{"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_count": 10, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02738569", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02738569.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 1 of 10\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\nJANE DOE NO. 101,\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARla\n\nPlaintiff,\nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nPLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO. 101'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S\nN TO DISMISS\nFIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AS MODIFIED\nBY DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ARGUMENTS I THROUGH VII\nOF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED\nCOMPLAINT\nPlaintiff, Jane Doe No. 101, by and through her undersigned attorneys, hereby responds\nto Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [D.E. 29] (\"Motion\"), as\nmodified by Defendant's Notice of Withdrawal [D.E. 53] (\"Notice of Withdrawal\") of\nArguments I Through VII of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended\nComplaint and, as grounds, states as follows:\nPleading Standard & Summary of Argument\nIt is well settled in the context of a civil action that a valid complaint requires only \"a short and\nplain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.\" Fed. R. Civ. P.\n8(aX2). Defendant improperly attempts to heighten this standard through his characterization of\nthis action as one that is essentially criminal and punitive in nature. Such a characterization is\ninappropriate, as this is a civil action that seeks only compensatory damages for the violation of\ncertain of the predicate offenses of Section 2255 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code as set forth in the\n\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Plaster Street, Suite 800, Miami. FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2800 Fax 3(15.3582382 • Port Lauderdale 954.463.4346\n\nwww.podhureLe001\n\nEFTA02738569\n\n\f", "char_count": 1665}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 2 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRAI\nFirst Amended Complaint (\"FAC\") [D.E. 9]. Accordingly, notice pleading is all that is required.\nLombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985).\nUnder notice pleading, the plaintiff need only provide the defendant fair notice of his\nclaim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200\n(2007). As this is a liberal pleading requirement, \"[s]pecific facts are not ner.eqsary; the\nstatement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon\nwhich it rests.\"' Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)) (internal\ncitation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court places a \"very high burden\" on a\ndefendant to show that a \"plaintiff cannot conceivably prove any set of facts that would entitle\nv. Deloitte & Touche et al., 144 F.3d 732, 735-36 (11th Cir. 1998); accord\n\nhim to relief.\"\n\nN.J. Inc. v. Thv. Bell TeL Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989).\n\nThe MC satisfies the\n\naforementioned pleading requirements.\nI.\n\nREQUIRING MERGER OF EACH SEPARATE STATUTORY PREDICATE\nOFFENSE INTO ONE SINGLE COUNT WOULD BE IMPROPER.\nA. Pleading of Multiple Counts Under 18 US.C. § 2255 Is Proper.\nIn his motion, Defendant argues that the multiple counts of the FAC should he merged\n\ninto a single count. Defendant improperly asserts:\nContrary to Plaintiff's attempt to multiply her recovery by asserting\nsix separate counts, [18 U.S.C.] § 2255, creates a single cause of action with a single penalty for all violations of a predicate offense, not\nseparate causes of action and separate recoveries on a \"per violation\"\nbasis.\n(Motion 34). In so contending, Defendant both confuses and incorrectly advances two distinct\npropositions: first, that pleading a separate count for each violation of a predicate offense as set\n2\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 80\n... [truncated, 2120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/1 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=1]", "char_count": 2120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 3 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA'\nforth in Section 2255 of Title 18 is improper, and second, that all violations of a particular\npredicate offense must be pled as a single cause of action to provide for a single recovery, even\nwhere multiple violations of that particular predicate offense may exist.\nIn connection with Defendant's first proposition, a plain reading of Section 2255\ndemonstrates that this civil remedies statute applies individually to each numerated predicate\noffense and establishes the minimum amount of civil damages available to a qualifying victim\nfor each violation. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. Section 2255 provides:\n(a) In General. - Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a\nviolation of section 2241(e), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A,\n2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a\nresult of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while\nsuch person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States\nDistrict Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains\nand the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person\nas described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained\ndamages of no less than $150,000 in value.'\n18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2008). Nowhere does the above statutory text require that the violation of\nthe specified federal statutes be pled as a single count. Section 2255 provides a civil remedy for\na violation of each of the predicate offenses, and does not, as Defendant maintains, preclude\nmultiple counts from being pled pursuant to its terms. For each predicate offense that Defendant\ncommitted, Section 2255 should apply independently and uniquely to properly determine the\nminimum amount of civil damages to be awarded for such offense. To adopt the contrary\napproach is to suggest that a victim of a violation of a single predicate offense receive the same\ncompe\n... [truncated, 2593 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/2 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=2]", "char_count": 2593}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 4 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON\nwell as principles of equity, provide for recovery for each separate predicate offense; to interpret\nthe statute as Defendant proposes would mean that Congress granted defendants who violate a\npredicate offense the ability to violate additional predicate offenses without any accountability.\nThis was not Congress' intent.\nThe underlying approach to statutory interpretation or construction in Florida is set forth\nin A.R. DoUglass, Inc., v. McRainey, 137 So. 157 (Fla. 1931):\nThe intention and meaning of the Legislature must primarily be\ndetermined from the language of the statute itself and not from\nconjectures aliunde. When the language of the statute is clear and\nunambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no\noccasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and\nconstruction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious\nmeaning.\nId. at 159. A review of the wording of Section 2255 unambiguously demonstrates that the\nstatute provides damages for both multiple violations of a single predicate ace as well as\nmultiple violations of separate predicate acts. In its current form, the statute allows laJny\nperson who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251,\n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a\nresult of such violation\" to recover damages in an amount of not less than S150,000.00. 18\nU.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). This statute is properly read to apply the damage floor of\nSection 2255 to each violation of a predicate offense. Defendant's assertion that the above\nstatute only permits a single recovery based on a single cause of action would require that the\nstatute be rewritten to eliminate the use of the article \"a\" and to make plural all singular usages\nof the word \"violation.\"\n2Set Section L B. of this Reply in support o\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/3 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=3]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 5 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON\nThe statute, however, was not written in this manner, and where the statute as currently\nconstructed is unambiguous in its meaning, judicial interpretation of the statute would be\nimproper. See Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Company, 358 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1978) (explaining\nthat \"[w]here the words selected by the Legislature are clear and unambiguous...judicial\ninterpretation is not appropriate to displace the expressed intent\").\nIn the instant case, where Defendant violated multiple predicate offenses in his sexual\nexploitation of Plaintiff, it is proper to plead each violation as a separate count and seek damages\nunder each count in accordance with Section 2255.\nB. Pleading of Multiple Violations of a Predicate Offense Under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 Is\nProper.\nDefendant continues his self-serving interpretation of Section 2255 through the\nadvancement of his second proposition. Similar to the above argument that the violation of\nseveral predicate offenses should be pled as one count, Defendant argues that, when multiple\nviolations of a single predicate offense occur, a victim's recovery on a \"per violation\" basis is\nprohibited. Again, Defendant's contention fails on the basis of a common sense reading of the\nstatute and principles of fairness. Just as it makes no sense to compensate a victim of a violation\nof a single predicate offense with exactly the same amount as a victim of a violation of multiple\npredicate offenses, it is equally unsustainable to argue that a victim of multiple violations of a\npredicate offense should receive the same damage award as a victim of only a single violation of\nthat same offense. To maintain otherwise is to eliminate the deterrent value of the statutory\nscheme by allowing a defendant to continue to victimize a child without any additional\nconsequences subsequent to such defendant's first violation of the relevant predicate ac\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/4 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=4]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 6 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA1\nDefendant argues that, \"where actual damages were less than [the threshold amount] or\notherwise impossible to prove, the statute would guarantee a lump-sum, make-whole penalty of\n[the threshold amount] for all injuries sustained as a result of the predicate acts.\" (Motion 35).\nDefendant fails to provide any support for this contention, either in the case law, legislative\nhistory, or otherwise. First, Defendant incorrectly states the amount of the \"make-whole\"\npenalty. The statute unambiguously provides that \"[a]ny person as described in the preceding\nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than [the threshold amount]. \" 18\nU.S.C. § 2255(a) (2008). As such, the threshold amount is a floor, and not a ceiling, on the\namount of damages that can be awarded for a violation of each predicate offense. Consequently,\nin the instant case, even if all violations of the predicate offenses, as well as all violations of a\nsingle predicate offense, were merged into a single cause of action, the recovery would not be\nlimited to the minimum threshold damage award.\nRelevant case law provides support for holding Defendant accountable for each time he\nviolated any of the enumerated predicate offenses. In United States v. Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 541\n(10th Cir. 1987), the court established that a determination of the correct unit of prosecution for\nviolation of a statute \"focuses in part on the identification of the key element of the federal\noffense.\" In Esch, the defendants were convicted on sixteen counts of sexual exploitation of\nchildren for photographs taken in violation of Title 18, Section 2251 of the U.S. Code. Id. at\n533. The court held that the indictment properly charged separate counts' for each of the\nphotographs produced. Id. at 533, 542. Specifically, the court noted that the charging of\n)Note that although Defendant contends that all predicate \n... [truncated, 2377 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/5 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=5]", "char_count": 2377}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 7 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591separate offenses was warranted where \"[e]ach photograph depended upon a separate and\ndistinct use of the children\" in violation of the key element of the offense. Id. at 542; see also\nEbeling v. M,\n\n237 U.S. 625, 629 (1915) (charging the defendant with a separate count for\n\neach mail bag cut open in violation of the statutory offense, despite the transaction being \"in a\nsense continuous\"); United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that\n\"each separate use of the mail to transport or ship child pornography should constitute a separate\ncrime because it is the act of either transporting or shipping that is the central focus of [18\nU.S.C. § 2252(aX1XA), a predicate] statute\").\nNotwithstanding that the foregoing jurisprudence involved criminal prosecution for the\nviolation of predicate offenses, because Section 2255 exists to provide civil remedies for those\npredicate offenses, Defendant's contention that a plaintiff seeking recourse under Section 2255\ncannot assert a claim on a \"per violation\" basis is without merit. It is simply illogical to assert,\nas Defendant does, that multiple counts and violations can be charged in the criminal context,\nbut that, in a civil action under Section 2255 for those same violations, all counts and violations\nmust be lumped together as one with a single penalty.\nMultiple counts are proper, as shown, for example, in Tilton v. Playboy Entertainment\nGroup, Inc., 554 F.3d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 2009), on which Defendant relies in his Motion.\n(Motion 34). In Tilton, the court did not prohibit the plaintiff from seeking separate damages\nagainst several defendants based on a single incident for violations of three predicate offenses\nunder Section 2255: §§ 2251(a), 2252(a), and 2252(AXa). Id. Although the counts brought\nunder Sections 2252(a) and 2252(A) were deemed to be duplicative by the court and thus were\nmer\n... [truncated, 2266 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738569/6 or ?id=EFTA02738569&page=6]", "char_count": 2266}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 8 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON\nawarded civil damages for each pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2255. Furthermore, Defendant's\nreliance on Tilton to claim that multiple alleged violations of a single predicate offense have\nnever been allowed is misplaced; this case involved only a single violation of a predicate statute.\nMoreover, Defendant's reliance on its own Doe vs. Epstein line of cases is, at a minimum,\npremature.\nAccordingly, in the instant case, not only was it proper for Plaintiff to plead multiple\ncounts in the FAC for the violation of each predicate statute identified therein, but also, this\nCourt should assess civil damages under Section 2255 for each violation of a particular predicate\nstatute. Defendant's argument is unsupported by case law and is nothing more than a blatant\nattempt to limit Plaintiff's potential recovery as a victim of Defendant's multiple acts of sexual\nexploitation and abuse.\nDated this\n\n(e.szt\"-day of June, 2009.\nRespectfully submitted,\nPODHURST ORSECIC, P.A.\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff\nBy:\n\ns/Katherine W. Ezell\nRobert C. Josefsberg,\nFla. Bar No. 040856\ndosefsberg@podhurst.com\nKatherine W. Ezell\nFla. Bar No. 114771\nkezell@podhurst.com\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800\nMiami, Florida 33130\n(305) 358-2800\n(305) 358-2382 (fax)\n\n8\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 3053582800 Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463430 f\n\nwww.podhurstcom\n\nEFTA02738576\n\n\f", "char_count": 1555}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 9 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA'\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nWE HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of June, 2009, we electronically filed the\nforegoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. We also certify that the\nforegoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the attached\nService List either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in\nsome other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive\nelectronically Notices of Electronic Filing.\nRespectfully submitted,\nPODHURST ORSECK, P.A.\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff\nBy:\n\ns/Katherine W. Ezell\nRobert C. Josefsberg\nFla. Bar No. 040856\nrjosefsberg@rx)dhurst.com\nKatherine W. Ezell\nFla. Bar No. 114771\nkezelk@nodhurst.com\nCity National Bank Building\n25 W. Flagler Street, Suite 800\nMiami, FL 33130\nTelephone: (305) 358-2800\nFacsimile: (305) 358-2382\n\n9\nPodhurst Orseck, PA.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 386.358250D Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.663.4346 I\n\nwww.podhlustcorn\n\nEFTA02738577\n\n\f", "char_count": 1159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738569", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/26/2009 Page 10 of 10\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591SERVICE LIST\nJANE DOE NO. 101 v. JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nCase No. 08-CV-80591-MARRa\nUnited States District Court, Southern District of Florida\nRobert Critton Esq.\nBurman, Critton, Luther & Coleman LLP\n515 North Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\nrcrits@bc1claw.com\nJack Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury, Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\njagesq®bellsouth.net\n\n10\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Plaster Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 3053582300 Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346\n\nwww.pxthurst.coen\n\nEFTA02738578\n\n\f", "char_count": 701}]}