{"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_count": 36, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02738375", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02738375.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 1 of 36\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA\n\nJANE DOE No. 101,\n\nCase No.: 9:09-CV-80591-KAM\n\nPlaintiff,\nv.\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN,\nDefendant.\n\nDEFENDANT JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED\nCOMPLAINT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT\nDefendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves to\ndismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement of, the First Amended Complaint. Fed. R.\nCiv. RR. 12(b)(6) & 12(e) (2009); Loc. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). In support, Defendant states:\nPleading Standard & Summary of Argument\nThe First Amended Complaint (\"FAC\") alleges claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 that\nexplicitly incorporate, and thus necessarily require Plaintiff to prove that Defendant is guilty of\nviolating, specific criminal prohibitions set forth in Title 18 of the U.S. Code. While the\nSupreme Court has held that every complaint \"'must contain something more than a statement of\nfacts that merely creates a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action,\" Bell Atlantic Corp.\nv. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and just last week made clear that \"Twombly expounded\nthe pleading standard for `all civil actions' and not just pleadings made in the context of an\nantitrust dispute,\" Ashcroft v. Iebal, No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (slip op. at 20) (quoting\nFed. R. Civ. P. 1), the need to enforce these pleading requirements is especially acute in this\ncontext. After all, the defendant in a § 2255 action is essentially being put on trial for violating\ncriminal laws, and the statutory penalty is obviously and intentionally punitive.\nAs a result, it not only is appropriate to require \"more than an unadorned, the-defendant-\n\nEFTA02738375\n\n\f", "char_count": 1806}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 2 of 36\n\nunlawfully-harmed-me accusation\" before allowing plaintiffs to launch a fishing expedition for\nevidence of possible crimes, Iqbal, slip op. at 14 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), but essential\nthat the accused be given \"such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform [him]\nof the specific offense ... with which he is charged,\"' including a \"specific identification of\nfact[s]\" required to establish \"fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or\nambiguity, ... all the elements necessary to constitute the offence.\"\n\nv. United States, 369\n\nU.S. 749, 764-65 (1962) (quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888); United States\nv. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)). The FAC does not come close to discharging that burden.\nA. The applicable version of § 2255 only permits \"minors\" to sue: \"Any minor who is a\nvictim of a violation of [certain criminal statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of\nsuch violation may sue.\"\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003) (emphasis added).\n\nYet the FAC\n\naffirmatively admits that Plaintiff is over the age of 18. See FAC ¶ 18 (\"Plaintiff was first\nbrought to Defendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003, when she was merely 17 years\nold.\"). Plaintiff is bound by that admission, and the FAC must be dismissed with prejudice.\nBest Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir.\n1983) (\"[A] party is bound by the admissions in his pleadings.\").\nB. Nor is Plaintiff the \"victim of a violation\" of a predicate criminal statute within the\nmeaning of § 2255. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). In our system of justice, those accused of \"violating\" a\ncriminal statute are innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal court.\nWith due respect to the courts that have concluded otherwise, it defies common sense to think\nthat Congress intended to invert that fundamental legal norm, and the\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/1 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=1]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 3 of 36\n\nabsence of a predicate conviction, the FAC not only fails to meet the modest pleading standards\nelucidated by Twombly and Iqbal, but—even taken as true—would not establish a legally\n\"plausible\" claim that Plaintiff is a victim of any predicate criminal offense giving rise to a\n§ 2255 cause of action. See Iqbal, slip op. at 15 (explaining that every civil complaint must state\n\"a plausible claim for relief,\" and that \"where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to\ninfer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not\n`shown'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.\") (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).\nD. Finally, Plaintiff's attempt to multiply the penalties recoverable under § 2255(a) by\npleading six separate counts is inconsistent with the language and structure of § 2255. The law\nallows for a single action predicated on any and all predicate criminal acts, and entitles the\nplaintiff only to a single recovery of actual damages (subject only to a presumptive minimum).\nI.\n\nTHE COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A MINOR.\nA.\n\nThe Version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 In Effect When The Predicate Acts Allegedly\nWere Committed Allowed Only \"Minors\" To File Suit.\n\nThe FAC is predicated exclusively on acts that allegedly occurred in 2003. FAC ¶ 18\n(\"Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion in ... the spring of 2003.\"); id. ¶ 19\n(\"Defendant thereafter lured [Plaintiff] to [his home] on at least one and perhaps two other\noccasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003.\"). At that time, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided:\nAny minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal statutes] and\nwho suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any\nappropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages\nsuch minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's\nfee. A\n... [truncated, 2526 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/2 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=2]", "char_count": 2526}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 4 of 36\n\nwords of the statutory provision.\") (quoting Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.\n2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this case, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both\nclear and unmistakable. It allowed only minors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed R.\nCiv. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit under § 2255. It provided only that \"any minor ... may sue\" and\nthat \"any minor ... shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains\" as a result of the\npredicate acts. Id. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its\nlimited scope: It spoke of \"any minor who is a victim,\" provided that \"such minor ... shall\nrecover\" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that \"any minor ... shall be\ndeemed\" to have sustained at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the\nstatute's words are unambiguous—as the are here—the \"judicial inquiry is complete.\" Merritt v.\nDillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003\nversion of the statute, only minors could initiate suit.\nTo the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's legislative\nhistory further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to minors: \"Current law\nprovides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from child pornography offenses. This\nsection expands the number of sex offenses in which a minor may pursue a civil remedy for\npersonal injuries resulting from the offense.\" H.R. Rep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in\n1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps most telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006—\nthree years after the alleged misconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil\naction available to persons who had turned 18 by the time they filed suit:\n(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of\nsection 2241(c),\n... [truncated, 2541 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/3 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=3]", "char_count": 2541}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 5 of 36\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added).\nThe contrast between the 2003 and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006 law\nreplaces each of the 2003 law's uses of the term \"minor\" with the term \"person.\" Where the\n2006 law does refer to a \"minor,\" it changes the 2003 law's present-tense references (\"is\") to\npast-tense references (\"was\"). And the 2006 law's new language now makes clear that, unlike\nthe 2003 statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may sue after they turn 18. Given\nthat amendments must be interpreted \"to have real and substantial effect,\"\n\nv. I.N.S., 514\n\nU.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that Congress recognized the prior statute's strict\nlimitations and for the first time expanded the right of action to adults.\nIndeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended to\nchange the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the Adam\nWalsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650 (2006), and are\nknown as \"Masha's Law.\" As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's Law—explained:\nWhat Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes \"any\nminor\" to \"any person,\" so that jj a minor is depicted in photographs\npornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but by the time the\nabuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still recover. They cannot\nnow, and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that recovery on the part ofa minor\ncan take place when they become an adult....\nAlthough I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual who would\ntake advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to ... make sure that\nreaching the age of adulthood does not exempt someone from recovery. It is a\ntribute to continuing to do what this bill does, and that is look after the protection\nof minors and ensure that those who violate them are caught a\n... [truncated, 2261 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/4 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=4]", "char_count": 2261}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 6 of 36\n\nS.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) (\"[A] sponsor's statement to the full Senate carries considerable\nweight.\"). There is no basis to depart from that rule here.\nIt thus is no answer that the 2003 statute's limitations clause provided that \"in the case of\na person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed] not later than three years after the\ndisability,\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the unamended version of the law implicitly\nmust have permitted victims to sue even after they turned 18. That interpretation not only would\nrender Masha's Law superfluous; it would make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because\nMasha's Law retained the \"legal disability\" language from the 2003 version of § 2255(b). See\n18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006). In short, the retained \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) of the\n2006 statute would be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law\nelsewhere did expressly. In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and\nredundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v.\n\n533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001).\n\nThe \"legal disability\" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference classic legal\ndisabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age.\nIndeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term \"legal disability\": most\nfederal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.\n§ 590c (\"A share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or under legal\n\nSimilarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service (\"CRS\") explained that\nMasha's Law \"[r]evises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek civil remedies to: (I)\nallow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from $50,000 to $150,000 the minimum\nvel of damages\" Official Summary of Pub. Law No. 109-2\n... [truncated, 2785 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/5 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=5]", "char_count": 2785}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 7 of 36\n\ndisability shall be paid ....\") (emphasis added); id. § 783 (\"Funds payable under sections 781 to\n785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall be paid....\") (emphasis\nadded); id. § 1128 (\"Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or\nwho are under a legal disability shall be paid....\") (emphasis added); id. § 1253 (\"Sums payable\n... to enrollees ... who are less than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability\nshall be paid....\") (emphasis added); id. § 1273 (same); id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id.\n§ 1300a-3 (same); id. § 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501.\nNeedless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of these\nstatutes if the term \"legal disability\" necessarily included one's status as a minor; instead,\nCongress's mere use of the term \"legal disability\" already would account for a would-be\nplaintiff's minority status. Given the rule \"against reading a text in a way that makes part of it\nredundant,\" Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing\nTRW Inc. v. Andrews 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that \"where words are employed\nin a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of this country, they are\npresumed to have been used in that sense,\" Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59\n(1911), § 2255's reference to \"legal disability\" can only be interpreted as a reference to classic\ndisabilities like insanity or mental incapacity, but not age.\nBut this Court need not even reach that issue in this case.\n\nRegardless of whether\n\n§ 2255(b) would allow a minor to sue within three years of turning 18, that carve-out would not\nhelp Plaintiff in this case. After all, she openly admits that she was 17 years-old in 2003. FAC\nIn 18, 19. That means that she was either 22 or 23 when she filed t\n... [truncated, 2438 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/6 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=6]", "char_count": 2438}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 8 of 36\n\nB.\n\nMasha's Law Does Not Apply To This Case.\n\nThe presumption against retroactivity and the Ex Post Facto clause preclude application\nof Masha's Law in this case, where the alleged predicate conduct was completed before 2006.\n1.\n\nCongress Did Not Intend To Apply Masha's Law Retroactively.\n\nIt is axiomatic that \"retroactivity is not favored,\" Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488\nU.S. 204, 208 (1988), and the \"traditional presumption teaches that [an amended statute] does\nnot govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.\" Landgraf v. USI Film\nProds., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). As the Supreme Court has explained, this presumption\nembodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary\nconsiderations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to\nknow what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled\nexpectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the \"principle that\nthe legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed\nwhen the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal.\" Kaiser Alum. &\nChem. Corp. v. Boniomo, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).\nId. at 265 (footnote omitted). Courts therefore apply the statute in effect at the time of the\nunderlying conduct unless there is a clear statement that an amendment should apply\nretroactively to pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.\nSchumer 520 U.S. 939, 952 (1997) (\"Given the absence of a clear statutory expression of\ncongressional intent to apply the 1986 amendment to conduct completed before its enactment,\nwe ... hold that, under the relevant 1982 version of the [statute], the District Court was obliged\nto dismiss this action.\").\nThere is no clear indication that Congress intended Masha's Law to apply retroactively.\nUnlike the many cases in which Congress has spec\n... [truncated, 2432 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/7 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=7]", "char_count": 2432}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLED Docket 05/26/2009 Page 9 of 36\n\narguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.\").\nFar more important, the only expression of congressional intent regarding retroactivity\nstrongly suggests that Congress did not intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively. As set forth\nabove, Masha's Law was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh Act. The centerpiece of that Act\nwas an expanded sex-offender registry (\"SORNA\") intended to bolster tracking of convicted sex\noffenders. See Pub. L. 109-248 §§ 1-155, 120 Stat. 587, 590-611 (2006). To effectuate SORNA,\nCongress provided that offenders must register \"before completing a sentence of imprisonment\nwith respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement, or not later than 3 business\ndays after being sentenced\" if no prison term was imposed. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b). It also\nimposed penalties on offenders who fail to register. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). At the same time,\nand of particular relevance in this case, Congress recognized that applying SORNA to past\noffenders would raise retroactivity concerns. It therefore addressed retroactivity expressly:\nThe Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the\nrequirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or\nits implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the\nregistration of any such sex offenders.\n42 U.S.C. § 16913 (d).\nWhile Congress clearly provided that SORNA could be applied retroactively, it did not\ndo so with respect to Masha's Law. As the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have long\nobserved, \"'where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it\nin another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and\npurposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\"' United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622,\n628 (11th Cir. 1990) (qu\n... [truncated, 2343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/8 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=8]", "char_count": 2343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 10 of 36\n\n2.\n\nThe Ex Post Facto Clause Bars Application Of Masha's Law.\n\nEven if Congress did intend Masha's Law to apply retroactively, doing so would violate\nthe Ex Post Facto clause. U.S. CONST. art.], § 9, el. 3. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:\n[The] Constitution provides that \"[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall\nbe passed\" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law violates the Ex Post\nFacto Clause if it \"'applies to events occurring before its enactment and\ndisadvantages the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal\nconduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.\" Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S.\n433, 441 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981)).\nUnited States v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added; internal\nalterations omitted). Even though this case nominally involves a civil cause of action, the Ex\nPost Facto Clause is triggered both because Masha's Law dramatically increased the penalties\nfor predicate criminal violations and because its retroactive application would revive\nDefendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become barred as a matter of law.\na.\n\nRetroactive Application Of Masha's Law Would Increase The\nPenalties For Violating The Predicate Criminal Statutes.\n\nWhile the 2003 statute provided that \"[a]ny minor ... shall be deemed to have sustained\ndamages of no less than $50,000,\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2003) (emphasis added), Masha's Law\ntrebles the minimum statutory damages by providing that plaintiffs \"shall be deemed to have\nsustained damages of no less than $150,000.\" Id. (2006) (emphasis added). As a result, the\nenhanced monetary penalties provided by Masha's Law \"increas[e] the punishment for the\ncrime,\" Lynce, 519 U.S. at 441, and make \"the punishment for crimes committed before its\nenactment 'more onerous\"' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute.\nId. \n... [truncated, 2479 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/9 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=9]", "char_count": 2479}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 11 of 36\n\nS8012-02 at 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (\"[Masha's Law] raises from\n$50,000 to $150,000 the penalty ... if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.\") (emphasis\nadded). Accordingly, Masha's Law cannot lawfully be applied in this case.\nThe Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Siegel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.\n1998), is virtually on point. In Siegel, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 371 and § 1956(a)(1)(A) that arose out of actions taken he took between February 1, 1988 and\nMay 1, 1990.\n\nId. at 1259.\n\nUnder the restitution statute in effect when the crimes were\n\ncommitted (\"VWPA\"), courts had discretion \"to order `that the defendant make restitution to any\nvictim of the offense.' Id. at 1259 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1985)). But that discretion was\nlimited: \"In exercising this discretion, the court was required to consider 'the amount of the loss\nsustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the\nfinancial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such\nother factors as the court deems appropriate,' before fixing the amount of the restitution, if any,\nthat the defendant was required to pay.\" Id. at 1260 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (1985)).\nBefore Siegel pleaded guilty in July 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory Victims\nRestitution Act (\"MVRA\"). Id. at 1258-59 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 211). That law\nmandated the award of full restitution without regard to the defendant's economic circumstances.\nId. at 1260. Congress expressly made those changes \"effective for sentencing proceedings in\ncases in which the defendant is convicted on or after April 24, 1996.\" Id. at 1258 (quoting\nstatute; alteration omitted). The district court applied MVRA at Siegel's sentencing and ordered\nhim to pay restitution totaling $1,207,000 without considering his inab\n... [truncated, 2465 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/10 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=10]", "char_count": 2465}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 12 of 36\n\nAccordingly, if the court determines that the VWPA should apply to this case, it\nmust use the old version to avoid running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.\nId. (quoting United States v. Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997)).\nThis case is indistinguishable from Siegel.\n\nAs in Siegel, Masha's Law caused \"a\n\nsubstantive change ... to [defendant]'s detriment,\" by trebling the minimum statutory penalty\npayable to the victim of a predicate crime. Id. at 1260. As in Siegel, Masha's Law thus has \"the\npotential to increase the amount of restitution [defendants] would have to pay\" to victims of a\npredicate crime. Id. Accordingly, and as in Siegel, Masha's Law cannot be applied where the\npredicate criminal conduct allegedly occurred prior to the amended statute's effective date.\nIt is no answer that the law at issue in Siegel provided \"restitution\" to the victim of a\ncriminal offense while this statute provides \"damages\" to the victim of a criminal offense; by\ndefinition, damages paid by an offender to the victim of a criminal offense are restitution. See\nBlack's Law Did. (8th ed. 2004) (defining restitution as \"[c]ompensation for loss; esp., full or\npartial compensation paid by a criminal to a victim.\"). Indeed, the case for applying ex post\nfacto principles is even stronger here than in Siegel: While MVRA mandated the award of actual\ndamages to the victim, Masha's Law mandates the payment of at least $150,000 to the victim\neven if the victim did not actually sustain $150,000 in damages. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006)\n(\"Any [victim] shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.\")\n(emphasis added). Given its obviously penal nature, there is little wonder why Senator Kerry\nrepeatedly described Masha's Law as increasing \"the penalty\" for persons convicted of a\npredicate crime. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02, 58016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry).\nBecause a\n... [truncated, 2356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/11 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=11]", "char_count": 2356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLED Docket 05/26/2009 Page 13 of 36\n\nPerhaps more important, the Ex Post Facto clause precludes application of Masha's Law\nhere because it would revive Defendant's exposure to penalties that previously had become\nbarred by operation of law—no matter their amount. As set forth above, the 2003 statute\nallowed only \"minors\" to file suit.\n\nBecause Plaintiff was 17 when the predicate offenses\n\nallegedly were committed, she could have sought the statutory penalty under the 2003 version of\n§ 2255. Once Plaintiff turned 18, however, she lost her ability to sue. That extinguished\nDefendant's exposure to penalties for his alleged crimes. Applying Masha's Law thereby would\nrevive Defendant's exposure to penalties in direct contravention of the Ex Post Facto clause.\nThe Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly\nillustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he\nallegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of limitations\nfor those offenses long had lapsed, a California law purported to \"revive\" stale claims by\nauthorizing the filing of charges within one year of a new police report alleging past child sexual\nabuse. 539 U.S. at 609-10 (discussing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 803(g) (2003)). The defendant\nmoved unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment, and later appealed to the Supreme Court.\nThat Court reversed, explaining that \"the new statute threatens the kinds of harm that ...\nthe Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to avoid,\" because its revival of previously barred claims would\nsubject the defendant to penalties for criminal conduct \"after the State has assured 'a man that he\nhas become safe from its pursuit,'\" and thus would \"deprive the defendant of the 'fair warning'\nthat might have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence.\" 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v.\nUnited States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and\n... [truncated, 2420 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/12 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=12]", "char_count": 2420}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 14 of 36\n\nThe second category—including any \"law that aggravates a crime, or makes it\ngreater than it was, when committed,\" describes California's statute as long as\nthose words are understood as Justice Chase understood them—i.e., as referring to\na statute that \"inflict[s] punishments, where the party was not, by law, liable to\nany punishment.\" After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had\nexpired, a party such as Stegner was not \"liable to any punishment.\" California's\nnew statute therefore \"aggravated\" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it \"greater\nthan it was, when committed,\" in the sense that, and to the extent that, it \"inflicted\npunishment\" for past criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did\nnot trigger any such liability.\nId. at 613 (quoting Calder, 3 Da11. at 391) (internal citations omitted). The Court held that the Ex\nPost Facto clause precludes the revival of claims predicated on past crimes.\nThe precise concerns animating Stegner are present in this case.\n\nAs in Sterner,\n\nDefendant was \"liable to punishment\" under § 2255 before Plaintiff turned 18, but once she\nattained that age, he no was longer \"liable to punishment\" under § 2255 for his alleged\ncommission of the predicate crimes against her. And as in Stogner, retroactively applying\nMasha's Law in a manner that would revive Defendant's exposure to statutory penalties would\n\"aggravate\" his alleged crimes \"in the sense, and to the extent that, it `inflicted punishment' for\npast criminal conduct that (when the new law was enacted) did not trigger any such liability.\"\nId. (quoting Calder, 3 Dall. at 391). At bottom, then, well-settled retroactivity and ex post facto\nprinciples preclude application of Masha's Law to Defendant's alleged pre-enactment conduct.\nC.\n\nThe FAC Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Concededly Is Not A Minor.\n\nAs the FAC makes clear, Plaintiff was 17 in the spring of 2003, and she\n... [truncated, 2571 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/13 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=13]", "char_count": 2571}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 15 of 36\n\nconsistent with Rule 11) allege that Defendant is guilty of \"a violation\" of a predicate statute.\nSee 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006) (plaintiff must be \"a victim of a violation of [certain\nfederal statutes]\"). As set forth below, the plain text of the statute and its legislative history\ndemonstrate that § 2255 is conditioned on a prior federal conviction. Because Defendant has\nnever been convicted of a predicate federal offense, the FAC must be dismissed.\nA.\n\nThe Statute Requires Proof Of A Prior Federal Conviction.\n\nBy its plain terms, § 2255 only permits \"a victim of a violation\" of certain federal\ncriminal statutes to seek statutory penalties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2003 & 2006). Given the\npresumption of innocence that animates our system of criminal justice, Congress's reference to\n\"a victim of a violation\" of a criminal statute can only be interpreted to require proof that the\ndefendant has been convicted of a predicate federal offense against the plaintiff. After all, an\nindividual accused of \"violating\" a criminal statute is deemed innocent until proven guilty\nbeyond a reasonable doubt. It would turn that principle upside down if plaintiffs could sue in the\nabsence of an antecedent criminal conviction. Given that \"Congress is understood to legislate\nagainst a background of common-law adjudicatory principles,\" Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assn.\nv. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991), \"the courts may take it as given that Congress has\nlegislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except `when a statutory purpose to\nthe contrary is evident.'\" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. M,\n\n343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).\n\nIn this case, however, the Court need not take anything \"as given.\" Even if the statute's\nlanguage were not clear—which it is—§ 2255's legislative history confirms that Congress\nintended to require a prior criminal conviction. While the history accompanying the pa\n... [truncated, 2400 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/14 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=14]", "char_count": 2400}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 16 of 36\n\nthe amendments, explained that \"the sanctions provided for in my bill, such as ... the amended\ncivil remedy section [would] provide much needed criminal enforcement tools\" against\nconvicted offenders. 134 Cong. Rec. S372-01 (Feb. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Not\nsurprisingly, the House Report accompanying that legislation used classic terms associated with\nan adjudicated conviction in order to make clear that the bill targeted those convicted of the\npredicate crimes: \"It is the intention of the Committee that only the offender who perpetrated\nthe offense against the minor is liable for damages under this section.\" H.R. Rep. 105-557, P.L.\n105-314: Protection of Children From Sexual Predators Act of 1998, at 23 (emphasis added).\nThe legislative history of Masha's Law is even more explicit:\nWhat Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it ... makes sure that\nrecovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an adult,\nwhether or not the guilty person is incarcerated. It raises from $50,000 to\n$150,000 the penalty for which that individual can be recompensated if, in fact,\nsomeone who depicts that picture and puts it on the Internet and uses them is\ncaught and convicted.\n152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry). These references\ncould hardly be clearer: for the statute to apply, the defendant must be arrested, tried, and found\n\"guilty\"—the \"penalty\" is available only \"if, in fact, someone ... is caught and convicted.\" Id.\nAs noted above, courts give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor. Corley, 129\nS.Ct. at 1569. Given these clear statements from Senator Kerry, the only plausible conclusion is\nthat § 2255 requires proof of an antecedent criminal conviction.\nThat having been said, we do recognize that two district courts have held that plaintiffs\nmay pursue a § 2255 action even without a prior convictio\n... [truncated, 2431 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/15 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=15]", "char_count": 2431}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 17 of 36\n\nrelating to unenacted drafts of the legislation. See\n\n, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 610-12; Liberatore,\n\n478 F. Supp. 2d at 754-55.\nFirst, both courts found it significant that § 2255 initially was proposed as an amendment\nto the civil RICO statute, and in particular that an early draft of the legislation allowed \"[a]ny\nperson injured (1) personally by reason of a violation of [RICO] if such injury results from an\nact indictable under sections 2251 and 2252 of this title (relating to sexual exploitation of\n276 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E1983-01\n,\n\nMI\n\nchildren) ... [to] sue therefor.\"\n\nSupp. 2d at 755 (relying on MI,\n\n276 F. Supp. 2d at 611). As\n\nIS\n\n(June 5, 1986) (statement of Rep. Siljander during extension of remarks)); Liberatore, 478 F.\nconcluded, \"[t]his\n\nlanguage ... indicates that it was not Congress's intent that a conviction under the other sexual\nexploitation statutes be a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil suit for damages,\" because the\ndraft bill grounded the cause of action on \"an act indictable' under the statute\" instead of one\nthat actually produced an indictment and conviction. MI\n\n276 F. Supp. 2d at 612.\n\nMB analysis draws precisely the wrong conclusion from this unenacted draft\nlanguage. After all, the law Congress actually passed did not contain the language on which\nand Liberatore relied. Instead, it allowed only by minors injured by an actual \"violation\"\nof the predicate statutes to sue—not those who merely alleged that a defendant could have been\nindicted (but was neither indicted nor convicted) for conduct that allegedly breached those\nstatutes. It is odd to treat the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted\nbill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello, 464 U.S. at\n23-24 (\"Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it\nprior to enactme\n... [truncated, 2343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/16 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=16]", "char_count": 2343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 18 of 36\n\nSupp. 2d at 755 (citing ).\n\nAccording to M,\n\nthe CRS report stated that \"violations are to\n\nbe determined by a preponderance of the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover\nthe cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation.\"\nId. (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986)).\n\nthus held that \"[t]he analysis of\n\nthat proposed draft indicated that a violation under § 2255 was to be proven only by a\npreponderance of the evidence,\" and \"indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 2255 was intended to provide a\nremedy ... without requiring a criminal conviction.\" Id. at 611-12.\nSet aside that Congress eventually deleted from the bill the preponderance-of-theevidence standard discussed in the CRS report; while that alone renders this portion of the CRS\nanalysis of the report is flawed on its own\n\nreport irrelevant, the key point here is that\n\nterms. To begin with, the fact that draft's proposed preponderance-of-the-evidence standard\ndoes not remotely prove that Congress sought to permit § 2255 actions in the absence of a\npredicate criminal conviction. To the contrary, requiring a prior criminal conviction is perfectly\nconsistent with such a standard, since the plaintiff in a § 2255 case could simply introduce proof\nof the prior conviction and thereby discharge her burden of proving a violation under a\npreponderance-of-the-evidence standard. As a result, the (never adopted) preponderance-of-theevidence standard on its own sheds no light on the question.\nMoreover, the\n\ncourt overlooked the key line in its quotation from the CRS report—\n\nnamely, the report's statement that the draft version of § 2255 would allow plaintiffs to recover\npenalties from \"'those found guilty of a violation.\" M,\n\n376 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (emphasis\n\nadded) (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep.\n\nduring\n\nextension of remarks)). Needless to\n... [truncated, 2355 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/17 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=17]", "char_count": 2355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 19 of 36\n\nFinally—and perhaps most important—= selective quotation from the CRS report\nomitted key language showing Congress's intent to require proof of an antecedent criminal\nconviction. Quoted in its entirety, the relevant portion of the CRS report explained:\nFor purposes of this section, violations are to be determined by a preponderance\nof the evidence. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to recover the cost of the suit,\nincluding a reasonable attorney's fee, from those found guilty of a violation.\nProposed § 2250(d) states that a defendant found guilty in any criminal\nproceeding brought by the United States under this chapter is estopped from\ndenying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil\nproceeding. Since the standard of proof in criminal cases, \"beyond a\nreasonable doubt,\" is stronger than the \"preponderance of the evidence\"\nstandard contained in proposed § 2255, this relieves the plaintiff-from having to\nestablish those facts which have already been proven under a higher standard\nofproof in a finalized criminal proceeding.\n132 Cong. Rec. E3242-02 (Sept. 23, 1986) (statement of Rep.\n\n(emphasis added).\n\nAs the omitted language makes clear, the whole point of the proposed preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard was that it would work hand-in-glove with the draft legislation's estoppel\nprovision in order to ensure that plaintiffs would not have to replicate proof of guilt after the\ndefendant was convicted in a prior criminal case.\n\nThus, to the extent the draft bills that\n\neventually led to § 2255 have any bearing on the meaning of the language that Congress actually\nenacted, the legislative history relied upon by\n\nand Liberatore makes clear that Congress\n\nintended to authorize a \"subsequent civil proceeding\" only after a defendant had been convicted\n\"beyond a reasonable doubt ... in a finalized criminal proceeding.\" Id. (emphasis added).\nAt bottom, the pla\n... [truncated, 2579 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/18 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=18]", "char_count": 2579}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 20 of 36\n\nas if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed against Plaintiff and, as\nsuch, must admit liability unto Plaintiff.\" FAC ¶ 24. While it generally is true that a complaint's\nallegations must be taken as true, \"unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions\nmasquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.\" Oxford Asset Mgnt.. Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d\n1182, 1188 (I lth Cir. 2002). Courts likewise may take note of public-record materials subject to\njudicial notice—even if those materials were not attached to the Complaint. Id. (citing cases).\nThe key point, then, is that Defendant's plea to two single-count charges under Florida\nlaw (one involving solicitation of prostitution — without regard to the prostitute's age — and one\ninvolving procurement of a minor for prostitution) does not remotely establish that Defendant\ncommitted any offense against Plaintiff much less that Defendant was convicted of violating\nany predicate federal statute that can give ground liability under § 2255. The official Florida\njudgment of conviction contains no reference to Plaintiff. See Exh. A. The official transcript of\nDefendant's plea colloquy makes clear that the state-law offenses to which he pleaded guilty\ntook place in 2004 and 2005—years after the events alleged to give rise to this case.\nTHE COURT: State, please give me a factual basis.\nMS. BELOHLAVEK: In 069454 CF AMB, between August I, 2004 and October\n31, 2005, the defendant in Palm Beach County did solicit or procure someone to\ncommit pros[titution] on three or more occasions. And in 08 CF 9381 CF AMB\nbetween August 1, 2004 and October 9, 2005, the defendant did procure a minor\nunder the age of 18 to commit prostitution in Palm Beach County also.\nExh. B at 41-42; compare id. with FAC ¶ 18 (\"Plaintiff was first brought to Defendant's mansion\nin or about the spring of 2003.\") (emphasis added) and FAC ¶ 19 (\"Defendant \n... [truncated, 2430 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/19 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=19]", "char_count": 2430}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 21 of 36\n\nBut even if Defendants' state-law pleas did involve state-law offenses against Plaintiff—\nwhich they did not—§ 2255 only authorizes suit based on predicate convictions under certain\nfederal statutes: \"Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251,\n2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title ... may sue.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2255\n(2003 & 2006). Needless to say, a conviction under Florida law is not a conviction under federal\nlaw, and there is no basis for accepting Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant's Florida pleas put\nhim \"in the same position as if he had been tried and convicted of the sexual offenses committed\nagainst Plaintiff and, as such, must admit liability unto Plaintiff.\" FAC ¶ 24. To reiterate, this\nCourt may not accept \"unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as\nfacts,\" Oxford Asset Mgnt., 297 F.3d at 1188 (citing Fernandez-Montes, 987 F.2d at 284), and\nPlaintiff's contrary assertions \"will not prevent dismissal.\" Id.\nBecause Plaintiff has not alleged—and cannot allege—that Defendant has been convicted\nof committing a predicate federal criminal offense against her, the FAC must be dismissed.\nIII.\n\nCOUNT ONE OF THE FAC MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT\nPLEAD A VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).\nCount I of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a\n\nclaim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). As set forth above, this Count is legally\nunsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted of an offense under\n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count I must be dismissed because the\nFAC does not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated\n§ 2422(b) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation. That statute provides:\nWhoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate ... co\n... [truncated, 2348 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/20 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=20]", "char_count": 2348}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 22 of 36\n\nAs the statute's text makes clear, the essence of this crime is the misuse of an interstate\nfacility to communicate prohibited things—that is, the using of a means or facility of interstate\ncommerce to persuade, induce, entice or coerce a person known by the defendant to be a minor\nto engage in prohibited sexual conduct—rather than the sexual conduct itself. As a result, the\ncommunication (the inducement of a known minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct) must\noccur through the interstate facility (the mail, phone, or intemet)—not thereafter—and the\nscienter element must be present while the facility is being used. See United States v. Murrell,\n368 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (\"[T]he government must first prove that [Defendant],\nusing the internet, acted with a specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to\nengage in unlawful sex.\") (emphasis added); United States v.\n\n165 Fed. Appx. 586, 588\n\n(10th Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he government must show: '(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2)\nto knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4)\nto engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or\nattempting to do so.\") (quoting United States v. =I,\n\n410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005)).\n\nA simple example illustrates this point. Suppose that a \"John\" walks to a downtown area\nwhere prostitutes are known to gather. He approaches several women, and asks each one how\nold she is. The first few women state that they are 18, but eventually one states that she is 16.\nThe \"John\" then threatens to call the police unless she has intercourse with him. She does so; he\npays her $200 and walks away. There is no question that the \"John\" has knowingly solicited\n(and, indeed, coerced) prostitution from a minor in violation of state law. But there also is no\nquestion that the \"John\" cannot b\n... [truncated, 2457 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/21 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=21]", "char_count": 2457}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 23 of 36\n\nCircuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal (2003) (instructing jury that it must find beyond\nreasonable doubt that \"the Defendant knowingly used [the mail] [a computer] [describe other\ninterstate facility as alleged in indictment] to attempt to persuade, induce, entice [or coerce] an\nindividual under the age of eighteen (18) to engage in sexual activity\") (emphasis added).\nWhile the statute is unambiguous on this point, it bears note that this plain-text reading of\nthe law finds additional support in the law's legislative history. Congress first enacted § 2422(b)\nas part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to combat sexual predators who solicit minors\nover the Internet. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 193 (1996) (expressing \"the need for\nCongress to take effective action to protect children and families from online harm\") (emphasis\nadded); see also United States v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that\nCongress enacted § 2422(6) \"after the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing regarding child\nendangerment via the Internet') (emphasis added). Prior to that time, § 2422 targeted only\ninducements to travel across state or national borders: \"Whoever knowingly persuades,\ninduces, entices or coerces any individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce ... to\nengage in prostitution or any [criminal] sexual activity ... shall be fined under this title or\nimprisoned not more than five years, or both.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1995). With no nexus to use\nof an interstate instrumentality, the existing law did nothing to address the problem of intemet\npredators, whose conduct might have nothing to do with interstate or transnational travel.\nAccordingly, when Congress added § 2422(b), it borrowed the predecessor statute's\nlanguage about knowing persuasion, and—with an eye to online communications—criminalized\nthe use of an interstate facility to knowingly persuade a m\n... [truncated, 2424 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/22 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=22]", "char_count": 2424}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 24 of 36\n\nengaging in illegal sexual activity.\").\nThis simple point is dispositive. The FAC never alleges that Defendant \"persuade[d],\ninduce[d], entice[d], or coerce[d]\" Plaintiff to engage in prohibited sexual conduct \"using the\nmail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce.\" 18\n\n§ 2422(b). It does\n\nnot allege that Defendant ever mailed Plaintiff anything, much less that he coerced her to engage\nin prohibited sexual activity by doing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever called or textmessaged Plaintiff, much less that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity by\ndoing so. It does not allege that Defendant ever e-mailed or instant-messaged Plaintiff, much\nless that he coerced her to engage in prohibited sexual activity using any intemet technology.\nTo the contrary, the FAC alleges that Defendant's efforts to induce Plaintiff to engage in\nprohibited sexual conduct took place exclusively in person, without any use of an interstate\nmeans or facility. The FAC alleges that \"in or about the spring of 2003,\" Plaintiff \"was recruited\nby one of Defendant's agents to give Defendant a massage for compensation,\" and that\nDefendant's agent \"drove [Plaintiff] to [Defendant's] mansion.\" FAC ¶ 18. After she allegedly\nwas led to the massage room, the FAC alleges that a topless woman \"with dark hair [and] an\naccent ... tried to coax Plaintiff to remove her shirt.\" Id. Defendant entered the room, and\neventually asked Plaintiff to massage his buttocks. Id. He then allegedly \"ordered Plaintiff to\nremove her clothes,\" \"began masturbating and fondling her breasts,\" and \"asked her to do more,\"\nbut \"she adamantly declined.\" Id. She allegedly was paid $200, and then driven away by\nDefendant's agent. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that she was \"lured\" to the mansion \"on at least\none and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or summer of 2003,\" but provides no\ndetails regardin\n... [truncated, 2386 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/23 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=23]", "char_count": 2386}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 25 of 36\n\nfactual allegations that, if true, would show that Plaintiff is the victim of a violation of § 2242(b).\nTo be sure, Plaintiff does allege that \"Defendant or an authorized agent would call and\nalert Defendant's assistants shortly before or after he arrived at his Palm Beach residence,\" FAC\n¶ 11—just like any professional would alert his or her administrative assistant that he or she was\ncoming to town. But Congress has not made that a crime, and even if Defendant's assistants\nlater \"would seek out economically disadvantaged and underage girls from West Palm Beach,\"\nid., it cannot reasonably be said that Defendant was \"using the mail or any facility or means of\ninterstate ... commerce [to] knowingly persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[ a minor] to\nengage in prostitution or any sexual activity.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b). Again, the statute only\nprohibits online or telephonic contact with minors—not with one's secretary.\nNor is it sufficient that Plaintiff baldly asserts that Defendant \"traveled to his mansion in\nPalm Beach for the purpose of luring minor girls,\" and \"used the telephone to contact these\nminor girls for the purpose of coercing them into acts of prostitution.\" 18 U.S.C. § 2242(b).\nThese bald allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, slip op. at 14 (\"Threadbare\nrecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not\nsuffice.\"); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 (it is not enough that \"the pleadings le[ave] open the\npossibility that a plaintiff might later establish some set of undisclosed facts to support\nrecovery\") (quotation and alteration omitted). And even if they could, these unsupported claims\ndo not demonstrate that this Plaintiff is entitled to relief: whether or not Defendant ever used to\nphone to contact some minor, a bare allegation that he called someone, sometime, does not\nremotely establish that he called Plainti\n... [truncated, 2395 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/24 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=24]", "char_count": 2395}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 26 of 36\n\ndescribes. But she hasn't—because she can't—and Count I must be dismissed with prejudice.\nIV.\n\nCOUNT TWO MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A\nVIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).\nCount II of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on a\n\nclaim that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Again, as set forth above, this Count is\nlegally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under\n§ 2423(b). Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count II still must be dismissed because the FAC\ndoes not make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated\n§ 2423(b) or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation.\nAs a threshold matter, however, it bears note that the FAC's factual allegations are so\nvague that it cannot be determined which version of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) even applies to this\nCount. Prior to April 30, 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) provided that:\nA person who travels in interstate commerce, or conspires to do so, or a United\nStates citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States\nwho travels in foreign commerce, or conspires to do so, for the purpose of\nengaging in any sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18\nyears of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act\noccurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States\nshall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.\n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2002) (emphasis added). On April 30, 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies\nand Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, or \"PROTECT Act,\"\nPub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, became effective, and § 2423 was amended to read:\nA person who travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a\nUnited States citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residenc\n... [truncated, 2461 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/25 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=25]", "char_count": 2461}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 27 of 36\n\nDefendant's mansion in or about the spring of 2003,\" FAC ¶ 18, and that she later was \"lured ...\nto the Epstein mansion on at least one and perhaps two other occasions in the spring and/or\nsummer of 2003.\" Id. ¶ 19. Since these vague allegations leave open the possibility that the\nalleged predicate conduct could have occurred either before or after the PROTECT Act's\neffective date, it is impossible to determine what law governs. No matter how generously one\nconstrues the pleading standards, they at least require allegations that are sufficiently precise to\npermit the Court to determine what law governs. Yet without alleging any specific dates, the\nFAC falls well short of that mark and ought to be dismissed for that reason alone.\nUnder either version of the statute, however, the key point is that § 2423 does not prohibit\ninterstate travel that merely happens to result in illicit sexual conduct.\n\nInstead, the courts\n\nrepeatedly have held that the statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for\ninterstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tykarsky,\n446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was\na dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.\") (citing United States v. Hayward,\n359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously\ncorrect. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it first was enacted as part of the Violent Crime\nControl and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, 2037—it was\nadded to the\n\nAct (first passed in 1910) and uses the identical \"for the purpose of language\n\nset forth in the original version of that statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (1986). Accordingly,\ncourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the\nuse of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v.\n... [truncated, 2449 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/26 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=26]", "char_count": 2449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 28 of 36\n\nthe same act are intended to have the same meaning.\") (quotation and citation omitted).\nTwo Mann Act cases are particularly apt. In Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934), the\nGovernment charged the defendant with violating the\n\nAct after she returned to the country\n\nwith a man with whom she was having \"illicit relations.\" Id. at 561. Despite the fact that the\nwoman intended to \"continue her irregular and improper conduct [after] returning,\" the Court\nheld that she had not violated the Act: \"People not of good moral character like others, travel\nfrom place to place and change their residence. But to say that, because they indulge in illegal or\nimmoral acts, they travel for that purpose, is to emphasize that which is incidental and ignore\nwhat is of primary significance.\" Id. at 562-63. Likewise, in Mortensen v. United States, 322\nU.S. 369 (1944), defendants were convicted after two women they employed as prostitutes at\ntheir Nebraska brothel traveled to Utah and back, where they resumed their unlawful activities.\nId. at 372. Again, the Supreme Court reversed: \"An intention that the women or girls shall\nengage in the conduct outlawed by [the\n\nAct] must be found to exist before the conclusion\n\nof the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement. And the\ntransportation must be designed to bring about such result.\" Id. at 374.\nThe FAC does not remotely allege that Defendant's dominant motive for traveling to\nPalm Beach \"in or about the spring of 2003\" was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. FAC\n¶ 18. Instead, as the FAC makes clear, Defendant is a successful businessman who maintains\nhomes and properties around the world. Id. 8. Even if the FAC's fanciful allegations regarding\nDefendant's conduct while at those homes were true, the FAC does not remotely allege that his\ndominant motive for travel was to engage in illicit sexual acts (much less that he tra\n... [truncated, 2411 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/27 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=27]", "char_count": 2411}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 29 of 36\n\nfacts\" to support the claim. Instead, each element must be supported by an adequate factual\nallegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561; see also Iqbal, slip op. at 14 (\"The plausibility standard\n... asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a\ncomplaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of\nthe line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief') (quoting Twombly, 550\nU.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).\nIndeed, Twombly itself supplies an excellent parallel. Plaintiffs there alleged that the\ndefendants engaged in coordinated activities that violated the antitrust laws, and asserted that\ndefendants thus must have agreed to restrain trade. As the Court observed, however, plaintiffs'\notherwise specific allegations of parallel conduct were as likely innocent as they were consistent\nan agreement to restrain trade:\n[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not\nsuffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a\nconclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply\nfacts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are\nset out..., they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding\nagreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent.\nId. at 556-57.\nSo too here. The mere fact that Defendant traveled between his residences and allegedly\nengaged in illicit conduct while at his homes hardly suggests that the dominant purpose of his\ntravel was to engage in illicit sexual activity. Instead, Defendant's travel is equally consistent\nwith the truth: that his vast business operations and charitable activities required frequent travel,\nand that any sexual activity—legal or not—that occurred was incidental to the legitimate\npurposes that motiva\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/28 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=28]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 30 of 36\n\ntourism that violates 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), or that Plaintiff herself is the victim of such an\noffense. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Count II muse be dismissed.\nV.\n\nCOUNT THREE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PLEAD A\nVIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2251.\nCount III of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on\n\nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251. Again, as set forth above, this Count is\nlegally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under\n§ 2251. Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count III still must be dismissed because the FAC does\nnot make factual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2251 or that Plaintiff is the victim of such a violation.\nYet again, Plaintiff's failure adequately to plead the dates on which the alleged predicate\nconduct occurred makes it impossible to determine which version of § 2251 applies in this case.\nPrior to April 30, 2003, § 2251 provided that:\nAny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor\nto engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any\nvisual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished ... if such person knows or\nhas reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported in interstate or\nforeign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using\nmaterials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign\ncommerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has\nactually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.\n18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2002) (emphasis added).\n\nAs with § 2423(b), however, Congress made\n\nsignificant changes to the statute when the PROTECT Act became effective on April 30, 2003:\nAny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor\nto engage in ...\n... [truncated, 2809 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/29 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=29]", "char_count": 2809}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 31 of 36\n\nor foreign commerce or mailed.\n18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2003) (emphasis added; underscored to denote amended text).\nUnder either version, however, Count III must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to\nplead that Defendant's dominant motive for enticing her to engage in sexual conduct was to\nproduce images of that conduct; that Defendant actually produced an image of Plaintiff; or that\nDefendant either knew that the resulting images would be transported in interstate commerce or\nactually transported or transmitted those photographs in interstate commerce. Instead, the FAC\nalleges only that Defendant displayed photos of other women in his homes and on his computer,\nsee FAC at\n\n14 & 16, and \"may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... and may have\n\ntransported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere using a\nfacility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce.\" Id. ¶1 16 & 34 (emphasis added).\nThose speculative assertions are insufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden at the pleading\nstage. In our legal system, defendants cannot properly be subjected to the burden and expense of\ndiscovery—and the accompanying pressure to settle—based on claims that they \"may have\"\ndone something wrong. Instead, \"the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the\nplaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the\nplaintiff's complaint should be dismissed.\" James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g. Inc.,\n540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Iqbal, slip op. at\n15 (complaint must be dismissed \"where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer\nmore than the mere possibility of misconduct\") (emphasis added); Bawa v. U.S., No. C 0700200 WHA, 2007 WL 1456040, *5 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2007) (dismissing complaint alleging\nthat defendant \"may have played a substantia\n... [truncated, 2334 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/30 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=30]", "char_count": 2334}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 32 of 36\n\nallowing Plaintiff to proceed. Count III must be dismissed with prejudice.\nVI.\n\nCOUNTS FOUR AND FIVE MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT\nPLEAD VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) OR 2252A(a)(1).\nCount IV of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on\n\nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Count V of the FAC asserts a cause\nof action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on allegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2252A(a)(1). Again, as set forth above, these Counts are legally unsustainable for the simple\nreason that Defendant has never been convicted under § 2252(a)(l) or § 2252A(a)(1). Supra at\n§ II. In the alternative, Counts IV and V still must be dismissed because the FAC does not make\nfactual allegations that, even if true, would establish that Defendant violated either statute or that\nPlaintiff is a victim of such a violation. By its plain terms, § 2252(a)(1) provides:\nAny person who ... knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of\ninterstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if ... the producing of\nsuch visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit\nconduct and ... such visual depiction is of such conduct ... shall be punished as\nprovided in subsection (b) of this section.\n18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(l) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added).\n\nSimilarly, the pre- and post-\n\nPROTECT Act versions of § 2252A(a)(1) provide:\nAny person who ... knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or\nforeign commerce by any means, including by computer, any childpornography\n... shall be punished as provided [by law].\n18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2002 & 2003) (emphasis added).\n\nIn turn, the term \"child\n\npornography\" was defined both pre- and post-PROTECT Act, and in relevant part, as:\nany visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer\nor computer-generated image\n... [truncated, 2399 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/31 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=31]", "char_count": 2399}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 33 of 36\n\ndisplayed photos of other unidentified women in his homes and on his computer, see FAC at\n¶1 14 & 16, and \"may have taken lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... with his hidden cameras and\nmay have transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff ... to his other residences and elsewhere\nusing a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce.\" FAC S¶ 16, 38, 43 (emphasis\nadded). Again, it simply is not enough to allege that Defendant \"may have\" done something\nwrong: \"the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,\nraising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should\nbe dismissed.\" James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted); see also\nIqbal, slip op. at 15 (holding the a complaint must be dismissed \"where the well-pleaded facts do\nnot permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct\") (emphasis added).\nBecause the FAC only speculates that Defendant \"may have\" committed a crime, and because\nPlaintiff surely would have charged that Defendant actually committed a crime if she had a\ngood-faith basis for doing so, Counts IV and V must be dismissed with prejudice.\nVII.\n\nCOUNT SIX MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) WAS NOT\nENACTED UNTIL 2006.\nCount VI of the FAC asserts a cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 predicated on\n\nallegations that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). Again, as set forth above, this Count\nis legally unsustainable for the simple reason that Defendant has never been convicted under\n§ 2251. Supra at § II. In the alternative, Count VI still must be dismissed because § 2252A(g)\nwas not enacted until 2006—three years after the alleged conduct underlying this case took\nplace. See Pub. L. 109-248, Title VII, § 701, July 27, 2006, 120 Stat. 614, 647. As set forth\nabove, supra § I.B.2, the Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prec\n... [truncated, 2343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/32 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=32]", "char_count": 2343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 34 of 36\n\nWalsh Act retroactive, but not others). Thus, while Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a\nviolation of § 2252A(g) in the first place, there is no lawful basis under which she could assert a\ncause of action predicated on that statute. Count VI must be dismissed with prejudice.\nVIII. ANY SURVIVING COUNTS SHOULD BE MERGED INTO A SINGLE COUNT.\nWhile we respectfully submit that none of the FAC's counts are viable and that each\nshould be dismissed with prejudice, this Court should require the merger of all claims into a\nsingle count to the extent it rejects the foregoing analysis and allows more than one count to\nproceed. Contrary to Plaintiff's attempt to multiply her recovery by asserting six separate\ncounts, § 2255 creates a single cause of action with a single penalty for all violations of a\npredicate offense, not separate causes of action and separate recoveries on a \"per violation\"\nbasis. We have not found a single precedent where a § 2255 plaintiff has been allowed to assert\nclaims on a \"per violation\" basis—each of the prior cases (including the prior cases involving\nthis defendant in this Court) involved a single count predicated on multiple alleged violations of\npredicate criminal statutes. See Tilton v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1371\n(11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2009);\n\n, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 432• Doe, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 754; Doe No. 2\n\nv. Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); pee No. 3 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383330\n(S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 4 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); and\nDoe No. 5 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009).\nThere is no basis for indulging Plaintiff's contrary approach. Instead, the plain language\nand structure of the statute foreclose Plaintiffs unprecedented approach. First, the order of the\ntwo sentences establishing the statutory penalty under § 2255(a) demonstrate that Congress did\nnot mean t\n... [truncated, 2388 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/33 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=33]", "char_count": 2388}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 35 of 36\n\nThen, in recognition of the fact that damages in these cases may be hard to prove, the second\nsentence provides for recovery of a minimum amount: \"Any minor as described in the preceding\nsentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000.\" Id. Together,\nthese provisions indicate that Congress intended to provide restitution to victims—that is, to\naward them \"actual damages\"—but that where actual damages were less than $50,000 or\notherwise impossible to prove, the statute would guarantee a lump-sum, make-whole penalty of\n$50,000 for all injuries sustained as a result of the predicate acts.\nMoreover, the fact that Congress did not expressly provide for damages on a \"per\nviolation\" basis further underscores the fact that Congress sought to provide only a lump-sum\nrecovery for all injuries sustained by a victim. After all, while Congress knows exactly how to\nprovide for damages on a \"per violation\" basis when it wants to, it did not do so here. See, e.g.,\n18 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing a \"civil action ... against any person who engages in conduct\nconstituting an offense under\" specified sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest\nstatutes, and authorizing \"a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the\namount of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, which\never amount is greater\") (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. § 49; 18 U.S.C. § 1034; 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2318. As the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly has explained, \"where Congress knows how to say\nsomething but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.\" Delgado v. United States Att'y Gen.,\n487 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting CBS, 245 F.3d at 1226 (itself quoting Griffith, 206\nF.3d at 1394 with citation and quotations omitted))) (alteration omitted).\nBecause the statute provides a single cause of action with a single remedy, this Court\nshould \n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02738375/34 or ?id=EFTA02738375&page=34]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02738375", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 9:09-cv-80591-KAM Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/26/2009 Page 36 of 36\n\nCertificate of Service\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with the\nClerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this\nday on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the manner specified by\n, 2009\nMay\nCM/ECF on this 26th day of\nRobert C. Josefsberg, Esq.\nKatherine W. Ezell, Esq.\nPodhurst Orseck, P.A.\n25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800\nMiami, FL 33130\n305 358-2800\nFax: 305 358-2382\ngosefsberg@podhurst.com\nkezell@podhurst.com\nCounselfor Plaintiff\n\nJack Alan Goldberger, Esq.\nAtterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.\n250 Australian Avenue South\nSuite 1400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012\n561-659-8300\nFax: 561-835-8691\njagesq@bellsouth.net\nCounselfor Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nRespectfully submitted:\n\nBy:\nRobert D. Critton, ., Esq.\nFlorida Bar No. 2 162\nrcrit@bciclaw.c\nMichael J. Pike, Esq.\nFlorida Bar No. 617296\nmpike@bciclaw.com\nBurman Critton Luttier & Coleman, P.A.\n515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400\nWest Palm Beach, FL 33401\nTelephone: (561) 842-2820\nFacsimile:\n(561)515-3148\nrcrit@bciclaw.com\nCounselfor Defendant Jeffrey Epstein\n\nEFTA02738410\n\n\f", "char_count": 1243}]}