{"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_count": 10, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02743351", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02743351.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 1 of 10\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80802-MARRAJANE DOE NO. 8\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nDEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN\nOPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, dated 08/12/09\nDefendant EPSTEIN, by and through his attorneys, replies to Plaintiff JANE DOE\nNo. 8's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint,\n(\"memorandum\"), dated August 12, 2009. In support of dismissal of Count I — \"Sexual\nAssault and Battery\" and Count III — \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in\nViolation of 18 U.S.C. §2422,\" based on the statute of limitations, Defendant replies:\nIntroduction\nDefendant's position is that Counts I and III are each barred by the applicable\nstatute of limitations. Since the issues in parts I and II of Plaintiff's memorandum\noverlap, Defendant will address those parts together in I and II herein.\n\nPart III\n\naddresses the statute of limitations for Count III, as set forth in 18 U.S.C. §2255(b).\nI.\n\nPlaintiff's Complaint on its face does show the date that her claims accrued.\n\nII.\n\nBased on the Complaint allegations, 495.11(7). Fla. Stat., does not apply to\nCount I — Assault and Battery: thus, such claim is time barred.\n\nPursuant to the allegations on the face of Plaintiff's complaint, Count I, based on\nFlorida's common law of assault and battery, and Count III, brought pursuant to 18\n\nEFTA02743351\n\n\f", "char_count": 1539}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 2 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 2\n\nU.S.C. §2255, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.\n\nPlaintiff and\n\nDefendant are in agreement that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations\ngrounds is appropriate where \"it is 'apparent from the face of the complaint' that the\nclaim is time-barred.\" See generally, La Grasta v. First Union Securities. Inc. 358 F.3d\n840, 845 -846 (11 th Cir. 2004).\nHowever, contrary to Plaintiffs assertion in section I, p. 2, of her memorandum,\nbased on the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff's claims alleged in Count I and III are\ntime barred. Plaintiff now attempts to rely on the \"discovery rule\" in an effort to argue\nthat the cause of action accrued at some later date; however, and significantly, there\nare no allegations in Count I that implicate application of the discovery rule which is\ncodified in Florida Statute §95.11(7).\n\nHearndon v. Graham, 767 So.2d 1179 (Fla.\n\n2000). Hearndon dealt with the accrual of a cause of action where a plaintiff alleges\nthat she suffered from traumatic amnesia caused by childhood sexual abuse. The\nFlorida Supreme Court answered the following question in the affirmative:\nWhere a plaintiff in a tort action based on childhood sexual abuse alleges that\nshe suffered from traumatic amnesia caused by the abuse, does the delayed\ndiscovery doctrine postpone accrual of the cause of action?\nThe Hearndon plaintiff filed her complaint in 1991 against her stepfather for\ninjuries from alleged sexual abuse committed upon her beginning in 1968 when she\nwas 8, and continuing until 1975 when she turned 15. She further alleged that she\nsuffered from \"'traumatic amnesia,' or a related syndrome [until approximately 1988],\ncaused by the abuses allegedly perpetrated by [the defendant], thereby explaining why\nearlier commencement of the action had not been possible.\" Id, at 1181. The plaintiff\n\nEFTA02743352\n\n\f", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 3 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 3\n\nclaimed the sexual abuse caused her to suppress or lose her memory for several years.\nThe Supreme Court noted that in reaching its decision allowing the accrual of the action\nto be delayed, it was not passing on the merits of whether she actually lost and then\nretrieved her memory, or on the reliability of any of the psychological techniques used to\nbring back the memories of the abuse.\nAs noted in Hearndon the Florida Legislature codified the discovery rule\nin intentional abuse cases when it enacted §95.11(7), Fla.Statutes. §95.11(7) was\nfound not to apply in Hearndon because the alleged sexual abuse occurred from 1968\nto 1975, and the abuse was not recalled until 1988. The plaintiff filed her complaint in\n1991.\n\nThe statute became effective in 1992.\n\nSee endnote 1 herein;\n\nMonhanan, 832 So.2d 708, 709-10 (Fla. 2002)(The Florida Legislature has imposed a\ndelayed discovery rule in cases of professional malpractice, medical malpractice, and\nintentional torts based on abuse, there is no other statutory basis for application of the\ndelayed discovery rule to delay the accrual of a cause of action). The discussion in\nHearndon remains relevant as it explains how and when the statutory discovery rule\napplies, and its effect on the accrual of a cause of action.\nThe Hearndon decision should be read in conjunction with\nSo.2d 708 (Fla. 2002). In\n\nv. Monahan, 832\n\nthe Florida Supreme Court made clear that the\n\nstatutory codification of the delayed discovery rule only applies to those causes of\nactions enumerated in §95.11, Fla.Stat., and refused to extend the ruling in Hearndon to\ncauses of action not based on the statutory enumerated exceptions or to causes of\nactions not based on allegations of childhood sexual abuse where a plaintiff has\n\nEFTA02743353\n\n\f", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 4 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 4\ntraumatic amnesia or a repressed memory type condition. In refusing to broaden the\nruling in Flearndon and apply the delayed discovery doctrine to claims for breach of\n\nCourt,\n\na\n\nfiduciary duty, conversion, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment, the Florida Supreme\nsupra at 712, stated:\n\nWhile we applied the delayed discovery doctrine to causes of action arising\nout of childhood sexual abuse and repressed memory in Heamdon, we did so\nonly after considering the unique and sinister nature of childhood sexual abuse,\nas well as the fact that the doctrine is applicable to similar cases where the\ntortious acts cause the delay in discovery. We also considered the Legislature's\nendorsement in amending section 95.11(7), Florida Statutes (1999), to include\nintentional torts based on abuse and the fact that the application of the doctrine\namong the states is both the majority rule and modern trend. In this case, there\nis no modern trend or statutory endorsement, and Monahan did not allege\nor MI actions caused\nfraud, so there was no specific allegation that\nMonahan's delayed discovery.\nPlaintiff is correct that part of the analysis as to whether a particular claim is time\nbarred involves an analysis as to when a particular cause of action has accrued. Under\nFlorida law, a statute of limitations \"runs from the time the cause of action accrues\"\nwhich, in turn, is generally determined by the date \"when the last element constituting\nthe cause of action occurs.\" § 95.031, Fla. Stat.' See generally State Farm Mut. Auto.\nIns. Co. v. Lee, 678 So.2d 818, 821 (Fla.1996)(\"[A] cause of action cannot be said to\nhave accrued, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, until an action may be\nbrought.\"); and Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp. 85 F.3d 1514,\n1 §95.031, Fla.Stat., provides in relevant part :\n... the time within which an action shall be begun\n... [truncated, 2191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743351/3 or ?id=EFTA02743351&page=3]", "char_count": 2191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 5 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 5\n\nrehearing denied (11th Cir. 1996)(Cause of action accrues for limitations purposes when\nlast element constituting cause of action occurs and plaintiff knew or should have\ndiscovered injury). Further, and significantly, the fact that a plaintiff does not know the\nfull extent of his or her injury and that the most substantial damages do not occur until\nlater date does not postpone running of limitations periods. Id. See also Penthouse\nNorth Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 461 So.2d 1350, 1352 (Fla. 1984)(\"A statute of limitation\ndoes not commence to run until the cause of action accrues. A cause of action does\nnot accrue until someone has been damaged by the acts complained of.\").\nAs alleged in the Complaint, JANE DOE NO. 8 had one \"encounter with Epstein\"\nat his Palm Beach mansion \"in or about 2001\" when she was \"then approximately 16\nyears old, fell into Epstein's trap and became one of his victims.\" Comp. ¶9, 13-14.\nShe further alleges that at the time of the one encounter, she \"was frightened and felt\ntrapped,\" and \"as a result of this encounter with Epstein, [she] experienced confusion,\nshame, humiliation and embarrassment, and has suffered severe psychological and\nemotional injuries.\" Comp. ¶13-14. On the face of the Complaint, Plaintiff was aware\nthat she was damaged at the time of the encounter complained.\nBecause Plaintiff was allegedly a minor at the time, under Florida law, Plaintiff\ncould not have brought the action in her own right. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are in\nagreement that the legal disability based on one being a minor is generally removed\nonce a person turns 18 years of age. (JD8 memorandum, fn. 2). Based on the\nallegations, it has been at least 8 years since Plaintiff \"fell into Epstein's trap and\n\nEFTA02743355\n\n\f", "char_count": 1877}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 6 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 6\nbecame one of his victims; and Plaintiff is now at least 24 years old; Plaintiff turned 18\nat least 6 years ago, well pass the applicable 4 year statute of limitations.\nUnder Florida law, the statute of limitations for assault and battery is 4 years,\n§95.11(3)(o). See Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Complaint, dated July 14, 2009, [DE\n8), for discussion as to why §95.11(7), Fla. Stat., does not apply to Plaintiff's Count I for\n\"sexual assault and battery.\" See endnote 1 hereto for statutory text of subsection (7),\nincluding statutes referenced therein.'\nIn her memorandum, Plaintiff attempts to rely on the statutory definition of\n\"abuse\" as set forth in §39.01(2), Fla. Stat., and claims that she has \"until 7 years after\nshe reaches the age of majority to bring suit (i.e. until she is 25 years old), or within 4\nyears from the time she discovers both the injury and the causal relationship between\nthe injury and abuse, whichever occurs later.\" As noted above, there are no allegations\nof repressed memory or similar type traumatic amnesia. In fact, the allegations reveal\nthat after the alleged one encounter, Plaintiff knew immediately that she suffered\ndamage in or about 2001, when she was 16. She could have brought the action in 2003\nin her own right when she turned 18. She is now at least 24 years old.\nA review of the Count I allegations establish that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a\nclaim for Florida's common law assault and battery to which a 4 year statute of limitation\napplies. See Defendant's motion to dismiss. As noted in fn. 1 of her memorandum,\nDefendant is not seeking dismissal of Count II as in ¶24, Plaintiff tracks the language of\n§39.01(2), Fla. Stat., pertaining to \"abuse.\"\n\nEFTA02743356\n\n\f", "char_count": 1846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 7 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 7\nIf this Court were to agree with Plaintiff's position that she has adequately pled a\nclaim based on sex abuse in Count I, (which she has not), then either Count I or Count\nII — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is required to be dismissed as neither is \"a\nfree-standing tort\" because both counts reallege the same underlying facts and\ndamages. See Tobin v. Damian, 772 So.2d 13, fn. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In discussing\nplaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress the Court determined that it\nwas \"not a free-standing tort\" because it \"realleges the same facts mentioned in\nappellant's sexual abuse claims and fails to provide any additional facts.\" Citing to\nFridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 69-70 (Fla. 1992)(holding that no separate cause\nof action for intentional infliction of emotional distress existed where plaintiff merely\nrenamed the initial cause of action and repled the same facts).\nAccordingly, Count I is required to be dismissed as the applicable statute of\nlimitations has expired. In the alternative, either Count I or Count II is required to be\ndismissed as they are duplicative claims as opposed to free-standing torts.\nIII.\n\nThe Complaint on its face shows that Count Ill is time barred.\n\nCount III is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255, which contains its own statute of\nlimitations in subsection (b). The language of §2255(b) is clear and unambiguous —\n\"Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint is filed\nwithin six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a person under a\nlegal disability, not later than three years after the disability.n2 Plaintiff now attempts to\n\n2 \"The primary principle of statutory construction requires courts to give effect to the plain\nmeaning of the words used \"in their ordinary and usual sense.\" Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470\n(19\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743351/6 or ?id=EFTA02743351&page=6]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 8 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 8\nargue that the delayed discovery doctrine applies although there are no allegations in\nthe Complaint which implicate its application.\nThe \"delayed discovery\" doctrine generally provides that a cause of action does not\naccrue until the plaintiff either knows or reasonably should know of the tortious act\ngiving rise to the cause of action.\n\nThe United States Supreme Court applied the\n\n\"blameless ignorance\" doctrine in Urie v. Thompson 337 U.S. 163, 170, 69 S.Ct. 1018,\n93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949), thereby delaying the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff\nreasonably discovered the right of action, reasoning that \"the traditional purposes of\nstatutes of limitations ... require the assertion of claims within a specified period of time\nafter notice of the invasion of legal rights.\" Id.\nAgain, the Complaint allegations are clear that Plaintiff was aware that she was an\nalleged \"victim\" as a result of the alleged one encounter with EPSTEIN in 2001, and that\nshe allegedly suffered damages therefrom. By her own allegations she felt \"frightened\nand trapped\" at the time. There are no allegations of repressed memory or traumatic\namnesia or other allegations which would delay the accrual of the cause of action.\nBased on the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff turned 18 in 2003 and, thus, she\nwas no longer under the legal disability of being a minor. Approximately 8 years have\npassed since the alleged one time encounter - well pass the 6 year statute of\n\nto every word and clause in a statute. U.S. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). TRW\nInc. v. Andrews 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). Additionally, courts must reject statutory interpretations\nthat would render portions of a statute surplusage. TRW, 534 at 31.\" Brotherhood of Loc.\nEngineers and Trainmen Gen. Comm. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 522 F.3d 1190, 1194 -1195 (11th\nCir. 2008).\n\nEFTA02743358\n\n\f", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 9 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 9\nlimitations; and approximately 6 years have passed since the legal disability of being a\nminor was removed — well passed the 3 year period.\nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and III of\nPlaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. In the alternative, Defendant requests that this\nCourt dismiss either Count I or II with prejudice, along with Count III wij\n\nrejudice.\n\nCertificate of Service\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing\nectronically filed with\nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being\nserved this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the\nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this Z9 day of August , 2009:\nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\n305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\nahorowitz@ hermanlaw.com\nIrivera@ hermanlaw.com\nCounsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #8\n\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njaoese@bellsouth.net\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER\n& COLEMAN, LLP\n515 N. Flagler v•, Suite 400\nWest Pal B c /FL 33401\n(561) 84 -2 0\nBy:\nb\nCritton, Jr.\nlorida r #224162\nMichael J. Pike\nFlorida Bar #617296\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\nrcrit@bciclaw.com\n\nEFTA02743359\n\n\f", "char_count": 1555}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743351", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 15 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/20/2009 Page 10 of 10\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 10\n\nmpike@bciclaw.com\n1 §95.11(7), Fla. Stat. (7) For intentional torts based on abuse.—An action founded on alleged abuse,\nas defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04,\nmay be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4\nyears after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4\nyears from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the\ncausal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.\n§39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) —\n(2) \"Abuse\" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical,\nmental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's\nphysical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child\nincludes acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal\ncustodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does\nnot result in harm to the child.\n§415.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) (1) \"Abuse\" means any willful act or threatened act that causes or is likely to cause\nsignificant impairment to a vulnerable adult's physical, mental, or emotional\nhealth. Abuse includes acts and omissions.\n§984.03 (2), Fla. Stat. (2001) —\n\"Abuse\" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury\nthat causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to\nbe significantly impaired. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or guardian for\ndisciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in\nharm to the child as defined in s. 39.01.\n\nEFTA02743360\n\n\f", "char_count": 1794}]}