{"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_count": 9, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02742605", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02742605.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "'Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 1 of 9\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FL\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80994-Marra/iiii\nJANE DOE NO. 6\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nDEFENDANT'S, EPSTEIN, MOTION TO DISMISS & FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT\nDIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO.6'S COMPLAINT\nDefendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves\nto dismiss and for more definite statement of Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 6's Complaint.\nRules 12(b)(6) and 12(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008). In support of his motion, Defendant\nstates:\nIntroduction\nDefendant previously filed motions to dismiss and for more definite statement\ndirected to the Amended Complaints filed against Defendant in this Court in JANE DOE\nNO. 2 (Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra),\n80232-Marra,\n\nJANE DOE NO. 3 (Case No. 08-CV-\n\n), JANE DOE NO. 4 (Case No. 08-CV-80380-Marra\n\nand JANE DOE NO. 5 (Case No. 08-CV-80381-Marra).\n\n),\n\nDefendant is also\n\nfiling similar motions in the actions filed by JANE DOE NO. 6 (Case No. 08-CV-80994Marra/Johnsn), and JANE DOE NO. 7 (Case No. 08-CV-80993-Hurley.\n\n). The\n\nmotions are directed to the Counts for Count I - \"Sexual Assault and Battery,\" andCount\nIII - \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422\" in each\n\nEFTA02742605\n\n\f", "char_count": 1323}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "• Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 2 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-Marra=\nPage No. 2\nof the respective complaints. However, there are distinctions in the six motions filed\nbased on the complaint allegations. For example, in the previously filed four motions\n(Jane Doe Nos. 2 through 5), Defendant challenged the Plaintiffs' allegations as to\nassault in all four actions, and challenged the battery allegations in JANE DOE NOS. 2\nand 3, but not in JANE DOE NOS. 4 and 5. Defendant moved to dismiss the §2422\ncount in all four of the JANE DOE Nos. 2 through 5 actions. As to JANE DOE NO. 6,\nDefendant challenges the battery allegations, but does not as to JANE DOE NO. 7 as\nthe underlying facts of the requisite \"touching\" are alleged. Defendant challenges the\n18 U.S.C. §2422 count in both JANE DOE NO. 6 and NO. 7.\nMotion\n1. Counts I and III of JANE DOE NO. 6's Complaint are required to be dismissed for\nfailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has\nfailed to allege sufficient factual allegations in the Counts and instead alleges labels and\nconclusions, and an attempted formulaic recitation of the elements in each Count.\n2. In the alternative or in conjunction with, Defendant seeks more definite statement\nof Count I and III. In Count I, the Plaintiff is required to more definitely allege what was\ndone to her; what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in\nPlaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements\nof assault and battery. In Count III, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the\nunderlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C.\n§2422(b) and §2455. Rule 12(e). See discussion of law below herein.\nWHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and\nIII, and require Plaintiff to more definitely plead the underlying elements of her claims.\n\nEFTA02742606\n\n\f", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 3 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-MarraM.\nPage No. 3\nSupporting Memorandum of Law\nStandard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss\nAs established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127\nS.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead\n\"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Id, at 1974.\nAlthough the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief\nin the complaint must state \"more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic\nrecitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.\" Id, at 1965. Further, \"[f]actual\nallegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the\nassumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).\" Id.\nOn a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiff's complaint are taken as\ntrue and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County\nSch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006).\nSignificantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly abrogated the\noften cited observation that \"a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a\nclaim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove not set of facts in\nsupport of his claim that would entitle him to relief.\" Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley\n355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme\nCourt rejected the notion that \"a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a\nmotion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff\nmight later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery.\" Id. As\nexplained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. supra at 1664-65:\nWhile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not\nneed detailed factual allegations ibid: Sanivan v. Amer\n... [truncated, 2182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02742605/2 or ?id=EFTA02742605&page=2]", "char_count": 2182}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 4 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-MarraM\nPage No. 4\nmore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements\nof a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286,\n106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts \"are\nnot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual\nallegation\"). Factual allegations mu§Lbgjnougbja raise a right to relief\n, Fed\nabove the speculative level, see 5 C.\n& A.\ncti\nProcedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter\n&\n)\n(\"ripe pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts\nthat merely creates a suspicion (of] a legally cognizable right of action\"), on\nthe assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if\ndoubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema Nisai ug U.S. 506, 508,\nn. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v.MM 490 U.S. 319,\n327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (\" Rule 12(b)(6) does not\ncountenance ... dismissals bas\njudge's disbelief of a complaint's\nfactual allegations\"). Scheuer v.\n416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683,\n40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it\nappears \"that a recovery is very remote and unlikely\").\nPursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a\npleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading \"is so vague or\nambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response.\" The motion is required\nto point out the defects and the desired details. Id.\nCount I — \"Sexual Assault and Battery\" is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has\nfailed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\nIt is well settled that this Court is to apply Florida substantive law in this action.\nErie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to Florida law, although the term\n\"assault and battery\" is most commonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, o\n... [truncated, 2381 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02742605/3 or ?id=EFTA02742605&page=3]", "char_count": 2381}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "• Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 5 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-MarraM\nPage No. 5\nAn \"assault\" is an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force,\nor exertion of force directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a\nreasonable fear of imminent peril. See Lay v. Kremer, 411 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA\n1982). It must be premised upon an affirmative act - a threat to use force, or the actual\nexertion of force. See 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1(\"The essential element of the tort of\nassault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact.\").\nTort of \"battery\" consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon\nanother with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is\nimminent. Quilling v. Price, 894 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005);\n\nv. Atlantic\n\nFederal Savings & Loan 454 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(\"a battery consists of the\nintentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon the person of another\"). See\n3A FIa.Jur.2d Assault §1.\nWith the standard of pleading established in Twomblv, supra, in the context of\nthe elements for assault and battery, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which\nrelief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). As to the elements of assault, here are no factual\nallegations as to what was said or done to Plaintiff such that it constituted an\n\"intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force\ndirected toward another under such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of\nimminent peril.\" See ¶13 of Comp. The same is true for the claim of battery. Plaintiff\nmakes the general allegation that \"he (Defendant) sexually assaulted Jane.\" The other\nallegations in ¶13 pertain to what Plaintiff allegedly did. Under applicable law, Plaintiff is\nrequired to give more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the\nelements of a cause of action. Twomblv supra. Plaintiff is required to\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02742605/4 or ?id=EFTA02742605&page=4]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 6 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-Marra\nPage No. 6\nof what was done to her; what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and\napprehension in Plaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or harmful contact?\nAs noted in the introduction and as this Court is well aware, there is more than\none action brought against this Defendant attempting to allege similar sounding claims.\nThe details as to a particular claim asserted by a particular Plaintiff are important to give\nthis Defendant fair notice of Plaintiffs claim so he may properly respond. Accordingly,\nunder applicable law, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for sexual assault and battery.\nIn the alternative to dismissing Count I, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be\nrequired to give more definite statement as to what was done to her; what EPSTEIN\nsaid and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the\nintentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and battery.\nRule 12(e).\nCount III — \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18\nU.S.C. 62422\" - is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim\nupon which relief can be wanted. Rule 12(b)(6).\nCount III of Plaintiffs Complaint attempts to assert a claim for \"Coercion and\nEnticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422.\" In her prayer for relief,\nPlaintiff demands judgment against EPSTEIN \"for all damages available under 18\nU.S.C. §2255(a),\n\n.\" Count III is required to be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to\n\nstate a claim under the statutes for which relief can be granted.\nThe applicable version of these statutory provisions, (pre-2006 Amendments, as\nthe Amended Complaint alleges a time period of \"in or about 2004,\" ¶9), provides:\nCHAPTER 117-TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\nAND RELATED CRIMES\n§ 2422. Coercion and enticement\n\nEFTA02742610\n\n\f", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "• Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 7 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-MarraM\nPage No. 7\n(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any\nindividual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or\nPossession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual\nactivity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or\nattempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than\n20 years, or both.\n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the\nUnited States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any\nindividual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution\nor any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal\noffense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned\nnot less than 5 years and not more than 30 years.\nCHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF\nCHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242 2243\n2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421 2422, or 2423 of this title and who\nsuffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any\nappropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual\ndamages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable\nattorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be\ndeemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value.\n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the\ncomplaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in\nthe case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after\nthe disability.\nRelevant to Plaintiffs complaint, 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a civil remedy for \"a\nminor who is a victim of a violation of secti\n... [truncated, 2509 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02742605/6 or ?id=EFTA02742605&page=6]", "char_count": 2509}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "• Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 8 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-MarraM\nPage No. 8\nallegations), are precisely what the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell\nAtlantic Corp. prohibits — Plaintiffs complaint alleges only \"labels and conclusions, and\na (partial) formulaic recitation of the elements.\"\nFirst, the Complaint fails to designate whether Plaintiff is relying on §2422(a) or\n§2422(b).\n\nSecond, although the complaint does contain a partial tracking of the\n\nlanguage in 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), it contains absolutely no factual allegations conceming\nthe requisite \"using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce\"\nby Plaintiff to state a cause of action based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). As well,\nthere are no underlying factual allegations involving this Plaintiff as to the requisite\nelements that a defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced any\nindividual (Plaintiff in this case) who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in\nprostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal\noffense, or attempted to do so. See 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); i.e. with what criminal offense\ncould Plaintiff and Defendant have been charged. Again, a Plaintiff cannot simply track\nthe language of a statute without some underlying factual allegations to state a claim\nupon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Count III is required to be dismissed.\nIn the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state the\nunderlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C.\n§2422(b) and §2455.\nConclusion\nAs discussed above herein, under the pleading standard established in Twombly\nsupra, and law concerning the elements of Count I and III, Plaintiff has failed to state\nclaims upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint lacks\n\nEFTA02742612\n\n\f", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02742605", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80994-KAM Document 8 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/14/2008 Page 9 of 9\nCase No. CV-80994-Marra\nPage No. 9\nunderlying factual allegations and, thus, in the alternative to dismissal or in conjunction\nwith, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the requisite factual allegations.\nCertificate of Service\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with\nthe Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being\nserved this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the\nmanner specified by CM/ECF on this 141 day of October, 2008:\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\nJeffrey Marc Herman, Esq.\nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\n305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\nahorowitza hermanlaw.com\njhermanahermanlaw.com\nIrivera(@hermanlaw.com\nCounsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2\nRespectfully submitte\nBy:\nROBERT D.\nITTON, JR., ESQ.\nFlorida Bar o. 224162\nrcritabcIclaw.com\nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #617296\nmpike(bcIclaw.com\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN\n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\n561/842-2820 Phone\n561/515-3148 Fax\n(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)\n\nEFTA02742613\n\n\f", "char_count": 1243}]}