{"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02743326", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02743326.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 1 of 6\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80802-MARRA\nJANE DOE NO. 8\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nDEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN (\"Epstein\"), by and through his attorneys, moves\nto dismiss Counts I and III of Plaintiffs Complaint as the causes of action are barred by\nthe applicable statute of limitations.1an° 2 Rule 12(b)(6); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Ma.\n2009). In support of dismissal, Defendant states:\nPlaintiffs Complaint attempts to allege three Counts; the first two counts are\npursuant to state common law, and the third count is brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries. Count I attempts to allege a cause of action\nfor \"Sexual Assault and Battery,\" Count II for \"Intentional Infliction of Emotional\n\nPlaintiffs Complaint attempts to assert both state common law claims and a claim pursuant to 18\nU.S.C. §2255. Since Jane Doe 8 did not relinquish her state claims and correspondingly did not file her\ncomplaint relying, exclusively, on 18 USC 2255, she is not entitled to the litigation benefits including\ncertain waivers that directly or indirectly accrue to other civil plaintiffs from the defendant's fulfilling\nobligations resulting from his separate confidential agreement with the United Staes Attorneys Office.\nPlaintiffs counsel conceded that the provisions of the NPA are not implicated where a plaintiff brings\nadditional causes of action and does not proceed exclusively under §2255. See June 12, 2009, Hearing\nTranscript in Jane Doe, et al v. Epstein, Case No. 08.80119-Civ-Marra, p. 29, line 19-25, p. 30, line 1.\n2\n\nUndersigned counsel provided the United States Attorneys' Office a copy of this Motion on July 9,\n2009. We requested confirmation that this motion did not involve any aspect of the Non Prosecution\nAgreement and advised of our required filing date. No response was received from the USAO.\n\nEFTA02743326\n\n\f", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 2 of 6\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 2\nDistress;\" and Count III for \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of\n18 U.S.C. §2422,\" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255.\nPursuant to the allegations on the face of Plaintiffs complaint, Count I, based on\nFlorida's common law of assault and battery, and Count III, brought pursuant to 18\nU.S.C. §2255, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Although a statute of\nlimitations bar to a claim is an affirmative defense, and a plaintiff is not required to\nnegate an affirmative defense in her complaint, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of\nlimitations grounds is appropriate where, as here, \"it is 'apparent from the face of the\ncomplaint' that the claim is time-barred.\"\n\nSee generally, La Grasta v. First Union\n\nSecurities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 -846 (11th Cir. 2004).\nCount I is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.\nAs to Count I, which is plead pursuant to state law, it is well settled that this Court\nis to apply Florida law. Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to\nFlorida law, the statute of limitations for assault and battery is four years, §95.11(3)(o).,\nFla. Stat. §95.11(3)(o), Fla. Stat., provides —\nActions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as\nfollows:\n(3) Within four years.—\n*\n(o) An action for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution,\nmalicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort,\nexcept as provided in subsections (4), (5), and (7).\nIn her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges in relevant part that 9. ... In or about 2001, Jane Doe, then approximately 16 years old, fell\ninto Epstein's trap and became one of his victims.\n\nEFTA02743327\n\n\f", "char_count": 1792}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 3 of 6\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 3\nAccording to the allegations of the Complaint, Jane Doe had one encounter with\nDefendant at his Palm Beach mansion in or about 2001 when Jane was approximately\n16 years old. See Complaint, ¶13, endnote 1 hereto.' Based on the allegations of the\nComplaint, it has been at least 8 years since the alleged conduct by EPSTEIN, well past\nthe four year statute of limitations, thus requiring dismissal of Count I. Based on the\nallegations, Plaintiff is now at least 24 years old.\nSubsections (4) and (5) referenced in §95.11(3)(o) are not applicable. Plaintiff\nmay attempt to argue that subsection (7) of §95.11, Fla. Stat. applies. See endnote 2\nhereto for statutory text of subsection (7), including statutes referenced therein.2\nHowever, a review of Plaintiff's allegations in Count I establish that Plaintiff is attempting\nto assert a cause of action based on the elements of Florida's common law assault and\nbattery to which a four year statute of limitation applies. (Compare Count II, ¶24,\nwherein Plaintiff tracks the language §39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2001), pertaining to \"abuse.\").\nPursuant to Florida law, although the term \"assault and battery\" is most\ncommonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, or a single concept, \"assault and battery\nare separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the beginning of an act which, if\nconsummated, constitutes battery.\" 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1. An assault and battery\nare intentional acts. See generally, Spivey v. Battaglia 258 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972); and\nTravelers Indem. Co. v. PCR, Inc. 889 So.2d 779 (Fla. 2004).\nOn the face of the Complaint, the applicable four year statute of limitations has\nexpired, and accordingly, Count I is barred an required to be dismissed.\n\nEFTA02743328\n\n\f", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 4 of 6\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 4\nCount III —18 U.S.C. 42255\nAs to the applicable statute of limitations for Count III which is brought pursuant to\n18 U.S.C. §2255, §2255(b), (both the 2001 version, which Defendant asserts is the\napplicable statute, and the amended version, effective July 27, 2006), provides:\n(b) Statute of limitations.-Any action commenced under this section\nshall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right\nof action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability,\nnot later than three years after the disability.\nAs noted above, according to the allegations of the Complaint, Jane Doe had one\nencounter with Defendant at his Palm Beach mansion in or about 2001 when Jane was\napproximately 16 years old. See Complaint, ¶13, endnote 1 hereto. Based on the\nallegations of the Complaint, it has been at least 8 years since the alleged conduct by\nEPSTEIN, well past the six year statute of limitations, thus requiring dismissal of Count\nIII. Based on the allegations, Plaintiff is now at least 24 years old, well pass the age of\nmajority. (The age of majority under both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18\nU.S.C. §2256(1), defining a \"minor\" as \"any person under the age of eighteen years:\"\nand §1.01, Definitions, Fla. Stat., defining \"minor\" to include \"any person who has not\nattained the age of 18 years.\"). Thus, on the face of the Complaint, Count III is timed\nbarred and required to be dismissed.\nConclusion\nAccordingly, Counts I and III of Plaintiff's Complaint are subject to dismissal. On\nthe face of the Complaint, the causes of action which Plaintiff attempts to allege are\nbarred by the applicable statute of limitations of 4 and 6 years, respectively.\n\nEFTA02743329\n\n\f", "char_count": 1839}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 5 of 6\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 5\n\nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and III of\nPlaintiffs Complaint with prejudice.\nCertificate of Service\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with\nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being\nserved this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the\nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this 14th\n2009:\nday of\nJuly\nStuart S. Mermeistein, Esq.\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\n305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\nahorowitzabermanlaw.com\nIriveraahermanlaw.com\nCounsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #8\n\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njaqesqabellsouth.net\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER\n& COLEMAN, LLP\n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL X3401\n(561) 842-2820\nBy:\nRobert D. ritton, Jr.\nFlorida B #224162\nMichael . Pike\nFlorida Bar #617296\nCounsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\nrcritabcIclaw.com\nmpikeabcIclaw.com\nComplaint, ¶13 alleges in relevant part —\n... Jane Doe was recruited by another girl, who told her that she could make some\nmoney, but did not tell her what was involved. At all relevant times, the girl who\n\nEFTA02743330\n\n\f", "char_count": 1517}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02743326", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80802-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/14/2009 Page 6 of 6\n\nJane Doe No. 8 v. Epstein\nPage 6\n\nrecruited Jane Doe was acting on behalf of and as an agent for Epstein. Jane was\ncontacted by this girl by telephone. Jane was then picked up and brought to\nEpstein's mansion in Palm Beach. Once there, she was lead up a flight of stairs to\nthe room with the massage table. Epstein came into the room and directed Jane\nto remove her clothes and give him a massage. Jane was frightened and felt\ntrapped. As directed by Epstein, Jane removed her clothes. Epstein then during\nthe massage touched Jane on her breasts and vagina, and he grabbed her hand\nand placed it on his penis. Epstein masturbated himself during the massage.\nEpstein then left money for Jane.\n2 §95.11(7), Fla. Stat. -\n\n(7) For intentional torts based on abuse.--An action founded on alleged abuse,\nas defined in s. 39.01, s. 415.102, or s. 984.03, or incest, as defined in s. 826.04,\nmay be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4\nyears after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4\nyears from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the\ncausal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later.\n§39.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2001) —\n(2) \"Abuse\" means any willful act or threatened act that results in any physical,\nmental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to cause the child's\nphysical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Abuse of a child\nincludes acts or omissions. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or legal\ncustodian for disciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does\nnot result in harm to the child.\n§415.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2001) —\n(1) \"Abuse\" means any willful act or threatened act that causes or is likely to cause\nsignificant impairment to a vulnerable adult's physical, mental, or emotional\nhealth. Abuse includes acts and omissions.\n§984.03 (2), Ha. Stat. (2001) —\n\"Abuse\" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury\nthat causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to\nbe significantly impaired. Corporal discipline of a child by a parent or guardian for\ndisciplinary purposes does not in itself constitute abuse when it does not result in\nharm to the child as defined in s. 39.01.\n\nEFTA02743331\n\n\f", "char_count": 2435}]}