{"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_count": 35, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02758167", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02758167.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 1 of 35\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCase No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/\nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2\nv.\nUNITED STATES\n\nJANE DOE 1 AND JANE DOE 2'S SUBMISSION ON PROPOSED REMEDIES\nCOME NOW Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (also referred to as \"the victims\"), by and through\nundersigned counsel, to provide their submission on proposed remedies. For the reasons explained\nbelow, the Court should grant Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 various remedies as listed below. The\nappropriate remedies include rescission of the provisions in the non-prosecution agreement that\nimmunized Epstein and his named and unnamed coconspirators from prosecution without first\nconferring with Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Court is well familiar with the facts of this case but highlighting some aspects of the\nlitigation history will usefully frame Jane Doe 1 and 2's request. The relevant facts of this case\nhave already been essentially established by this Court's detailed ruling on summary judgment.\nAs this Court found in its February 21, 2019 opinion and order, between about 1999 and 2007,\n\"Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls, including Petitioners Jane Doe 1 and\nJane Doe 2 . . . at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and\noverseas.\n\nBecause Epstein and his co-conspirators knowingly traveled in interstate and\n1\n\nEFTA02758167\n\n", "char_count": 1470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 2 of 35\n\ninternational commerce to sexually abuse Jane Doe I, Jane Doe 2 and others, they committed\nviolations of not only Florida law, but also federal law.\" Jane Does I and 2 v. United States, 359\nF.Supp.3d 1201, 1204 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations omitted). Ultimately in 2007, the U.S.\nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (hereinafter referred to simply as the \"U.S.\nAttorney's Office\") entered into a non-prosecution agreement (\"NPA\") with Epstein, in which that\nparticular Office agreed not to prosecute him for federal sex abuse crimes committed against Jane\nDoe 1 and Jane Doe 2 and numerous other identified underage girls whom Epstein and his coconspirators victimized. Id. at 1206-08.\nThis NPA was and is illegal, as the U.S. Attorney's Office entered into it by intentionally\nviolating the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. As this Court explained:\nHere, it is undisputed that the Government entered into a NPA with Epstein\nwithout conferring with [Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2] during its negotiation and\nsigning. Instead, the Government sent letters to the victims requesting their\n\"patience\" with the investigation even after the Government entered into the NPA.\nAt a bare minimum, the CVRA required the Government to inform Petitioners that\nit intended to enter into an agreement not to prosecute Epstein. Although the\nbinding effect of the NPA was contingent upon Epstein pleading guilty to the state\ncharges, that contingency was out of the control of the Government. The\nGovernment's hands were permanently tied if Epstein fulfilled his obligations\nunder the NPA. Thus, Petitioners and the other victims should have been notified\nof the Government's intention to take that course of action before it bound itself\nunder the NPA. Had the Petitioners been informed about the Government's\nintention to forego federal prosecution of Epstein in deference to him pleading\n... [truncated, 2809 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/1 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=1]", "char_count": 2809}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 3 of 35\n\nStates v. Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455ADSJO, 2005 WL 2875220, at *17 n. 11\n(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) (Senate debate supports the view that the contemplated\nmechanism for victims to obtain information on which to base their input was\nconferral with the prosecutor concerning any critical stage or disposition of the\ncase).\nId. at 1219.\nThis Court also found that the U.S. Attorney's Office had \"concealed\" the NPA from the\nvictims and \"misled\" the victims about the possibility of a federal prosecution:\nParticularly problematic was the Government's decision to conceal the existence of\nthe NPA and mislead the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a\npossibility. When the Government gives information to victims, it cannot be\nmisleading. While the Government spent untold hours negotiating the terms and\nimplications of the NPA with Epstein's attorneys, scant information was shared\nwith victims. Instead, the victims were told to be \"patient\" while the investigation\nproceeded.\nId.\nIn light of these and other illegal actions by the U.S. Attorney's Office, this Court\nspecifically held that \"under the facts of this case, there was a violation of the victims' rights under\nthe CVRA.\" Id. at 1222. The Court accordingly granted Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's motion for\nsummary judgment, holding that Jane Doe 1 and 2's \"right to conferral under the CVRA was\nviolated.\" Id.1\nIn addition, Epstein was directly involved in these CVRA violations. As this Court found,\n\"Epstein's counsel was aware that the Office was keeping the NPA secret from the victims and,\nindeed, had sought assurances to that effect.\" Id. at 1208 (citing DE 407 at ¶ 49).\n\nJane Doe 1 and 2 had also alleged violations of their rights to be treated with fairness and\nto receive notice of court proceedings. The Court did not rule on those allegations.\n3\n\nEFTA02758169\n\n", "char_count": 1932}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 4 of 35\n\nAt the end of the Court's opinion, the Court directed counsel for Jane Doe I and 2 and the\nGovernment to \"confer and inform the Court within 15 days of the date of entry of this Order how\nthey wish to proceed on determining the issue of what remedy, if any, should be applied in view\nof the violation.\" Id. at 1222. As recounted in Jane Doe 1 and 2's submission on this procedural\nissue, the two victims and the Government were unable to agree on a precise schedule for\ndetermining remedies. See DE 452 at 1-6. Accordingly, on May 13, 2019, the Court directed Jane\nDoe I and 2 to submit proposed remedies no later than 30 days after that date of that order. Jane\nDoe 1 and 2 now timely file their requested remedies.\nJANE DOE 1 AND 2'S REQUESTED REMEDIES\nJane Doe 1 and 2 request that the Court enter an order providing to them the specified\nremedies, generally grouped into the following categories: rescission of the immunity provisions\nin the NPA; an apology from the U.S. Attorney's Office; restoration of basic rights to which the\nvictims were deprived; educational remedies; related equitable remedies; other miscellaneous\nremedies; sealed remedies; and all other just and proper remedies. In overview, Jane Doe 1 and 2\nask the Court to enter an order providing the following:\nRescission Remedies\nI. The provisions in the non-prosecution agreement between the U.S. Attorney's\nOffice for the Southern District of Florida and Jeffrey Epstein barring his\nprosecution and that of his named and unnamed conspirators were entered into\nillegally. These provisions are accordingly null and void to the extent that they\nprevent prosecution of federal crimes committed in the Southern District of Florida\nagainst Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (or any other victim of a federal sex offense\ncommitted by Epstein or his coconspirators within the Southern District of Florida\n(hereinafter referred to as an \"Epstein victim\"));\n2\n... [truncated, 2183 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/3 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=3]", "char_count": 2183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 5 of 35\n\nany other Epstein victim) is appropriate, the Constitution would permit such a\nprosecution;\n3. The U.S. Attorney's Office is enjoined to forthwith make its \"best efforts\" to protect\nthe CVRA rights of Jane Doe I and 2 (and all other Epstein victims) under 18\nU.S.C. § 3771(cX1);\n4. The U.S. Attorney's Office is enjoined to forthwith \"confer\" with Jane Doe 1 and\n2 (and all other Epstein victims who request it) as required by 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(aX5), and to provide them with accurate and timely notice of future case\nevents as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2);\nApology Remedies\n5. The U.S. Attorney's Office shall provide a letter of apology within 14 days to Jane\nDoe 1 and 2 (and all other Epstein victims) for violating Jane Doe I and Jane Doe\n2's (and all other victims') rights;\n6. The current U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, then-U.S. Attorney\nfor the Southern District of Florida R. Alexander Acosta, the line prosecutor who\nhandled the case, and then-supervisors shall personally meet with Jane Doe 1 and\nJane Doe 2 and their legal counsel (and all other Epstein victims who so request)\nwithin 30 days, to explain in detail the decision not to prosecute Epstein's crimes\nagainst them and confer with them about the case and about what steps might be\ntaken to insure that Epstein is held accountable for the sex offenses he has\ncommitted;\n7. The Court shall hold a hearing within 45 days in which Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2\n(and any other Epstein victim, including others victimized outside the Southern\nDistrict of Florida as a result of the Epstein conspiracy within this District) at which\ntime victims may address the Court regarding the Epstein investigation and its\nresolution — and R. Alexander Acosta and intervenor Jeffrey Epstein shall be\nrequired to attend this hearing;\nInformational Remedies\n8. The Government shall provide Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (and any other Epstein\nvi\n... [truncated, 2359 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/4 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=4]", "char_count": 2359}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 6 of 35\n\noffenses (and his conspiracy to commit sex offenses) against Jane Doe 1 and Jane\nDoe 2 to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (and any other Epstein victim who requests\nit);\n10. The Government shall within 30 days provide any information regarding FBIMiami's investigation into Jane Doe I or 2's (or any other Epstein victim who\nrequests it) victimization by Epstein, including unredacted copies of any FBI\nReports of Interviews (\"302's\") regarding the interviews of any such victims;\nII. The Government shall within 30 days provide to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (and\nany other Epstein victim who requests it) all sealed materials previously submitted\nfor in camera review in this case;\n12. The Government shall within 30 days provide to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (and\nany other Epstein victim who requests it) all materials covered by the motion they\nfiled in DE 414;\n13. The Government shall within 30 days provide to Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2 (and\nany other Epstein victim who requests it) all materials covered by the motion filed\nin DE 348;\nEducational Remedies\n14. The Justice Department shall within 45 days require a course of training for\nemployees in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida about\nthe CVRA and steps that can be taken to improve the treatment of crime victims,\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(0(2)(B) and implementing Justice Department\nregulations;\nMiscellaneous Remedies\n15. The U.S. Attorney's Office shall with 30 days pay a monetary sanction, in an\namount to be determined following a hearing before the Court, to Jane Doe 1 and\nJane Doe 2 directly or to any appropriate entity that they may direct;2\n16. The U.S. Attorney's Office shall, at times as directed by the Court, pay to Jane Doe\nI and Jane Doe 2 (and any other Epstein victim who request it), all forms of\nrestitution provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b) (providing for counseling expenses, lost\nincome, attorneys' fees\n... [truncated, 2261 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/5 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=5]", "char_count": 2261}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 7 of 35\n\n17. The U.S. Attorney's Office shall within 30 days pay attorney's fees and costs to the\nattorneys for Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, under the Court's inherent authority to\nenter such an award, in an amount to be determined following appropriate\nsubmissions from the parties;\nSealed Remedies\n18. The Government shall provide the remedies that Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2 listed\nin their sealed supplemental pleading on remedies, filed on December 6, 2011; and\nAll Other Just and Proper Remedies\n19. Any other remedy that the Court deems just and proper to remedy the past\nviolations of the CVRA rights of Jane Doe 1 and 2 (and all other Epstein victims)\nand to prevent any future violation of their CVRA rights.\nDISCUSSION\nThe Court has statutory authority to award each and every one of these remedies to Jane\nDoc I and 2. And for the reasons explained below, it should do so. If for any reason the factual\nrecord existing in this case is insufficient to support a remedy for Jane Doe I or 2, they would\nrequest a trial during which they could provide the factual support for the remedy.\nI.\n\nTHE CVRA GIVES THE COURT BROAD POWER TO CRAFT APPROPRIATE\nREMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS IT CONFERS.\nBefore turning to the specifics of the individual remedies that Jane Doe 1 and 2 are seeking,\n\nit is important to understand the broad remedial structure surrounding the CVRA. Since the earliest\ndays of our nation, it has been settled law that \"where there is a legal right, there is also a legal\nremedy . . . ..\" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (internal quotation omitted).\n\n3 The victims are, of course, aware that the CVRA provides that it does not authorize a\ncrime victim's claim for \"damages.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX6). As explained below, the Court\npossesses the power to award attorney's fees based on other sources outside the CVRA (including\nits inherent power) and therefore a fee award is appropriat\n... [truncated, 2033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/6 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=6]", "char_count": 2033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 8 of 35\n\nMoreover, \"[i]f the right is created by a federal statute, the federal courts have the power to fashion\nan appropriate remedy.\" Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, Georgia 482 F.2d 361, 371\n(5th Cir. 1973). Beyond these general principles, the CVRA itself requires this Court to protect\nvictims' rights, emphasizing that \"[i]n any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime\nvictim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA].\"\n18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1) (emphasis added).\nWhen a violation of federal law is established, \"federal courts generally have the power to\ngrant any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute.\"\nMoreno v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted).\nFederal courts should \"presume the availability of all appropriate remedies [for a federal right of\naction] unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.\" Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public\nSchools, 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992). Congress has \"expressly indicated\" a few, narrowly drawn\nlimitations on remedies in the CVRA. These limitations, however, are inapplicable to this case.\nCongress limited certain legal remedies under the CVRA, in particular providing that the\nCVRA did not create a new \"cause of action for damages.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). It also\nprovided a specific provision regarding \"limitation on relief':\n(5) Limitation on relief— In no case shall a failure to afford a right under this\nchapter provide grounds for a new trial. A victim may make a motion to re-open a\nplea or sentence only if—\n(A) the victim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the proceeding at\nissue and such right was denied;\n(B) the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 14 days;\nand\n(C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest o\n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/7 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=7]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 9 of 35\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5). As is readily apparent, these limitations only apply to crime victims'\nefforts to obtain a \"new trial\" or to \"re-open a plea or sentence.\" Jane Doe 1 and 2's proposed\nremedies here do not include a \"new trial\"— no trial has ever been held. Likewise, they do not ask\nto \"re-open\" a plea, much less a sentence. Epstein never pled guilty to any crime in federal court\n(and his plea in state court was not to charges involving them, although this fact remains\nuncertain4). Instead, the victims seek (among other remedies) the invalidation of an illegal nonprosecution agreement so that they can confer with the Government about an appropriate\nprosecution of the crimes Epstein committed against them. Accordingly, none of the specifically\nprovided \"limitations on relief' apply to this case. Indeed, this Court has already specifically\ndiscussed this language, concluding that (if anything) this language supports the conclusion that\nthe Epstein NPA can be reopened. See DE 189 at 8 (\"the court concludes that the statute is properly\ninterpreted impliedly to authorize a 're-opening' or setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial\nagreements made in derogation of the government's CVRA conferral obligations . . ..\"). And the\nCourt has emphasized that keeping a non-prosecution agreement secret from victims is worse than\nkeeping a plea agreement secret, because even if a plea is kept secret \"the victims will at least have\nan opportunity to provide input to a judge at sentencing.\" 359 F.Supp.3d at 1220 n.6.\n\n4 A recent article from the Washington Post indicates that the state plea Epstein entered\nwas to soliciting sex from a 16-year-old victim, rather than a 14-year-old victim, in order to ease\nhis obligations to register as a sex offender. See Beth Reinhard et al., Investigation: Age of Victim\nin Prosecution ofJeffrey Epstein, Long a Source of Confusions, Eased His Obligations to Regist\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/8 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=8]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 10 of 35\n\nIn light of the narrow reach of the CVRA's \"limitation\" language, the CVRA clearly leaves\nopen all other remedies. Of course, when \"Congress includes particular language in one section\nof a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress\nacts intentionally and purposely\" in its exclusion. United States v. Vereen, 920 F.3d 1300, 1307\n(11th Cir. 2019) (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 107 (2012) (\"The\nexpression of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expression unius est exclusion alterius)\").\nAnd with regard to the remedial structure of statutes, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that \"the\ndistrict court is presumed to have the authority to grant the requested relief, absent some indication\nin the underlying statute that such relief is not available.\" Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co., LLC v.\n6.04 Acres, More or Less, Over Parcel(s) of Land of Approximately 1.21 Acres, More or Less,\nSituated in Land Lot 1049, 910 F.3d 1130, 1152 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 1116465\n(U.S. Apr. 29, 2019). Thus, \"'[U]nless the underlying statute clearly and validly limits the\nequitable jurisdiction of the district court, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court\nare available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.\" 910 F.3d at 1152 (quoting\nAT & TBroadband v. Tech Commc 'ns, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citation\nomitted).\nMore generally, the \"federal courts have historically had broad authority to fashion\nequitable remedies ....\" Hardison v.\n\n375 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). Settled law\n\nholds that \"the nature of the remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the . . .\nviolation.\" Nichols v. Hopper, 173 F.3d 820, 824 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted).\nThe Eleventh Circuit has expressly required district courts to fashion appropriate equit\n... [truncated, 2116 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/9 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=9]", "char_count": 2116}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 11 of 35\n\nHospital Ass'n v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 962 (11'\" Cir. 1983) (in light of statutory violation, we\n\"accordingly remand to the district court so that it may devise an appropriate equitable remedy.\").\nAnd the CVRA is obviously \"remedial legislation\" that should be broadly construed to achieve its\nremedial purposes.\n\nv. Kia Motors ofAmerica, Inc., 554 F.3d 943, 948 (11th Cir 2008).\n\nIndeed, as the Senate co-sponsor of the CVRA explained, \"it is the clear intent and expectation of\nCongress that the district . . . courts will establish procedures that will allow for a prompt\nadjudication of any issues regarding the assertion of a victim's right, while giving meaning to the\nrights we establish.\" 150 Como. REC. 22953 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphases\nadded).\nA good illustration of the broad power of district courts to remedy CVRA violations comes\nfrom the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re M,\n\n527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008). There, the Fifth\n\nCircuit found a violation of crime victims' right to confer with prosecutors regarding a plea\nagreement. The Circuit, however, declined to grant its own remedy, instead remanding to the\ndistrict court. \"We are confident, however, that the conscientious district court will fully consider\nthe victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement should be accepted.\"\nId. at 396.\nWhile this Court has broad powers to remedy a CVRA violation, it may prove entirely\nunnecessary for the Court to do so. The CVRA envisions that the Justice Department will be the\nfirst line of defense against a CVRA violation — and the first actor to respond to a violation that\nhas occurred. Under the CVRA's plain language, the Government must remedy the violation of\nthe CVRA. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1), the Government has a \"best efforts\" obligation to afford\nvictims their rights, including doing so without \"unreasonable delay,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a\n... [truncated, 2024 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/10 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=10]", "char_count": 2024}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 12 of 35\n\nAccordingly, before the Court takes any action, the Government has a statutory obligation to\nundertake its own corrective efforts to protect the victims' rights to confer.\nThe Court has directed the Government to respond to the victims' proposed remedies\nwithin 30 days. In light of the Court's binding ruling that the Government has violated its CVRA\nobligations, the Government may decide to announce that it will voluntarily take all the steps listed\nabove. If so, this litigation might be brought to a swift conclusion without the need for any further\njudicial rulings. Here the Government has it entirely within its power to provide all the various\nremedies being sought through the lawsuit — and then some. Hopefully the Government will\nsimply agree to the remedies described above — thereby avoiding any need for the Court to make\na determination as to how to proceed.\nII.\n\nTHE VICTIMS ARE ENTITLED TO MULTIPLE REMEDIES FOR THE\nGOVERNMENT'S DELIBERATE CVRA VIOLATIONS.\nJane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 are entitled to multiple remedies for the Government's\n\ndeliberate violation of their CVRA rights, including the Government's actions in \"misleading\"\nthem about the status of the case. First, Jane Doe 1 and 2 are entitled to have the Court invalidate\nthe provisions in the non-prosecution agreement blocking prosecution of Epstein and his named\nand unnamed co-conspirators declared null and void. Second, entirely apart and in addition to\nvoiding the immunity provisions in the agreement, Jane Doe I and 2 are entitled to seek a wide\nrange of other remedies\nA.\n\nTo Protect Their CVRA Right to Meaningfully Confer, Jane Doe 1 and 2 Are\nEntitled to Have the Immunity Provisions in the Non-Prosecution\nAgreement Rescinded and Declared Null and Void.\n\n12\n\nEFTA02758178\n\n", "char_count": 1853}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 13 of 35\n\nThis Court has already directly ruled on one of the most important remedy issues in this\ncase, specifically holding that rescission of the NPA's provisions blocking Epstein's prosecution\ncan be set aside. This Court has already held that the victims' \"rights under the CVRA attach\nbefore the Government brings formal charges against a defendant.\" 359 F.Supp.3d at 1218 (citing\nJane Doe 1 and 2 v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011)). This Court has\nalso held that \"the CVRA authorizes the rescission or 'reopening' of a prosecutorial agreement,\nincluding a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations\nunder the statute.\" 359 F.Supp.3d at 1218 (emphasis added) (quoting Jane Does I and 2 v. United\nStates, 950 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). This Court has further held that \"section\n3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements . ...\"\nId. (citing Jane Does 1 and 2 v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 1267). And, finally, this Court\nhas held that \"the 'reasonable right to confer . . . in the case' extends to the pre-charge state of\ncriminal investigations and proceedings.\" Id. Of course, all of these previous holdings are now\nthe law of the case and any discussion of remedies begins against that backdrop.\nGiven these previous holdings, Jane Doe 1 and 2 are clearly entitled to an order from the\nCourt that provisions in the NPA entered into between the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern\nDistrict ofFlorida and Jeffrey Epstein barring his prosecution and that ofhis named and unnamed\nconspirators were entered into illegally and are accordingly null and void to the extent that they\nprevent prosecution of federal crimes committed in the Southern District of Florida against Jane\nDoe land 2 and any Epstein victim. 5\n\n$ It appears that only three sentences in the non-prosecution agr\n... [truncated, 2134 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/12 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=12]", "char_count": 2134}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 14 of 35\n\nBecause this Court has already explicitly ruled on the availability of this remedy, the only\nquestion is whether the remedy is appropriate given this Court's factual findings surrounding the\nCVRA violations. Not only is this remedy appropriate under the CVRA, if anything the CVRA\nrequires it. The Court has now found that Jane Doe 1 and 2's right to confer under the CVRA was\nviolated, particularly because the two victims were not afforded an opportunity to shape the course\nof the agreement that the Government and Epstein reached. For example, Epstein attempted to\nshape the agreement to his liking through pleas all the way up to the highest levels of the Justice\nDepartment. 359 F.Supp.3d at 1221. This Court noted that \"[w]hile Epstein was within his rights\nto attempt to persuade higher authorities with the Department of Justice to overrule the\nprosecutorial decisions of the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District ofFlorida, the CVRA\nwas designed to give victims the same opportunity to attempt to affect prosecutorial decisions\nbefore they becamefinal.\" /d. (emphasis added). Rescinding the NPA's immunity provisions will\ngive Jane Doe 1 and 2 an opportunity to \"affect\" the prosecutorial decision of whether to file\nfederal charges for Epstein's sex crimes in Florida before that decision becomes \"final.\" It\n\nis\n\nSouthern District of Florida, prosecution in this district for these offenses [i.e., federal sex crimes\ncommitted by Epstein and his co-conspirators] shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the\nState of Florida ....\";\n2. \"After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the agreement, no prosecution for\nthe offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the\nsubject of the joint investigation by Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States\nAttorney's Office, nor any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Ju\n... [truncated, 2537 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/13 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=13]", "char_count": 2537}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 15 of 35\n\nonly after rescission that Jane Doe 1 and 2 can enjoy \"the full unfettered exercise of their conferral\nrights at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those rights meaningfully.\" DE 189 at 9\n(citing U.S. v. BP Products North America, Inc., 2008 WL 501321 at *14 (S.D. Tex. 2008). The\nCVRA requires this Court to \"ensure that the crime victim is afforded the rights described [in the\nCVRA].\" 18 U.S.C. § 3771(bX1). Accordingly, the Court is required to enter this remedy. See,\ne.g., Kenna v. United States District Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006) (when trial court\ndenied victim his right to give statement at defendant's sentencing hearing and victim filed writ of\nmandamus as authorized by federal law, the trial court \"must avoid upsetting constitutionally\nprotected rights, but it must also be cognizant that the only way to give effect to [the victim's] right\nto speak . . . is to vacate the sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing\").\nWhile this Court's previous rulings make clear that this remedy is appropriate, ample\nprecedent supports the power of this Court to set aside the agreement if it was arrived at illegally.\nWhen other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of law, they have been stricken\nby the courts. For example, United States v. =\n\n98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), held that where\n\na sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation revocation the defendant\nwas then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea agreement — the defendant\nwas not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement. The Court explained that the case\nwas one \"in which the bargain is vitiated by illegality .\n\n.\" Id. at 947. Moreover, even though\n\nthe defendant had served some prison time under the agreement, that did not mean he was entitled\nto specific performance of the agreement. Id. at 947. The defendant had \"forfeited\" the r\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/14 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=14]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 16 of 35\n\nHere, of course, exactly the same is true: the NPA is \"vitiated\" by illegality — namely, the\nfact that (as this Court has previously held) the parties negotiated it in deliberate violation of the\nvictims' rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Moreover, Epstein has\n\"forfeited\" any right to seek specific performance of the NPA. As this Court has previously found,\nEpstein was a party to — and, indeed, the instigator of — the Government's CVRA violations. As\nthis Court explained, \"Epstein's counsel was aware that the Office was deliberately keeping the\nNPA secret from the victims and, indeed, had sought assurances to that effect.\" 359 F.Supp.3d\n1201 at 1208 (citing DE 407 at ¶ 48 (emphasis added)). Thus, unlike the\n\ncase where the\n\nagreement was accidently crafted in violation of law, here the illegal agreement was a deliberate\nplan to violate the law. In such circumstances, any equitable or other claim Epstein has for specific\nperformance of the non-prosecution agreement disappears.\nOther cases reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60\n(Colo. 1999) (because \"neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to modify or waive\nthe mandatory parole period,\" such \"is not a permissible subject of plea negotiations,\" and thus,\neven if \"the trial court erroneously approves of such an illegal bargain\" such plea is \"invalid\" and\nthus will not be specifically enforced). Nor can a defendant claim some right to specific\nperformance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See State v.=,\n\n582 N.W.2d 879, 881-\n\n82 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81-month sentence, but court added 10-year conditional\nrelease term because, under facts of case, sentence without such release term is \"plainly illegal,\"\nand thus remedy of specific performance not available); State v. Wall, 348 N.C. 671, 502 S.E.2d\n585, 588 (1998) (plea agreement was for s\n... [truncated, 2172 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/15 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=15]", "char_count": 2172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 17 of 35\n\nspecific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this state\"); Ex\npane Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where \"the plea bargain seemed fair\non its face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to circumstances beyond the control\nof [the parties], namely the fact that one of the enhancement paragraphs was mischaracterized in\nthe indictment, resulting in an illegal sentence far outside the statutory range,\" proper remedy is\nplea withdrawal, as \"there is no way of knowing whether the State would have offered a plea\nbargain within the proper range of punishment that he deemed acceptable\"); State v. Mazzone, 212\nW.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891, 897 (2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant would plead\nguilty to two felony counts of felon in possession of firearm and prosecutor would dismiss\nremaining six counts re other offenses with prejudice, and all parties erroneously believed these\ntwo crimes were felonies, lower court \"correctly resolved this unfortunate predicament by holding\nthat a plea agreement which cannot be fulfilled based upon legal impossibility must be vacated in\nits entirety, and the parties must be placed, as nearly as possible, in the positions they occupied\nprior to the entry of the plea agreement\").\nTo be clear, nothing in our arguments here is intended to undercut the general proposition\nthat the Government must generally abide by its promises in plea agreements. See. e.g., Santobello\nv. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir.\n1989)). But the very point of all the cases cited by the victims in the previous paragraph is that\nthe Government cannot abide by illegal promises, even where it has accidentally entered into some\nkind of an agreement with a defendant to that effect. Here the Government made promises —\nimmunity from prosecution — that it extended in viola\n... [truncated, 2159 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/16 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=16]", "char_count": 2159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 18 of 35\n\nthis Court has held) a \"deliberate\" agreement between the Government and Epstein to keep the\nNPA secret from Jane Doe 1 and 2. See 359 F.Supp.3d at 1208.\nAccepting any contrary argument would allow the Government by private arrangement\nwith a criminal to supersede congressional mandates for keeping crime victims informed. Just as\nthe Government cannot illegally agree to run a sentence on a new crime concurrently with a\nprobation revocation, United States v. =\n\n98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), so too here it cannot\n\nillegally agree not to prosecute a sex offender without first conferring with his victims, treating\nthem fairly, and giving them timely and accurate notice of court hearings.\nFinally, a plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between a criminal defendant and the\nGovernment. See United States v. Howie, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999). Accordingly,\nplea agreements are governed by applicable principles of contract law.\n\nv. Thompson, 161\n\nF.3d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Meyers, 32 F.3d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1994). One\nsuch fundamental principle of contract law is that a contracts entered into in violation of law does\nnot create enforceable legal rights. See, e.g., Power Fin. Credit Union v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin.\nBd, 494 F. App'x 982, 986 (11th Cir. 2012) (\"[A] contract which violates a provision of... a statute\nis void and illegal and, will not be enforced in [Florida] courts\") (citing De Lage Landen Fin.\nServs., Inc. v. Cricket's Termite Control Inc., 942 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 5th\nDist.2006)); see also Shaughnessy v. D'Antoni, 100 F.2d 422, 424 (5th Cir. 1938); accord\nv. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899) (\"[N]o court will lend its assistance in any way\nto carrying out the terms of an illegal contract.... nor will they enforce any alleged rights directly\nspringing from such contract\"). And a court cannot enforce such an illegal agreement to t\n... [truncated, 2022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/17 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=17]", "char_count": 2022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 19 of 35\n\ndetriment of an innocent third party. Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 182 (5th Cir.\nUnit A Sept. 1981).6\nFor all these reasons, the Court should set aside the NPA's immunity provisions as one of\nthe appropriate remedies in this case. Jane Doe 1 and 2 are only seeking that these particular\nprovisions be set aside. For the sake of completeness, the two victims note that Epstein cannot\nsomehow seek to invalidate other provisions in the NPA. Epstein cannot ask for rescission or\ninvalidation of any provision in the NPA, because he has \"unclean hands,\" that is, he is \"one who\nhas acted in bad faith, resorted to trickery and deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice or\nunfairness\" and thus will appeal in vain to a court of conscience.\" In re Kingsley, 518 F.3d 874,\n878 (11th Cir. 2008). Whatever else might be said about this case, it certainly proves \"unclean\nhands\" by the Epstein and the Government. Epstein joined with the Government to \"deliberately\"\n(359 F.Supp.3d at 1208) keep his agreement with the Government secret from Jane Doe 1 and 2\n(and other victims) — including sending \"misleading\" noticesabout what was happening (id. at\n1219). A defendant who acts in bad faith \"is in no position to claim that good faith reliance upon\nthe sentencing stipulations in the plea agreement wrongly induced his guilty plea.\" United States\nv. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971 (8th Cir.2003).\nSetting aside the immunity provisions in the agreement does not raise any federal double\njeopardy concerns, even though Epstein spent some time in state custody following his entry of a\nplea to state charges.\n\nFor starters, any double jeopardy issue could not be raised by the\n\n6 \"Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding as\n\nprecedent in the Eleventh Circuit.\" United States v.\n2003).\n19\n\n342 F.3d 1245, 1246 n.l (1 I th Cir.\n\nEFTA02758185\n\n", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 20 of 35\n\nGovernment. The Government will obviously suffer no harm if this Court invalidates the\nimmunity provisions in the non-prosecution agreement barring certain federal prosecution. To\npossess standing to raise a claim, a litigant \"must show . . . it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that\nis (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.\"\nFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180\n(2000). And so this issue belongs only to Epstein — and to Epstein alone— and until he raises the\nissue, it is not before the Court.\nIn any event, enforcement of victims' rights as we propose here does not implicate double\njeopardy concerns. A good analysis of this point comes from the Oregon Supreme Court in State\nv.\n\n255 P.3d 472 (Or. 2011), which allowed a resentencing (and possible sentencing\n\nenhancement) to protect a victim's right to be heard. Citing relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases,\nexplained the \"'guarantee [against double jeopardy] has been said to consist of three\nseparate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense\nafter acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And\nit protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.\"' Id. at 481 (quoting U.S. v.\nDiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980)).\n\nconcluded that none of these three guarantees\n\nwas implicated in the resentencing to protect victims' rights: \"The defendant 'is charged with\nknowledge of the statute and its appeal provisions, and has no expectation of finality in his sentence\nuntil the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has expired.' A defendant has no more right to\nexpect that his sentence will remain unchanged on appeal than he does to expect that his parole or\n\n7 Similarly, none of Epstein's named or unnamed coconspirators would have standin\n... [truncated, 2085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/19 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=19]", "char_count": 2085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 21 of 35\n\nprobation will never be revoked.\" Id. at 481 (quoting DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137).\n\nheld\n\nthat the victim's \"proposed remedy—vacating defendant's sentence and conducting a resentencing\nhearing—was permissible, in that it was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" Id.\nSo too here. Epstein is charged with knowledge of the CVRA — including its right to confer\nand the enforcement provisions in the statute. He has no constitutional right to demand that Jane\nDoe I and 2 forfeit their right to seek enforcement of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Because his\nscheme to conceal how he was resolving the case failed, it is now proper that he suffer the\nconsequences. The NPA's immunity provisions are void and unenforceable, certainly as to Jane\nDoe I and 2 — and likewise to any other victim who would like to see Epstein prosecuted.\nFor all these reasons, the Court should enter the \"rescission\" remedies listed above —\nspecifically remedies I, 2, 3, and 4. These remedies also include a prospective injunction,\nrequiring the Government to protect the CVRA rights of Jane Doe 1 and 2 (and other victims).\nNothing in the CVRA precludes injunctive relief. Moreover, the facts previously determined by\nthe Court show a long running conspiracy between the Government and Epstein. As of yet, the\nGovernment has yet to apologize for its past violation of the victims' CVRA rights, let alone agree\nnot to violate their rights in the future. Indeed, despite the passage of nearly three months since\nthe Court's ruling in this case, the Government has yet to offer a single commitment to Jane Doe\nI and 2 to protect their rights. Injunctive relief is appropriate if \"the defendant's past conduct\nindicates that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.\" SEC v.\nCaterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir.I980) (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th\nCir.1978)). Nothing in the Government\n... [truncated, 2174 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/20 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=20]", "char_count": 2174}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 22 of 35\n\nB.\n\nThe Victims Are Entitled to a Range of Other Remedies for Deliberate\nViolation of Their Rights.\n\nFor all the reasons just explained, Jane Doe I and 2 are entitled to rescission of the NPA's\nimmunity provisions. But that remedy alone is insufficient to provide full justice in this case.\nDoing so only allows them to seek prosecution of Epstein and his coconspirators some eleven\nyears after the prosecutors' decision was made. Given the passage of time, it will no doubt be\nmore difficult to persuade prosecutors to move forward with a prosecution. Of course, even where\n\"a court may not be able to return the parties to the status quo ante,\" so long as \"a court can fashion\nsome form of meaningful relief\" it should do so. See Church ofScientology ofCalifornia v. U.S.,\n506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Accordingly, Jane Doe 1 and 2 are entitled to additional remedies.8\nAdditional remedies are appropriate in five separate areas: an apology from the U.S. Attorney's\nOffice; information about the case from the U.S. Attorney's Office; educational remedies; other\nmiscellaneous remedies; sealed remedies; and all other just and proper remedies. Each of these\nareas is discussed below.\n1. An Apology, Meeting with the Former U.S. Attorney, and Court Hearing.\nJane Doe I and 2 seek three additional remedies (numbers 5, 6, and 7 above) — i.e., a letter\nof apology, a meeting with the former U.S. Attorney, and a court hearing to address the Court\nregarding the case. All of these remedies are also appropriate, and the Court should enter an order\nawarding them to the two Jane Does.\n\n8 Of course, if for any reason, the Court were to determine that rescission is not a\npermissible remedy in this case, then Jane Doe I and 2 would be entitled to the additional remedies\nfor that reason as well.\n22\n\nEFTA02758188\n\n", "char_count": 1889}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 23 of 35\n\nA letter of apology seems like the least that the Government could do under the\ncircumstances. As the Court is aware, the Government has claimed benign motives for concealing\nthe NPA — all the while asserting work product and similar protections over the evidence that\nwould support or contradict its claims. See 359 F.Supp.3d at 1213 n.3. If the Government truly\nacted from benign motives, then this request for an apology should be uncontested.\nIn addition, Jane Doe 1 and 2 seek an opportunity to personally meet with the current U.S.\nAttorney for the Southern District ofFlorida and R. Alexander Acosta, who was the U.S. Attorney\nwho approved the NPA with Epstein and was deeply involved in the decisions involving the\nvictims. See 359 F.Supp.3d at 1207-10. Jane Doe 1 and 2 have previously requested an\nopportunity to depose Acosta about some of the important subjects related to this case. One\nexample of a subject for discussion is a \"breakfast meeting\" that appears to have taken place on\naround October 12, 2007, between U.S. Attorney Acosta and Epstein attorney Jay Lefkowitz. This\nCourt has previously noted that this meeting occurred. See Jane Does I and 2 v. U.S, 359\nF.Supp.3d 1201, 1210 (S.D. Fla. 2019). And a subsequent letter from Leflcowitz to Acosta briefly\nrefers to \"a commitment\" by the U.S. Attorney at that meeting that his Office \"would not . . .\ncontact any of the identified [victims] ... in this matter.\" Id. But what was discussed specifically\ndoes not appear to have been memorialized. A chance to discuss this matter with Mr. Acosta to\nget answers about that and other related questions will, Jane Doe 1 and 2 believe, provide the kind\nof information that they would have received had the U.S. Attorney's Office properly conferred in\na timely fashion back in 2007.\nFinally, Jane Doe 1 and 2 also seek a hearing before the Court in which they and any other\nEpstein victim may address \n... [truncated, 2089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/22 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=22]", "char_count": 2089}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 24 of 35\n\nthat R. Alexander Acosta and intervenor Jeffrey Epstein be required to attend this hearing. The\nCourt, of course, always possesses authority to order a hearing on a case before it. And as\ndescribed above, the Court possesses broad remedial powers, both as conferred specifically by its\nCVRA enforcement power (18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1)) and generally by its remedial powers to ensure\nfederal statutes are enforced. Given potential difficulties with placing Jane Doe 1 and 2 back into\nthe position that they would have been if the U.S. Attorney had conferred with them in 2007, the\nCourt should give them a public hearing to present issues related to their treatment. Such a hearing\nwould ensure that all issues related to this case were publicly aired and that the victims had an\nopportunity to be heard about what has transpired.\nThe Court has jurisdiction to order Mr. Acosta and Mr. Epstein to appear at the hearing.\nMr. Acosta's name appears on pleadings filed in this case as early as July 2008 and he remains a\ngovernment employee today. In addition, Mr. Epstein affirmatively moved to intervene in this\ncase — and was granted intervention — subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the Court.\n2. Disclosing Information to the Victims.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also seek three additional sets of remedies (numbers 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and\n13 above) related to information regarding this case — i.e., information about the non-prosecution\ndecision, grand jury material, FBI information, materials submitted for in camera review, and other\nmaterials. All of these remedies are also appropriate, and the Court should enter an order awarding\nthem to the two Jane Does.\nIf the Government had properly conferred with the two Jane Does and other victims, it\nseems likely that the result would have been a federal prosecution — with a resulting federal trial\nor plea deal and following federal sentencing hearing. These events would h\n... [truncated, 2036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/23 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=23]", "char_count": 2036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 25 of 35\n\nDoe I and 2 with much more information about Epstein's criminal conspiracy and its scope and\noperation. But the Court need not make any specific findings about the likelihood of a federal\nprosecution to conclude that the Government (joined by Epstein) illegally blocked any opportunity\nfor the victims to obtain such a federal prosecution in Florida through the NPA. Since one of the\nharms that flows from that illegality is the loss of any chance to obtain information, the obvious\nremedy is to disclose that information.\nThe Court should direct the Government to disclose all information is posses about why it\ndecided not to prosecute Epstein. If the Government had properly conferred with the victims back\nin 2007 when it was first making that decision, then the victims would have immediately had an\nunderstanding of what the Government is doing. Indeed, the Government persisted in refusing to\nexplain to the victims what it was doing over the ensuing years. See, e.g., DE 127 at 16 (noting\nthat the Government has refused to give the victims any specifics about its handling of the case).\nGiven the 12 years of uncertainty and questions that the Government's illegal concealment has\ncaused, the remedy is release of this information.\nIt also appears that grand jury information exists in connection with this case. And this\nCourt clearly has authority to order release of this information, under both Rule 6(e) of the Federal\nRules ofCriminal Procedure and the Eleventh Circuit \"special circumstances\" doctrine.\nTo be sure, grand jury proceedings are always secret in the first instance under Rule 6(e).\nBut this is not to say that Rule 6(e) draws \"a veil of secrecy . . . over all matters occurring in the\nworld that happen to be investigated by a grand jury. On the contrary, there is noper se rule against\ndisclosure of any and all information which has reached the grand jury n\n\nJudicial Watch,\n\nInc. v. \n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/24 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=24]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 26 of 35\n\nInc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Senate ofPuerto Rico v. DOA 823 F.2d 574,\n582 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). It is for this very reason that Rule 6(e)(3)(E) specifically provides that the\nCourt \"may authorize disclosure — at a time, in a manner, and subject to any other conditions that\nit directs — of a grand jury matter ... preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.\"\nTo obtain release of information on this provision, a parties must show \"the material they\nseek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another court proceeding, that the need for disclosure\nis greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only\nmaterial so needed.\" Pitch v. United States, 915 F.3d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Douglas\nOil Co. of Ca. v. Petrol Stops NW, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v.\nTillerson, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2017) (granting release of grand jury materials under this\nthree-part test).\nAll three conditions are satisfied here. Given the uncertainties that the Government has\ncreated about what would have happened if it had properly consulted with the victims, the victims\nwill suffer an injustice if they are not given all possible information related to the Epstein\n(non)prosecution decision. Moreover, whatever need for secrecy may have existed back in around\n2007, it seems unlikely that the need continues today. On the other hand, the need for releasing\nthe information has only grown over the years, as victims have been left to wonder why the case\nwas handled the way it was. Indeed, public scrutiny of the case has substantially increased in\nrecent months. Major media sources speculating that the Epstein plea deal was cut for improper\nreasons. See Julie =,\n\nTimeline of the Jeffley Epstein Sex Abuse Case, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.\n\n28, 2018. A congressional hearing has raised many questions abo\n... [truncated, 2141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/25 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=25]", "char_count": 2141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 27 of 35\n\nRelated Agencies of the House Appropriation Committee, Apr. 3, 2019. The victims deserve\nanswers to the questions that have been raised. And the only way to begin to answer those\nquestions is to release all of the grand jury materials that bear substantively on the non-prosecution\ndecision.\nIn addition to the specific provisions of Rule 6(e), the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly\nrecognized that district courts retain \"inherent power beyond the literal wording of Rule 6(e)\" to\ndisclose grand jury material not otherwise covered by the exceptions.\" Pitch v. United States, 915\nF.3d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials\n(Hastings), 735 F.2d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 1984)). While secrecy remains the normal approach,\nthe need for disclosure under this authority \"requires a fact intensive analysis that depends on the\ncompeting interests in a particular case.\" 915 F.3d at 710. Here, \"exceptional circumstances\"\nexist requiring release of appropriate grand jury materials to protect the victims' right to confer —\nas well as other rights that remain in play.9 It is extraordinary circumstance that the Government\nto negotiate with a sex abuser about the extent to which his victims would be told about the\ndisposition of criminal charges involving them. See 359 F.Supp.3d at 1208. And the fact that the\nGovernment and a defendant agreed to \"conceal the existence of the NPA and mislead the victims\nto believe the federal prosecution was still a possibility\" (id. at 1219) is truly extraordinary.\nAgainst that backdrop release of grand jury materials is appropriate.\n\n9 The Court has previously ruled that Jane Doe 1 and 2's CVRA right to confer was\nviolated. It has not yet ruled on whether the their CVRA rights to be treated with \"fairness\" and\nto notice have been violated.\n27\n\nEFTA02758193\n\n", "char_count": 1931}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 28 of 35\n\nOther materials should also be released. As the Court is well aware, the Government has\nsubmitted voluminous materials concerning its internal deliberations in this case for in camera\nreview. The Government argued that these materials were protected through work product and\nother privileges. And yet in response to Jane Doe 1 and 2's summary judgment motion, the\nGovernment made many representations about its internal deliberations, claiming that these\ndeliberations involved nothing but benign intentions. Whatever else may be said about these\nclaims, they surely waived work product and other protections. See generally Jane Doe 1 and 2's\nMotion for Finding of Waiver of Work Product and Similar Protections and for Production of\nDocuments, DE 414. This Court previously concluded that it did not need to reach the issue of\nwaiver of privilege \"[g]iven . . . the Court's . . . ruling in favor of [Jane Doe I and 2] on [the\nsummary judgment motions].\" 359 F.Supp.2d at 1213 n.3. But the Court specifically stated that\nJane Doe 1 and 2 \"may reassert this argument if and when appropriate.\" Id.\nThe time for reasserting this argument has arrived. One clear remedy for the Government's\nrefusal to properly confer with Jane Doe 1 and 2 is to provide to these victims information about\nwhat was going on during deliberations. Indeed, given the Government's waiver of privilege, no\ngood reason exists for keeping the information secret any longer.\nThe victims deserve to know what the Government was doing back in 2007 and 2008 and\nwhy it was doing it. In 2004, Congress enacted the CVRA because it found that in case after case\n\"victims, and their families, were ignored, cast aside, and treated as non-participants in a critical\nevent in their lives. They were kept in the dark by prosecutors too busy to care enough ... and by\na court system that simply did not have place for them.\" 150 CONG. REC. 7296 (2004) (sta\n... [truncated, 2026 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/27 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=27]", "char_count": 2026}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 29 of 35\n\nof Sen. Feinstein). To avoid keeping the victims in the dark any longer, the Court should release\nall of the sealed information submitted to it in camera.\nThe Court should also release the information previously requested by Jane Doe 1 and 2 in\n2016 in DE 348. Jane Doe 1 and 2 have explained in their motion why that information would be\nuseful to them (and other victims) in understanding what happened. The Court previously found\nit was unnecessary to reach that motion to grant summary judgment in favor of the Jane Does,\ndenying the motion \"without prejudice.\" 359 F.Supp.2d at 1222. Accordingly, Jane Doe 1 and 2\nsimply reassert that motion at this time, because granting the motion would help to remedy the fact\nthat they lack all the information about why the Government was reaching certain decisions. The\nCourt should accordingly grant this previously filed motion.\n3. Educational Remedies.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also seek an additional remedy (number 14 above) related to educating\nprosecutors about protecting victims' rights. One of the great hopes of Jane Doe 1 and 2 is that\nthe mistreatment they suffered will never again be experienced by crime victims, in the Southern\nDistrict of Florida or elsewhere. Accordingly, they seek this prospective remedy designed to train\nfederal prosecutors and investigators.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 ask the Court to order that the employees in the U.S. Attorney's Office\nfor the Southern District of Florida receive training to improve their handling of similar matters in\nthe future. The CVRA itself provides that regulations concerning such remedial training is part of\nthe enforcement apparatus for the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(t)(2)(B). Perhaps in the several\nmonths since the Court's ruling the Justice Department has already undertaken this remedial\ntraining on its own accord, but, if not, the Court should order it directly.\n29\n\nEFTA02758195\n\n", "char_count": 1975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 30 of 35\n\n4. Miscellaneous Remedies\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also seek three additional categories of remedies (numbers 15, 16, and\n17 above) ofa miscellaneous nature. The first of these is a direction that the U.S. Attorney's Office\nshould be directed to pay a monetary sanction, in an amount to be determined following a hearing\nbefore the Court, to Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2 directly or to any appropriate entity that they may\ndirect. Jane Doe 1 and 2 are aware, of course, that the CVRA provides that it does not \"authorize\na cause of action for damages.\" 8 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). Accordingly, Jane Doe I and 2 are not\nseeking \"damages\" under the CVRA and thus have no need to adduce any evidence about the\ndegree to which they have suffered harm from the U.S. Attorney's Office's violation. But that a\ntraditional means for enforcing rights through the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply\nwith a law. As the Senate co-sponsor of the CVRA explained, \"it is the clear intent and expectation\nof Congress that the district . . . courts will establish procedures that will allow for a prompt\nadjudication of any issues regarding the assertion of a victim's right, while giving meaning to the\nrights we establish.\" 150 CoNG. REC. 22953 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis\nadded). To give meaning to the rights at issue here, the court should impose sanctions on the\nGovernment.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also ask the Court to award to them (and all other Epstein victims who\nso request) restitution, payable by the Government. One of the opportunities that the victims have\nlost as the result of denial of the right to confer is the opportunity to confer and convince the U.S.\nAttorney's Office to prosecute Epstein. Had the Office done so and obtained a conviction, then\nthey would have been entitled to restitution, under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. As a proper remedy for\nthis lost opportunity, the Court should order the Govern\n... [truncated, 2063 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/29 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=29]", "char_count": 2063}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 31 of 35\n\neach of Epstein's victims. The available restitution under the statute is for the cost of medical,\nphysical, psychiatric, and psychological care; physical and occupational therapy; lost income; and\nexpenses incurred during the investigation of the crime and attendance at proceedings related to\nEpstein's crime.\nJane Doe I and 2 also ask for an award of attorneys' fees to their attorneys who have\nhandled this case. The attorneys' have handled this case on a pro bono basis for Jane Doe 1 and 2\nfor more than a decade, devoting several thousand hours to vindicating their right (and the rights\nof other Epstein victims). The amount of fees to be awarded should be determined following\nappropriate submissions from the parties.\nAn award of attorneys' fees against the Government and in favor of the Jane Doe attorneys\nis just and proper, both under the enforcement provisions of the CVRA and under the inherent\npower of the Court. The Supreme Court has made clear that \"[t]here are ample grounds for\nrecognizing ... that in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts have inherent power to assess\nattorney's fees against counsel.\"\n\nv. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45 (1991) (internal\n\nquotation omitted). For example, a federal court has authority, stemming from its historic equity\njurisdiction, to \"award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly benefit others.\"\nId. at 45. Here, of course, Jane Doe 1 and 2's efforts directly benefits other victims, not to mention\nthe general public. In addition, a federal court has authority to awared fees when a party has \"acted\nin bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.\" Id. at 45-46. As noted above and\nas the Court is award, the U.S. Attorney's Office has previously made claims about its internal\ndeliberations, claiming that these deliberations involved nothing but benign intentions. Whatever\nelse may be said about these clai\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/30 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=30]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 32 of 35\n\nwhat happened during the internal deliberations. See generally Jane Doe 1 and 2's Motion for\nFinding of Waiver of Work Product and Similar Protections and for Production of Documents, DE\n414. This Court previously concluded that it did not need to reach the issue of waiver of privilege\n\"[Oven\n\n. the Court's . . . ruling in favor of [Jane Doe 1 and 2] on [the summary judgment\n\nmotions].\" 359 F.Supp.2d at 1213 n.3. But the Court specifically stated that Jane Doe 1 and 2\n\"may reassert this argument if and when appropriate.\"\n\nBecause the attorneys' fees\n\ndetermination requires an assessment of the reasons for the Government's decade-long crusade to\nblock enforcement of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, it is now appropriate for the Court to either\nprovide all materials about the Government's internal deliberations to Jane Doe 1 and 2 because\nof the Government's waiver. Alternatively, the Court should conclude, on the facts of this\nparticular case, either that vexatious or oppressive litigation has occurred or that the Government\nis estopped from denying that such occurred.\nRelated to this point is the fact that Jane Doe 1 and 2 still have pending an allegation that\nthe Government has violated their right to be treated \"with fairness.\" When the Court reaches that\nallegation, a component of fairness will be the issue of whether attorneys' fees are available for\nvictims' rights attorneys, at least in the unique circumstances of this case, under the CVRA and its\nenforcement provisions. Indeed, the Court should simply construe the enforcement provisions for\nthe violation of the right to confer as encompassing the power to award attorneys' fees and grant\nthose fees to Jane Doe 1 and 2's counsel.\n5. Sealed Remedies.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also previously sought remedies the nature of which is under seal\n(hereinafter \"sealed remedies\"), as explained in their sealed supplemental pleading on remedies,\n32\n\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02758167/31 or ?id=EFTA02758167&page=31]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 33 of 35\n\nfiled on December 6, 2011. Jane Doe I and 2 now reassert their request for all of those remedies,\nfor the reasons listed there.\n6. All Other .Just and Proper Remedies.\nJane Doe 1 and 2 also request any other remedy that the Court deems just and proper to\nremedy the past violations of the CVRA rights of Jane Doe 1 and 2 (and all other Epstein victims)\nand to prevent any future violation of their CVRA rights.\nIV.\n\nJANE DOE I AND 2 PRESERVE THEIR RIGHT TO A TRIAL TO ESTABLISH\nVIOLATIONS OF THEIR RIGHT TO BE TREATED WITH FAIRNESS AND\nRIGHT TO BE NOTIFIED OF COURT HEARINGS.\n\nIn granting summary judgment in favor of Jane Doe 1 and 2, the Court did so based solely\non the Government's violation of their right to confer. Accordingly, Jane Doe 1 and 2 continue to\nhave pending before the court two other allegations of the CVRA violations: a violation of their\nright to be treated with faimess and a violation of their right to notice. So that the record is clear,\nthe Jane Does continue to assert those violations. They request a trial (or court hearing) to prove\nthose violations and also all remedies that would be associated with proving those violations.\nCONCLUSION\nThe Court should grant Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 all the remedies identified above. If\nthe Court believes that additional evidence is required to award any of the remedies, it should hold\na trial or hearing as appropriate.\nDATED: May 23, 2019\nRespectfully Submitted,\nEteutley\nJ.\n\nwevtela\n\n33\n\nEFTA02758199\n\n", "char_count": 1563}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 34 of 35\n\nPottinger LP\n425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2\nFort Lauderdale, Florida 33301\nTelephone (800) 400-1098\nE-Mail: brad@epllc.com\nPaul G. Cassell\nPro Hac Vice\nS.J. Quinney College of Law at the\nUniversity of Utah*\n383 S. University St.\nSalt Lake City, UT 84112\nTelephone: (801) 585-5202\nE-Mail: cassellp@law.utah.edu\nJohn Scarola\nSearcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley\n2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33409\nTelephone: (561) 686-6300\nE-Mail: jsx@searcylaw.com\nAttorneysfor Jane Does I and 2\n\n' This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes\nonly and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah.\n34\n\nEFTA02758200\n\n", "char_count": 790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02758167", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 458 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2019 Page 35 of 35\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI certify that the foregoing document was served on May 23, 2019, on counsel of record using\nthe Court's CM/ECF system:\nJill E. Steinberg\nNathan P. Kitchens\nU.S. Attorneys' Office for the Northern District of Georgia\n600 U.S. Courthouse\n75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W.\nAtlanta, GA 30303\n(404) 581-6000\nJill.Steinberg@uisdoj.gov\nNathan.Kitchens@usdoj.gov\nAttorneysfor the Government\nRoy Eric Black\nJacqueline Perczek\nBlack Srebnick Komspan & Stumpf\n201 S Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 1300\nMiami, FL 33131\n305-371-6421\nFax: 358-2006\nEmail: pleading@royblack.com\nAttorneysfor Jeffrey Epstein\n\n/s/\n\nedeuezta\n\n35\n\nEFTA02758201\n\n", "char_count": 721}]}