{"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_count": 17, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02738424", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02738424.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 1 of 17\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\n\nJANE DOE NO. 2,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nJANE DOE NO. 3,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80232-MARRA\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nJANE DOE NO. 4,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nJANE DOE NO. 5,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-8038I-MARRA\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nEFTA02738424\n\n\f", "char_count": 524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 2 of 17\n\nJANE DOE NO. 6,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80994-MARRA\n\nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nJANE DOE NO. 7,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80993-MARRA\n\nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nC.M.A.,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-MARRA/JOHNSON\n\nvs.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nJANE DOE,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 08-CV-80893-MARRA\n\nVS.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al,\nDefendants.\n\n-2-\n\nEFTA02738425\n\n\f", "char_count": 464}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 3 of 17\n\nDOE II,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80469-MARRa\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN et al,\nDefendants.\n/\nJANE DOE NO. 101,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nJANE DOE NO. 102\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO.: 09-CV-80656-MARRA,\n\nvs.\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n/\nUNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO COURT'S ORDER\nREQUESTING POSITION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY IDE 991\nComes now the United States, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States\nAttorney, and files this response to the Court's Order requesting the position of the United\nStates on Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's Motion to Stay Proceedings [DE 99]. For the reasons\nset forth below, it is the United States' position that a stay of the proceedings is not necessary\nand was not contemplated by the Non-Prosecution Agreement between the United States and\nDefendant Jeffrey Epstein.\n-3-\n\nEFTA02738426\n\n\f", "char_count": 970}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 4 of 17\n\nISSUE PRESENTED\nThe United States is not a party to these lawsuits and, accordingly, is not fully aware\nof the scope of the proceedings, the range of arguments presented by counsel, and any\ncorrespondence or oral communications between the parties in these civil suits. Based on\nthe information presented by the Court and a review of Defendant Jeffrey Epstein's Motion\nto Stay and/or Continue Action for Time Certain Based on Parallel Civil and Criminal\nProceedings with Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Court File No. 08-CV-80811MARRAI\n\nDE 51-1), and responses thereto filed by various plaintiffs in their suits,\n\nthe undersigned understands that the Court has requested the position of the United States\non the following issue:\nAre there \"special circumstances\" that require the imposition of a stay of the\ncivil proceedings in the \"interests of justice\" until the \"expiration\" of the NonProsecution Agreement [\"NPA\"] between the United States and Epstein?\nBy filing this response, the United States does not make itself a party to this litigation\nand takes no position with respect to the outcome of any of the civil suits; nor does the\nUnited States take any position regarding Defendant Epstein's performance of his obligations\npursuant to the NPA. The United States also declines to comment on Defendant Epstein's\nrepresentations regarding past allegations of violations of the NPA by Epstein. The United\nStates files this response solely as amicus curiae at the Court's request and does not waive\nany procedural or statutory bars to suit.\n\n-4-\n\nEFTA02738427\n\n\f", "char_count": 1649}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 5 of 17\n\nI.\n\nSTANDARD FOR IMPOSING A DISCRETIONARY STAY\nA.\n\nThe Defendant Must Show that the Assertion of His Fifth\nAmendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Would\nAutomatically Result in the Entry of Summary Judgment Against\nHim.\n\n\"The decision whether or not to stay civil litigation in deference to parallel criminal\nproceedings is discretionary.... A movant must carry a heavy burden to succeed in such an\nendeavor.\" Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Internal'!, Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 77 (1st\nCir. 2004) (citations omitted). When a defendant facing possible criminal liability invokes\nhis Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination in connection with civil\nlitigation, a court can stay discovery or the entire civil case.\n\nv. Jenne, 2007 WL 624286\n\n*1 (S.D. Fl. Feb. 23, 2007) (Cooke, J.). \"However, `the Constitution does not require a stay\nof civil proceedings pending the outcome of related criminal proceedings. Forcing an\nindividual to risk non-criminal disadvantage by remaining silent for fear of self incrimination\nin a parallel criminal proceeding does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional\ninfringement?\" Id. (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Altina Assocs., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 536, 540\n(M.D. Fl. 1994)).\nAs this Court has previously explained:\nThe law regarding stays of civil actions is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit.\nIn United States v. Lot 5, Fox Grove, Alachua County, Fla, 23 F.3d 359, 36365 (11th Cir. 1994) (\"Lot 5\"), the Court articulated the following principles of\nlaw with respect to a stay of a civil action pending resolution of a related\ncriminal action:\n[A] blanket assertion of the privilege is an inadequate basis for\nthe issuance of a stay. Rather, a court must stay a civil\n-5-\n\nEFTA02738428\n\n\f", "char_count": 1833}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 6 of 17\n\nproceeding pending resolution of a related criminal prosecution\nonly when \"special circumstances\" so require in the \"interests\nof justice.\" The court may deny a stay so long as the privilege's\ninvocation does not compel an adverse judgment against the\nclaimant.\n\n[T]he standard set by the Eleventh Circuit as to when a stay should be granted\nto prevent unconstitutional infringement is more narrow. The law in the\nEleventh Circuit requires consideration of whether, as a result of invoking the\nprivilege, the defendant faces certain loss of the civil proceeding on summary\njudgment if the civil proceeding were to continue. Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 364;\nPervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944 (1 1 th Cir. 1990).\nUnder this standard, Movants must show that invocation of the privilege in the\ninstant matter will result in certain loss by automatic summary judgment.\nUnited States v. Two Parcels of Real Property, 92 F.3d 1123, 1129 (11th Cir.\n1996); Pervis, 901 F.2d at 946-47. This must be an actual adverse judgment,\nand not \"merely the loss of the defendant's most 'effective defense.'\nSecurities & Exchange Comm. v. lncendy, 936 F. Supp. at 955 (S.D. H. 1996);\nShell Oil Co., 866 F. Supp. at 540-41.\nCourt-Appointed Receiver of Lancer Mgt. Group LLC v. Lauer, 2009 WL 800144 (S.D. Fl.\nMar. 25, 2009) (Marra, J.).\nThus, before reaching the relative benefit and prejudice to each of the parties caused\nby staying the cases, the Court must determine whether, if defendant Epstein were to invoke\nhis Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination' and the Court were to allow an adverse\ninference to be drawn therefrom, an adverse judgment against Epstein would be\nautomatically compelled. The United States respectfully submits that it would not.\n\n'It appears from a brief review of some of Epstein's discovery responses that Epstein has\nmade a blanket assertion of the privilege. For example, Epstein has\n... [truncated, 2238 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738424/5 or ?id=EFTA02738424&page=5]", "char_count": 2238}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 7 of 17\n\nFrom a review of the Complaints filed by the plaintiffs in these cases, it appears that\nsome have filed claims based upon Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, some have\nfiled claims based upon common law torts, and some have filed a combination of the two.\nUnder general principles of tort law, a plaintiff is required to prove: (1) that the defendant\ncommitted a bad act; (2) that the plaintiff suffered damages; and (3) that the damages were\ncaused by the defendant's bad act. To succeed on a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, a plaintiff\nmust show: (I) that the plaintiff is a person who, while a minor, was a victim of an\nenumerated offense committed by the defendant; (2) that the person suffered personal injury\nas a result of that violation; and (3) the amount of damages she sustained.\nEpstein's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege could result in the drawing of\na negative inference only as to the first element under both of these claims. Therefore, to\nsucceed on summary judgment (or at trial), the plaintiffs would still have to prove that they\nsuffered personal injury/damages as a result of the defendant's bad act. Cf. In re Financial\nFederated Title & Trust, Inc., 252 B.R. 834, 838 (S.D. Fl. Bank. Ct. 2000) (Stay not\nwarranted in bankruptcy proceeding where criminal indictment was pending because\nnegative inference related only to defendant's receipt of allegedly fraudulent transfers, but\n\"Trustee must still carry the burden of proving all of the elements of his complaint for\nfraudulent transfers .\n\ninclud[ing] fraudulent intent, insolvency, and financial condition at\n\nthe time of the transfers to the Defendants.\").\nWhile Epstein may believe that his arguments and proof as to the first element are his\n\"most effective defense,\" that alone is insufficient to warrant the imposition of a stay of the\n-7-\n\nEFTA02738430\n\n\f", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 8 of 17\n\nlitigation. There are two other items for the Court to consider in deciding this issue. First,\npursuant to the terms of the NPA, as to those victims identified by the United States, Epstein\nhas already made a concession that they are victims of an enumerated offense committed by\nEpstein. Thus, this inference is drawn not due to his invocation of the right against selfincrimination but due to his entry into a contractual agreement with the United States for\nwhich the identified victims are third-party beneficiaries.2 Second, in Lot 5, the Eleventh\nCircuit pointed out the wealth of evidence other than the defendant's testimony that could\nbe used to defeat a liability claim. See Lot 5, 23 F.3d at 364 (\"Thus, Claimant's assertion that\nonly her own testimony could vindicate her is groundless; other participants to the illegal acts\nthat gave rise to the forfeiture were available to testify at trial. Claimant's failure to indicate\nwith precision why she did not use other parties' testimony to substantiate her defense was\nfatal.\"). For example, Epstein could mount a defense using effective cross-examination,\ntelephone records, travel records, documents within the possession of the plaintiffs or third\nparties, and/or the testimony of third parties to rebut the plaintiffs' proof.\n\n'The United States notes that it is not aware of the identities of all of the plaintiffs in the civil\nsuits. To the extent that any are not \"identified victims\" under the NPA, this contractual provision\nwould not apply.\n-8-\n\nEFTA02738431\n\n\f", "char_count": 1615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 9 of 17\n\nB.\n\nAdditional Factors to Consider in Balancing the Prejudice to the\nParties\n\nIf the Court is persuaded that the negative inference drawn from Epstein's assertion\nof his Fifth Amendment privilege would result in an automatic grant of summary judgment\nin favor of the plaintiffs, then the Court must engage in a balancing of equities in determining\nwhether there are \"special circumstances\" warranting the imposition of a stay \"'to prevent\na party from suffering substantial and irreparable prejudice.\" Securites and Exchange\nComm'n v. Incendy, 936 F. Supp. 952, 956 (S.D. FL 1996) (quoting S.E.C. v. First Financial\nGroup of Texas, Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (add'/ citations omitted).\nExamples of \"special circumstances\" provided by the Supreme Court in\n[United States v. Kordel] are: (1) if the Government brought the civil action\nsolely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution, (2) if the Government\nfailed to advise the defendant in the civil proceeding that it contemplates his\ncriminal prosecution; (3) if the defendant is without counsel or reasonably\nfears prejudice from adverse pretrial publicity or other unfair injury; or (4) any\nother special circumstances indicating unconstitutionality or even impropriety.\nIncendy at 956 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970)). See also Securities\nand Exchange Comm'n v.\n\n261 Fed. Appx. 259, 263 (11th Cir. 2008) (\"[N]o 'special\n\ncircumstances' existed in this case warranting a stay, as there is no record evidence\nsuggesting the Government had brought the civil case solely to obtain evidence for the\ncriminal prosecution or that the criminal case against [defendant] was unconstitutional or\ninappropriately instituted.\").\nNo \"special circumstances\" exist here. First, unlike\n\nand Incendy, the United\n\nStates Government is not a party to the civil litigation. Each suit is brought on behalf of an\n\n-9-\n\nEFTA02738432\n\n\f", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 10 of 17\n\nindividual plaintiff represented by private counsel. Some of those plaintiffs are adverse to\nthe United States and have filed suit against the Government based upon its handling of the\ncriminal case against Epstein. (See In re Jane Doe Litigation, Court File No. 08-80736-CivMarra.) There has been no allegation, and certainly no showing, that the civil litigation is\na ruse to obtain discovery on behalf of the criminal investigation.\nAs some of the plaintiffs have mentioned, one purpose of the NPA was to place the\nidentified victims in the same position where they would have been if Epstein had been\nconvicted after trial of an offense enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255. (See, e.g., Court File No.\n08-CV-80119 DE 49-2.) If Epstein had proceeded to trial and been convicted, those victims\nwould have been entitled to restitution and to file suit pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and\nwould have been entitled to the same sorts of discovery that they now seek. None of the\nplaintiffs has contacted the United States about passing on materials gathered through\ndiscovery to any criminal investigators or about seeking discovery that would be relevant\nonly to the criminal proceedings, rather than to their individual cases. If Epstein has\nlegitimate concerns that the civil discovery process is being abused in some way, he can ask\nthe Court for a protective order limiting the scope of discovery or its distribution.\nFurthermore, if at some time in the future, Epstein were the subject of a criminal indictment\nand he alleged that the evidence to be used against him was gathered improperly, he could\nfile a motion to suppress or to dismiss the indictment in that criminal action. See, e.g., United\nStates, ex. rel. Westrick v. Second Chance, 2007 WL 1020808 *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2007)\n(Defendant in civil False Claims Act suit moved to stay civil action pending criminal\n-10-\n\nEFTA02738433\n\n\f", "char_count": 1972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 11 of 17\n\ninvestigation where no indictment had been returned. The district court denied the motion,\nnoting that while \"allowing civil discovery to proceed may afford the government [who was\nthe real party in interest in the civil case] the opportunity to gain evidence that it may not be\nentitled to under the more restrictive criminal discovery rules, if and when discovery\nbecomes necessary, protective orders and other remedial measures may be taken.\") (citations\nomitted).\nBy entering into the NPA, with its explicit discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein\nacknowledged that the United States was trying to protect the victims' rights to restitution\nand that civil claims would likely follow. Epstein did not bargain for a stay of those\nproceedings. Instead, both parties received benefits and gave consideration for the bargain\nthat was struck — while Epstein is faced with answering discovery requests that he would not\nface during criminal proceedings, he also is entitled to the identification of and extensive\ndiscovery from the victims, which he would not have received in the criminal case. Based\nupon a review of the discovery requests he has promulgated thus far, it appears that Epstein\nis taking full advantage of this benefit and if a criminal case were ever filed, he would, no\ndoubt, seek to use that information in his defense.'\n\n'With respect to the other \"special circumstances\" mentioned in Incendy, the government\nobviously advised Epstein of the potential for criminal charges, and that knowledge led to the\nnegotiation of the NPA. Epstein also has a number of attorneys listed on the Service List for the\ncivil cases and has retained a similarly large number of attorneys to handle the criminal investigation\nand negotiation of the NPA. Epstein alleges a fear of adverse publicity, but as the plaintiffs have\npointed out, during the course of the state and federal criminal investigations, Epstein's \n... [truncated, 2324 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738424/10 or ?id=EFTA02738424&page=10]", "char_count": 2324}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 12 of 17\n\nUnlike\n\nand Incendy, Epstein also has not been criminally indicted. In some\n\ndistricts, this alone is virtually dispositive. See, e.g., Sterling Nat'l Bank v. A-I Hotels\nInternat'l, 175 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (\"district courts in this Circuit\n`generally grant the extraordinary remedy of a stay only after the defendant seeking a stay\nhas been indicted.' (quoting Citibank, N.A. v.\n\n1993 WL 481335 *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.\n\n18, 1993) (add'/ citations omitted). As one court explained:\nthe consensus that a party seeking a stay bears a heavier burden when he has\nnot yet been indicted derives logically from the balancing test set out by the\ncourts of appeals that have considered the question. When a defendant has\nbeen indicted, his situation is particularly dangerous, and takes a certain\npriority, for the risk to his liberty, the importance of safeguarding his\nconstitutional rights, and even the strain on his resources and attention that\nmakes defending satellite civil litigation particularly difficult, all weigh in\nfavor of his interest. Moreover, if the potential prejudice to the defendant is\nparticularly high post-indictment, the prejudice to the plaintiff of staying\nproceedings is somewhat reduced, since the criminal litigation has reached a\ncrisis that will lead to a reasonably speedy resolution. Furthermore, at that\nstage in the criminal proceeding, the contours of the indictment will provide\nthe Court with a reasonable basis for determining the extent of the threat to the\ndefendant's Fifth Amendment rights, and the likely extent and timing of the\ncriminal litigation.\nPre-indictment, these factors must be balanced significantly differently.\nThough many of the same risks to the civil defendant are present, the dangers\nare at least somewhat more remote, and it is inherently unclear to the Court\njust how much the unindicted defendant really has to fear. Conversely, the\ndelay imp\n... [truncated, 2512 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738424/11 or ?id=EFTA02738424&page=11]", "char_count": 2512}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 13 of 17\n\nbe litigated, or how time-consuming the resulting criminal case will be. Under\nthese circumstances, the likelihood that a civil party can make the necessary\nshowing to obtain the \"extraordinary\" remedy of a stay is inevitably much\nreduced.\nSterling Nat'l Bank, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (internal citations omitted).\nThe First Circuit has noted that the decision whether to grant a stay \"is highly nuanced\n... [and] involves competing interests. Balancing these interests is a situation-specific task,\nand an inquiring court must take a careful look at the idiosyncratic circumstances of the case\nbefore it.\" Microfinancial, supra, 385 F.3d at 78. Epstein's case is more idiosyncratic than\nmost.\nAs the Court aptly noted in its Order denying Epstein's first motion to stay the civil\nproceedings, Epstein has not been indicted and there are no criminal proceedings pending\nagainst him.' The resurrection of criminal proceedings against Epstein lies entirely within\nEpstein's own hands, by performing or not performing under the terms of the NPA. This tips\nthe balance of equities even further in favor of the plaintiffs. Epstein makes allegations that\nthe U.S. Attorney's Office has unfettered discretion in determining breaches of the NPA, but\nthis is no different than in any contractual setting. If one party believes that there has been\na breach, it may seek the remedy set forth in the contract. If the other party believes that\n\n'Epstein points to provisions requiring him to maintain certain evidence \"inviolate\" as proof\nthat the grand jury investigation is still active. These provisions are meant only to insure that easily\ndestroyed evidence identified through the investigation, such as computer equipment, that is still in\nEpstein's control, will still be available to investigators if Epstein does, in fact, breach the NPA.\nEpstein is well aware that litigation concerning those matters have been removed f\n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738424/12 or ?id=EFTA02738424&page=12]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 14 of 17\n\nthere has been no breach, it has a remedy at law or equity. In this situation, Epstein would\nbe entitled to seek dismissal of the indictment. See United States v. Beeks, 167 Fed. Appx\n777 (1 1 th Cir. 2006); United States v.\nStates v.\n\n138 Fed. Appx. 965 (9th Cir. 2005); United\n\n, 393 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2004).\n\nEpstein argues that because he is seeking a finite period of delay — until the time that\nhe asserts that the NPA \"expires\" — and that, thereafter, he will promptly provide full and\ncomplete responses to all discovery, the harm to the plaintiffs is de minitnis. With all respect,\nthis overlooks a number of obvious issues. First, if a stay is imposed until Epstein's\nproposed \"expiration date,\" it affords Epstein one of two incentives: (a) to delay any intended\nbreach until a time when he believes that the United States has no remedy and then to breach\nthe agreement with impunity (Le, to use the NPA as a shield and a sword); or (b) to delay the\ncivil litigation as long as possible (until shortly before the \"expiration\" of the NPA), and\nthen, after criminal charges have been filed, to seek a mandatory stay of the civil cases until\nthe criminal case is resolved. Thus, contrary to the assertions of Epstein, the delay is not\nlimited but, instead, is \"potentially indefinite,\" as Sterling Bank warns. If the U.S. Attorney's\nOffice were to proceed criminally, the litigation would likely be very lengthy, and would\nresult in an even greater delay to the plaintiffs.5\n'The United States also notes that this finite termination to Epstein's exposure to potential\ncriminal consequences is illusory. The NPA addresses only certain victims identified during the\ncourse of the government's investigation. To the extent that any of the plaintiffs who have already\nfiled suit against Epstein do not fall within that group, the NPA does not address potential charges\nbased upon crimes committed against them.\n... [truncated, 2271 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738424/13 or ?id=EFTA02738424&page=13]", "char_count": 2271}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 15 of 17\n\nThe factors to consider include: \"(i) the interests of the civil plaintiff in proceeding\nexpeditiously with the civil litigation, including the avoidance of any prejudice to the\nplaintiff should a delay transpire; (ii) the hardship to the defendant, including the burden\nplaced upon him should the cases go forward in tandem; (iii) the convenience of both the\ncivil and criminal courts; (iv) the interests of third parties; .\n\n(v) the public interest()\n\n(vi) the good faith of the litigants (or the absence of it) and (vii) the status of the cases.\"\nMicrofinancial, 385 F.3d at 78 (citations omitted).\nIn considering those factors, the United States respectfully recommends to the Court\nthat all of the factors weigh against a stay. In making its decision, the Court should consider\nthat, unlike all of the cases cited herein, Epstein seeks to stay not one suit involving a single\nplaintiff, but more than a dozen suits filed by individual plaintiffs. Each of those plaintiffs,\nin turn, impliedly asserts that she is a \"crime victim\" with the \"right to full and timely\nrestitution\" and the \"right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.\" 18 U.S.C. §\n3771(a)(6) & (7). As noted above, one of the purposes of the NPA was to provide these\nrights to victims identified in the Government's investigation. Thus, this factor weighs more\nheavily for the plaintiffs than in the average civil dispute as it embodies both the plaintiffs'\nand the public's interests. The victims who were identified in the government investigation,\nby and large, were without financial assets and had significant counseling needs that could\n\nwhichever is longer. 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Thus, for Epstein (or any other person accused of sexually\nabusing children) to \"wait out\" any chance of criminal liability, the court would have to stay civil\nlitigation until all of the plaintiffs have died.\n-15-\n\nEFTA02738438\n\n\f", "char_count": 1972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 16 of 17\n\nbe remedied through obtaining restitution from Epstein. In addition to those needs, they have\nlegitimate concerns about memories fading, witnesses becoming unavailable, and dissipation\nof Epstein's assets while the matter is stayed. On the other hand, while the potential harm\nto the defendant normally weighs in the defendant's favor, in this case, Epstein has\nsignificant control over whether the criminal investigation remains in abeyance and whether\ncriminal charges are ever filed.\nCONCLUSION\nIn accordance with the Court's Order, the United States hereby submits that it is not\naware of any \"special circumstances\" that warrant staying all of the civil cases pending the\n\"expiration\" of the NPA.\nRespectfully submitted,\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\nBy:\n\nA. r\n\nVillafafia\nA.\nVILLAFASA\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\nt\n\nFlorida Bar No. 0018255\n500 East Broward Boulevard, 7th Floor\nFt. Lauderdale, FL 33394\nTelephone: 954-356-7255\nFacsimile: 954-356-7230\n\n-16-\n\nEFTA02738439\n\n\f", "char_count": 1082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738424", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 34 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2009 Page 17 of 17\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 28, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing\ndocument with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. According to the Court's website, counsel\nfor all parties are able to receive notice via the CM/ECF system.\nViliafaila\nVILLAFARA\nA.\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\n- I 7-\n\nEFTA02738440\n\n\f", "char_count": 423}]}