{"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_count": 10, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02743341", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02743341.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 1 of 10\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80802-MARRA/JOHNSON\nJANE DOE NO. 8,\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nPLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO. 8's MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN\nOPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 8, submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to\nDismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to S.D.Fla.L.R. 7.1(C), as follows:\nINTRODUCTION\nAs with the related cases in this Court against Defendant Jeffrey Epstein, Plaintiff Jane Doe\nNo. 8 alleges that she was the victim of a plan and scheme by Defendant Epstein to lure her to his\nPalm Beach mansion, where he sexually molested her. The Complaint in this case sets forth state\nlaw claims and a federal law claim under 18 U.S.C. §§2422 and 2255. Defendant relies exclusively\non the statute of limitations as grounds for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(bX6).\nWith respect to Plaintiff's state law causes of action for assault and battery, Defendant\nincorrectly applies a four-year statute of limitations. Florida Statute §95.11 is clear that a seven-year\nstatute of limitations applies to the state law claims alleged by Plaintiff. As a result, the state law\ncause of action for assault and battery is timely.\nIn contending that Plaintiff's federal claim should be dismissed based on the statute of\n\n-1-\n\nEFTA02743341\n\n\f", "char_count": 1449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 2 of 10\n\nlimitations, Defendant wrongly assumes that this claim accrued on the date when Defendant's\nwrongful conduct occurred. Defendant's argument fails to recognize that the \"discovery rule\" is\napplicable, which provides that an action does not accrue until the Plaintiff knew or should have\nknown of both her injuries and their cause. Given the nature of the discovery rule and the factual\ninquiry it necessitates in the context of childhood sexual abuse, Plaintiff's federal claim is not\nsusceptible to dismissal on statute of limitations grounds pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).\nAccordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied in its entirety.\nARGUMENT\nI.\nDISMISSAL IS NOT WARRANTED UNDER\nFED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) AS TO ANY OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS\nDefendant moves for dismissal of Counts I and Ill of the Complaint exclusively on grounds\nof statute of limitations, which is an affirmative defense. Such a dismissal \"is appropriate only if its\nis apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time barred.\" Tello v\n\nWitter\n\nInc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). \"This standard for dismissal\ncan be met only if the complaint shows the date on which the time-barred claim accrued.\" Durden v.\nCiticorp Trust Bank, 2008 WL 2098040 *3 (M.D.Fla. 2008) (citing Avco Corp. v. Precision Air\nParts Inc., 676 F.2d 494, 495-96 (11th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis supplied). Accord Del Monte Fresh\nProduce Co. v. Dole Food Co. 136 F.Supp. 2d 1271, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Gold, J.) (\"R]he\nabsence of an indication ofthe date on which Del Monte discovered the alleged misappropriations\nprevents the Court from determining from the face of the complaint at what time Del Monte's\nactions accrued.\"). It is not apparent from the Complaint in this case that any of Plaintiff's claims\nare time barred. In particular, nowhere does the Complaint allege the date on which any of her\nclaims accrued. Therefo\n... [truncated, 2087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743341/1 or ?id=EFTA02743341&page=1]", "char_count": 2087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 3 of 10\n\nH.\n\nCOUNT I OF COMPLAINT IS NOT TIME BARRED UNDER THE\nSEVEN-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. FLA. STAT. O5.11(7)\n\nCount I (assault and battery) and Count II (intentional infliction of emotional distress) allege\nclaims under state law. I Defendant asserts that Count I should be dismissed because a four-year\nstatute of limitations applies to that claim, and it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that\nPlaintiff filed her claim past this limitations period. Defendant recognizes that, for this argument to\nsucceed, he must establish that Fla.Stat. §95.11(7), providing a seven-year limitations period after the\nPlaintiff reaches the age of majority for claims based on abuse, is inapplicable in this case. A review\nof the language of the Statute, however, and applying basic tenets of statutory construction, reveal\nthat §95. I 1(7) is clearly the statute of limitations pertinent to Plaintiff's state law claims.\nSection 95.11(7) provides a seven-year limitations period, as follows:\n(7) For intentional torts based on abuse. — An action founded on\nalleged abuse, as defined in s. 39.01, . . . may be commenced at any\ntime within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after\nthe injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4\nyears from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the\ninjury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse,\nwhichever occurs later.\nThe term \"abuse\" is defined in Fla.Stat. §39.01(2) as follows:\n\"Abuse\" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any\nphysical, mental or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to\ncause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be\nsignificantly impaired.\nThe Complaint in this case alleges \"abuse\" under the broad definition of §39.01. Specifically, Count\nI alleges willful acts (Complaint 11 8-13, 18-19); resulting in physical, mental or sexual injury\n(Complaint\n\n... [truncated, 2158 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743341/2 or ?id=EFTA02743341&page=2]", "char_count": 2158}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 4 of 10\n\nhealth to be significantly impaired (Complaint VI 14, 20). Under §95.11(7), therefore, the Plaintiff\nhas until seven years after she reaches the age of majority to bring suit (Le. until she is 25 years old),\nor within four years from the time she discovers both the injury and the causal relationship between\nthe injury and abuse, whichever occurs later. Accordingly, the statute of limitations cannot expire\nbefore the Plaintiff's 25th birthday, and her Count I claim is timely under §95.11(7).\nDefendant nonetheless asserts that the pertinent limitations provision is §95.11(3)(o),\nproviding a four-year limitation period, not §95.11(7). Section 95.11(3)(o), lists causes of action\nsubject to a four-year limitations period, as follows:\nAn action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution,\nmalicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional\ntort, except as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).\n(Emphasis supplied). Section 95.11(3)(o), by its express terms, is subject to an exception, as\nprovided in § 95.11(7). The plain meaning of this language is that an intentional tort claim alleging\n\"abuse\" against a child, as described in Fla.Stat. §39.01, is controlled by §95.11(7), which trumps\n§95.I I (3Xo). The seven-year limitations period (or four years after discovery) thus applies in this\ncase. See\n\nv. Tyler Technologies, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 2d 1255, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (where\n\nlanguage of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be given its plain and obvious\nmeaning).\nDefendant nonetheless seems to argue that §95.11(3)(o) applies because it expressly\nreferences the intentional torts of assault and battery, ignoring that the Complaint at issue alleges\n\"abuse\" as defined in Florida Statute §§95.11(7) and 39.01(2). This is a strained and plainly\nincorrect construction of the language in §§95.11(3)(o) and 95.11(7). Defendant essentially contends\nthat\n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743341/3 or ?id=EFTA02743341&page=3]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 5 of 10\n\nnecessarily fall under §95.11(3)(o). However, as one Court has recognized, there is no Florida cause\nof action for abuse, and §95.11(7) did not create one. Zlotogura v. Geller 681 So.2d 778 (Ha. 3d\nDCA 1996). Accordingly, if §95.11(7) is to have any meaning, it necessarily must encompass claims\nof assault and battery and other intentional torts involving \"abuse\" upon a child as defined in\n§39.01(2).\nEven assuming that §§95.11(3)(o) and 95.11(7) were ambiguous, it is a basic rule of statutory\nconstruction that two sections are to be read in pam =feria, such that all sections are given effect\nand are read as a consistent whole. H.T.E., 217 F.Supp. 2d at 1259. Doing so in this case compels\nthe conclusion that the seven-year limitation of §95.11(7) applies to Plaintiff's Count I claim.\nDefendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I must accordingly be denied.\nIII.\n\nTHE COMPLAINT DOES NOT SHOW ON ITS FACE\nTHAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNT III CLAIM IS TIME BARRED\n\nCount III of the Complaint alleges a claim of coercion and enticement to sexual activity\nagainst a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. A victim who suffers personal injuries as a result of\na violation of this statutory provision is granted a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §2255. A\nlimitations provision is included on this statute at subsection (b), which provides that a claim is\nbarred unless it is brought \"within six years after the rights of action first accrues or in the case of a\nperson under a legal disability, not later than three years after disability.\"2 The pertinent issue, then,\nfor purposes of this statute of limitations, where the victim is over the age of 21, is when the action\naccrued. Defendant Epstein assumes in his Motion to Dismiss that the action accrued on the date\n\n2 Under Florida law, a person is under a disability as a minor until age 18. See Fla. Stat. §743.07.\n\n-5-\n\nEFTA02743345\n\n\f", "char_count": 1968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 6 of 10\n\nwhen Epstein's sexual misconduct occurred.' That assumption is incorrect under federal law and the\nallegations of the Complaint.\nA claim does not necessarily accrue when the wrongful conduct occurs. Rather, the\n\"discovery rule\" applies to accrual of federal causes of action. See\n\nv. Mercury Marine, 129\n\nF.3d 1428, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that use of word \"accrue\" indicated approval of discovery\nrule in statute of limitations in accordance with federal precedents adopting discovery rule). Under\nthis rule, an action accrues \"when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and its\ncause.s4 Id. (emphasis supplied). See also Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980) (in\na case analyzing accrual under federal law for a civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, noting\nthat the Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick 444 U.S. III, 100 S.Ct. 352 (1979), \"has\nrejected the standard which would allow the statute of limitations to commence running before the\nplaintiff was or should have been aware of the causal connection between his injury and the acts of\ndefendants\") (emphasis supplied). Accord. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir.\n1999) (in wrongful death case under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), holding that claim accrues\nwhen the plaintiff knows or should have known both of the decedent's death and its causal\nconnection to the government); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1270-71(7th Cir. 1980)\n\n3 The Motion to Dismiss asserts that \"it has been at least 8 years since the alleged conduct by\nEPSTEIN, well past the six year statute of limitations, thus requiring dismissal of Count HI.\"\n(Motion to Dismiss, p. 4).\n\n4 The case of\nv Husband, 376 F.Supp. 2d 603 (E.D.Va. 2005) is inapposite. While that case\nwas brought under 18 U.S.C. §2255 fora violation of 18 U.S.C. §2251, alleging sexual exploitation\nof a minor for the purpose of producing a se\n... [truncated, 2308 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743341/5 or ?id=EFTA02743341&page=5]", "char_count": 2308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 7 of 10\n\n(holding that claim under FTCA did not accrue until the plaintiff had knowledge of a causal\nconnection \"to tie together\" the breach of duty and her injury); Skwira v. United States 344 F.3d 64,\n76-83 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 903 (2004) (holding that discovery rule, requiring that\naccrual does not occur before the plaintiff knew or should have known of injury and its causal\nconnection to the defendant, applies outside the medical malpractice context).\nIn a case where a minor is sexually abused, or wrongfully enticed or coerced into sexual\nactivity by an adult, the victim is unlikely in the exercise of reasonable diligence to be (i)\nimmediately aware of her injuries given the subtle and pernicious effects of childhood sexual abuse;\nor (ii) able to connect those injuries to the defendant's misconduct. S\n\nDoe v. Paukstat, 863\n\nF.Supp. 884, 890-91 (ED. Wis. 1994) (noting that application of discovery rule in case of childhood\nsexual abuse is \"amorphous\", and holding that when cause of action for abuse accrues is a question\nfor the trier-of-fact)• cf. R.L. v. Voytac, 971 A.2d 1074 (N.J. 2009) (holding that \"it is necessary to\nconsider all relevant facts and circumstances\", including expert psychological testimony, in applying\ndiscovery rule to claim of childhood sexual abuse, and that the issue is \"when the injured party in\nfact discovered, or when a reasonable person subjected to child sexual abuse should have discovered,\nthat the claimed injury was causally related to the asserted child abuse by the defendant\"). The\ndetermination of when the limitations period accrues under the discovery rule, in a case involving the\ndefendant's sexual misconduct with a minor, therefore, requires a detailed and complex factual\ninquiry. The date of accrual certainly is not obvious nor is it otherwise alleged in the Plaintiff's\nComplaint?\n\nAs a result, Count III cannot be dismissed under Fed.\n... [truncated, 2236 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02743341/6 or ?id=EFTA02743341&page=6]", "char_count": 2236}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 8 of 10\n\nthe statute of limitations.6\nCONCLUSION\nBased on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be\ndenied in its entirety.\nDated: August 12, 2009.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nBy:\n\ns/ Stuart S. Mermelstein\nStuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245)\nssm@sexabuseattorney.com\nAdam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980)\nahorowitz@sexabuseattorney.com\nMERMELSTEIN & HOROWITZ, P.A.\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff Jane Doe 8\n18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218\nMiami, Florida 33160\nTel: 305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\n\n6 It would also be inappropriate to dismiss this case on limitations grounds because Defendant has\n\nargued in one of the related cases that 18 U.S.C. §2255 requires a prior federal conviction. (aLe Jane\nDoe 101 v. Epstein case no. 09-CV-80591, Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, p. 15,\n§II(A), DE 29). If that argument were correct then the Plaintiff's claim in Count 111 has not yet\naccrued. Defendant should not be heard to whipsaw the Plaintiffs and take such inconsistent\npositions in these related cases.\n-8-\n\nEFTA02743348\n\n\f", "char_count": 1148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 9 of 10\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI hereby certify that on August 12, 2009, I electronically filed the f oregoing document with\nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that theforegoing document is bei ng served this\nday to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of\nNotioes of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those\nparties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.\n/s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein\n\n-9-\n\nEFTA02743349\n\n\f", "char_count": 629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743341", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 13 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/12/2009 Page 10 of 10\n\nSERVICE LIST\nDOE vs JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80802-MARRA\nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida\n\nJack Alan Goldberger. Esq.\nigoldberRer@agwpa.com\nRobert D. Critton, Esq.\nrcritton@bcIclaw.com\n/s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein\n\n- 10_\n\nEFTA02743350\n\n\f", "char_count": 351}]}