{"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_count": 11, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02743427", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02743427.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 1 of 11\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80802-MARRAMIMI\nJANE DOE NO. 8\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nDEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE\nDEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT IDE 24. 12/14/091\nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (EPSTEIN), by and through his attorneys, files\nhis answer and affirmative defenses to Plaintiff JANE DOE No. 8's Amended Complaint,\ndated December 12, 2009 [DE 24], and states:\n1. Without knowledge and deny.\n2. As to the allegations in paragraphs 2, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - lilt would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against SelfIncrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. -\n\nEFTA02743427\n\n\f", "char_count": 1435}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 2 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 2\n\n.. a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n3. EPSTEIN denies the allegation in ¶3 that he \"is a citizen and resident of the state\nof New York.\" As to the remainder of the allegations in ¶3, Defendant asserts his Fifth\nAmendment privilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company\n436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)• Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the\nFifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due\nProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - \"lilt would be incongruous to have\ndifferent standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same\nfeared prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal\ncourt.\"); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny - Privilege Against\nSelf-Incrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to\na specific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions.\n—\"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n4. As to the allegations in ¶4, deny.\n5. As to the allegations in ¶5, without knowledge and deny.\n\nEFTA02743428\n\n\f", "char_count": 1862}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 3 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 3\n6. As to the allegations in ¶6 and ¶7, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Malloy v. Hogan 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - \"Lilt would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against SelfIncrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —\n\"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n7. As to the allegations in ¶¶8 through 14, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - lilt would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-\n\nEFTA02743429\n\n\f", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 4 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 4\n\nIncrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —\n.. a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief\" which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n8. As to the allegations in ¶15, Defendant realleges and adopts his responses to\nthrough 14 of the Amended Complaint as set forth in ¶¶1 through 7 above herein.\n9. As to the allegations in ¶¶16 through 20, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)• Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - \"[i]t would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Selfincrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —\n\"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief\" which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n\nEFTA0274343\n... [truncated, 2004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743427/3 or ?id=EFTA02743427&page=3]", "char_count": 2004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 5 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 5\n10. As to the allegations in ¶21, Defendant realleges and adopts his responses to\n¶¶1 through 14 of the Amended Complaint as set forth in ¶¶1 through 7 above herein.\n11. As to the allegations of ¶¶22 through 26, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)- Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - \"[i]t would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny - Privilege Against SelfIncrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —\n.. a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief\" which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\n12. As to the allegations in ¶27, Defendant realleges and adopts his responses to\n¶¶1 through 14 of the Amended Complaint as set forth in ¶¶1 through 7 above herein.\n13. As to the allegations in ¶¶28 through 35, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment\nprivilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi v. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d\n1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)- Malloy v. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth\nAmendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process\n\nEFTA02743431\n\n\f", "char_count": 1983}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 6 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 6\n\nClause of the Fourteenth Amendment - \"[i]t would be incongruous to have different\nstandards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared\nprosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.\"); 5\nFed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against SelfIncrimination (\"...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a\nspecific denial.\"). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. .. a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting\nthe privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute\nthe kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief\" which would prevent a plaintiff\nbringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege.\nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court deny the relief sought by Plaintiff.\nAffirmative Defenses\n1. As to all counts, Plaintiff consented to and was a willing participant in the acts\nalleged, and therefore her claims are barred, or her damages are required to be\nreduced accordingly.\n2. As to all counts alleged, Plaintiff actually consented to and participated in\nconduct similar and/or identical to the acts alleged with other persons which were the\nsole or contributing cause of Plaintiffs alleged damages.\n3. As to all counts, Plaintiff impliedly consented to the acts alleged by not objecting,\nand therefore, her claims are barred, or her damages are required to be reduced\naccordingly.\n\nEFTA02743432\n\n\f", "char_count": 1686}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 7 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 7\n4. As to all counts, Defendant reasonably believed or was told that the Plaintiff had\nattained the age of 18 years old at the time of the alleged acts.\n5. As to all counts, Plaintiffs alleged damages were caused in whole or part by\nevents or circumstances completely unrelated to the incident alleged in the complaint.\n6. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiffs\nclaims as alleged in Counts I, II, and III of the Amended Complaint arose in 2001.\nPlaintiff did not file suit until 2009 — approximately 8 years later — and, thus, her claims\nare time barred.\n7. As to Count I, Plaintiff's claim for assault and battery is time barred under\n§95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat., as Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege \"abuse\" under §39.01,\nFla. Stat., and thus, §95.11(7), Fla. Stat., is inapplicable.\n8. As to Count I and Count II, the Counts are duplicative of each other and thus,\nPlaintiff has failed to state a cause of action in one or the other.\n9. As to Count III, such claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 18\nU.S.C. §2255(b).\n10. As to Count III, such claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, 18\nU.S.C. §2255(b). Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege and cannot allege and facts\nthat would implicate the doctrine of delayed discovery.\n11.As to Count III, Plaintiff has failed to and cannot state a cause of action under 18\nU.S.C. §2255, as she has failed to sufficiently and cannot allege a violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§2422, as the requisite predicate act.\n\nEFTA02743433\n\n\f", "char_count": 1671}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 8 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 8\n12. As to Count III, Plaintiff has failed to and cannot state a cause of action under\n18 U.S.C. §2255, as she has failed to sufficiently and cannot allege a violation of 18\nU.S.C. §2422. Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege and cannot allege — \"using the\nmail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce to knowingly persuade,\ninduce or entice ...\" JANE DOE NO. 8 in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b).\n13.As to Plaintiffs claims for punitive damages in Count I — \"Sexual Assault &\nBattery,\" and Count II — \"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,\" such claims are\nsubject to the limitations as set forth in §768.72, et seq., Florida Statutes.\n14.As to Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages in Count I — \"Sexual Assault &\nBattery,\" and Count II — \"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,\" such claims are\nsubject to the constitutional limitations and guideposts as set forth in BMW of North\nAmerica v. Gore 116 S.Ct 1589 (1996); Philip Morris USA v. la\n(2007) State Farm v.\n\n123 S.Ct 1513 (2003);\n\n127 S.Ct. 1057\n\nv. Liqget Group, Inc., 945\n\nSo.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the\nUnited States Constitution and Florida's Constitution, Art. I, §§2 and 9, prohibit the\nimposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments\n15. As to Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages in Count I — \"Sexual Assault &\nBattery,\" and Count II — \"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,\" the determination of\nwhether or not Defendant is liable for punitive damages is required to be bifurcated from\na determination of the amount to be imposed.\n16. Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for sexual assault and/or battery\nunder Count I.\n\nEFTA02743434\n\n\f", "char_count": 1844}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 9 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 9\n17. As to Count III, Plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action as she does not and\ncan not show a violation of a predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005).\n18.As to Count III, the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 in effect at the time of the alleged\nconduct applies, and, thus, the presumptive minimum damages amount should Plaintiff\nprove the elements of such claim is $50,000, and not subject to any multiplier.\n19.As to Count Ill, application of the amended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective\nJuly 27, 2006, would be in violation of the legal axiom against retroactive application of\nan amended statute, and also in violation of such constitutional principles, including but\nnot limited to, the \"Ex Post Facto\" Clause, U.S. Const. Article I, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1, and\nprocedural and substantive due process, U.S. Const. 14th Amend., 5th Amend. The\nstatute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct applies.\n20.As to Count III, application of the amended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective\nJuly 27, 2006, is prohibited pursuant to the vagueness doctrine and the Rule of Lenity.\nA criminal statute is required to give \" 'fair warning ... in language that the common\nworld will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make\nthe warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.' \" United States v. Lanier\n520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting McBovle v. United\nStates. 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931)) (omission in original). The\n\"three related manifestations of the fair warning requirement\" are: (1) the vagueness\ndoctrine bars enforcement of a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an\nact in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its\nmeaning and differ as to its application; (2) the canon of strict construction of criminal\n\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743427/8 or ?id=EFTA02743427&page=8]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 10 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 10\n\nstatutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal\nstatute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered; (3) due process bars courts from\napplying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor\nany prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.\n21. The applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 creates a cause of action on behalf of\na \"minor.\" Plaintiff had attained the age of majority at the time of filing this action, and\naccordingly, her cause of action is barred.\n22. Because Plaintiff has no claim under 18 U.S.C. §2255, this Court is without\nsubject matter jurisdiction as to all claims asserted.\n23.Application of the 18 U.S.C. §2255, as amended, effective July 27, 2006, is in\nviolation of the constitutional principles of due process, the \"Ex Post Facto\" clause, and\nthe Rule of Lenity, in that in amending the term \"minor\" to \"person\" as to those who may\nbring a cause of action impermissibly and unconstitutionally broadened the scope of\npersons able to bring a §2255 claim.\n24. 18 U.S.C. §2255 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment\nunder the U.S. Constitution, and thus Plaintiffs claim thereunder is barred.\n25. 18 U.S.C. §2255 violates the constitutional guarantees of procedural and\nsubstantive due process. Procedural due process guarantees that a person will not be\ndeprived of life, liberty or property without notice and opportunity to be heard.\nSubstantive due process protects fundamental rights. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cause of\naction thereunder is barred.\nCertificate of Service\n\nEFTA02743436\n\n\f", "char_count": 1757}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743427", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 25 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/17/2009 Page 11 of 11\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 11\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with\nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being\nserved this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the\nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this /q day of eigeo-nait , 2009:\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njaqesqAbellsouth.net\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\n305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\nahorowitze,hermanlaw.com\nIriveraAhermanlaw.com\nCounsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #8\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER\n& COLEMAN, LLP\n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FJq 33401\n(561) 842-2820\nBy:\nRobert D. ritton, Jr.\nFlorida B r #224162\nMichael J. Pike\nFlorida Bar #617296\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\nrcritabcIclaw.com\nmpike@bciclaw.com\n\nEFTA02743437\n\n\f", "char_count": 1191}]}