to Petitioners'\nSubmission on Proposed Remedies (\"Government's Response\"), (DE 462:7-13),\neviscerates Petitioners' contention that the scope of remedies permitted under the CVRA\nis virtually limitless. Beyond that, the CVRA does not authorize the imposition of any\nremedies against Mr. Epstein eleven (11) years after Petitioners filed their CVRA petition.\nA.\n\nJudicial Reformation of an NPA is not an Authorized Remedy\n\nCiting cases dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803), and\nemphasizing the \"broad remedial structure surrounding the CVRA,\" Petitioners argue that\nthis Court has the \"power to grant any appropriate relief\" because the CVRA contains only\na \"few, narrowly drawn limitations on remedies.\" (DE 458:7-8). Petitioners misread the\nCVRA and rely on broad generalities in lieu of case law directly interpreting the statute.\n27\n\nEFTA02758387\n\n", "char_count": 1887}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 38 of 63\n\n\"[W]here a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must\nbe chary of reading others into it.\" Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v.M, 444 U.S.\n11, 19 (1979). \"The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is\nstrongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an\nintegrated system of procedures for enforcement.\" Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp.t\nWorkers Union of America, AFL-C10, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). \"The judiciary may not, in\nthe face of such comprehensive legislative schemes, fashion new remedies that might upset\ncarefully considered legislative programs.\" Id.\nThe CVRA contains just such a comprehensive legislative scheme. The structure\nof the statute — including its prompt deadlines for victims to seek enforcement of the ten\nseparate rights listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) and the strictly limited and time-sensitive\ncircumstances under which victims may seek to re-open a plea or sentence, see §\n3771(d)(3) and (dX5)(A)-(C) — is designed to ensure immediate remedial action while a\ncase is pending and before an agreement has been fully performed. The statute does not\ndelegate authority to a court to sanction non-compliance, impose measures that are punitive\nagainst an individual, interfere with prosecutorial discretion, or re-write terms of an\nagreement between the government and an individual. Sanctions for non-compliance by\nthe government are delegated to the Attorney General for self-enforcement, based on\ncomplaints from victims.\nContrary to Petitioners' argument, (DE 458:8-9), the \"limitation on relief\" provision\nof § 3771(d)(5) does not, by implication, mean that any and all other remedies are available.\nSection 3771(d)(5) provides a strict limitation on whether and when a plea or sentence may\n28\n\nEFTA02758388\n\n", "char_count": 1913}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 39 of 63\n\nbe re-opened. It does not imply that specific clauses in non-prosecution agreements may\nbe struck eleven years after the fact. Because this same provision served as the basis for\nthe Court's conclusion that rescission of an NPA, being akin to re-opening a plea, was an\nauthorized remedy under the CVRA, (see DE 462:15 n.13, citing DE 189:7-9), then the\nsame \"only if\" limitations in § 3771(d)(5)(A)-(C) must apply to whether and when an NPA\nmay be invalidated. Those limitations preclude Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies.\nTwo CVRA appellate decisions, not cited by Petitioners, reject Petitioners' \"implied\nremedies\" construct. In United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 531-33 (D.C. Cir. 2011),\nthe D.C. Circuit observed that the CVRA's \"carefully crafted and detailed enforcement\nscheme\" provides \"strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other\nremedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.\" Monzel, 641 F.3d at 542 (emphasis\nin original) (citation omitted). In United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308, 1315 (10'h Cir.\n2008), the Court refused to \"read additional remedies\" into the CVRA beyond those\nexpressly contained therein. In the only CVRA case cited by Petitioners, In re\n\n527\n\nF.3d 391 (5111 Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit did not grant a remedy, much less decide that a\ncourt may simply re-write the terms of a non-prosecution agreement as directed by a third\nPly\nMoreover, an interpretation of the CVRA that would allow a district court to impose\nthe \"implied remedy\" of re-writing the terms of a non-prosecution agreement, or\ninvalidating \"immunity provisions,\" after an individual had served his time in jail and paid\nsubstantial money damages, would require this Court to decide the serious constitutional\nquestions raised herein regarding due process and separation of powers. Under the doctrine\n29\n\nEFTA02758389\n\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 40 of 63\n\nof constitutional avoidance, courts should construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional\nproblems unless such a construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward\nJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,\n575 (1988). Accordingly, this Court should construe the CVRA to avoid reaching those\nquestions.\nB.\n\nThe Remedies Sought by Petitioners Against Mr. Epstein are\nTime-Barred under the CVRA\n\nSection 3771(d)(3) provides as follows:\nThe rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district court in\nwhich a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is\nunderway, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.\nThe district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a victim's\nrightforthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may\npetition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals\nmay issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule or\nthe Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up\nand decide such application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has\nbeen filed, unless the litigants, with the approval of the court, have stipulated\nto a different time period for consideration. In deciding such application, the\ncourt of appeals shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review. In no\nevent shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than\nfive days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of appeals\ndenies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be clearly stated on\nthe record in a written opinion.\n(Emphasis added). Thus, the CVRA mandates that a district court shall decide any motion\nasserting a victim's right forthwith. Moreover, the statute expressly prohibits a stay or\ncontinuance of more than \"five days\" under\n... [truncated, 2311 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/39 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=39]", "char_count": 2311}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 41 of 63\n\nBlack's Law Dictionary 654 (6th ed. 1990) defines \"forthwith\" as \"Immediately;\nwithout delay; directly; within a reasonable tine under the circumstances of the case;\npromptly and with reasonable dispatch.\" The former Fifth Circuit discussed the concept\nof \"forthwith\" in the context of executing a search warrant under a former version of\nFed.R.Crim.P. 41(c), as follows:\nThe word `forthwith' is deliberately undefined, in our view, to allow courts\nto interpret it in the context of `reasonableness,' on a case-by-case basis. We\nare convinced that `forthwith' requires no more or less than reasonable\npromptness, diligence or dispatch in executing a warrant, considering the\ndifficulties actually encountered in attempting to perform the task. The\ncommand of forthwith' clearly will not tolerate delay `when deliberate and\nmade by the officers for the purpose of selecting their own time and for\ntheir own purpose, especially where that purpose is to prejudice the rights\nof a suspect.\nUnited States v.M,\n\n428 F.2d 1013, 1016 (5'11 Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). Courts\n\nmeasure the term \"forthwith\" in days. See, e.g., Amelia v. United States, 732 F.2d 711,\n713 (94 Cir. 1984) (service of process 63 days not \"forthwith\"); In re Grand Jury Subpoena\n(T-112), 597 F.3d 189, 202-03 (4th Cir. 2010) (five months delay to produce documents\nunder subpoena not \"forthwith\"); Halperin v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 8, 10 (S.D.Fla.\n1985) (service of process 93 days after filing complaint not \"forthwith\"). In using the term\n\"forthwith\" in the CVRA, Congress plainly contemplated that same degree of swiftness, as\nthe same subsection of the CVRA defines time periods in hours (72) and days (5), not years\nor, as in this case, more than a decade. These time limits were expressly \"framed to resist\nad hoc relaxation\" and, thus, may fairly be characterized as \"rigid.\" Cf. Carlisle v. United\nStates, 517 U.S. 416, 434-36 (1996\n... [truncated, 2145 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/40 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=40]", "char_count": 2145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 42 of 63\n\nCourts have often grappled with the effect that missing a deadline imposed by a\nstatute or rule has on the court's authority to act. In some instances, courts have deemed\nthe deadline to be a condition which cannot be waived or extended and, if missed, prohibits\nthe court from acting. See Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 421-28 (district court lacked authority to\ngrant a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal filed one day outside the time limit\nprescribed by Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)); United States v.\n\nClark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th\n\nCir. 2002) (holding that \"there exists no `inherent authority' for a district court to modify\na sentence\" outside the time limit in Rule 35(a)). In other instances, courts view a deadline\nas \"seek[ing] speed by creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does\nnot deprive a judge ... of the power to take the action to which the deadline applies if the\ndeadline is missed.\" Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 611 (2010) (the fact that a\nsentencing court missed the 90-day deadline \"for the final determination of the victim's\nlosses\" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) did not deprive the court of the power to order\nrestitution).\nThis Court, however, need not decide whether missing a mandatory deadline under\nthe CVRA ipso facto deprives it of the authority to grant relief Nor does this Court need\nto alternatively decide at what point past the mandatory deadline its discretion is\ncircumscribed. Whatever the elasticity, if any, of the CVRA's time limits, there are no\nconceivable circumstances in which a delay of eleven years can be considered \"forthwith,\"\nparticularly where the first two years of that delay are directly attributable to deliberate\ninaction by Petitioners, knowing that Mr. Epstein was incarcerated and enduring the\nconsequences of the NPA. The command of \"forthwith\" under the CVRA simply does not\n32\n\nEFTA02758392\n\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 43 of 63\n\ntolerate deliberate inaction or an extraordinary delay.\nIn that regard, the decision in Monzel is easily distinguished. There, the Court\ndecided a petition for writ of mandamus under the CVRA approximately three (3) months\nafter it was filed. The Court reasoned that \"I a]lthough the statute leaves us no room to set\naside the 72-hour deadline, the multiple issues of first impression this case raises, involving\nseveral statutes and conflicting views among the circuits, called for oral argument and a\npublished opinion that is being issued past the deadline.\" Monzel, 641 F.3d at 532. The\nCourt was not faced with a deliberate delay by the CVRA petitioners to pursue civil\nmonetary claims, an extraordinary delay that exceeded a decade, nor prejudice to a nonparty to the CVRA action. The strict deadlines in the CVRA would be rendered entirely\nmeaningless if they could be disregarded under the circumstances presented in this case.\nPetitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies are statutorily time-barred.\nIII.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW PRECLUDE IMPOSITION OF\nPETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDIES\nA.\n\nA Court may not Re-write an Agreement Between Two\nContracting Parties to Eliminate all Benefits to one Party\n\nRescission means \"[a]nnulling or abrogation or unmaking of [a] contract and the\nplacing of the parties to it in status quo.\" Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968). \"The\neffect of rescission is to render the contract abrogated and of no force and effect from the\nbeginning.\" Borck v. Holewinski, 459 So. 2d 405, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (emphasis\nadded). \"A prerequisite to rescission is placing the other party in status quo\" and \"the\n\n33\n\nEFTA02758393\n\n", "char_count": 1751}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 44 of 63\n\nnecessary pre condition for rescission is tender of the benefits received under the contract.\"\nMazzoni Farms, Inc., v. E.L Dupont de Nemours & Co., 671 So. 2d 306, 313 (Fla. 2000).\nAlthough Petitioners describe their request as one for \"rescission,\" they have\nactually disavowed rescission of the NPA as a remedy. (DE 458:19) (\"Jane Doe 1 and 2\nare only seeking that these particular provisions be set aside.\"). Plainly, Petitioners have\nno legally valid claim to rescission.\nWhere a party, with knowledge of facts entitling him to rescission of a\ncontract or conveyance, afterward, without fraud or duress, ratifies the same,\nhe has no claim to the relief of cancellation. An express ratification is not\nrequired in order thus to defeat his remedy; any acts of recognition of the\ncontract as subsisting or any conduct inconsistent with an intention of\navoiding it, have the effect of an election to affirm.\nHendricks v. Stark, 99 Fla. 277, 285 (Fla. 1930); AVVA-BC, LLC v. Amiel, 25 So. 3d 7, 11\n(Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (\"[W]here a party seeking rescission has discovered grounds for\nrescinding an agreement and either remains silent when he should speak or in any manner\nrecognizes the contract as binding upon him, ratifies or accepts the benefits thereof, he will\nbe held to have waived his right to rescind.\"); Mazzoni Farms, 761 So. 2d at 313 (\"[Al\nparty's right to rescind is subject to waiver if he retains the benefits of a contract after\ndiscovering the grounds for rescission.\"); Abbadessa v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 987 F.2d\n18, 23-24 (P Cir. 1993) (contracts could not be rescinded where parties seeking rescission\ntreated agreements as binding and sought benefits pursuant to the agreements).\nPetitioners and their counsel do not wish to (and cannot) restore Mr. Epstein to the\nstatus quo or return the money they received from him in their civil settlements, including\ntheir attorneys' fees. Instead, they\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/43 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=43]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 45 of 63\n\n\"immunity provisions,\" while at the same time demanding additional benefits, including\nmore compensation for themselves and fees for their attorneys. (DE 458:7, 117).\nPetitioners \"wish to retain the benefits of [the NPA] while simultaneously challenging its\nburdens. Florida law does not provide them with such a windfall.\"\n\nv. BellSouth\n\nTelecomms, 372 F.3d 1250, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004). There is no basis for rescinding any\naspect of the NPA, especially because it has been fully performed. Seh Ahn Lee v. United\nStates, 895 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (\"Because of the disruptive effect of\nretroactively invalidating a government contract, the invalidation of a contract after it has\nbeen fully performed is not favored.\") (citation omitted); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v.\nUnited States, 177 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 1999).\nRegardless, Petitioners are asking the Court to reform the NPA to their liking, not\nto rescind it. Reformation of a contract is an equitable remedy, but its purpose is to\n\"conform to the intention, agreement, and understanding of all the parties,\"\n\nv.\n\nParodi, 50 Fla. 541, 544 (Fla. 1905) (citation omitted), not to change the bargain, punish\none of the contracting parties, or provide a windfall to a third party. Even when there is a\ndisagreement between two contracting parties, courts cannot simply re-write agreements\nbetween them to eliminate the contractual consideration provided by one side, (DE 462:1920), or change material terms. Cf. United States v. Fernandez, 960 F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir.\n1991) (district court erred in rejecting one paragraph of the plea agreement rather than\naccepting or rejecting the entire agreement); United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 375\n(6th Cir. 1993) (\"Nothing in [Rule II] even remotely allows the district court to accept a\nguilty plea but rewrite the plea agreement....\").\n35\n\nEFTA02758395\n\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 46 of 63\n\nThe NPA is not a divisible agreement. (DE 462:19-20); (DE361-62:7) (\"Epstein\nasserts and certifies that each of these terms is material to this agreement and is supported\nby independent consideration....\"). Invalidating any one part of the NPA, particularly one\nthat contained the entire consideration for Mr. Epstein to enter into it, would render the\nentire agreement invalid and would, in the government's view, \"pose a significant risk of\nharm to certain victims\" with whom the government has communicated. (DE 462:15). It\nwould place all of the civil monetary damage settlements at risk, and thus \"imperil ... the\nbenefits and settlements obtained by the more than dozen victims who invoked the NPA\nterms.\" (DE 462:14). Mr. Epstein's state felony convictions and sex offender registration\nwould also be subject to collateral attack, given the state court's recognition that the NPA\nwas the \"significant inducement\" for Mr. Epstein to plead guilty. (Exh. 3, at p.39). Such\na collateral attack would compromise the efforts of the state prosecutors and judiciary to\nconform their resolution of the case to the terms of the NPA.\nEven assuming, arguendo, that there was any legal basis to judicially modify the\nterms of an agreement between two contracting parties at the request of a third party, there\nis simply no logical basis for striking the \"immunity provisions\" and \"rewarding the\ngovernment for what the Court determined was a violation of the CVRA.\" (DE 462:21).\nThe Court made it clear that it \"is not ruling that the decision not to prosecute was\nimproper.\" (DE 435:32-33) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no finding that the immunity\nprovisions were illegal. They are not; they do not violate public policy. The government\nhad the legal authority to provide that consideration and should not be released from its\ncontractual obligations.\n36\n\nEFTA02758396\n\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 47 of 63\n\nB.\n\nThe General Releases Signed by Petitioners Bar Petitioners'\nProposed Epstein Remedies\n\nThe \"Settlement Agreement and General Release\" signed by Petitioners in their civil\nlawsuits against Mr. Epstein were \"negotiated and entered into by the Parties with the\nadvice and assistance of respective counsel.\" (E.g., Exh. 4, at p.5). Petitioners were\nrepresented in those civil settlement agreements by the same counsel who represent them\nin this CVRA litigation. The settlement agreements are governed by Florida law; each\ncontained the same \"General Release\" clause with the broadest language and no\nexceptions. (Exh. 4 at pp. 1-2, 4; Exh. 5, at pp. 1-2, 4). The General Release expressly\nencompassed \"all, and all manner of, action and actions,\" including \"State or Federal,\"\nwhether \"common law or statutory\" and \"claims, and demands whatsoever in law or in\nequity ... for, upon, or by reasons of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever (whether known\nor unknown), from the beginning of the world to the day of this release.\" Id.\nAlthough the General Release extends to even unknown matters, this CVRA case\narises from the same subject matter as the civil lawsuits and was well-known to Petitioners\nat the time of their monetary settlements as it had already been pending for two years.\nPetitioners, though well aware of the potential remedies they might seek in this CVRA\ncase, did not carve out from the General Release any of the proposed equitable remedies\nthey now seek against Mr. Epstein relating to the NPA. Nor would such a carve-out have\nbeen consistent with the entire purpose of the settlement agreement, which was to ensure\nfinality of all claims between Mr. Epstein and Petitioners in exchange for the monetary\npayments Petitioners received. (E.g., Exh. 4, at p.2) (\"It is further agreed that this\n37\n\nEFTA02758397\n\n", "char_count": 1915}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 48 of 63\n\nSettlement Agreement represents a final resolution of a disputed claim and is intended to\navoid further litigation.\"). Petitioners' counsel emphasized the fact of finality vis-à-vis Mr.\nEpstein when they sought to revive their CVRA lawsuit solely against the government.\n(DE 41:1) (\"[W]hile [Petitioners] had settled their case with Jeffrey Epstein, they had\nreached no settlement with the U.S. Attorney's Office...\") (emphasis in original).\nFlorida law \"favors the finality of settlements,\" Pettinelli v. Danzig, 722 F.2d 706,\n710 (11'h Cir. 1984), and Florida courts enforce general releases in settlement agreements\n\"to further the policy of encouraging settlements.\" Mazzoni Farms, Inc., 761 So. 2d at 314.\nThe construction and enforcement of a release are governed by general principles of\ncontract law. Weingart v.\n\n& O'Hare, 654 F.2d 1096, 1103 (5'h Cir. 1981). \"[W]here\n\nthe language of a release is clear and unambiguous a court cannot entertain evidence\ncontrary to its plain meaning.\" Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 679 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 1996).\nA general release will ordinarily be regarded as embracing all claims which have matured\nat the time of its execution. Mulhem v. Rogers, 636 F.Supp. 323, 325 (S.D.Fla. 1986).\nFlorida courts and the Eleventh Circuit have not hesitated to enforce broad general\nreleases in myriad circumstances. For example, in Cerniglia, the Florida Supreme Court\nheld that a wife's general release of the husband from \"all claims of whatever nature each\nmay have had in or to any assets/property or estate of whatever kind, now or hereafter\nowned or possessed by the other\" was intended by the parties to serve as a complete bar to\nall claims arising from the marriage and barred the wife's claims to assets based on tort\nand contract theories. Cerniglia, 679 So. 2d at 1164 & n.4;\n\n372 F.3d at 1278-79\n\n(interpreting Florida law and barring Plaintiff's claims based on \"the un\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/47 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=47]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 49 of 63\n\nthe general releases\" they signed); Pettinelli, 722 F.2d at 710. Where, as here, a release\nhas all-inclusive language such as \"any and all liabilities and claims\" and covers the time\nperiod \"from the beginning of the world to the days present,\" it bars all claims which have\nmatured prior to executing the release. Finn:pion v. Conel Acreage Dev. Co., Inc., 830 So.\n2d 208, 210 (Fla. 5thDCA 2002); Hold v. Manzini, 736 So.2d 138, 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).\nIndeed, even where a claim is unrelated to the litigation that resulted in the release, that\nclaim will be barred if the general release in the prior litigation covered \"any and all claims\"\nthat had matured. Plumpton, 830 So. 2d at 211.\nPetitioners readily acknowledge that the government \"will obviously suffer no harm\nif this Court invalidates the immunity provisions in the non-prosecution agreement,\" (DE\n458:20), so it is clear that Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies are directed only at Mr.\nEpstein, a non-party. It makes no difference that Petitioners are seeking this equitable relief\nthrough the vehicle of a CVRA case filed against the government rather than in a lawsuit\ndirectly naming Mr. Epstein, as the language of the General Release is all-encompassing\nand bars any form of relief, including equitable relief, against him.4\nIV.\n\nTHE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE AND JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL\nPRECLUDE IMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED\nEPSTEIN REMEDIES\n\nIn their civil monetary damage lawsuits, Petitioners sought to enforce the terms of\n\n'While, in the ordinary case, release is an affirmative defense which must be pled in the\nparty's answer to the complaint, Rakip v. Paradise Awnings Corp., 514 F. App'x 917, 920\n(11th Cir. 2013)), Mr. Epstein was not served with a complaint. Thus, now is his first\nopportunity to assert the defense of release, as Petitioners are seeking remedies against\nhint as a result of the summary judgment ruling against th\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/48 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=48]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 50 of 63\n\nthe NPA against Mr. Epstein. Principles of equitable and judicial estoppel preclude\nPetitioners from doing a complete about-face on the enforceability of that agreement.\nAs argued in Section II.B, supra, the CVRA requires a decision \"forthwith,\" which\nsuggests a concern that judicial action be taken before the parties have performed their\nobligations in reliance on an agreement. Petitioners, far from proceeding with dispatch,\nstymied the operation of the CVRA because, as they conceded in August 2008, it was\n\"likely not in [the petitioners'] interest to ask for the [rescission] relief that we initially\nasked for.\" (DE 27:4). As this Court observed, \"the CVRA case stalled as petitioners\npursued collateral civil claims against Epstein.\" (DE 189:5, ¶ 8). In their civil lawsuits for\nmoney damages, Petitioners argued that the NPA precluded Mr. Epstein from \"denying the\nacts alleged in this Complaint\" and forced him to \"effectively admit liability to the\nPlaintiff.\" (DE 403-16, at ¶118-20; DE 403-17, at 9¶18-20; DE 205-6:11-12; 58-59, 8990). In the interim, Mr. Epstein, to his detriment, served his sentence and a year of\ncommunity control, registered as a sex offender, and made substantial financial payments,\nincluding to Petitioners, to settle numerous civil claims to comply with his obligations\nunder the NPA. Only after they had utilized the NPA to their advantage in securing their\nown substantial monetary settlements from Mr. Epstein did Petitioners resurrect their\nCVRA lawsuit. Petitioners made a deliberate decision to choose one lawsuit over the other.\nThe doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Petitioners from attacking, in this\n\n40\n\nEFTA02758400\n\n", "char_count": 1762}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 51 of 63\n\nproceeding, the NPA they expressly relied upon in their civil lawsuits.5 \"The doctrine of\nequitable estoppel is grounded in fairness.\" Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 701 F.3d\n1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012). \"The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a plaintiff from, in\neffect, trying to have his cake and eat it too; that is, from \"rely[ing] on the contract when it\nworks to [his] advantage [by establishing the claim] and repudiat[ing] it when it works to\n[his] disadvantage . ...\" In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 976 (11th\nCir. 2002), rev'd on other grounds, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401\n(2003), quoting Tepper Realty Co. v. Mosaic Tile Co., 259 F. Supp. 688, 692 (S.D.N.Y.\n1966). \"Equitable estoppel precludes a party from claiming the benefits of a contract while\nsimultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that contract imposes.\" Blinco v.\nTree Servicing LLC, 400 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Humana, 285 F.3d at\n976).\nPlainly, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies. So does the separate doctrine of\njudicial estoppel, which precludes a party from \"asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that\nis inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.\" Burnes v. Pemco\nAeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled in pan, Slater v. United\nStates Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1176-77 (1 1 th Cir. 2017). It is \"an equitable concept\nintended to prevent the perversion of the judicial process,\" id., which prohibits \"parties\nfrom deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.\" New\n\n5 The government raised the issues of equitable estoppel and judicial estoppel in its\nsummary judgment submissions and re-raised the argument in its response to Petitioners'\nproposed remedies. (DE 462:17, n.14). This Court expressly reserved ruling on those\narguments because they \"relate only to th\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/50 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=50]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 52 of 63\n\nHampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001). \"Stated simply, the doctrine of judicial\nestoppel rests on the principle that `absent any good explanation, a party should not be\nallowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an inconsistent\nadvantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.' Slater, 871 F.3d at 1180-81 (quoting Ryan\nOperations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996)).\nThe Eleventh Circuit \"employs a two-part test to guide district courts in applying\njudicial estoppel: whether (1) the party took an inconsistent position under oath in a\nseparate proceeding, and (2) these inconsistent positions were `calculated to make a\nmockery of the judicial system.' Id. at 1181 (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285). These\ntwo factors \"are not inflexible or exhaustive; rather, courts must always give due\nconsideration to all of the circumstances of a particular case when considering the\napplicability of this doctrine.\" Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286.\nIn their civil actions, Petitioners relied on the NPA as a valid, legal agreement which\nprecluded Mr. Epstein from contesting his liability for money damages to them, telling this\nCourt at about the same time that the NPA's invalidation was likely not in their best\ninterest. (DE 27:4). After they reaped for themselves the financial benefits of the NPA\nand released Mr. Epstein from all further actions related to the NPA, Petitioners reversed\ntheir position and argued that the NPA was an \"illegal agreement\" that should be reformed\nto eliminate all benefits to Mr. Epstein. The first part of the Slater standard is satisfied.\nSuch blatant inconsistency is calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system:\ntrying to convince one court to rule in their favor based on the binding validity of the NPA\nand then trying to convince this Court that the NPA agreement was an \"illegal agreement.\"\n42\n\nEFTA0275840\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/51 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=51]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 53 of 63\n\nApparently, the NPA shifted from being an invalid to a valid agreement and then back to\nan invalid agreement based solely on the financial benefits Petitioners stood to gain and\nthe different legal strategies that served their purposes in the different proceedings. This\nwas no inadvertence or mistake. Petitioners are represented by able and sophisticated\nlawyers; their manipulation of the legal system for their financial benefit was not\naccidental. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to prevent this type of\ngamesmanship.\nV.\n\nPRINCIPLES OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PRECLUDE\nIMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN\nREMEDIES\n\nPetitioners invite this Court to judicially endorse a prospective breach of the NPA\nby the government. The Court should decline that invitation. \"Due process requires the\ngovernment to adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity agreement it makes.\"\nUnited States v. ■, 643 F.3d 807, 874 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Harvey,\n869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404\nU.S. 257, 262 (1971) (\"When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise ... of the\nprosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise\nmust be fulfilled.\"); United States v. AI-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (\"Due\nprocess requires the government to adhere to the promises it has made in a plea\nagreement.\"). That the \"immunity provisions\" were very clearly an inducement for Mr.\nEpstein to enter his state court plea was confirmed by the state court judge who sentenced\nhim: \"I would view [the agreement \"not to prosecute you federally\"] as a significant\n\n43\n\nEFTA02758403\n\n", "char_count": 1800}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 54 of 63\n\ninducement in accepting this plea.\" (Exh. 3, at p.39).\nA federal court's role is to ensure that the government fulfills, not breaches, its\ncontractual promises to criminal defendants. United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 70 (I\"\nCir. 1992). A non-prosecution agreement is entitled to no less constitutional protection\nthan a plea agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 61516 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (non-prosecution agreements \"are to be construed in light of `special\ndue process concerns') (quoting United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 2000)\n(citations omitted); (DE 205-2:34) (ICJ/institutional due process guarantees do not allow\neither the Non-Prosecution Agreement — which by its terms induced Epstein to, inter alia,\nplead guilty to state criminal charges and serve an 18-month sentence of state incarceration\n— or the governmental obligations undertaken therein to be set aside.\"); (DE 435:27)\n(Court: \"Although the binding effect of the NPA was contingent upon Epstein pleading\nguilty to the state charges, that contingency was out of the control of the government. The\ngovernment's hands were permanently tied V Epstein fulfilled his obligations under the\nNPA.\") (emphasis added).\nPetitioners acknowledge this well-established principle but argue that it does not\napply because the government \"cannot abide by illegal promises.\" (DE 458:17). As argued\nsupra, however, the \"immunity provisions\" are not illegal. (DE 435:32-33) (\"The Court is\nnot ruling that the decision not to prosecute was improper.\"). That distinction renders\ninapposite the cases cited by Petitioners, which involved contracts whose very terms were\nillegal. (DE 458:18). For example, in Power Fin. Credit Union v. Nat'l Credit Union\nAdmin. Bd., 494 Fed. Appx. 982, 986 (11d' Cir. 2012), the question was whether one party,\n44\n\nEFTA02758404\n\n", "char_count": 1948}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 55 of 63\n\na Florida credit union, could prospectively enforce an agreement it had entered into with a\nNational Credit Union to purchase certain mortgages when a Florida statute expressly\nprohibited such purchases. The essential term of the contract was illegal. The Eleventh\nCircuit held that a court could not prospectively enforce any part of a contract that required\none party to violate the law. Id.\nAt its core, Petitioners' claim is not that any particular provision of the NPA is\nunenforceable as against the law or public policy, but rather that the NPA as a whole was\nexecuted before the government complied with its conferral obligations under the CVRA.\nThe government's failure to comply with its obligation to third parties, however, is simply\nno basis for unshackling the government from its contractual obligations to its\ncounterparty. Rejection of Petitioners' Proposed Epstein Remedies would not leave\nPetitioners without any remedies. The CVRA, and its implementing regulations, contain a\nmechanism for remedying prosecutorial violations of the CVRA. See 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(f)(2)(C); 28 C.F.R. § 45.10; (DE 462:9-10). That is not to say that such sanctions are\nappropriate here.\nThe inequities of invalidating the \"immunity provisions\" of the NPA at this juncture,\nand depriving Mr. Epstein of its benefits, are stark. Mr. Epstein can never be returned to\nthe status quo ante. The time he spent in jail and on community control cannot be restored\nto him, the prejudice he has suffered from being required to register as a sex offender\ncannot be undone, and he will never recoup the substantial amounts he paid in monetary\nsettlements. Invalidating the \"immunity provisions\" of the NPA after full performance by\nMr. Epstein would violate his substantive due process rights.\n45\n\nEFTA02758405\n\n", "char_count": 1881}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 56 of 63\n\nVI.\n\nTHE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES\nIMPOSITION OF PETITIONERS' PROPOSED EPSTEIN\nREMEDIES\n\nThe Executive Branch has broad discretion to decide when to initiate criminal\nproceedings. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir.\n1986) (\"The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core\nof the Executive's duty to see the faithful execution of the laws.\"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470\nU.S. 821, 832 (1985) (\"The decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict\n... has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive ... who is charged by\nthe Constitution to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.\") (citing U.S. Const.\nart. II, § 3). This \"broad discretion\" exists because the Executive Branch is responsible for\nconsidering many factors \"not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are\ncompetent to undertake,\" such as \"the strength of the case, the prosecution's general\ndeterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to\nthe Government's overall enforcement plan...\" Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607\n(1985). As such, the decision to prosecute is \"particularly ill-suited to judicial review.\" Id.\nFurthermore, \"a district judge must be careful not to exceed his or her constitutional\nrole.\" United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995). \"When a\njudge assumes the power to prosecute, the number [of branches] shrinks to two.\" In re\nUnited States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d\n167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (\"It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of\npowers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers\nof the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.\").\n46\n\nEFTA02758406\n\n", "char_count": 1991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 57 of 63\n\nThese principles are particularly important in the context of non-prosecution\nagreements, which are private contracts between the government and an investigatory\ntarget, entered into in the exercise of the government's sole discretion to decide whether to\nbring criminal charges. Non-prosecution agreements are not filed with the court, do not\ngenerally become public, and where, as here, there has been full performance on both sides,\nnon-prosecution agreements ordinarily do not involve judicial proceedings of any sort.\nUnlike a plea agreement or deferred prosecution agreement (\"DPA\"), which are the result\nof a \"case or controversy\" filed in court, a non-prosecution agreement is extrajudicial and\ndoes not require court approval.' Petitioners' proposal that the Court order the excision of\nthe \"immunity provisions\" from the NPA and declare that the Constitution permits the\nfederal prosecution of Mr. Epstein would eliminate all contractual consideration provided\nto Mr. Epstein. It would thrust the Court into the role of prosecutor and plea negotiator,\nintrude on the authority and function of the Executive to resolve criminal investigations\nthe way it deems appropriate, and violate the Separation of Powers doctrine.\nEven in the context of DPAs, where courts do have limited involvement, courts may\nnot permissibly reject a DPA based on disapproval of its substance. United States v. Fokker\n\nThese crucial distinctions between DPAs, which require the involvement of the courts,\nand NPAs, which do not, may explain why Congress did not include NPAs in the 2015\namendment to § 3771(a)(9). Although Mr. Epstein is aware that the Court has decided\notherwise, (DE 435:28-30), Congress likely chose not to open up a wholly non-judicial\nprocess committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive to scrutiny under the\nCVRA. \"If, in the context of [N]PAs, Congress intended to rejigger the historical allo\n... [truncated, 2218 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/56 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=56]", "char_count": 2218}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 58 of 63\n\nServs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Nor may courts oversee the implementation of\na DPA. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d at 138. Fokker Services addressed the intersection\nof judicial and executive powers with respect to a DPA and held that the district court could\nnot reject the DPA based on its disagreement with the Executive's charging decisions.\nThe Executive's primacy in criminal charging decisions is long settled. That\nauthority stems from the Constitution's delegation of \"take Care\" duties, U.S.\nConst. art. II, § 3, and the pardon power, id. § 2, to the Executive Branch.\nSee United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 . . . (1996); In re Aiken\nCnty., 725 F.3d 255, 262-63 (D.C.Cir.2013). Decisions to initiate charges,\nor to dismiss charges once brought, \"lie[ ] at the core of the Executive's duty\nto see to the faithful execution of the laws.\" Cmty.for Creative Non—Violence\nv. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1986). The Supreme Court thus has\nrepeatedly emphasized that \"[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file\nor bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the\n, 442 U.S. 114, 124 . . .\nprosecutor's discretion.\" United States v.\n(1979); see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 . . . (1978).\nFokker Services, 818 F.3d at 741.\nAccordingly, judicial authority is \"at its most limited when reviewing the\nExecutive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations.\" Id. In Fokker, the\nquestion before the D.C. Circuit was whether the district court had the power to decline to\nenter a speedy trial waiver because it believed that the terms of the DPA were too lenient.\nThe Court answered that question with a definitive no, reasoning that Congress, in enacting\nthe Speedy Trial Act, \"acted against the backdrop of long-settled understandings about the\nindependence of the Executive with regard to charging decisions\" and that \"[n]othing in\nthe statute\n... [truncated, 2269 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758351/57 or ?id=EFTA02758351&page=57]", "char_count": 2269}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 59 of 63\n\nAlthough Fokker addressed DPAs, the same principles apply with even greater force\nto NPAs, which involve no judicial supervision. By granting Petitioners' Proposed Epstein\nRemedies and re-writing the terms of the NPA to remove the \"immunity provisions,\" the\nCourt in effect would be rejecting the deal agreed to by the parties and would be deciding,\non behalf of the Executive, how to resolve Mr. Epstein's criminal exposure. It does not\nmatter that the Court would not actually be initiating a prosecution; by dictating the\noutcome of a negotiated contract between the government and Mr. Epstein relating to the\ndecision not to prosecute, which is within the Executive's exclusive discretion, the Court\nwould be playing the role of prosecutor. The Separation of Powers doctrine does not permit\nshrinking the number of branches to two.\nVII. THE DOCTRINE OF RIPENESS PRECLUDES IMPOSITION OF\nPROPOSED EPSTEIN REMEDY #2\nRemedy #2 proposed by Petitioners seeks a declaration from the Court as follows:\n\"If, after consultation with the victims, the U.S. Attorney's Office determines that\nprosecution of Epstein for crimes committed against Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (or any\nother victim) is appropriate, the Constitution would permit such a prosecution[.]\" (DE\n458:4-5). The Court should reject Petitioners' invitation to render an advisory opinion. A\ndeclaration that \"the Constitution would permit\" a prosecution of Mr. Epstein would violate\nthe well-settled ripeness doctrine. This doctrine is rooted in the constitutional requirement\nthat federal courts consider only \"cases\" and \"controversies,\" U.S. Const. art. III, §2, and\nin prudential concerns. National Advertising Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1335, 1339\n(11th Cir. 2005).\n49\n\nEFTA02758409\n\n", "char_count": 1834}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 60 of 63\n\n\"Strict application of the ripeness doctrine prevents federal courts from rendering\nimpermissible advisory opinions and wasting resources through review of potential\nabstract disputes.\" Id. The prudential aspect of this doctrine \"asks whether it is appropriate\nfor this case to be litigated in a federal court by these parties at this time.\" Id. A ripeness\ninquiry requires a two part \"determination of (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial\ndecision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.\" Id. One\nof the \"basic rationales\" for the ripeness doctrine is \"to protect the [administrative] agencies\nfrom judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its\neffects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.\" Digital Props., Inc. v. City of\nPlantation, 121 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations\nomitted). There is no prosecution pending before this Court. Thus, the Court should not\nassume the role of deciding the myriad of constitutional challenges that Mr. Epstein might\nhave to that prosecution. It truly is an advisory opinion as the government has re-affirmed\nagain that \"fundamental tenets of contract law ... bind the government's hands in this\ncase.\" (DE 462:18).\nVIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED REMEDY IS NOT\nAUTHORIZED BY THE CVRA\nMr. Epstein does not oppose the first and third remedies proposed by the\ngovernment (DE 462:7), as those are self-imposed measures that the government may\nundertake even without a directive from the Court. Moreover, Mr. Epstein has no legal\nbasis to object if the government voluntarily chooses to provide a forum within the\nExecutive Branch for individuals to make public victim impact statements and to express\n50\n\nEFTA02758410\n\n", "char_count": 1863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 61 of 63\n\ntheir displeasure with the DOJ about how it handled the case.\nHowever, there is no authority under the CVRA nor, to our knowledge, any\nhistorical precedent, for a federal judge to order and preside over a proceeding in a federal\ncourtroom for unadjudicated victims to make impact statements about a person who has\nnot been convicted of, or facing sentence for, a federal crime. This proposal would provide\na federal judicial forum for non-parties who were not individually found to have been\nharmed by federal crimes to make statements about another non-party, Mr. Epstein, who\nwas never adjudicated guilty of a federal crime. There is no \"case or controversy\" before\nthis Court.\nIX.\n\nMR. EPSTEIN ADOPTS THE ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY\nRAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT\nTHE REMEDY IN THIS CASE\n\nThroughout the CVRA litigation, the government raised several arguments about\nthe scope of the CVRA which the Court rejected. These arguments included: a) whether a\ncrime victim's rights under the CVRA attach before the govemment brings formal charges\nagainst a defendant; b) whether the CVRA's conferral right extends to conferring about\nnon-prosecution agreements; c) whether rescission is an available remedy for a violation\nof the right to confer; and d) whether Petitioners are crime victims under the CVRA. See\nDoes v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Doe v. United States,\n950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267-69 (S.D. Fla. 2013); (DE 99; DE 119; DE 189; DE 435:26;\nDE 462:1-2 n.1). Mr. Epstein respectfully adopts those arguments insofar as they preclude\nthe remedies Petitioners are now seeking and preserves those arguments in the event there\n\n51\n\nEFTA02758411\n\n", "char_count": 1776}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 62 of 63\n\nis further review of this case by the Eleventh Circuit or the Supreme Court.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Petitioners' Proposed Epstein\nRemedies, as well as the government's second proposed remedy.\nRespectfully submitted,\n/s/Roy Black\nRoy Black, Esq.\n(FL Bar No. 126088)\nJackie Perczek, Esq.\n(FL Bar No. 042201)\nBLACK SREBNICK KORNSPAN & STUMPF, P.A.\n201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300\nMiami, Florida 33131\nTele: (305) 371-6421\nFax: (305) 358-2006\nE-Mail: rblack@royblack.com\nE-Mail: jperczelarovblack.com\n\nS\n\n. Weinberg\nG. Weinberg, Esq.\nG. VVEINBERG, P.C.\nBar No. 519480)\n20 Park Plaza, Suite 1000\nBoston, Massachusetts 02116\nTele: (617) 227-3700\nFax: (617) 338-9538\nE-Mail: owlmgvv@att.net\n\n/s/ Scott A. Srebnick\nScott A. Srebnick, Esq.\n(FL Bar No 872910)\nSCOTT A. SREBNICK, P. A\n201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1210\nMiami, Florida 33131\nTele: (305) 285-9019\nE-Mail: scott@srebnicklaw.com\n\n52\n\nEFTA02758412\n\n", "char_count": 1034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758351", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 463 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2019 Page 63 of 63\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that July 8, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing\ndocument with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. According to the Court's website,\ncounsel for all parties and intervenors are able to receive notice via the CM/ECF system.\n\n/s/Jackie Perczek\nJackie Perczek\n\n53\n\nEFTA02758413\n\n", "char_count": 410}]}