{"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_count": 32, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02740276", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02740276.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 1 of 32\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO.: 08-CIV-80232-MARRA\nJANE DOE NO. 3,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\n\nDEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,\nINCLUDING SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW\nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (\"EPSTEIN\"), by and through his undersigned\ncounsel, seeks summary judgment determining that under the undisputed material facts,\n(1) the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time\nduring which EPSTEIN's alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff JANE DOE NO.\n3's claim brought pursuant to §2255 in Count III of the Second Amended Complaint\n[D.E. 50]; (2) Plaintiff has failed to and cannot establish a predicate act — under 18 U.S.C.\n§2422 as plead in her complaint, in order to state a cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§2255 (2005); and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the predicate acts\nallegedly were committed allow only \"minors\" to file suit. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. (2010);\nLocal Gen. Rules 7.1, and 7.5 (S.D. Fla. 2010).\n\nIn support of his motion, Defendant\n\nstates:\nIntroduction\nDefendant, without waiving any affirmative defense or grounds which may entitle\nhim to summary judgment in this action or in any other actions brought by other plaintiffs\n\nEFTA02740276\n\n\f", "char_count": 1386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 2 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra\nPage 2\nin multiple civil actions asserting §2255 and other claims against EPSTEIN, seeks\nsummary judgment regarding the proper application of 18 U.S.C. §2255. Based on the\nundisputed material facts and applicable law relevant to the summary judgment sought,\nDefendant is entitled as a matter of law to the entry of summary judgment determining\nthat (1) the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time\nduring which EPSTEIN's alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff's claim brought\npursuant to §2255; (2) Plaintiff has not and cannot establish the requisite elements to state\na claim under 18 U.S.C. §2255, which she attempts to assert in Count III of her Second\nAmended Complaint [D.E. 50]. In particular, the undisputed material facts show that\nPlaintiff has failed to and cannot establish a predicate act —under 18 U.S.C. §2422 as\nplead in her complaint, in order to state a cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255\n(2004); and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the predicate acts\nallegedly were committed allow only \"minors\" to file suit. The pleadings and the\ndiscovery materials on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\nestablishing that EPSTEIN is entitled as a matter of law to the summary judgments\nsought.\nStatement of Material Facts in Support of Summary Judgment, Loc.Gen.Rule 7.5\nStatement of the Case\nI. Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 3's Second Amended Complaint [D.E. 50], dated\nFebruary 27, 2009, attempts to assert three causes of action. Count I and Count II,\nrespectively, attempt to allege state law claims under Florida law for \"Sexual Assault and\nBattery,\" and \"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.\" Count III, which is the\nsubject of this motion, is entitled \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in\n\nEFTA02740277\n\n\f", "char_count": 1971}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 3 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra\nPage 3\nViolation of 18 U.S.C. §2422,\" and attempts to assert a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§2255. (Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 3 shall be referred to as \"JD3\" or \"Jane\" or \"Jane\nDoe.\" Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint shall be referred to as \"2d Am Comp,\"\nand is attached hereto as Exhibit A.).\n2. According to the allegations - \"In or about 2004-2005, Jane Doe, then\napproximately 16 years old, fell into Epstein's trap and became one of his victims.\" [2d\nAm Comp, ¶8]. She had one encounter with Epstein; (after the one encounter she\nbrought other girls to Epstein's Palm Beach home as specified below). (2d Am Comp.\n¶14). Plaintiff further alleges that —\nrecruited Jane Doe to give Epstein a massage for\nbrought Jane to Epstein's mansion in\nmonetary compensation.\nPalm Beach. Jane was led up the flight of stairs to the room with the massage\ntable. She was alone in the room when Epstein arrived wearing a towel to\ncover his private parts. He laid down on the massage table, and sexually\nassaulted Jane Doe during the massage. In addition, Jeffrey Epstein\nmasturbated during the massage. [2d Am Comp, ¶12].\n... Jane was paid $200 by Epstein. (2d Am Comp, ¶13).\n3. Material to this motion, in attempting to assert a claim in Count III pursuant to 18\nU.S.C. §2255, Plaintiff alleges in material part that —\n29. Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly\npersuade, induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of\n18 years, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any\nperson can be charged with a criminal offense.\n30. On June 30, 2008, Epstein entered a plea of guilty to violations of\nFlorida §§796.07 and 796.03, in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for\nPalm Beach County (Case Nos. ...), for conduct involving the same\nplan or scheme as alleged herein.\n31. As to Plaintiff Jane Doe, Epstein could have been charged\n... [truncated, 2165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/2 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=2]", "char_count": 2165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 4 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 4\nincluding violations of Florida Statutes §§798.02 and 800.04 (including\nsubsections (5), (6) and (7) thereof).\n32. Epstein's acts and conduct are in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422.\n33. As a result of Epstein's violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422, Plaintiff has\nsuffered personal injury, including mental, psychological and\nemotional damages.\n4. In the \"WHEREFORE\" clause of Count III, Plaintiff \"demands judgment against\nJeffery Epstein for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. §2255(a),\n\n.\" See 2d Am\n\nComp, Count III, Exhibit A hereto.\n5. In trying to assert a violation of the federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. 2422 as the\nrequisite predicate act for a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255(a)1, Plaintiff generally\ntracks the language of subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. 2422 (eff. Apr. 30, 2003), which states\nin relevant part —\n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\nStates knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has\nnot attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for\nwhich any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall\nbe fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 30\nyears.\nSee endnote 2 for complete text of statute.\n(See endnote 1 hereto for full text of 18 U.S.C. §2255, the version that applied in 2004,\nand the amended version effective July 27, 2006.)\n6. Epstein never, using a facility or means of interstate commerce, knowingly\npersuaded, induced or enticed JD3, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in\nprostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal\noffense, or attempted to do so. (Deposition Testimony of JD3, taken February 19 2010.\n\nEFTA0274027\n... [truncated, 2004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/3 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=3]", "char_count": 2004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 5 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-MarraPage 5\nSee pages referenced below herein). A copy of the referenced deposition pages is\nattached hereto as Exhibit B. See endnote 2 for full text of 18 U.S.C. §2422.2\n7. JD3 testified that she first learned of Epstein (\"Jeffrey\") through Jane Doe No. 4,\n(another Plaintiff in a lawsuit against Epstein), and\n\nand through other girls,\n\nJane Doe No. 7 and J.S. (JD3 Deposition, pp. 84-90). According to JD3, while at the\nhome of Jane Doe No. 4,\n\ntold her \"You can make quick money, 200 bucks\n\njust to give a guy a massage.\" Haley said his name and that he live in Palm Beach. (JD3\nDeposition, p. 90, lines 12-24). JD3 and Jane Doe 4 \"were good friends\" at the time. (Id,\np. 104). JD3 learned at some point \"through word of mouth\" that Jane Doe 4 had been to\nEpstein's house because they \"all hung out together.\" (Id, p. 92-93).\n8. Jane Doe 4 told her \"you give him a massage.\" (Id, p. 95, Lines 8-9). Haley said\nthe same — you give a 1/ 2 hour massage for $200. (P. 96, p. 217). Haley telephone JD3\ntwice and asked if she wanted to give Epstein a massage for $200. JD3 thought about it\nand eventually JD3 agreed to do so and Haley \"set it up.\" (Id, p. 218-20).\n9. JD4 and JD7, who had been to Epstein's home and who are both represented by\nthe same law firm as JD3, JD2, JD5 and JD6 in other actions against Epstein before this\nCourt, were friends of JD3 and led JD3 to believe it was no big deal to go to Epstein's\nhome and that nothing inappropriate had ever occurred. (JD3 Deposition, pp. 143-145).\nNow that they seek millions in damages, Plaintiffs' version of the facts has changed\nsubstantially.\n10. JD3 never spoke with Epstein by phone, and never received or sent a text or email or computer/electronic communication from Epstein. (JD3 Deposition, p. 222).\n\nEFTA02740280\n\n\f", "char_count": 1914}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 6 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 6\nThere is no deposition testimony or allegations that JD3 ever traveled anywhere by any\nmeans with Epstein.\n11. JD3 went to Epstein's Palm Beach home a total of four times. (JD3 deposition, p.\n19, lines 19-21).\n\nAlthough JD3 only gave Epstein the \"massage\" the one time,\n\nafterwards she brought back other girls and got paid for it, even picking up the girls in her\nown car. (JD3 Deposition, p. 175, lines 8-25, p. 176, lines 1-14; p. 259-62, p. 266).\n12. JD3's date of birth is March 5, 1988. (JD3 Deposition, p. 5). The original\nComplaint [D.E. 1] in this matter was filed on March 5, 2008. JD3 turned 18 on March\n5, 2006. Thus, JD3 was 20 years old at the time this suit was filed.\nSummary Judgment Standard\nSummary judgment is proper under Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P, when there is no\ngenuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\nlaw. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).\nPursuant to Rule 56(b), \"a party against whom relief is sought may move, with or without\nsupporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.\"\nAs stated by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323,\n106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986)\n.., summary judgment is proper \"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to\ninterrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show\nthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party\nis entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\" In our view, the plain language of\nRule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for\ndiscovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing\nsufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,\nand on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In\n... [truncated, 2256 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/5 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=5]", "char_count": 2256}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 7 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-.M\nPage 7\n\"entitled to a judgment as a matter of law\" because the nonmoving party has\nfailed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with\nrespect to which she has the burden of proof.\nDiscussion of Law as Applied to Undisputed Material Facts Showing\nthat EPSTEIN Is Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law.\nI. The version of 18 U.S.C. 42255 in effect at the time the purported conduct took\nplace applies to the Plaintiff's 42255 claim against EPSTEIN, not the version as\namended and effective July 27, 2006.\nThe applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides —\nPART I--CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251,\n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers\npersonal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United\nStates District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and\nthe cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in\nthe preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than\n$50,000 in value.\n(See endnote 1 for complete statutory text, pre and post amendment.)\nBy its own terms, 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a cause of action for \"a minor who is\na victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260,\n2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such\nviolation ... .\" See generally,\n=v.\n\nv Husband 428 F.Supp.2d 432 (RD. Va. 2006);\n\nHusband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d\n\n742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The referenced statutes are all federal criminal statues\ncontained in Title 18 of the United States Code. Thus, in order to sustain \n... [truncated, 2206 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/6 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=6]", "char_count": 2206}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 8 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 8\n25, 2005), requiring evidence to establish predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 to state\ncause of action.\nI. A. The statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred applies to\neach of the Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 — not the amended\nversion which became effective on July 27, 2006. See endnote 1 for complete statutory\ntext in effect prior to July 27, 2006 and as amended.\nPlaintiff in her complaint asserts that the alleged conduct by EPSTEIN occurred\nprior to the amended version of §2255 taking effect.\n\nBased on JD3's deposition\n\ntestimony, she had one encounter with Epstein (and three other visits to his house at\nwhich she brought other girls but did not have any encounter with Epstein) in or about\n2004-2005.\n\nThus, it is undisputed Epstein's conduct occurred prior to §2255's\n\namendment, effective July 27, 2006.\nUnder applicable law, the statute in effect at the time of the alleged conduct\napplies. See U.S. v. Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.Ca1. Jan. 11, 2010);\nU.S. v. Renga 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Ferenci, 2009\nWL 2579102, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. 1\n(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. v. Zane, 2009 WL 2567832, fn.1 (RD. Cal. Aug. 18\n2009). In each of these cases, the referenced footnote states —\nPrior to July 27, 2006, the last sentence in Section §2255(a) read \"Any\nperson as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have\nsustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value.\" Under the civil statute,\nthe minimum restitution amount for any violation of Section 2252 (the\npredicate act at issue) is $150,000 for violations occurring after July 27, 2006\nand $50,000 for violations occurring prior to $50,000.\nEven with the typo (the extra \"$50,000\") at the end of the quoted sentence, it is\n\nEF\n... [truncated, 2013 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/7 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=7]", "char_count": 2013}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 9 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marraa\nPage 9\nclear that the Court applied the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct\nconstituting one of the statutorily enumerated predicate acts, which is consistent with\napplicable law discussed more fully below herein.\nIt is an axiom of law that \"retroactivity is not favored in the law.\" Bowen, 488\nU.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film\nProducts, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994):\n... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our\njurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.\nElementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an\nopportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled\nexpectations should not be lightly disrupted!\" For that reason, the \"principle that the\nlegal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed\nwhen the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.\" Kaiser, 494 U.S.,\nat 855, 110 S.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society,\ncreativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that\ngives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.\nFN18. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105,\n1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) (\"Retroactive legislation presents problems of\nunfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because\nit can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions\");\n[Further citations omitted].\nIt is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression\nin several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits\nretroactive application of penal legislation.R419 Article I, § \n... [truncated, 3172 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/8 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=8]", "char_count": 3172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 10 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 10\napplicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 DalI. 386, 390-391, 1\nL.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).\nThese provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The\nLegislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly\nand without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a\nrisk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution\nagainst unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for\n*9498 the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 &Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17\n(1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have \"fair\nwarning\" about the effect of criminal statutes, but also \"restricts governmental\npower by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.\" Id, at 28-29,\n101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). F142°\nFN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706,\n732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) (\"Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that\npromulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against\nthe enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern\nabout the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of\nprivate citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is\nbest equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create\nthe conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed\")\n(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James v. United\nStates, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961)\n(retroactive punitive measures may reflect \"a purpose not to prevent dangerous\nconduct generally but to i\n... [truncated, 2810 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/9 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=9]", "char_count": 2810}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 11 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 11\nSeigel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. M,\n\n162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and\n\ngenerally, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798).\nThe United States Constitution provides that \"[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex\npost facto Law shall be passed\" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law\nviolates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it \" `appli[es] to events occurring before its\nenactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the\ndefinition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.\"\nLynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting\nWeaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)).\nU.S. v. Siegel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998).\n§2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - \"Crimes and Criminal\nProcedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children.\"\n18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and imposes a\npresumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000, should Plaintiff prove any\nviolation of the specified criminal statutes and that she suffered personal injury with\nactual damages sustained. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27,\n2006, would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during\nthe time of the alleged acts.\nThe statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application\nis to be retroactive.\n\nThus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply\n\nretroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct\nis to apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 1493, (\"A statement that a statute\nwill become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any\napplicat\n... [truncated, 2252 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/10 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=10]", "char_count": 2252}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 12 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marraa\nPage 12\nPredator Punishment Act of 1998;\" House Report No. 105-557, 11, 1998 U.S.C.A.N.\n678, 679 (1998). Quoting from the \"Background and Need For Legislation\" portion of\nthe House Report No. 105-557, 11-16, H.R. 3494, of which 18 U.S.C. §2255 is included,\nis described as \"the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties\never developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by\ncomputers.\"\n\nFurther showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or\n\npunishment, \"Title H — Punishing Sexual Predators,\" Sec. 206, from House Report No.\n105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an\nadditional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and\npunishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation\nof the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against\nthose who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S801202. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as \"penalties.\" Id.\nThe cases of U.S. v. Siegel, supra (11th Cir. 1998), and U.S. v.\n\nsupra (3d\n\nCir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18\nU.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the\nEleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory\nVictim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct\noccurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1)(A), even though\nthe guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute.\nOn July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C.\n§371 and §1956(a)(I )(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, ban\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/11 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=11]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 13 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 13\n7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution\nunder the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110\nStat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court\nmust order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the\ndefendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18\nU.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No.\n97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the\ndefendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution.\nWhen the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the\nVWPA \"shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing\nproceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment\nof this Act [Apr. 24, 1996].\" Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between\nFebruary, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 1996\nMVRA \"should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order\nbecause to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States\nConstitution. See U.S. Const. art 1, §9, cl. 3.\"\nThe Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to\nthis action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court first considered\nwhether a restitution order is a punishment. Id at 1259. In determining that restitution\nwas a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(a)(1) of Title 18 expressly describes\nrestitution as a \"penalty.\" In addition, the Court also noted that \"[a)lthough not in the\ncontext of an ex post facto determination, ... restitution is a `criminal penalty meant to\nhave strong de\n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/12 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=12]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 14 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 14\n1493 n. 12 (I 1 th Cir.1997).\" Second, the Court considered \"whether the imposition of\nrestitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto\nClause.\" Id, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would\nindeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the\nmajority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty.'\n\"The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering\nthe defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an\namount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court\nmust order restitution to each victim in the full amount.\" Id, at 1260. See also U.S. v.\n162 F.2d 87 (3'd Circuit 1998).\nIn the instant cases, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition\nof a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered\nby a minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. See statutory text and House\nBill Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the presumptive minimum\ndamages amount under §2255 as \"punishment\" or \"penalties.\" According to the Ex Post\nFacto doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a \"civil remedy,\" such label is not dispositive;\n\"if the effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is criminal in nature, the ex post\nfacto clause is implicated.\" See generally, Roman Catholic\n\nof Oakland v.\n\nSuperior Court, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,\n360-61 (1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of §2255 would be to triple the\nThe Eleventh Circuit, in holding that \"the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose criminal\nconduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996,\" was \"persuaded by the majority of dis\n... [truncated, 2312 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/13 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=13]", "char_count": 2312}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 15 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 15\namount of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor who proves the elements of her\n§2255 claim. The fact that a plaintiff proceeding under §2255 has to prove a violation of\na criminal statute and suffer personal injury to recover damages thereunder, further\nsupports that the imposition of a minimum amount, regardless of a victim's actual\ndamages sustained, is meant and was enacted as additional punishment or penalty for\nviolation of criminal sexual exploitation and abuse of minors.\nAccordingly, this Court is required to apply the statute in effect at the time of the\nalleged criminal acts. Not only is there no language in the 2006 statute stating that it is to\napply retroactively, but further, such application of the 2006 version of 18 U.S.C. §2255\nto acts that occurred prior to its effective date would have a detrimental and punitive\neffect on Defendant by tripling the presumptive minimum of damages available to a\nplaintiff, regardless of the actual damages suffered?\nI. C. As discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal\nstatutory scheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors,\nand thus, the Ex Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended\nversion. Even if one were to argue that the statute is \"civil\" and the damages thereunder\nare \"civil\" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in\nLandgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil\nstatutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress to apply the new statute to past\n2\n\nIn other filed civil actions attempting to assert §2255 claims against EPSTEIN, some\nplaintiffs also propose that the minimum damage amount is to apply on a per violation basis; the\nabsurdity of such position is further magnified when one considers that th\n... [truncated, 2341 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/14 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=14]", "char_count": 2341}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 16 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 16\nconduct, but also, the clear effect of retroactive application of the statute would be to\nincrease the potential liability for past conduct from a minimum of $50,000 to $150,000,\nand thus in violation of the constitutional prohibitions against such application. As noted,\n18 U.S.C. §2255 is entitled \"Civil remedy for personal injuries.\" Notwithstanding this\nlabel, the statute was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who\nsexually exploit and abuse minors.\n\nRegardless of the actual damages suffered or proven\n\nby a minor, as long as a minor proves violation of a specified statutory criminal act under\n§2255 and personal injury, the defendant is held liable for the statutory imposed\nminimum.\nAlthough there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages\nawarded under §2255 are meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award,\nDefendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at\nthe time of the alleged criminal conduct applies.\nAs explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505,3\nWhen a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the\ncourt's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the\nstatute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to\nresort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such\nexpress command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have\nretroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he\nacted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with\nrespect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate\nretroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent\nclear congressional intent favoring such a result.\n\n3\n\n... [truncated, 2359 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/15 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=15]", "char_count": 2359}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 17 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 17\nHere, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to\nconduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B\nherein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as a\npunishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. See discussion\nof House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The amount triples\nthe previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, regardless of the\namount of actual damages a plaintiff has suffered and proven. The new statute imposes a\nsubstantial increase in the monetary liability for past conduct.\nAs stated in Landgraf, \"the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as\nthe criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored.\" Courts have\nconsistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to\nconduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landgraf, supra at 284-85. Even if\nplaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute \"would vindicate its\npurpose more fully,\" even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption\nagainst retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. \"The presumption against statutory retroactivity is\nfounded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long\nheld and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation.\" Id.\nAccordingly, as a matter of law, this Court is required to apply the version of 18\nU.S.C. §2255 (2004-05) in effect at the time of the alleged conduct by EPSTEIN directed\nto Plaintiff.\nII. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count ill, as under the\nundisputed material facts, Plaintiff has failed to and can not show a violation of\na requisite predicate act to sustain a claim pursuant to 18 U.S\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/16 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=16]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 18 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 18\nAs matter of law, Defendant is entitled to the entry of a summary judgment in his\nfavor on Count III - entitled \"Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of\n18 U.S.C. §2422.\" In reality, Count III is an attempt to bring a claim pursuant to 18\nU.S.C. §2255(a), which creates a civil remedy for violations of certain federal criminal\nstatutes as discussed herein. The undisputed material facts and applicable law show that\nPlaintiff does not and cannot establish the elements required to prove her §2255 claim.\nAs confirmed by Plaintiff in her deposition testimony, the one encounter which is\nalleged as the basis for her Count III §2255 claim (and the visits to Epstein's home in\nwhich she brought other girls) took place sometime during 2004-05. As testified to by\nJD3, she heard about being able to get $200 for giving a massage to a man in Palm Beach\nthrough conversations with friends. (See Statement of Facts above, 1112, 6, 7, 8, 9, and\n10). JD3 testified that the only phone calls were between her and Sarah and that the only\nthing mentioned was the giving of a massage for $200. There was no discussion of the\nperformance sexual activity or sexual conduct. There was absolutely no communications\nby phone, intemet, texting or other electronic means between Epstein and JD3. JD3\nnever traveled anywhere with Epstein. She drove herself and other girls to Epstein's\nPalm Beach home. (Id).\nThe applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides —\nPART I--CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF\nCHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242,\n2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and\nwho suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any\nappropriate United States District Court and shall re\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/17 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=17]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 19 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Mana-M\nPage 19\nsuch minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's\nfee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to\nhave sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value.\n(See endnote 1 for complete statutory text.)\nBy its own terms, 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a cause of action for \"a minor who is\na victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260,\n2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such\nviolation ... .\" See generally, Gray v. Darby, 2009 WL 805435, 6 (E.D.Pa.,2009)(\"§2255\nestablishes a civil remedy for personal injuries suffered as a result of the violation of\nspecific sections of the Code [U.S.C. Title 18]. Under this section, any minor who is the\nvictim of any of those sections may sue in federal court to recover 'the actual damages\nsuch minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee!\");\nv. Husband 428 F.Supp.2d 432 (E.D. Va. 2006);\n\nv. Husband, 376\n\nF.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa.\n2007). The referenced statutes are all federal criminal statues contained in Title 18 of the\nUnited States Code. In her complaint, Plaintiff partially tracks the language of 18 U.S.C.\n§2422(b) and cites generally to §2422 in an attempt to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C.\n§2255. (2d Am Corn, 129, 32-33). None of the State of Florida criminal statutes\nreferenced by Plaintiff are a requisite predicate act required to prove a claim under 18\nU.S.C. §2255. (See ¶30-31 of 2d Am Comp.).\nThus, in order to sustain a cause of action under §2255, Plaintiff is required to prove\nall the elements of one of the statutory enumerated predicate acts. See Gray v. Darby,\n2009 WL 805435 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2005), requiring evidence to establish predicate act\nunder 18 \n... [truncated, 2095 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/18 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=18]", "char_count": 2095}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 20 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 20\n§2422 of Title 18, and tracks the language of subsection (b) of that statute. There is no\nevidence whatsoever of EPSTEIN \"using the mail or any facility or means of interstate\nor foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the\nUnited States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has\nnot attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which\nany person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, ... .\"\nIn order to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), four elements must be proven:\n(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or\ncoerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to engage in any sexual activity for\nwhich any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempting to do so. U.S. v.\n410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869 (10th\nCir. 2005); U.S. v. Kaye, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, 782-83 (E.D. Va. 2006). The undisputed\nmaterial facts show that EPSTEIN and JD3 never communicated at any time on any\nsubject via the telephone, intemet, texting, e-mails, or other form of electronic\ncommunication. JD3 testified that she found out about getting $200 for a massage from\nother girls. The only thing discussed with\n\nand JD3 over the phone was\n\nthe giving of a massage for $200. No other type of activity or conduct was discussed.\nThere was no communication by any means in which sexual activity or illicit sexual\nconduct was brought up with Epstein. There is no testimony or complaint allegations that\nJD3 travelled anywhere with EPSTEIN by car or otherwise.\nThus, there was no (1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly\npersuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to\nengage in \n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/19 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=19]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 21 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 21\noffense, or attempting to do so. See for e.g., U.S. v.\nCir. 2007). In\n\n506 F.3d 140, 150-51 (2d\n\na defendant was convicted of violating §2422(b) where he\n\ninitiated contact with girl he believed was a minor in an Internet chat room called \"I Love\nOlder Men,\" repeatedly made sexual advances toward girl and her \"friend,\" asked them\nfor their pictures, steered the conversation toward sexual activities, described the acts that\nhe would engage in with them, tried to set up a meeting with both of them, and appeared\nfor a meeting with condoms and a Viagra pill in his car. Thus, the Circuit court agreed\nhad the requisite intent to violate § 2422(b).\n\nThe Circuit Court determined that a\n\nreasonable juror could also have found that the defendant took a substantial step beyond\nmere preparation when he arrived at the meeting place with two condoms and a Viagra\npill in his car. See also U.S. v. Munro 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir.2005)(Defendant\nconvicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts by using computer\nconnected to the intemet, under §2422(b), where chat room communications included\ndefendant asking \"girl\" about her sexual history, her virginity, her experience wit oral\nsex, and the possibility of making a movie together; defendant further told \"girl\" about\nhis desire to perform oral sex on her.); U.S. v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2009). See\nalso U.S. v. Kave, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, supra, where defendant engaged in lengthy \"chat\nroom\" communications of a sexual nature with individual he believed was a 13 year old\nboy, described what he was going to do with 13 year old, and traveled to the home of the\n13 year old.\nThus, because the evidence (JD3's own sworn testimony) establishes that there\nwas no violation of §2422(b), an essential element of Plaintiff's 18 U.S.0 §2255 claim\nasserted in Count HI is missing\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/20 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=20]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 22 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 22\nentitled to the entry of summary judgment on the claim. Summary judgment is proper\nunder Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact\nand the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.\n317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Pursuant to Rule 56(b), \"a party\nagainst whom relief is sought may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for\nsummary judgment on all or part of the claim.\"\nThus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, EPSTEIN is entitled\nto summary judgment on Count III of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as a matter\nof law. JD3's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of\ninterstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in\nany sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or\nattempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Under the undisputed material facts, JD3\ncannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate act, §2422(b) on which she relies, in\norder to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential element of her\n§2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary judgment on\nCount III.\nIII. The Version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 In Effect When The Predicate Acts\nAllegedly Were Committed Allowed Only \"Minors\" To File Suit.\nThe Second Amended Complaint is predicated on conduct that occurred sometime\nin 2004 and 2005. JD3's date of birth is March 5, 1988. (See Statement Facts above).\nThe original Complaint in this matter was filed on March 5, 2008. Thus, JD3 was 20\nyears old at the time this suit was filed and no longer a minor.\n\n(The age of majority\n\nunder both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a\n\nEFTA02740297\n\n\f", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 23 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 23\n\"minor\" as \"any person under the age of eighteen years;\" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla.\nStat., defining \"minor\" to include \"any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.\")\nFrom 1999 to July 26, 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided:\nAny minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal\nstatutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may\nsue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the\nactual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a\nreasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding\nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than\n$50,000 in value.\nIt is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the\ntext and structure of the law. CBS, Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222\n(11th Cir. 2001) (\"We begin our construction of [a statutory provision] where courts\nshould always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should\nend it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.\") (quoting Harris v.\nGarner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this\ncase, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both clear and unmistakable. It allowed only\nminors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed R. Civ. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit\nunder § 2255. It provided only that \"any minor ... may sue\" and that \"any minor ...\nshall recover the actual damages such minor sustains\" as a result of the predicate acts.\nId. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its limited\nscope: It spoke of \"any minor who is a victim,\" provided that \"such minor ... shall\nrecover\" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that \"any minor ...\nshall be deemed\" to have sustaine\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/22 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=22]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 24 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 24\ncomplete.\" Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation\nomitted)). Under the pre-July, 2006 version of the statute, only minors could initiate suit.\nThe recent case of U.S. v. Baker 2009 WL 4572785, *7-8 (E.D. Tx Dec. 7,\n2009), in discussing the restitution under 18 U.S.C. §2255 noted that when the statute\nwas amended in 2006 — \"Masha's Law increased the minimum damages amount from\n$50,000 to $150,000 and broadened the language of section 2255 to allow adults to\nrecover for damages sustained while they were a minor.\" The plain reading of the statute\nmakes clear that prior to the 2006 amendment, the remedy was created for the benefit of\nminors who suffered sexual exploitation as a result of violation of a statutorily\nenumerated criminal act(s).\nTo the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's\nlegislative history further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to\nminors: \"Current law provides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from\nchild pornography offenses. This section expands the number of sex offenses in which a\nminor may pursue a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from the offense.\" H.R.\nRep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps\nmost telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006—three years after the alleged\nmisconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil action available to\npersons who had turned 18 by the time they filed suit:\n(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a\nviolation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A,\n2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a\nresult of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while\nsuch person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate Unit\n... [truncated, 2175 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/23 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=23]", "char_count": 2175}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 25 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 25\nas described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained\ndamages of no less than $150,000 in value.\n18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added).\nThe contrast between the prior and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006\nlaw replaces each of the prior law's uses of the term \"minor\" with the term \"person.\"\nWhere the 2006 law does refer to a \"minor,\" it changes the prior law's present-tense\nreferences (\"is\") to past-tense references (\"was\"). And the 2006 law's new language now\nmakes clear that, unlike the prior statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may\nsue after they turn 18. Given that amendments must be interpreted \"to have real and\nsubstantial effect,\"\n\nv. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that\n\nCongress recognized the prior statute's strict limitations and for the first time expanded\nthe right of action to adults.\nIndeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended\nto change the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the\nAdam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650\n(2006), and are known as \"Masha's Law.\" As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's\nLaw—explained:\nWhat Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes\n\"any minor\" to \"any person,\" so that if a minor is depicted in\nphotographs pornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but\nby the time the abuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still\nrecover. They cannot now, and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that\nrecovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an\nadult....\nAlthough I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual\nwho would take advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to ...\nmake sure that reaching the age of adulthood does not e\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/24 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=24]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 26 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 26\nthat is look after the protection of minors and ensure that those who\nviolate them are caught and punished and have to pay to the maximum\nextent.\n152 Cong. Rec. 58012-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis\nadded). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corley\nv. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) (\"[A] sponsor's statement to the full Senate\ncarries considerable weight.\").4 There is no basis to depart from that rule here.\nIt thus is no answer that the pre-amended statute's limitations clause provided that\n\"in the case of a person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed] not later\nthan three years after the disability,\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the\nunamended version of the law implicitly must have permitted victims to sue even after\nthey turned 18. That interpretation not only would render Masha's Law superfluous; it\nwould make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because Masha's Law retained the\n\"legal disability\" language from the prior version of § 2255(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b)\n(2006). In short, the retained \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) of the 2006 statute\nwould be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law elsewhere did\nexpressly.\n\nIn these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and\n\nredundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. =,\n\n533 U.S. 167, 174\n\n4\n\nSimilarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service (\"CRS\")\nexplained that Masha's Law \"[r]evises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek\ncivil remedies to: (I) allow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from $50,000 to\nSI 50,000 the minimum level of damages.\" Official Summary of Pub. Law No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), as\nreprinted at \n... [truncated, 2811 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/25 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=25]", "char_count": 2811}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 27 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 27\n(2001). The \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference\nclassic legal disabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age.\nIndeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term \"legal disability\":\nmost federal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25\nU.S.C. § 590c (\"A share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or\nunder legal disability shall be paid ....\") (emphasis added); id. § 783 (\"Funds payable\nunder sections 781 to 785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall\nbe paid....\") (emphasis added); Id. § 1128 (\"Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less\nthan eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....\")\n(emphasis added); id. § 1253 (\"Sums payable ... to enrollees ... who are less than\neighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....\") (emphasis\nadded); id. § 1273 (same); id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id. § 1300a-3 (same); id.\n§ 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501.\nNeedless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of\nthese statutes if the term \"legal disability\" necessarily included one's status as a minor;\ninstead, Congress's mere use of the term \"legal disability\" already would account for a\nwould-be plaintiff's minority status. Given the rule \"against reading a text in a way that\nmakes part of it redundant,\" Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551\nU.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon\nthat \"where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning\n... in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense,\"\nStandard Oil Co. v. United States, \n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/26 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=26]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 28 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 28\nmental incapacity, but not age.\nAccordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment determining that the\napplicable version of §2255 allows for a minor to pursue the remedy thereunder. JD3\nwas 20 years old at the time she instituted this action, no longer a minor.\nConclusion\nThus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, Defendant is\nentitled to the entry of summary judgment determining that (1) the version of 18 U.S.C.\n§2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time during which EPSTEIN's\nalleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255; (2)\nJD3's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of\ninterstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in\nany sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or\nattempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Her testimony and the allegations of the\ncomplaint also show that EPSTEIN never traveled interstate with the specific intent of\nengaging in sexual activity with her. 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) and (e). Under the undisputed\nmaterial facts, JD3 cannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate acts on which\nshe relies, in order to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential\nelement of her §2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary\njudgment on Count III; and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the\npredicate acts allegedly were committed allow only \"minors\" to file suit;\nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court enter the summary judgments\nsought herein. Defendant further requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in\ndefending this claim.\n\nEFTA02740303\n\n\f", "char_count": 1878}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 29 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 29\nBy: Is/ Robert D. Critton, Jr.\nROBERT D. CIUTTON, JR., ESQ.\nFlorida Bar No. 224162\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed\nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is\nbeing served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following service list in\nthe manner specified via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by\nCM/ECF on this 7th day of May, 2010:\n\nStuart S. Mermelstein, Esq.\nAdam D. Horowitz, Esq.\nMermelstein & Horowitz, P.A.\n18205 Biscayne Boulevard\nSuite 2218\nMiami, FL 33160\n305-931-2200\nFax: 305-931-0877\nssm@sexabuseattomey.com\nahorowitz@sexabuseattomey.com\nCounselfor Plaintiff\n\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njagesqabellsouth.net\nCounselfor Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nBy: /s/ Robert D. Critton, Jr.\nROBERT D. CR1TTON, JR., ESQ.\nFlorida Bar No. 224162\nrcritabc1claw.com\nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #617296\nmpike@bciclaw.com\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER &\nCOLEMAN\n\nEFTA02740304\n\n\f", "char_count": 1305}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 30 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra\nPage 30\n303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\n561/842-2820 Phone\n561/515-3148 Fax\n(Co-Counselfor Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)\n\n1 18 USCA §2255 (effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 20061\nPART I-CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c) 2242\n2243, 2251, 2251A 2252, 2252A, 2260 2421, 2422 or 2423 of this title\nand who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in\nany appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual\ndamages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a\nreasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding\nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than\n$50,000 in value.\n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the\ncomplaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in\nthe case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years\nafter the disability.\nCREDIT(S)\n(Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, § 101(b) Mile VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986,\n100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I. § 101(b) (Title VII,\n§ 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314. Title VI, §\n605 Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.)\n18 U.S.C. §2255, as amended 2006\nEffective July 27, 2006\nPART I--CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of\nsection 2241(c), 2242 2243 2251 2251A, 2252 2252A 2260 2421 2422\nor 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such\nviolation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a\nminor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/29 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=29]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 31 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra-M\nPage 31\n\nrecover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit,\nincluding a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the\npreceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less\nthan $150,000 in value.\n(b) Statute of limitations.--Any action commenced under this section shall\nbe barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of\naction first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not\nlater than three years after the disability.\nCREDIT(S)\n(Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, § 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)), Oct. 18, 1986,\n100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591, Title I, § 101(b) [Title VII, §\n703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI, 4 605,\nOct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248, Title VII, 4 707(b). (el July\n27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.)\n•\n\n2\n\nCHAPTER 117-TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND\nRELATED CRIMES\nP.L.\n107-377 (End) approved 12-19-02\nCurrent through\n§ 2422. Coercion and enticement\n(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to\ntravel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the\nUnited States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any\nperson can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined\nunder this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.\n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\nStates knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has\nnot attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for\nwhich any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so,\nshall be fined under this t\n... [truncated, 2402 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02740276/30 or ?id=EFTA02740276&page=30]", "char_count": 2402}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02740276", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 141 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2010 Page 32 of 32\nJane Doe No. 3 v. Epstein\nCase No. 08-CV-80232-Marra\nPage 32\n\nperson can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined\nunder this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\n(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\nStates knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has\nnot attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for\nwhich any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so,\nshall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more\nthan 30 years.\nNote: The amendment to the statute increased punishment that could be imposed\nfor a violation thereof.\n\nEFTA02740307\n\n\f", "char_count": 918}]}