{"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_count": 15, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02739173", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02739173.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 1 of 15\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nCASE NO. 10-80309-CIVJANE DOE No. 103,\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\nJEFFERY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nDEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO D1SMISS,COUNT VI &\nFOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT & TO STRIKE\nDIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO. 103'S\nCOMPLAINT !dated 2/23/20101\nDefendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (\"EPSTEIN\"), by and through his undersigned\ncounsel, moves to dismiss Count Six of Plaintiff JANE DOE 103's Complaint for failure\nto state a cause of action, as specified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2009); Local\nGen. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Defendant further moves for More Definite Statement\nand to Strike. Rule 12(e) and (f), In support of his motion, Defendant states:\nThe Complaint attempts to allege 6 counts, all of which are purportedly brought\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 — Civil Remediesfor Personal Injuries. Count Six is subject\nto dismissal because the predicate act relied upon by Plaintiff for her claims did not come\ninto effect until July 27, 2006, well after the conduct alleged by Plaintiff occurred. The\nMore Definite Statement requested is for Plaintiff to allege her date of birth in that her\nbeing a minor has significance in the claims she alleges.\n\n1\n\nEFTA02739173\n\n\f", "char_count": 1313}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 2 of 15\n\nSupporting Memorandum of Law\nPrinciples of Statutory Interpretation\nIt is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the\nplain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS, Inc. v. Prime Time 24\nVenture, 245 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Castroneves 2009 WL 528251, *3 (S.D.\nFla. 2009), citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and V.\nHusband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 (\"When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry begins\nwith the text.\"). \"The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and\nscrutinize the statute's `language, structure, and purpose.' Id. In addition, in construing\na statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what it\nsaid, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in\nCBS. Inc. supra at 1228 — \"Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative\nintent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and unambiguous meaning\nare in effect asking courts to alter that language, and IcJourts have no authority to alter\nstatutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left\nout.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187.\" See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73\nAm.Jur.2d Statutes §124 .\nTitle 18 of the U.S.C. is entitled \"Crimes and Criminal Procedure.\" §2255 is\ncontained in \"Pan I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of\nChildren.\" 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2002), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and\nprovides:\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251,\n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers\nThe above quoted version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 was the same beginning in 1999 until\namended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006.\n2\n\nEFTA02739174\n\n\f", "char_count": 1946}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 3 of 15\n\npersonal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United\nStates District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains\nand the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorneys fee. Any minor as\ndescribed in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages\nof no less than $50,000 in value.\n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint\nis filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a\nperson under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.\nSee endnote 1 hereto for statutory text as amended in 2006, effective July 27,\n2006. Prior to the 2006 amendments, the version of the statute quoted above was in\neffect beginning in 1999.1\nAll of Plaintiff's allegations of abuse occurred between January 2004 and May\n2005 (par. 18), well prior to 18 U.S.C. §2255 being amended.\nMotion to Dismiss\nPlaintiff's reliance on the amended version of 18 U.S.C. 42255, such reliance is\nimproper. The version of Defendant's position that 18 U.S.C. §2255 in effect\nprior to the 2006 amendments applies to this action, and therefore Count Six is\nrequired to be dismissed as it relies on a predicate act that was not in effect at\nthe time of the alleged conduct.23\nPlaintiff does not specifically allege in her Complaint on which version of 18\nU.S.C. §2255 she is relying. However, in Count Six of her Complaint, ¶50, she alleges\nthat Defendant \"knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18\nU.S.C. §2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(g)(1).\" §2252A is one of the\nspecified predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. §2255. However, subsection (g) of §2252 was\nPoints (2) and (3) are addressed together as the legal arguments overlap.\nIn other §2255 actions filed against Defendant, Defendant has previously asserted the position\nthat 18 U.S.C. §2255's create\n... [truncated, 2841 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/2 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=2]", "char_count": 2841}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 4 of 15\n\nnot added to the statute until 2006. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is relying on the\namended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, such reliance is improper and Count Six is required\nto be dismissed as it relies on a statutory predicate act that did not exist at the time of the\nalleged conduct.\nThe statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred is 18 U.S.C.\n§2255 (2005) — the version in effect prior to the 2006 amendment, eff. Jul. 27, 2006,\n(quoted above), and having an effective date of 1999 through July 26, 2006. See\nendnote 1 hereto. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's conduct occurred during\nthe time period from the age of 17, January 2004 until approximately May 2005.\nComplaint, ¶¶17, 18. Thus, the version in effect in 2004-2005 of 18 U.S.C. §2255\napplies.\nIt is an axiom of law that \"retroactivity is not favored in the ►aw.\" Bowen 488\nU.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film\nProducts, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994):\n... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our\njurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.\nElementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an\nopportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled\nexpectations should not be lightly disrupted Flats For that reason, the \"principle that the\nlegal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the\nconduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.\" Kaiser, 494 U.S., at 855, 110\nS.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both\ncommercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people\nconfidence about the legal consequences of their actions.\nFN18. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105,\n1112,\n... [truncated, 2549 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/3 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=3]", "char_count": 2549}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 5 of 15\n\nfrom passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws \"impairing the Obligation of\nContracts.\" The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other\ngovernment actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for\na \"public use\" and upon payment of \"just compensation.\" The prohibitions on \"Bills of\nAttainder' in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons\neting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States v.\n, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The\nDue Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be\ncompromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's\nprospective application under the Clause \"may not suffice\" to warrant its retroactive\napplication. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893,\n49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976).\n\n\"M\n\nFN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9,\ncl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. I). We have construed the Clauses as\napplicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 DaII. 386, 390-391, 1\nL.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).\nThese provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The\nLegislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly\nand without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a\nrisk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution\nagainst unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for\n**I498 the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17\n(1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have \"fair warning\"\nabout the effect of criminal statutes, but also \"restricts govern\n... [truncated, 3420 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/4 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=4]", "char_count": 3420}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 6 of 15\n\nNot only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply\nretroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would\nbe in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it\nwould be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the penalty\nor punishment for the alleged crime. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. I. U.S. v.\nSeigel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. v.\n\n162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and\n\ngenerally, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798).\nThe United States Constitution provides that \"inJo Bill of Attainder or ex\npost facto Law shall be passed\" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law\nviolates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it \" lappli[es] to events occurring before its\nenactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the\ndefinition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.\"\nLynce v. Mathis 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting\nWeaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)).\nU.S. v. Siegel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998).\nThe statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application\nis to be retroactive.\n\nThus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply\n\nretroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct\nis to apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 1493, (\"A statement that a statute\nwill become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any\napplication to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.\").\nThis statute was enacted as part of the Federal Criminal Statutes targeting sexual\npredators and sex crimes against children. H.R. 3494, \"Child Protection and Sexual\nPredator Punishment Act of 1998;\" House Report \n... [truncated, 2221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/5 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=5]", "char_count": 2221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 7 of 15\n\nis described as \"the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties\never developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by\ncomputers.\"\n\nFurther showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or\n\npunishment, \"Title II — Punishing Sexual Predators,\" Sec. 206, from House Report No.\n105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an\nadditional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and\npunishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation\nof the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against\nthose who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S801202. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as \"penalties.\" Id.\nThe cases of U.S. v. Siegel, supra (11'^ Cir. 1998), and U.S. v. M,\n\nsupra (3d\n\nCir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18\nU.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the\nEleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory\nVictim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct\noccurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1)(A), even though\nthe guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute.\nOn July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C.\n§371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and\nlaundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March\n7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution\nunder the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110\nStat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments t\n... [truncated, 2059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/6 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=6]", "char_count": 2059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 8 of 15\n\nmust order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the\ndefendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18\nU.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No.\n97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the\ndefendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution.\nWhen the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the\nVWPA \"shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing\nproceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment\nof this Act [Apr. 24, 1996).\" Siegel supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between\nFebruary, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 19%\nMVRA \"should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order\nbecause to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States\nConstitution. See U.S. Const. art I, §9, cl. 3.\"\nThe Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to\nthis action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court first considered\nwhether a restitution order is a punishment. Id, at 1259. In determining that restitution\nwas a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(a)(1) of Title 18 expressly describes\nrestitution as a \"penalty.\" In addition, the Court also noted that \"[a]lthough not in the\ncontext of an ex post facto determination, ... restitution is a 'criminal penalty meant to\nhave strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect.' United States v. Twittv 107 F.3d 1482,\n1493 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997).\" Second, the Court considered \"whether the imposition of\nrestitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto\nClause.\" Id, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVR\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/7 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=7]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 9 of 15\n\nindeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the\nmajority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty.4\n\"The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering\nthe defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an\namount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court\nmust order restitution to each victim in the full amount.\" Id, at 1260. See also U.S. v.\nM,\n\n162 F.2d 87 (3rd Circuit 1998).\nAs discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal statutory\n\nscheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors, and thus, the\nEx Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended version.\nNotwithstanding the above legal analysis, in the recent case of Individual Known\nto Defendant As 08MIST096.JPG and 08mist067.ipg v. Falso, 2009 WL 4807537 (N.D.\nN.Y. Dec. 9, 2009), United States District Court for the Northern District of New York\naddressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the\nconstitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.\n\nThe New York Court stated that\n\n\"looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to\nprovide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by the title ... and the fact that the statute\naims to provide compensation to individuals who suffered personal injury as a result of\ncriminal conduct against them.\" The New York Court in analyzing whether §2255\nviolated the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, concluded that although\nThe Eleventh Circuit, in holding that \"the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose\ncriminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996,\" was \"persuaded by the majority of\ndistricts on this issue.\" \"Restitution is a criminal penalty carr\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/8 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=8]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 10 of 15\n\nthe behavior to which §2255 is criminal, it did not find that the \"primary aim\" was\n\"retribution and deterrence.\" \"The statute serves civil goals.\" The \"primary aim\" is \"the\ncompensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of criminal conduct.\"\nTherefore, because Jane Doe 103 has invoked the provisions of the criminal NonProsecution Agreement (NPA) between EPSTEIN and USAO (see paragraphs 25 and 26\nof complaint), plaintiff cannot avoid the full protection of the rule of lenity and due\nprocess to which EPSTEIN is entitled in the context of these unique factual\ncircumstances.\nAlthough there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages\nawarded under §2255 are meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award,\nDefendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at\nthe time of the alleged criminal conduct applies.\nAs explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505,5\nWhen a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's\nfirst task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper\nreach. ►f Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default\nrules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must\ndetermine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would\nimpair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past\nconduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the\nstatute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not\ngovern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.\n\nHere, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to\nconduct occurring well before its enactment. See discussion of House Bill Reports and\nCongressional background abo\n... [truncated, 2376 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/9 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=9]", "char_count": 2376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 11 of 15\n\nAs stated in Landgraf, \"the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as\nthe criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored.\" Courts have\nconsistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to\nconduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landgraf, supra at 284-85. Even if\nplaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute \"would vindicate its\npurpose more fully,\" even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption\nagainst retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. \"The presumption against statutory retroactivity is\nfounded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long\nheld and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation.\" Id.\nThus, Count Six should be dismissed.\nMotion For More Definite Statement and To Strike, Rule 12(e) and (0, F.R.C.P.\nAs noted above, Plaintiff alleges that she was 17 year old high school student as\nof January, 2004, and that the alleged conduct involving EPSTEIN occurred \"between\napproximately January 2004 and May 2005. Thus, Plaintiff had to be 18 (no longer a\nminor) by January of 2005. Under the principles of statutory construction, the language\nof §2255(a) is clear — \"Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section ...of this title\nand who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate\nUnited States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains\nand the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in\nthe preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than\n$50,000 in value.\"\nAs Plaintiff's date of birth is significant to her §2255 claim, she should be\nrequired to more definitely state her date of birth so that Defendant and this Court are\n\n11\n\nEFTA02739183\n\n\f", "char_count": 1973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 12 of 15\n\nable to determine precisely when she reached the age of majority. (The age of majority\nunder both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a\n\"minor\" as \"any person under the age of eighteen years;\" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla.\nStat., defining \"minor\" to include \"any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.\")\nTo the extent that Plaintiff is relying on any alleged conduct that occurred after\nher 18 birthday as an element of her §2255 claim, such allegations should be stricken as\nimmaterial and she should be required to more definitely state the dates of the alleged\nconduct. See Rule 12(0. Defendant also seeks to strike ¶¶10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16,\nof Plaintiff's Complaint as immaterial and impertinent. None of the allegations in those\nparagraphs specifically pertain to the Plaintiff.\n\nNot until ¶17 does Plaintiff assert\n\nallegations pertaining to her and the conduct of Defendant directly involving her. What\nEPSTEIN may or may not have allegedly done with respect to other alleged girls does\nnot effect Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255. The allegations in ¶¶10-16 are not\nrelated to the elements of Plaintiff's §2255 claim and, thus, are required to be stricken.\nConclusion\nPursuant to the above, Count Six is required to be dismissed. In addition, Plaintiff\nshould be required to more definitely state her date of birth, and any conduct occurring\nafter her 18th birthday should be stricken, and ¶¶10 - 16 of the Complaint should also be\nstricken.\nWHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Cou • ismiss Count Six against him,\nand further grant his Motion for More Definite Stat\n\ntrike.\n\nRobe\nitt r , Esq.\nAttorney for Defendant\nCertificate of Service\n12\n\nEFTA02739184\n\n\f", "char_count": 1818}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 13 of 15\n\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the for oing was electronically filed\nforegoing document is\nwith the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify\nlowing Service List in\nbeing served this day on all counsel of recd identified\n, 2010.\nthe manner specified by CM/ECF on this 5 day of\n\nRobert C. Josefsberg, Esq.\nKatherine W. Ezell, Esq.\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800\nMiami, FL 33130\n305 358-2800\nFax: 305 358-2382\nrjosefsberg@podhurst.com\nkezell@podhurst.com\nCounselfor Plaintiff\n\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njagesq@bellsouth.net\nCounselfor Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nRespectfully\n\nd,\n\nBy:\nON, JR., ESQ.\nROBER\nFlorida Bar No. 22 •2\nrcrit@bc1claw.com\nMICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.\nFlorida Bar #617296\nmoike bcIclaw.com\nBURMAN, CRITTON, LUTHER &\nCOLEMAN\n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\n561/842-2820 Phone\n561/515-3148 Fax\n(Counselfor Defendant Jeffiey Epstein)\n\n13\n\nEFTA02739185\n\n\f", "char_count": 1147}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 14 of 15\n\ni\n\n18 USCA 62255 (1999-July 26, 2006);\nPART I--CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF\nCHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242\n2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422 or 2423 of this title\nand who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in\nany appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual\ndamages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a\nreasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding\nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than\n$50,000 in value.\n(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the\ncomplaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or\nin the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years\nafter the disability.\nCREDIT(S)\n(Added Pub.L. 99-500. Title I. § 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18,\n1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I. 6 101(b)\n[Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314,\nTitle VI. 6 605, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.)\n18 U.S.C. 62255, as amended 2006, Effective July 27, 2006:\nPART I--CRIMES\nCHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF\n\nCHILDREN\n§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries\n(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation\nof section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421,\n2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such\nviolation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a\nminor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall\nrecover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit,\nincluding a reasonable attomey's fee. Any person as described in the\npreceding sentence shall be deemed\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02739173/13 or ?id=EFTA02739173&page=13]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02739173", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:10-cv-80309-ICAM Document 14 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/05/2010 Page 15 of 15\n\n(b) Statute of limitations.--Any action commenced under this section shall\nbe barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of\naction first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later\nthan three years after the disability.\nCREDIT(S)\n(Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, & 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)), Oct. 18, 1986,\n100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591, Title I, & 101(b) [Title VII, §\n703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314, Title VI, & 605,\nOct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248, Title VII. & 707(b). (c), July\n27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.)\n\n15\n\nEFTA02739187\n\n\f", "char_count": 725}]}