{"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_count": 9, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02743392", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02743392.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 1 of 9\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO. 09-80802-CIV-MARRA\nJANE DOE NO. 8,\n\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\n\nDefendant.\n/\n\nOPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS\nTHIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's (\"Defendant\")\nMotion to Dismiss (DE 8). Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 8 (\"Plaintiff') filed a response to the motion\n(DE 13) and Defendant filed a Reply (DE 15). The Court has carefully reviewed the motion,\nresponse, and reply, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.\n\nBackground\nOn May 28, 2009, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant (DE 1). Plaintiff\nbrings suit alleging Count I - Sexual Assault and Battery; Count II - Intentional Infliction of\nEmotional Distress; and Count III - Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 2422.\nThe facts, as alleged in the Complaint, are as follows: Defendant, an adult male, has a\nsexual preference and obsession for underage minor girls. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9. Defendant engaged in\n\n1\n\nEFTA02743392\n\n\f", "char_count": 1111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 2 of 9\n\na plan and scheme in which he gained access to primarily economically disadvantaged minor\ngirls in his home, sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave them money. Compl. ¶ 9. In or\nabout 2001, Plaintiff, then approximately 16 years old, became one of Defendant's victims.\nComp11 9.\nDefendant's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage, ostensibly to\ngive a wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm Beach mansion. Comp1.1\nII. The underage victim would be brought or directed to Defendant's mansion, where she would\nbe led up a flight of stairs to a room that contained a massage table in addition to other\nfurnishings. Id. The girl would then find herself alone in the room with Defendant, who would\nbe wearing only a towel. Id. Defendant would then remove his towel and lie naked on the\nmassage table, and then direct the girl to remove her clothes. Id. Defendant would then perform\none or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts. Id.\nConsistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Plaintiff was recruited by another girl,\nwho told her that she could make some money, but did not tell her what was involved. Compl.\n13. Plaintiff was picked up and brought to Defendant's mansion in Palm Beach. Id. Once there,\nshe was led up a flight of stairs to the room with the massage table. Id. Defendant came into the\nroom and directed Plaintiff to remove her clothes and give him a massage. Id. Plaintiff was\nfrightened and felt trapped. Id. During the massage, Defendant touched Plaintiff's breasts and\nvagina, and grabbed her hand and placed it on his penis. Id. Defendant masturbated himself\nduring the massage. Id. Defendant then left money for Plaintiff. Id. As a result of this encounter\nwith Defendant, Plaintiff experienced confusion, shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, and\nhas suffered severe psychological and emotional injuries. Compl. ¶ 14.\n2\n\nEFTA02743393\n\n\f", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 3 of 9\n\nUnder Count I - Sexual Assault and Battery, the Complaint alleges as follows: Defendant\nmade an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact toward Plaintiff, creating a\nreasonable fear of imminent peril and sexual assault. Compl. ¶ 16. Defendant intentionally\ninflicted harmful or offensive contact on the person of Plaintiff Compl. ¶ 17. Defendant\ntortiously committed a sexual assault and battery on Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 18. Defendant's acts\nwere intentional, unlawful, offensive and harmful. Id. Defendant's plan and scheme in which he\ncommitted such acts upon Plaintiff were done willfully and maliciously. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff\nhas suffered and will continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including\nmental, psychological and emotional damages and loss of enjoyment of life. Compl. 20.\nUnder Count III, Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §\n2422, the Complaint alleges as follows: Defendant used a facility or means of interstate\ncommerce to knowingly persuade, induce or entice Plaintiff, when she was under the age of 18\nyears, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a\ncriminal offense. Compl. ¶ 28. On June 30, 2008, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to\nviolations of Florida §§ 796,07 and 796.03 in the 15ih Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach\nCounty (Case nos. 2008-cf-009381AXXXMB and 2006-cf-009454AXXXMB), for conduct\ninvolving the same plan and scheme as alleged herein. Comp. ¶ 29. As to Plaintiff, Defendant\ncould have been charged with criminal violations of Florida Statute § 796.07(2) (including\nsubsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) thereof), and other criminal offenses including violations\nof Florida Statutes §§ 798.02 and 800.04 (including subsections (5), (6), and (7) thereof). Comp.\n¶ 30. As a result of Defendant's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, Plaintiff has suffere\n... [truncated, 2105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743392/2 or ?id=EFTA02743392&page=2]", "char_count": 2105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 4 of 9\n\nDefendant argues in his motion to dismiss that Counts I and 10 of the Complaint must be\ndismissed as time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations on the face of the Complaint.'\nPlaintiff responds that the Court should deny the motion because it is not apparent from the\nComplaint that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred because the Complaint does not allege the date\non which her claims accrued. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Count I is not time-barred\nbecause Plaintiff had until seven years after she reached the age of majority to file her claim.\n\nStandard of Review\nIn deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a\ncourt must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most\nfavorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). To satisfy the\npleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a short and\nplain statement showing an entitlement to relief, and the statement must \"give the defendant fair\nnotice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\" Swierkiewicz v.\nSorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v.\nTwombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005).\nThis is a liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with\nparticularity every element of a cause of action. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253\nF.3d 678, 683 (I I th Cir. 2001). Instead, the complaint need only \"contain either direct or\ninferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under\nsome viable legal theory.\" Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). \"A complaint need not\n' Defendant's Motion does not move for dismissal of Count II.\n4\n\nEFTA02743395\n\n\f", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 5 of 9\n\nspecify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the\ndefendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the grounds on which it\nrests.\"\n\nv. United Food and Comm'! Workers Intl Union, 866 F.2d 1380, 1384 (11th Cir.\n\n1989).\n\"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(bX6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed\nfactual allegations, [ ] a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief\nrequires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause\nof action will not do.\" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations omitted).\n\"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the\nassumption that all of the complaint's allegations arc true.\" Id. at 1965. Plaintiff must plead\nenough facts to state a plausible basis for the claim. Id.\n\nDiscussion\nCount I alleges a claim for sexual assault and battery. Defendant asserts that Count I\nshould be dismissed because a four-year statute of limitations applies to that claim, and it is\napparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff filed her claim past this limitations period.\nA statute of limitations bar is \"an affirmative defense, and ... plaintiff's] [are] not\nrequired to negate an affirmative defense in [their] complaint.\" LaGrasta v. First Union\nSecurities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (AS Tregenza v. Great American\nCommunications Co., 12 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 1993)). A Rule 12(bX6) dismissal on statute of\nlimitations grounds is appropriate only if it is \"apparent from the face of the complaint\" that the\nclaim is time-barred. Id.; Omar v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1251 (I 1th Cir. 2003); Carmichael v.\n5\n\nEFTA02743396\n\n\f", "char_count": 1870}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 6 of 9\n\nNissan Motor Acceptance Corp. 291 F.3d 1278, 1279 (1 I th Cir. 2002).\nDefendant argues that, pursuant to Florida law, the statute of limitations for assault and\nbattery is four years. Defendant relies upon Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3Xo), which provides:\nActions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:\n(3) Within four years.-(o) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious\ninterference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort, except as provided\nin subsections (4), (5), and (7).\nDefendant asserts that, based upon the allegations in the Complaint', it was approximately eight\n(8) years between the alleged conduct by Defendant and the filing of the Complaint. Thus,\nDefendant argues, on the face of the Complaint, the four year statute of limitations has expired\nand, accordingly, Court I should be dismissed as time-barred.\nIn response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is relying on the wrong limitations period.\nSection 95.1 l(3Xo), upon which Defendant relies, provides as follows: \"An action for assault,\nbattery, false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any\nother intentional tort, except as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).\" (emphasis added).\nThus, Section 95.143Xo) is not applicable to causes of action falling within the purview of §\n95.11(7). Section 95.11(7) provides as follows:\n(7) For intentional torts based on abuse. — An action founded on alleged abuse, as\ndefined in s. 39.01, ... may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the\nage of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency\nof the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of\nboth the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse,\nwhichever occurs later.\nAccordingly, an intentional tort claim alleging \"abuse\" against a child,\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743392/5 or ?id=EFTA02743392&page=5]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 7 of 9\n\n§39.01, is controlled by §95.11(7), as an exception to the four-year limitations period provided\nfor in §95.11(3X0). See H.T.E. v. Tyler Technologies, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (M.D.\nFla. 2002) (where language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its\nplain and obvious meaning).\nThe term \"abuse\" is defined in Fla. Stat. §39.01(2) as follows: \" `Abuse' means any\nwillful act or threatened act that results in any physical, mental or sexual injury or harm that\ncauses or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly\nimpaired.\" The Complaint in this case alleges \"abuse\" under the broad definition of §39.01.\nSpecifically, Count I alleges willful acts (Complaint ¶¶ 8-13, 16-19); resulting in physical, mental\nor sexual injury (Complaint ¶¶ 13,17, 20); that cause or are likely to cause the child's physical,\nmental or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Thus, the seven-year limitations period\nafter the Plaintiff reaches the age of majority applies to Plaintiff's claims in Count I. According\nto the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff was approximately 16 years old in 2001. Comp. ¶ 9.\nIt follows that Plaintiff was approximately 24 years old (and approximately six years past the age\nof majority) when she filed her Complaint. Therefore, Count I is not time-barred pursuant to the\napplicable statute of limitations.\nCounts III alleges a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) based upon an alleged violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 2422. That statute states, in pertinent part,\n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\nStates knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has\nnot attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for\nwhich any person can be charged \n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743392/6 or ?id=EFTA02743392&page=6]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 8 of 9\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).\nDefendant argues that, on the face of the Complaint, Count III is barred by the statute of\nlimitations contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b). That statute provides: \"Any action commenced\nunder this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of\naction first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years\nafter the disability.\" Defendant states that, based on the allegations of the Complaint, it has been\neight (8) years since the alleged conduct by Defendant occurred, well past the six-year statute of\nlimitations. Additionally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is now at least 24 years old, well past\nthe age of majority under both federal and state law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1); Fla. Stat. § 1.01.\nPlaintiff responds that Defendant's motion assumes that the action accrued on the date\nwhen Defendant's alleged sexual misconduct occurred, but that the determination of when the\nlimitations period accrues under the discovery rule in a case involving sexual misconduct with a\nminor requires a detailed and complex factual inquiry regarding when Plaintiff became aware of\nher injuries and was able to connect those injuries to the Defendant's conduct. (Resp. at 5-7).\nWhile ordinarily a Plaintiff need not negate the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations,\nLaGrasta 358 F.3d at 845, when on the face of the complaint it appears that the limitations\nperiod has run, Plaintiff must allege facts which, if proven true, would avoid the limitations\nperiod. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (II thh Cir. 2003) (to dismiss a claim as timebarred it must appear beyond a doubt from the complaint itself that the plaintiff can prove no set\nof facts which would avoid a statute of limitations bar); Berkson v. Del Monte Corp. 743 F.2d\n53, 55 (1' Cir. 1984); see. e.g., Autry Petroleum Co. v. BP Products North\n... [truncated, 2130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743392/7 or ?id=EFTA02743392&page=7]", "char_count": 2130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743392", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/18/2009 Page 9 of 9\n\nface of the Complaint, it is apparent (1) that the statute of limitations has run and (2) that there\nare no facts that Plaintiffs could prove that would support a finding that BP has committed a\nfraud which prevented Plaintiffs from bringing the action at an earlier time.\") A review of the\nComplaint, however, reveals no allegations which implicate the doctrine of delayed discovery, or\nwould avoid the running of the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count III\nwithout prejudice for Plaintiff to amend to add allegations which implicate the doctrine of\ndelayed discovery, if she can do so in good faith.\n\nConclusion\nFor the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (DE 8) is GRANTED IN\nPART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is denied.\nDefendant's motion to dismiss Count III is granted. Count HI is hereby dismissed without\nprejudice, with leave to amend in accordance with this Order.\nDONE AND ORDERED in\n\nat West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,\n\nFlorida, this 18\"' day ofNovember, 2009.\n\nKENNETH A. MARRA\nUnited States District Judge\ncopies to:\nAll counsel of record\n\n9\n\nEFTA02743400\n\n\f", "char_count": 1241}]}