{"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_count": 14, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02753962", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02753962.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 1 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA\nFILED by\n\nJANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2,\npetitioners,\n\nD.C.\n\nJUN 1 8 2013\nSTEVEN M LARIMORE\nCLERK U S DIST\nPB\nS. D of FLA -W\n\nVS.\n\nt\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nrespondent.\n\nORDER DENYING GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS\nFOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION &\nORDER LIFTING STAY OF DISCOVERY\nTHIS CAUSE is before the court on the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject\nmatter jurisdiction [DE 119], the petitioners' response in opposition [DE 127] and the government's\nreply [DE 147]. For reasons stated below, the court has determined to deny the motion.\nI. Preface\nThe petitioners in this action seek to vacate a \"non-prosecution agreement\" (\"the agreement\")\nbetween the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (USAO/SDFL) and\nJeffrey Epstein (Epstein) pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004 (CVRA), 18 U.S.C.\n§3771. Under the agreement, Epstein agreed to (1) plead guilty to two then pending state court\ncharges, solicitation of prostitution and solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution (a charge\nrequiring him to register as a sex offender), in violation of Fla. Stat. §§796.07 and 796.03 and\n(2) make a binding recommendation for an eighteen-month sentence in county jail followed by\ntwelve months of community control. In exchange for Epstein's performance, the USAO/SDFL\nagreed to (1) defer prosecution of related federal offenses against Epstein which had been\n\nEFTA02753962\n\n\f", "char_count": 1613}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 2 of 14\n\ninvestigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in favor of prosecution by the State of\nFlorida and (2) refrain from instituting criminal charges against certain alleged co-conspirators\nof Epstein. Further, the USAO/SDFL and Epstein expressed their \"anticipat[ion]\" that the\n\"agreement will not be made part of any public record. \" Additionally, the USAO/SDFL promised\nto provide Epstein advance notice before disclosing the agreement in response to a Freedom of\nInformation Act request or compulsory process commanding disclosure [DE 48-5, pp. 2-15].\nII. Factual Background\nAs outlined in their CVRA petition and supplemental pleadings filed in this action,\npetitioners allege the following sequence of events, which the court assumes to be true at the motion\nto dismiss stage:2\n1. In 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an investigation into allegations that\nEpstein had been inducing minor females to engage in commercial sexual activity over the preceding\nfive year period of time. The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida\naccepted the case for prosecution, and in June, 2007 and August, 2007, the FBI issued standard\n\nThe agreement enumerated certain federal offenses which the FBI and the United States\nAttorney's Office determined may have been committed by Epstein between 2001 through 2007,\nincluding conspiracy to use and the use of facilities of interstate commerce to persuade, induce or\nentice minor females to engage in prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b); conspiracy to\ntravel and travel in interstate commerce for purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minor\nfemales in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b); knowingly recruiting, enticing and obtaining persons\nunder the age of eighteen years to engage in commercial sex acts in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§1591(aX1).\n2\n\nSeeMv. United States, 755 F.2d 873 (I I\" Cir. 1985)(in rev\n... [truncated, 2193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/1 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=1]", "char_count": 2193}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 3 of 14\n\nvictim notification letters to the petitioners Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2.\n2. On September 24, 2007, the USAO/SDFL entered into the above-described nonprosecution agreement with Epstein without first conferring with petitioners, and without alerting\nthem to the existence of the agreement either before or promptly after the fact.' Petitioners claim\nthey were kept in the dark about the agreement for roughly nine months - with no mention of the\nfederal deal made in intervening correspondence and verbal communications between petitioners,\nthe FBI and the local United States Attorney's Office.'\n3. On June 27, 2008, the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to the Epstein case\ncontacted petitioners' counsel to advise that Epstein was scheduled to plead guilty to certain state\ncourt charges on June 30, 2008, without mentioning that the anticipated plea in the state court was\na term of the pre-existing non-prosecution agreement with the federal authorities.\n4. On July 3, 2008, petitioners' counsel sent a letter to the USAO/SDFL advising that Jane\n\n'The government appears to concede the non-conferral, stating in its reply brief:\nWhile it may be true that the USAO-SDFL did not inform Petitioners and confer with\nthem about the Non-Prosecution Agreement before it signed that agreement, the\nUSAO-SDFL had conferred with both of the Petitioners about the potential\nprosecution of Epstein and was aware that Jane Doe #1 wished to see Epstein\nprosecuted and that, at that time, Jane Doe #2 had expressed open hostility toward\nany prosecution of Epstein.\n[DE 147, page 31).\n4\n\nThe post-agreement communications are alleged to include a May 30, 2008 letter from the\nUSAO/SDFL to a recognized victim advising that the case \"is currently under investigation\" and that\n\"it can be a lengthy process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a through\ninvestigation.\" In addition, the USAO/SDF\n... [truncated, 2296 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/2 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=2]", "char_count": 2296}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 4 of 14\n\nDoe No. 1 wished to see federal charges brought against Epstein.\nIII. Procedural History\n5. On July 7, 2008, Jane Doe No. I filed an \"emergency\" petition under the CVRA,\ncontending that Epstein was currently involved in plea negotiations with the USAO/SDFL, which\n\"may likely result in a disposition of the charges in the next several days.\" [CVRA Petition, DE 1,\n¶3]. Claiming to be wrongfully excluded from those discussions, Jane Doe 1 asserted the violation\nof her CVRA rights to confer with federal prosecutors; to be treated with fairness; to receive\ntimely notice of relevant court proceedings and to receive information about her right to restitution.\nAs relief, she requested entry of an injunction directing the United States Attorney's Office to\n\"comply with the provisions of the CVRA prior to and including any plea or other agreement with\n[Epstein] and any attendant proceedings.\"\n6. On July 9,2008, the government filed its response, disclaiming application of the CVRA\nto pre-charge negotiations with prospective defendants. Alternatively, the government contended\nit did use its \"best efforts\" to comply with CVRA notice and conferral requirements in its dealings\nwith Jane Doe I.\n7. On July 11, 2008, the court entertained a hearing on the initial petition. During the course\nof that proceeding, the court allowed an amendment of the petition to include Jane Doe No. 2 as a\ncomplainant. The government acknowledged at that time that both petitioners met the definition\nof \"crime victims\" under the CVRA.\n\n4\n\nEFTA02753965\n\n\f", "char_count": 1625}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 5 of 14\n\n8. Over the course of the next eighteen months, the CVRA case stalled as petitioners\npursued collateral civil claims against Epstein. The CVRA case was administratively closed on\nSeptember 9, 2010, and then re-opened at petitioners' request on October 28, 2010. Since then,\npetitioners have submitted a \"Motion for Finding of Violations of the CVRA\" and a supporting\nstatement of facts [DE 48].\n9. On September 26, 2011, the court entered its order partially granting the petitioners'\nmotion for a finding of violations of the CVRA, recognizing that the CVRA can apply before\nformal charges are filed against an accused. The court deferred ruling on the merits of the motion\npending development of a full factual record, and authorized petitioners to conduct limited\ndiscovery in the form of requests for production of documents and requests for admissions directed\nto the U.S. Attorney's Office, with leave for either party to request additional discovery as\nappropriate [DE 99].\n10. On November 8, 2011, the government moved to dismiss the entire CVRA proceeding\nfor lack of subject matter jurisdiction [DE 119], and successfully sought a stay of discovery pending\nresolution of that motion [DE 121, 123]. In its current motion to dismiss, the government first\ncontends that \"even assuming that the CVRA was violated as petitioners claim, petitioners lack\nstanding to seek redress for those violations\" because the remedy petitioners seek- - a vacating or\nre-opening of the non-prosecution agreement — is not a legally viable option at this juncture.\nAlternatively, the government argues that petitioners' CVRA claims are not \"constitutionally ripe\"\nbecause petitioners have a present ability to confer with prosecutorial authorities in other\njurisdictions, namely the United States Attorney's Offices of the District of New Jersey and New\nYork, which share jurisdiction and venue over the federal offenses potenti\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/4 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=4]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 6 of 14\n\nEpstein for crimes committed in this District. Thus, the government asserts that it is premature and\nspeculative for petitioners to bring a claim for the prospective denial of CVRA conferral rights,\nrendering their current claims constitutionally unripe. These arguments are addressed, in turn, in the\ndiscussion which follows.\nIV. Discussion\n\"[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.\" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.\nCt. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To satisfy Article III's minimum standing requirements, a\nplaintiff must generally show (1) it has suffered an injury in fact — i.e. the invasion of a legally\nprotected interest that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent; (2) the injury\nis fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely\nspeculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-561.\nHere, the government contends petitioners are unable to satisfy the third prong of this test\non the theory it is legally impossible for petitioners to obtain the relief which they seek - the\nvacating of the non-prosecution agreement as a predicate to the full and unfettered exercise of their\nCVRA conferral rights — and that they are therefore unable to show a likelihood that the CVRA\ninjury alleged will be redressed by a favorable decision in the case. More specifically, the\ngovernment contends that rescission of an otherwise valid plea or non-prosecution agreement (i.e.\nan agreement containing no illegal terms or conditions) is prohibited by constitutional Due Process\nguarantees - even if entered in violation of the CVRA. Alternatively, the government argues that\neven if the court could set the agreement aside and order the government to confer with petitioners\nbefore arriving at a final\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/5 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=5]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 7 of 14\n\ngovernment claims that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida\nwould still be legally bound to abide by the terms of the September 24, 2007 agreement,'\neliminating the possibility that exercise of petitioners' conferral rights under the CVRA might lead\nto a different federal charging outcome.\nThe court disagrees. As a threshold matter, the court finds that the CVRA is properly\ninterpreted to authorize the rescission or \"re-opening\" of a prosecutorial agreement - including a\nnon-prosecution arrangement — reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under\nthe statute. Clearly, the statute contemplates such a result where, under the \"enforcement and\nlimitations\" provision, § 3771(d)(5), the conditions under which \"[a] victim may make a motion to\nre-open a plea or sentence\" in order to remedy a failure to afford a right provided under the CVRA\nare specifically prescribed. If the government's theory was correct, i.e. that no otherwise valid plea\nmay be disturbed, notwithstanding a CVRA violation, as a matter of constitutional due process\nguarantees -- the statutory prescriptions for \"re-opening\" a plea or sentence reached in violation\nof thc CVFtA would effectively be nullified. The court will not embrace such a strained construction\nof the statute.\n\n5\n\nThe government acknowledges that the USAO/SDFL has been recused by the Department of\nJustice for prospective responsibility of any further criminal investigation or potential prosecution\nof Epstein relating to his alleged sexual activities with minor females in the Southern District of\nFlorida, and that responsibility for any future prosecutorial action arising out of Epstein's alleged\ncriminal activity in this district has now been assigned to the United States Attorney's Office for the\nMiddle District of Florida [Government Motion to Dismiss, page 8, n. 8][DE 119]. However, it\ncontends, wi\n... [truncated, 2346 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/6 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=6]", "char_count": 2346}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 8 of 14\n\nAlthough this particular statutory enforcement provision expressly refers to the re-opening\nof a \"plea\" or \"sentence\" — events falling in the post-charge stage of criminal proceedings — the court\nconcludes that the statute is properly interpreted impliedly to authorize a \"re-opening\" or setting\naside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements made in derogation of the government's CVRA\nconferral obligations as well.\nFirst, the court concludes that the \"reasonable right to confer ... in the case \" guaranteed by\nthe CVRA at §3771(a)(5)\n\nis properly read to extend to the pre-charge stage of criminal\n\ninvestigations and proceedings, certainly where -- as here-- the relevant prosecuting authority has\nformally accepted a case for prosecution. The case law and legislative history of the statute support\nsuch an expansive reading of the statutory mandate. See United States v. BP Products North\nAmerica, Inc., 2008 WL 501321 at * 11-15 (S.D. Tex. 2008)(unpub), citing 150 Cong. Rec. 52460,\nS4268 (daily ed. Apr 22, 2004)(statement of Senator Feinstein)(explaining that the right to confer\nwas \"intended to be expansive,\" applying to \"any critical state or disposition ofthe case\") and United\nStates v.=,\n\n458 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (D. Utah 2006)(govemment motion to dismiss charge of\n\nusing facility of interstate commerce to entice minors to engage in unlawful sexual activity would\nnot be granted until government consulted with victim); United States v. Ingrassia, 2005 WL\n2875220 at *17 n. 11 (Senate Debate supports view that contemplated mechanism for victims to\nobtain information on which to base their input was conferral with prosecutor concerning any critical\nstage or disposition of the case), and United States Department of Justice, Attorney General\nGuidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance 30 (2005)(\"Responsible officials should make\nreasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider vic\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/7 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=7]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 9 of 14\n\nIn short, there is no logical reason to treat a \"non-prosecution agreement\" which the\ngovernment employs to dispose of contemplated federal charges any differently from a \"plea\nagreement\" employed to dispose of charged offenses in interpreting remedies available under the\nCVRA. Where the statute expressly contemplates that a \"plea\" may be set aside if entered in\nviolation of CVRA conferral rights, it necessarily contemplates that a \"non-prosecution\" agreement\nmay be set aside if entered in violation of the government's conferral obligations.\nThus, in their petition and supplemental pleadings, Jane Doe I and 2 have identified a\nremedy which is likely to redress the injury complained of— the setting aside of the non-prosecution\nagreement as a prelude to the full unfettered exercise of their conferral rights at a time that will\nenable the victims to exercise those rights meaningfully. See BP Products North America, supra\nat *14 (\"Section 3771(c)(1) requires government officials to use best efforts to give victims notice\nof their rights under subsection (1), including the right to confer, at a time that will enable the\nvictims to exercise these rights meaningfully\"). Thus, petitioners do not lack constitutional standing\nbecause of an inability to identify a remedy for their alleged injury.\nNor is the court persuaded by the government's \"futility\" argument, derived from its stated\nperception that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (and\nderivatively the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida) would be\nconstrained to honor the terms of the September 24, 2007 agreement even if the court were to set it\naside and order the government to confer with the victims before reaching a final charging decision.\n\n9\n\nEFTA02753970\n\n\f", "char_count": 1891}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 10 of 14\n\nThe fallacy with this strand of the government's standing argument derives from its misidentification\nof the alleged injury sought to be remedied in the case: The victims' CVRA injury is not the\ngovernment's failure to prosecute Epstein federally — an end within the sole control of the\ngovernment. Rather, it is the government's failure to confer with the victims before disposing of\ncontemplated federal charges. This injury can be redressed by setting aside the agreement and\nrequiring the government to handle its disposition of the Epstein case in keeping with the mandates\nof the CVRA, including the pre-charge conferral obligations of the government.\nThe court rejects the notion that a victim must show the likelihood or at least a possibility\nof a prosecution as a pre- requisite to demonstrating standing for redress of conferral rights under\nthe CVRA - which is the fundamental premise of the government's futility argument. What the\ngovernment chooses to do after a conferral with the victims is a matter outside the reach of the\nCVRA, which reserves absolute prosecutorial discretion to the government. 18 U.S.C. §3771\n(d)(6)(\"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the\nAttorney General or any officer under his direction\").\nWhile the law of standing does require, as a general proposition, that a federal plaintiff show\nsome logical nexus between the asserted injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated (i. e. a\nlikelihood that the relief sought is likely to vindicate the injury), Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.\n614, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed. 2d 536 (1973), these requirements apply only in the absence of a\nstatute expressly conferring standing. Id. at 617 n. 3 (\"[] Congress may enact statutes creating leal\nrights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the\nstatute\"), citing Trafficante v. Metropolita\n... [truncated, 2174 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/9 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=9]", "char_count": 2174}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLED Docket 06/19/2013 Page 11 of 14\n\na statute expressly conferring certain legal rights upon \"crime victims,\" the invasion of which\ncreates standing to seek relief under the CVRA, even though no cognizable injury would exist\nwithout the statute. It is also apparent that the petitioners in this case meet the definition of \"crime\nvictims\" conferred with standing to assert the subject CVRA claims.\nThe CVRA at §3771(e) defines a \"crime victim\" as \" a person directly and proximately\nharmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense.\" In the Eleventh Circuit, a two-part test\nis employed to determine whether an individual qualifies as a crime victim under this statute: First,\nthe court must identify the behavior constituting the \"commission of a Federal offense.\" Second,\nthe court must identify the direct and proximate effects of that behavior on parties other than the\nUnited States. In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285 (1\n\nCir. 2008). If the criminal behavior causes a party\n\ndirect and proximate harmful effect, the party is considered a victim under the CVRA. Id at 1288.\nThe non-prosecution agreement at issue refers to five distinct federal sex offense crimes\ninvolving minors contemplated against Epstein, the direct and proximate harmful effects of which\nwere allegedly visited upon the petitioners, plainly qualifying them as crime victims within the\nmeaning of the CVRA. As such, they have standing to assert rights under the CVRA, as they have\ndone in this case. See e.g. United States v. Thetford,\n\nF. Supp. 2d\n\n2013 WL 1309851\n\n(N.D. Ala. 2013). Presented with these claims, the court is obligated to decide whether, as crime\nvictims, petitioners have asserted valid reasons why the court should vacate or re-open the nonprosecution agreement reached between Epstein and the USAO/SDFL. Whether the evidentiary\nproofs will entitle them to that relief is a question properly reserved for determination upon a fully\n\n11\n\nEFTA02753972\n\n\n... [truncated, 2001 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/10 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=10]", "char_count": 2001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 12 of 14\n\ndeveloped evidentiary record. 6\nIn sum, the petitioners' standing is expressly conferred by the CVRA, which limits its\nprotections to \"crime victim(s),\" defined as \"person[s] directly and proximately harmed as a result\nof the commission of a Federal offense ...\" 18 U.S.C. §3771(e). The court finds and the government\ndoes not dispute that petitioners are persons \"directly and proximately harmed\" as the result of\nfederal offenses allegedly committed by Epstein. This concludes the proper confines of the standing\ninquiry.\n\n6\n\nRecognizing the need for a developed evidentiary record, the court accordingly rejects the\ngovernment's related \"estoppel\" argument as an independent attack on petitioners' constitutional\nstanding to sue. In this vein, the government argues that the petitioners are legally precluded from\nseeking rescission of the non-prosecution agreement under any scenario because they had, but\nforfeited, an opportunity to press for rescission at an early stage in these CVRA proceedings-before Epstein performed his part of the bargain (i.e. before he served jail time on the two state\ncharges). Due to petitioners' counsel's initial \"indecision\" on whether to seek rescission, as\nexpressed at an earlier hearing held in August 2008, the government argues that \"[e]ven assuming\narguendo that the CVRA would allow a victim to seek rescission of a non- prosecution agreement\nbetween the government and an uncharged individual, petitioners' action would legally preclude\nthem from obtaining such a remedy in these proceedings.\"\nWhether petitioners are estopped from seeking vindication of their CVRA conferral rights\nvia the vehicle of rescission or a \"re-opening\" of the non-prosecution agreement due to an earlier\nlitigation posture assumed in this case-- as the government contends -- implicates a fact-sensitive\nequitable defense which must be considered in the historical factual context of the e\n... [truncated, 2653 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02753962/11 or ?id=EFTA02753962&page=11]", "char_count": 2653}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 13 of 14\n\nB. Ripeness\nThe \"ripeness doctrine,\" under which a plaintiff lacks standing if his claim is not ripe, aims\nto prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in\nabstract disagreements over administrative policies. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 (4' Cir. 2013);\nv. Roman Catholic Diocese ofSyracuse New York, Inc., 322 Fed. Appx. 852, 2009 WL\n941765 (1 I th Cir. 2009Xunpub).\nIn this case, the government contends that the petitioners' CVRA conferral claims are not\nconstitutionally ripe because petitioners do not allege they have sought and have been denied\nconferral with all federal prosecutorial authorities having potential jurisdiction over Epstein's\nfederal sex crimes in the Southern District of Florida. Specifically, the government argues that the\nUnited States Attorney's Office of the Districts o f New Jersey and New York share jurisdiction with\nthe United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida over federal sex offenses\nallegedly committed by Epstein in the Southern District of Florida, and that petitioners' CVRA\nconferral claims are not ripe unless and until all other relevant prosecutorial authorities refuse or fail\nto confer with them regarding federal offenses chargeable against Epstein.\nThe court summarily rejects this argument. Petitioners have alleged a violation of their\nCVRA conferral rights against a federal prosecutorial authority which formally accepted the case\nagainst Epstein for prosecution. Whether conferral rights do or do not exist with prosecutorial\nauthorities in some other jurisdiction does not detract from the ripeness of this claim against a local\nfederal prosecutorial authority which did actively investigate potential charges against Epstein in\nthis district and formally resolved those charges with the challenged non-prosecution agreement at\n13\n\nEFTA02753974\n\n\f", "char_count": 1967}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02753962", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 189 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2013 Page 14 of 14\n\nissue in this action.\nIII. Conclusion\nBased on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:\n1. The government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction [DE 119] is\nDENIED.\n2. The stay of discovery pending ruling on the government's motion to dismiss entered\nNovember 8, 2011 [DE# 123] is LIFTED.\nDONE AND ORDERED in\n\nat West Palm Beach, Florida this 18th day of June,\n\n2013.\n\n,e:\nKenneth A. Marra\nUnited States District Judge\n\nSEALED\ncc. All counsel\n6.\n\n0T SEALED\n\n14\n\nEFTA02753975\n\n\f", "char_count": 585}]}