{"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_count": 15, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737635", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737635.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 1 of 15\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nJANE DOE 1000,\nPlaintiff,\nv.\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-I0577-LJL-DCF\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors of\nthe ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR\nMOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02737635\n\n\f", "char_count": 557}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 2 of 15\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nARGUMENT\n\n1\n\nA.\n\nPlaintiff has the procedural burden backwards: she fails to meet her\nburden to allege facts sufficient to invoke an extraordinary exception to\nthe statute of limitations\nI.\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) because she fails to\npresent a criminal indictment that arises from Decedent's alleged\nconduct towards her\n\n2.\n\nPlaintiff bears the burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances;\nshe fails to meet this burden\n\n3\n\nB.\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c is not applicable retroactively.\n\n6\n\nC.\n\nThis motion is proper and timely regardless of its title.\n\n6\n\nD.\n\nThere is no basis to disregard black letter New York law applying the law\nof the place of alleged tons to the issue of punitive damages.\n\n7\n\nEven if USVI law applies, which it does not, it follows the majority rule\nprohibiting recovery of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate\n\n9\n\nE.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n10\n\nEFTA02737636\n\n\f", "char_count": 1030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 3 of 15\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAbercrombie v. College,\n438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)\n\n3\n\nAmusement Indus. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\nBlissett v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n8\n\nBooth v. Bowen,\nNo. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (DN.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\n\n10\n\nBrandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd.,\n24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1989)\n\n10\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n5\n\nCerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC,\nNo. 07-CV-7998 (HB), 2008 WL. 1710910 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008)\n\n7\n\nv. Christian,\n46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005)\n\n10\n\nv.\nNo. 15-cv-5359 (KMK), 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)\n\n5\n\nDeutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.,\n723 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n8\n\nFairley v.\nNo. 09-CV-6894 (PGG), 2011 WL 1002422 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.)\n(Gardephe, J.)\n\n3\n\nFunk v. Belnellekhim,\nNo. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019)\n\n4\n\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n5\n\nGotlin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006).\n\n.5\n\nEFTA02737637\n\n\f", "char_count": 1179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 4 of 15\n\nGov't of Virgin Islands v.\nNo. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014) .......\n\n9\n\nGuidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp.,\nNo. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 WL 1846864 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003) .\n\n8\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n5\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009)\n\n10\n\nHunter v. Palisades Acquistion XVI, LLC,\nNo. 16-civ-8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)\n\n1\n\nIsaac v. Crichlow,\n63 V.I. 38, 2015 WL 10568556 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n10\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas SA.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n3\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\nNo. 97-CV-3804 (RWS), 1998 WL 437153 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998)\n\n6\n\nIn re Merrill\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig.,\n851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n7\n\nNash v. Coram Healthcare Corp.,\nNo. 96-CV-0298 (LMM), 1996 WL 363166 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996)\n\n7\n\nNat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\n417 F. Supp. 3d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)\n\n8, 9\n\nOkyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC,\n961 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n\n1\n\nOrtiz v. Cornetta,\n867 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1989)\n\n1\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n,\n69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n10\n\nSIB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ.,\nNo. 03-CV-6653 (NRB), 2004 WL 1586500 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n\n6\n\nSt.\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows,\n15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979)\n\n10\n\niii\n\nEFTA02737638\n\n\f", "char_count": 1396}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 5 of 15\n\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt.,\nNo. 14-CV-0463 (JMF), 2015 WL 2152816 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n7\n\nStenberg v. Carhart,\n530 U.S. 914 (2000)\n\nI\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin,\nNo. I5-CV-5796 (DAB), 2016 WL 7378762 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n\n6\n\nv. Rios,\n780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D.V.I. 2011)\n\n0\n\nStatutes\nEPTL §11-3.2(a)(1)\n\n7, 8\n\nOther Authorities\nC.\n\n& A. =,\n\nSC Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.)\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa)\n\n6\nI, 2, 3\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6)\n\n3\n\n2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)\n\n11\n10, II\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2)\n\niv\n\nEFTA02737639\n\n\f", "char_count": 677}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 6 of 15\n\nThe Co-Executors' submit this reply memorandum of law in support of their motion to\ndismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1).\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff effectively asks the Court to depart from well-established\nlaw to resuscitate her claims that expired fifteen years ago. First Plaintiff asks the Court to\ndisregard basic principles of statutory interpretation and numerous cases applying CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) by holding that, unless a criminal indictment expressly rules out that it arises from the\nsame event as a civil action, a plaintiff in the civil action may invoke that rule to revive a timebarred claim. Second, Plaintiff asks the Court to disregard Second Circuit authority holding that\nit is Plaintiff's burden to allege \"extraordinary circumstances\" to toll the statutes of limitations.\nThird, while conceding that courts generally apply the law of the place of a tort to the issue of\npunitive damages, Plaintiff nonetheless urges this Court to create a new rule whereby, if an alleged\ntortfeasor's will is being probated in a jurisdiction that has nothing to do with the tort, the law of\nthe probate jurisdiction should apply. Plaintiffs requests are baseless.\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nPlaintiff has the procedural burden backwards: she fails to meet her burden to allege\nfacts sufficient to invoke an extraordinary exception to the statute of limitations.\n1.\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) because she fails to present a\ncriminal indictment that arises from Decedent's alleged conduct towards her.\n\nPlaintiff's central premise in arguing for application of CPLR § 215(8Xa) to this action,\nnotwithstanding the Indictment charges sex-trafficking of minors while Plaintiff alleges she was\nabused by Decedent as an adult, is that the \"pattern described in the Indictment matches\n[Plaintiff's] experience.\" (Op. Br. p. 4.) Even assuming that is correct, it does not render CPLR\n\nCapital\n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/5 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=5]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 7 of 15\n\n§ 215(8)(a) applicable. Rather, to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a), Plaintiff is required to establish the\nIndictment and this action arise from the same \"event or occurrence\"—i.e., what Decedent\nallegedly did to her. Plaintiff fails to do this.\nThe Indictment has nothing to do with Plaintiff, even if it concerns her alleged abuser and\ndescribes a \"pattern\" similar to what she described. There is no legal authority that permits a civil\nPlaintiff to interpret CPLR § 215(8)(a) in such an open-ended manner. Plaintiff's assertion that\nthe Indictment \"was not restricted to minors\" (Op. Br. p. 6) defies a plain reading of it. Plaintiff's\nreliance on an FBI press release (id. at 6-7) is unconvincing in light of the language in the\nIndictment itself it alleges that Decedent sexually trafficked \"minor girls\" (Compl., Ex. A at ¶ I),\nstating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking of \"minors\" (id., Ex. A at ¶¶ 2-4, 6, 8, 11-15, 1820, 22).\nThe cases cited in the Co-Executors' moving brief confirm that, even where it is undisputed\nthat the subject criminal indictment concerns the civil plaintiff and the same kind of conduct\nalleged in the plaintiff's civil complaint, CPLR § 215(8Xa) still does not apply where the\nindictment and civil action arise from different events or occurrences—i.e., the express limitation\nset forth in the text of CPLR § 215(8Xa). (See Op. Br. pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish\nthese cases on the ground that they \"focused on events that occurred on specific dates\" (id., p. 9)\nis based on Plaintiff's dubious assertion that, because the Indictment at issue here \"was not limited\nto a specific day or discrete event\" (id., p. 10), anyone alleging she suffered the same type of\nmisconduct described in the Indictment is free to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). Such a reading renders\nthe limitation in CPLR § 215(8Xa) meaningless and does not comport with the rationale set forth\nin the cited decisio\n... [truncated, 2023 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/6 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=6]", "char_count": 2023}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 8 of 15\n\nPlaintiff once again relies on Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019),\nnotwithstanding that the Co-Executors already demonstrated that Kashef, which concerned a\nconspiracy between BNP and Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions, is factually distinguishable from\nthis action. (Mov. Br. p. 8.) Plaintiff's decision to cite Kashefagain shows that she has not located\nany relevant authority to rebut the cases cited by the Co-Executors.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff bears the burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances; she fails to\nmeet this burden.\n\nPlaintiff misstates the burden with respect to equitable estoppel by asserting \"Defendants\nhave failed to meet their burden of showing that [she] will be unable to invoke equitable estoppel\nand ... tolling.\" (Op. Br. p. I.) As explained in the Co-Executors' moving brief, the burden is on\nPlaintiffto sufficiently allege \"extraordinary circumstances\" to invoke these doctrines. (Mov. Br.\npp. 8-11.)\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff does not even attempt to address many of the cases that\nthe Co-Executors cite on this point, including Abercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243\n(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (\"without adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore cannot\ndefeat a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds\"), and this Court's decision in\nFairley v. M,\n\nNo. 09-CV-6894 (PGG), 2011 WL 1002422, at *4-6 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.)\n\n(Gardephe, J.) (finding equitable tolling did not apply and granting defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P.\n12(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaint on statute of limitations grounds).\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden. In her opposition brief, Plaintiff attempts to paint a more\ndetailed picture of why she waited 15 years to bring this action than she did in her Complaint.\nHowever, the Complaint is controlling.\n\nIn her Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege: any\n\nparticularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from exercisi\n... [truncated, 2053 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/7 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=7]", "char_count": 2053}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 9 of 15\n\na misrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it; or that she reasonably\nrelied on any misrepresentation by Decedent to her detriment.\nRather, excluding vague allegations concerning Decedent's alleged misconduct directed at\nsome unidentified set of alleged victims that does not include Plaintiff (see, e.g., Compl. ¶ 26\n(\"[Decedent]\n\nmanipulate[d] his victims\"), Plaintiff merely asserts the following allegations\n\nconcerning events allegedly occurring in 1999: \"Upon meeting [Plaintiff], [Decedent] offered her\na position modeling with Victoria's Secret . . . [Decedent] reiterated his connection to Victoria's\nSecret each time he saw and spoke with [Plaintiff]\" (id. ¶ 39); Plaintiff was \"terrified of [Decedent],\nwho repeatedly threatened her and made representations about his wealth, power, and connections\"\n(id.140); \"On one occasion, [Decedent] forced [Plaintiff] to meet with a lawyer ... and [Decedent]\nlater used the information that the lawyer had obtained through his meeting with [Plaintiff] to\nintimidate her and to keep her compliant in his sex-trafficking scheme\" (id. ¶ 43); \"[Decedent]\nmade very clear to [Plaintiff] that he was incredibly wealthy, powerful, and regularly in contact\nwith world leaders ... he had photographs displayed of significant political figures to ensure that\nany young female entering the home would know that he had extensive government connections\n... [Decedent] was not to be disobeyed and he made clear by his words and actions that there would\nbe consequences if [Plaintiff] did not comply with his demands\" (id. ¶ 44); and \"[Decedent]\nconstantly promised [Plaintiff] modeling opportunities ... up until the last time [Plaintiff] saw\n[Decedent]\" (id. ¶ 45).\nThese nebulous allegations do not constitute \"exceptional\" circumstances that justify\npermitting Plaintiff to pursue this action that expired 15 years ago. Not a single case Plaintiff cites\nsupport\n... [truncated, 2200 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/8 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=8]", "char_count": 2200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 10 of 15\n\nconfirms that her allegations fall short. In that matter, the court found the plaintiffs \"alleged\nextraordinary circumstances that could warrant the application of equitable tolling: they were\ndrugged, kidnapped, flown to Belarus, held captive, and tortured for 383 and 483 days,\nrespectively.\" Id. at •2. There are no such allegations here.\nOther cases Plaintiff cites likewise support the conclusion she has not met her burden. See\nGatlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817, at •30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)\n(plaintiffs in medical malpractice action alleged defendants failed to provide them with, and\nintentionally and fraudulently attempted to discourage and prevent them from obtaining, their\nmedical records); Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y. 1966) (plaintiff was\nallowed to invoke equitable estoppel against a bookkeeper who had used his position to carefully\nconceal his theft of the plaintiff's money);\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 59 (2d\n\nCir. 2002) (employee argued his medical condition prevented him from timely filing his\ncomplaint); Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d 325, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (plaintiff filed her\nlawsuit less than a year after leaving a home where she was allegedly forced to work without pay\nas a servant). Other cases Plaintiff cites do not even address the issues on this motion?\nPlaintiff's reliance on\n\nv.\n\n, No. 15-CV-5359 (ICMK), 2016 WL 5720811, at\n\n*11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)—to support her assertion that reasonable fear of retaliation \"may\nbe sufficient\" to warrant equitable tolling (Op. Br. p. 17)—is misleading. In that action, the court\ngranted a pro se prisoner leave to allege facts sufficient to show he pursued his claims with\nreasonable diligence. Id. at *39. However, the court was very clear that its findings were based\non plaintiff's incarceration andpro se status. See id. at •35, 39 (\"in theprison context, reasona\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/9 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=9]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 11 of 15\n\nfear of retaliation may be sufficient\"; \"given Plaintiffs pro se status ... the Court is hesitant to\ndismiss [his] claims\"). Plaintiff is neither a prisoner nor pro se, so\nB.\n\nis inapplicable.\n\nCPLR § 213-c does not apply retroactively and is not a revival statute.\nPlaintiff's invocation of CPLR § 213-c is erroneous. The 20-year statute of limitations in\n\nCPLR § 213-c became effective as of September 18, 2019; the statute of limitations was 5 years\nas of 2006 and 1 year before then. (L. 2006, ch. 3, § 5(b).) The 20-year statute of limitations does\nnot apply retroactively except \"where the applicable statute of limitations in effect on the date of\nsuch act or omission has not yet expired.\" L. 2019, ch. 315, § 4. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c neither\napplies retroactively nor revives Plaintiff's claims, all of which expired nearly two decades ago.\nC.\n\nThis motion is proper and timely regardless of its title.\nPlaintiff's argument that the Co-Executors may only move to strike her punitive damages\n\nclaim (Op. Br. pp. I, 19) is both wrong and irrelevant. \"[T]he technical name given to a motion\nchallenging a pleading is of little importance ... as prejudice to the nonmoving party hardly can\nresult.\" See C.\n\n& A.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.).\n\nCourts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss punitive damages. See, e.g., The\nCookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15-CV-5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at *17\n(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without\nleave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and\ndid not rise to the required level of malice); SIB v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofEduc., No. 03-CV-6653 (NRB),\n2004 WL 1586500, at •8 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss\npunitive damages claims which were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., No. 97CV-3\n... [truncated, 2268 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/10 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=10]", "char_count": 2268}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 12 of 15\n\nCourts in the Second Circuit, including in this District, also routinely grant motions to\nstrike punitive damages including at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., In re Merrill\n\nAuction\n\nRate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendant's motion to strike\nsections of first amended complaint asserting punitive damages); Nash v. Coram Healthcare\nCorp., No. 96-CV-0298 (LMM), 1996 WL 363166, at •5 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) (\"The motion\nto strike the punitive damages prayer from the Complaint is Granted.\"); Cerveceria Modelo, S.A.\nde C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07-CV-7998 (HB), 2008 WL 1710910, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.\nApr. 10, 2008) (\"Because Defendant has failed to allege that Plaintiff's conduct was egregious and\ndirected at the public generally, its claim for punitive damages cannot proceed.\"). Therefore,\nwhether the Co-Executors' motion is deemed one to dismiss or strike, the Court should dispose of\nPlaintiff's punitive damages claim.3\nD.\n\nThere is no basis to disregard black-letter New York law applying the law of the\nplace of alleged torts to the issue of punitive damages.\nPlaintiff's argument that \"New York choice-of-law-rules\" dictate the application of USVI\n\nlaw to the issue of punitive damages (Op. Br. p. 20) is wrong for two independent reasons. First\nPlaintiff alleges the acts and omissions giving rise to her causes of action occurred in New York\nand Florida. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-42, 46.) Therefore, New York and Florida law applies to the issue of\npunitive damages. See Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-CV-0463 (JMF),\n2015 WL 2152816, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (\"Because punitive damages are conduct-\n\n'Plaintiff cites Amusement Indus. v. Stern, 693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). However, that court acknowledged\na plaintiff's demand for punitive damages may be stricken where, as here, it is prohibited by law. Id. at 318 n.5 (citation\nomitted). Further, \n... [truncated, 2617 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/11 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=11]", "char_count": 2617}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 13 of 15\n\nregulating, `the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.\"' (quoting\nDeutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Guidi v. InterContinental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 WL 1846864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,\n2003)).\nSecond, Plaintiff may not have the Court apply the first sentence of § 11-3.2(a)(1),\npermitting her to bring this case, but disregard the very next sentence precluding punitive damages.\nAt least one New York federal court expressly rejected such an \"anomalous situation.\" See Blissett\nv. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (\"[I]t would be an anomalous situation\nindeed if plaintiff were allowed to proceed with this ... action ... because of (§) 11-3.2(aX1), while\nat the same time he was allowed to recover ... punitive damages.\").\nPlaintiff's premise used to gin up a purported connection to the USVI in this action—that\nDecedent \"chose to probate his Estate\" there and had allegedly abused other victims (but not\nPlaintiff) there (Op. Br. p. 21)—is specious. Plaintiff sues for damages based on torts that occurred\nin New York and Florida. Further, she chose to sue in New York. Therefore, the Court should\nreject Plaintiff's assertion that \"[w]hereas the [USVI] has a strong interest in applying its law on\npunitive damages, New York and Florida have no conceivable interest in denying the [USVI] from\nadvancing that interest.\" (Id. p. 21). The USVI has no interest in applying its punitive damages\nlaws in a case brought by a non-USVI resident who alleges torts that took place in New York and\nFlorida.\nThe sole connection to the USVI is that the Decedent's Estate is being probated there, 20\nyears after the alleged tortious conduct took place—a connection much weaker than the one\ndeemed \"tenuous\" in Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d 416 (S.D.N.Y.\n2019), on which Plaintiff relies. Even unde\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/12 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=12]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 14 of 15\n\nhas the greater interest in applying its laws and policies concerning Plaintiff's improper claim for\npunitive damages.\nPlaintiff also misinterprets Adelson. In Adelson, the National Jewish Democratic Council\nand its chair sued Sheldon G. Adelson for damages based on Adelson's prior filing of a defamation\nsuit against them in the same court pursuant to Nevada law. Id. at 421. The court had dismissed\nAdelson's prior action under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, which has its own punitive damages\nprovision. Id. at 421, 426. In the action against Adelson, the court held that Nevada had a much\nstronger interest in applying its punitive damages law because Adelson had tried to use Nevada's\ndefamation law to chill First Amendment rights. Id. at 426. By contrast, \"New York's interest\n[was] relatively attenuated\" in the second action because \"[i]ts sole connection to this suit [was]\nthat the suit was filed here.\" Id. Here, the situation is effectively the opposite, given the strong\nNew York connection.\nE.\n\nEven if USVI law applies, which it does not, it follows the majority rule prohibiting\nrecovery of punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate.\nPlaintiff does not dispute that New York law bars her punitive damages claim. Should the\n\nCourt find New York law applies (it does), then Plaintiff's punitive damages claim should be\ndismissed. Even if the Court finds USVI law applies to Plaintiff's punitive damages claim (it does\nnot), the result is the same. USVI courts apply a \"Banks analysis\" to determine U.S.V.I. common\nlaw, including consideration of: (1) whether USVI courts previously adopted a particular rule; (2)\nthe position taken by a majority of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which approach\nis the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. =,\n\nNo. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095,\n\n2014 WL 702639, at *1 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014). The Banks factors show that USVI courts would\nadopt the majo\n... [truncated, 2194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737635/13 or ?id=EFTA02737635&page=13]", "char_count": 2194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737635", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 40\n\ndamages against estates, see, e.g.,\n\nFiled 04/13/20\n\nPage 15 of 15\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I.\n\n2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067, at *5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\n(considering the inverse issue); (2) a majority of U.S. jurisdictions preclude awards of punitive\ndamages based on wrongful acts of decedents, see 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4\n(7th ed. 2015) (\"[A] majority ofjurisdictions will not award punitive damages against a deceased\ntortfeasor's estate.\" (citation omitted)); and (3) post-Banks, USVI have found the Restatement\n§ 908 is \"the soundest rule,\" Pappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8\n(U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing\n\nv. Christian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005). See\n\nalso Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 2015 WL 10568556 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015); St.\n\nHouse,\n\nInc. v. Barrow; 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Ten. Ct. 1979); Brandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I.\n249 (V.I. Ten. Ct. 1989);\n\nv. Rijos, 780 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011).4\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor the reasons set forth above and in the Co-Executors' moving brief, the Co-Executors\nrespectfully request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, together with such other and\nfurther relief the Court deems just and proper.\nDated: New York, New York\nApril 13, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n212.704.6000\nBy:/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\n4 Plaintiff argues that the USVI A.G.'s request for punitive damages in a USVI Criminally Influenced and Corrupt\nOrganizations Act lawsuit against Decedent's Estate shows the third Banks factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor.\nHowever, that the USVI A.G. asks for something in a lawsuit is not legal authority. See Sienberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.\n914, 940 (2000).\n10\n\nEFTA02737649\n\n\f", "char_count": 1910}]}