{"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_count": 32, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737603", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737603.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 1 of 32\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nJANE DOE 1000,\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO: 19-cv-10577-LJL\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN,\nin their capacities as the executors of the\nESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,\n\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO\nDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nEFTA02737603\n\n\f", "char_count": 432}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 2 of 32\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2\n\nARGUMENT\n\n4\n\nI. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely\n\n5\n\nA. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa)\nI. The Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\n5\n6\n\n2. Plaintiff's Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the Indictment\nConcerned.\n7\n3. Defendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) Fail\n\n9\n\nB. Plaintiff's Claims are Timely Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\n11\n\nC. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Estoppel.\n\n14\n\nD. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Tolling.\n\n17\n\nH. The Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages\n\n18\n\nA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages is Procedurally Improper.\n\n19\n\nB. Plaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case\n\n19\n\nI. The Law of the Virgin Islands for Punitive Damages Governs Under New York's\nChoice-of-Law Principles.\n20\n2. Virgin Islands Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against Defendants in this\nCase\n22\na. Banks Factor One: Whether Any Virgin Islands Courts Have Adopted a Rule\n\n22\n\nb. Banks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts from Other\nJurisdictions\n\n23\n\nc. Banks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the Virgin Islands\n\n24\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n25\n\nii\n\nEFTA02737604\n\n\f", "char_count": 1515}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 3 of 32\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAmusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n19\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBabcock v. M,\n191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)\n\n20\n\nBanks v. Int 7 Rental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011)\n\n22, 25\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n18\n\nBurrows v. Bd. ofAssessorsfor Town ofChatham,\n98 A.D.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1983), Ord, 473 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 1984)\nChilders v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp.,\n36 F. Supp. 3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)\n\n14\n5, 16, 18\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1999)\n\n9, 10\n\nCT Bank N.A. v. Schiffinan,\n948 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2020), certified question accepted, No. 36, 2020 WL 729773\n(N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n\n25\n\nClemens v. Nealon,\n202 A.D.2d 747 (3d Dep't 1994)\n\n5\n\nCoffinan v. Coffinan,\n60 A.D.2d 181 (2d Dep't 1977)\n\n14\n\nCrabtree ex. Rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n24\n\n■ v.\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)\n\n17\n\nEllis v. Zuck,\n546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977)\n\n23\n\nEstate ofFarrell ex rel. Bennett v.\n770 A.2d 517 (Del. 2001)\n\n23\niii\n\nEFTA02737605\n\n\f", "char_count": 1191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 4 of 32\n\nFlight Sci., Inc. v. Cathay Pac. Airways\n647 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\nI7\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-cv-0376, 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 1 1 . 2019)\n\n15\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018)\n\n9. 10\n\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n15\n\nGotlin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)\n\n16\n\nGov't of the V.I. v. =,\n60 V.I. 597 (V.I. 2016)\n\n22, 24\n\nGuardian Ins. Co. v. Gumbs,\nNo. ST-15-CV-195, 2016 WL 9525609 (V.I. Super. Aug. 22, 2016)\n\n25\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n18\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (Super. Ct. 2009)\n\n23\n\nHaralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc.,\n31 P.3d 114 (Ariz. 2001)\n\n23\n\nHarris v. City ofNew York,\n186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)\n\n5\n\nHofer v. Lavender,\n679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)\n\n23\n\nHunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI,\nNo. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017)\n\n19\n\nIn re Gleason (Michael Vee, Ltd.),\n749 N.E.2d 724 (2001)\n\n13\n\nIn re S. African Apartheid Litig.,\n617 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\n18\n\nKaopuiki v. Kealoha,\n87 P.3d 910 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003)\n\n23\n\niv\n\nEFTA02737606\n\n\f", "char_count": 1254}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\nPage 5 of 32\n\n4, 7, 10, 11\n\nKlaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,\n313 U.S. 487 (1941)\n\n20\n\nKosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C.,\n274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001)\n\n16\n\nMcElligott v. City ofNew York,\n15-cv-7107, 2017 WL 6210840 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017)\n\n10\n\nMcGuirk v. City Sch. Dist ofAlbany,\n116 A.D.2d 363 (3d Dep't 1986)\n\n12\n\nMeegan S. v. Donald T.,\n475 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1984)\n\n12, 14\n\nNat'lJewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\nNo. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 WL 4805719 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019)\n\n20, 21\n\nOkyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC,\n961 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n\n19\n\nOrtiz v. Cornelia,\n867 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1989)\n\n5\n\nPadula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp.,\n644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994)\n\n20\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, Inc.,\n69 V.I. 3 (VI. Super. 2015)\n\n22\n\nv. Mellon,\n299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982)\n\n23\n\nv. Boy Scouts ofAm., Inc.,\n65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985)\n\n21\n\nTillett v. Lippert,\n909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996)\n\n23\n\nStatutes\n22 U.S.C. § 7102\n\n9\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130.35\n\n12\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130.50\n\n12\n\nEFTA02737607\n\n\f", "char_count": 1153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 6 of 32\n\nRules\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12\n\n19\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201\n\n13\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\npassim\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215\n\npassim\n\nOther Authorities\nBrief of Defendants-Appellees, Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\nNo. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), Dkt. 92\n\n10\n\nComplaint, GVI v. Estate ofJeffrey E. Epstein,\nNo. ST-20-CV-014 (V.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020)\n\n21\n\nN.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. No. 6574, 242nd Legis. Sess. (June 17, 2019)\n\n13\n\nv. Indyke, et at,\nTranscript of Pre-motion Conference,\nNo. 19-cv-10475 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), Dkt. 39\n\n17\n\nvi\n\nEFTA02737608\n\n\f", "char_count": 627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 7 of 32\n\nPlaintiff Jane Doe 1000, by and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits\nthis Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's\nComplaint.'\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nFor decades, Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited countless young women to\nhis homes in New York, Florida, and elsewhere, and forced them to give him massages that\nescalated into sexual assault. Plaintiff Jane Doe 1000 was just one of many victims that Epstein\nand his co-conspirators recruited to be a part of their sex-trafficking operation when she was a\nyoung woman. Epstein continuously offered to help Jane Doe with her career, but instead sexually\nabused her for years.\nDefendants contend that Jane Doe's claims are untimely, but wholly ignore the burden that\nthey bear and which they have failed to meet. First, Jane Doe's claims are timely under N.Y.\nC.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides that when a criminal action is commenced with respect to\nthe same event or occurrence that gives rise to a plaintiff's civil claims, the plaintiff has at least\none year from the termination of the criminal action to file a civil action. Second, Jane Doe's\nclaims are timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c, which provides victims of rape or other delineated\ncriminal sexual acts with 20 years to bring a civil action against the perpetrator. Third, Defendants\nhave failed to meet their burden of showing that Jane Doe will be unable to invoke equitable\nestoppel and equitable tolling. Finally, Defendants' motion to \"dismiss\" Jane Doe's demand for\npunitive damages is not only procedurally improper, but incorrect—punitive damages are available\nunder U.S. Virgin Islands law. The Court should deny Defendants' motion to dismiss in full.\n\nPlaintiff respectfully requests oral argument pursuant to Individual Rule 2.K.\n\nEFTA02737609\n\n\f", "char_count": 1918}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 8 of 32\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nPlaintiff Jane Doe 1000's story echoes the stories of many other victims of Jeffrey Epstein.\nJane Doe grew up in extreme poverty and her mother had been homeless at various times\nthroughout her childhood. Comp/.1 37. Jane Doe did modeling work as a young woman, and\nafter seeing her picture, a man contacted her to ask if she would like to meet someone with\nconnections to various modeling opportunities—Jeffrey Epstein. Id.138. Because Jane Doe was\nstruggling financially and aspired to be a successful model, Jane Doe agreed to meet Epstein at his\nNew York mansion. Id. When they met, Epstein bragged about his friendship with Leslie Wexner,\nthe chief executive of Victoria's Secret, and offered Jane Doe a modeling job with the lingerie\nretailer. Id. ¶ 39. After identifying Jane Doe's vulnerabilities, Epstein moved her into his\napartment building on 66th Street, where he provided housing to other victims. Id.140.\nEpstein soon began sexually abusing Jane Doe. Ghislaine Maxwell, Epstein's head\nrecruiter, and other recruiters would call Jane Doe several times a week and direct her to give\nEpstein massages at his New York mansion. Id. ¶ 40. Consistent with Epstein's pattern of abuse\nof countless other victims, Epstein forced Jane Doe to engage in sex acts during the massages,\nincluding by making her use sex toys. Id. 1140-41. Epstein also flew Jane Doe to his mansion in\nPalm Beach, Florida, for additional sexual massages. Id.142.\nJane Doe's final encounter with Epstein was particularly harrowing. On that day, Epstein\ncalled Jane Doe to his New York mansion, and when she arrived, Maxwell led her upstairs to\nEpstein's\n\nbedroom. Id. 1 46. Sex toys had been laid out on the bed prior to Jane Doe's\n\narrival. Id. Epstein and Maxwell then simultaneously sexually assaulted Jane Doe by force, and\nMaxwell penetrated Jane Doe with a sex toy. Id. The encounter left Jane Doe distraught and\nterrified. S\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/7 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=7]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 9 of 32\n\nEpstein and his co-conspirators used displays of wealth and power to manipulate, scare,\nand control their victims. Id. 113, 27, 44. For example, after recruiting victims, Epstein and his\nco-conspirators made sure that victims saw photographs of Epstein with powerful political and\nsocial figures and noticed the opulence of his homes. ld.127. These tactics were meant to ensure\nthat victims knew that there would be consequences if they did not comply with Epstein's demands\nor if they reported their abuse to the authorities or the media. Id.\nUnsurprisingly, Epstein and his co-conspirators used these tactics on Jane Doe. Knowing\nthat Jane Doe had struggled financially, Epstein provided her with housing to ensure that she\nremained loyal to and dependent on him. Id.140. He also constantly touted his relationship with\n\nmodeling opportunities every time he abused her. Id.\n\nII\n\nWexner and Victoria's Secret because he knew about her aspirations, and he promised her\n39, 45. Epstein made it so that without\n\nhim, Jane Doe was homeless, jobless, and without any career prospects. On one occasion, Epstein\nforced Jane Doe to meet with a prominent lawyer and law professor, who gathered personal\ninformation about her that Epstein later used against her to intimidate her and to keep her quiet.\nId. 143.\nAfter decades of escaping appropriate punishment for his extraordinarily far-reaching and\ndisturbing crimes, Epstein was indicted in July 2019 on one count of sex-trafficking conspiracy\nand one count of sex trafficking. Compl., Ex. A (the \"Indictment\"). The Indictment focused on\nEpstein's recruitment of victims to his New York and Palm Beach homes to provide him with\nmassages that became sexual in nature. Indictment 1 7. The Indictment specifically described\nhow Epstein recruited victims who \"were, for various reasons, often particularly vulnerable to\nexploitation\" to come to his New York and Florida mansions to give h\n... [truncated, 2142 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/8 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=8]", "char_count": 2142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 10 of 32\n\nvictims to include, among other things, sex acts such as groping and direct and indirect contact\nwith the victim's genitals\" with his hands or sex toys. Id. 11 9, 15. Afterwards, Epstein and his\nassociates would continue to contact victims to schedule appointments for additional sexual\nencounters so that he could continue to abuse them. Id. 1 11, 17. This pattern described in the\nIndictment matches Jane Doe's experience and the experiences of countless other victims.\nOn August 8, 2019, shortly after Epstein's Indictment, Epstein executed his last will and\ntestament, naming Defendants the executors of his Estate. Comp!. 1 30. Two days later, Epstein\nwas found dead in his jail cell. ld.1 31. His last will and testament was filed in the U.S. Virgin\nIslands on August 15, 2019. M. 132. The U.S. Attorney's Office submitted a proposed nolle\nprosequi order and Judge Richard M. Berman dismissed the indictment on August 29, 2019.\nId.1 36. Plaintiff filed her Complaint shortly thereafter, on November 14, 2019.\nARGUMENT\nDefendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages should be denied. \"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. .. . A claim\nhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" Ashcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must \"accept[] all factual\nallegations in the complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.\"\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019).\nDrawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Defendants have failed to meet their\nburden of proving that Plaintiff's claims for battery and intentiona\n... [truncated, 2223 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/9 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=9]", "char_count": 2223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nI.\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 11 of 32\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims\nAre Untimely\n\nBecause the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of\nproving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Childers v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 36\nF. Supp. 3d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A motion to dismiss based on timeliness \"should not be\ngranted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his\nclaim which would entitle him to relief.\" Ortiz v. Cornelia, 867 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1989)\n(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, \"dismissal is appropriate only if a\ncomplaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.\" Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250\n(2d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff's factual allegations demonstrate that (A) her claims are\ntimely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), (B) her claims are timely under C.P.L.R. § 213-c,\n(C) Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, and (D) the\nlimitations period for bringing her claims was equitably tolled.\nA.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).\n\nPlaintiff's claims fall squarely within N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which allowed Plaintiff\nto file her complaint within a year of the Indictment's dismissal. That provision provides that:\nWhenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been\ncommenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim . . . arises,\nthe plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal\naction ... in which to commence the civil action ....\nId. Section 215(8)(a)'s one-year limitations period has three requirements: \"(1) a criminal action\nhas been commenced, (2) against the same defendants, and (3) concerning the same event or\ntransaction from which the civil action arose.\" Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/10 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=10]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 12 of 32\n\nDefendants' only argument to the contrary is that the Indictment did not concern the same\nevent or transaction from which Plaintiff's civil action arose because the Indictment targeted,\naccording to Defendants, some separate sex trafficking operation that only involved underage girls.\nDefs.' Mem. at 5 (\"Plaintiff does not allege she was a minor when Decedent sexually assaulted\nher in or around 1999.\n\nTherefore, this action and the Indictment arise from different\n\noccurrences.\"). But Defendants mischaracterize § 215(8)(a), the applicable case law, Plaintiff's\nComplaint, and, most egregiously, the vast sex-trafficking operation that the Indictment targeted.\n1.\n\nThe Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Indictment covered the crimes Defendants committed against\nPlaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that she did not allege that she was a child when they occurred.\nDefendants seek to minimize the scope of the abuse alleged in the Indictment by focusing on its\nreference to \"minors.\" Defs.' Mem. at 5. But clinging to the use of the word \"minors\" does not\nchange the nature of the vast and sophisticated operation alleged in the Indictment. Epstein's\npattern and practice was to recruit and traffic young females with vulnerabilities that he knew he\ncould exploit, and the Indictment spells out that pattern in detail. Age is not the deciding factor as\nto whether a female was a victim of the sex-trafficking operation or experienced the precise\npatterns of recruitment and abuse described in the Indictment. And the fact that many of the\nvictims were minors does not mean that non-minors were not victimized by Epstein's sophisticated\nsex-trafficking operation. Indeed, the Indictment states that \"many\" but not \"all\" of Epstein's\nvictims were minors, demonstrating that prosecutors were investigating Epstein's crimes against\nyoung women over the age of 18 as well. Indictment I II (\"[Epstei\n... [truncated, 2335 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/11 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=11]", "char_count": 2335}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 13 of 32\n\nwant to hear from you, regardless of the age you are now, or whatever age you were then, no matter\nwhere the incident took place.\" https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/jeffrey-epstein-chargedmanhattan-federal-court-sex-trafficking-minors (last visited March 30, 2020) (emphasis added).\nThe mere fact that Plaintiff did not allege that she was a minor at the time that she was\nrecruited into Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme does not negate the fact that Plaintiff's civil claims\narise from the acts described in the Indictment. Plaintiff therefore had one year from August 29,\n2019, the date on which Judge Berman formally dismissed the Indictment, to file the Complaint.\nHaving filed suit on November 14, 2019, her claims fall well within that limitations period.2\n2.\n\nPlaintiffs Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the\nIndictment Concerned.\n\nEven if the Indictment for some reason was limited to Epstein's trafficking of minors (to\nthe exclusion of other victims), Plaintiff's claims would nonetheless arise from the same \"event or\noccurrence\" for the purposes of § 215(8)(a). See, e.g., Kashef, 925 F.3d at 62 (noting that \"a New\nYork appellate court explicitly rejected the theory that the tolling provisions of CPLR 215(8) are\nexclusively for the benefit of the victims of the crime charged in the criminal proceeding\" (internal\nquotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, the Court should not construe the\nIndictment \"narrowly,\" Defs.' Mem. at 6, where the Indictment itself describes a pattern of abuse\nagainst numerous victims spanning a number of years. Epstein repeated the same patterns of\nrecruitment and abuse time and time again on countless young females, including Plaintiff. See,\ne.g., Indictment ¶ 7 (explaining that Epstein \"perpetuated [the] abuse in similar ways\" against\n\n2\n\nTo the extent Defendants suggest that Epstein's crimes against Jane Doe are not part of the\ns\n... [truncated, 2391 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/12 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=12]", "char_count": 2391}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 14 of 32\n\nvictims). The Indictment was therefore not limited to neatly categorized events that happened on\nspecified dates—it covered a sprawling sex-trafficking operation that occurred \"over the course of\nmany years\" and affected an unspecified number of victims. Id.\n\nI.\n\nDefendants' contention that the Indictment \"does not refer to misconduct of the type that\nPlaintiff alleges here\" is incorrect. Defs.' Mem. at 7. The sex-trafficking operation that the\nIndictment described is precisely the same sex-trafficking operation that Plaintiff was lured\ninto—the Complaint's allegations as to the perpetrator, the locations, and the repeated sexual\nassaults all match the pattern described in the Indictment. Just as the Indictment alleged that\nEpstein enticed and recruited \"particularly vulnerable\" females to engage in sex acts with him in\nNew York and Palm Beach, Indictment 9111 3. 6, Epstein enticed and recruited Plaintiff, a\nparticularly vulnerable young woman, to engage in sex acts with him in New York and Palm\nBeach. Compl. 9191 37, 40-42. Just as the Indictment alleges that the abuse would start out with\nthe victim performing a massage on Epstein, Indictment11 9, 15, recruiters initially called Plaintiff\nto Epstein's home to give him a massage. Compl. 1 40. The Indictment alleges that Epstein would\nescalate the nature and scope of physical contact during the massages to include sex acts,\nIndictment 11 9, 15, and Epstein escalated the nature and scope of Plaintiff's massages to include\nsex acts. Comp1.11 40, 41. The Indictment alleges that Epstein used sex toys on victims during\nmassages, Indictment 11 9, 15, and Epstein repeatedly used sex toys on Plaintiff during massages.\nCompl. 1 41. And, finally, just as Epstein's associates would call victims by phone to arrange for\nthem to return for additional sexual encounters, Indictment 1 11, Epstein's associates called\nPlaintiff frequently to schedule more sexual m\n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/13 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=13]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 15 of 32\n\nDefendants have the audacity to make a stunning contention that Plaintiff does not\nsufficiently allege that she was a sex-trafficking victim. Defs.' Mem. at 7. Defendants may be\nunfamiliar with the definition of sex trafficking: \"the recruitment, harboring, transportation,\nprovision, obtaining, patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex\nact.\" 22 U.S.C. § 7102. Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited Plaintiff and housed her in his\napartment building for the sole purpose of sexually abusing her, without ever helping her find a\nmodeling job as he had promised. Comp1.11 40, 45, 46. She is therefore unquestionably a victim\nof sex trafficking. Defendants' desperate attempt at severing Plaintiff's experience from the vast,\nsophisticated sex-trafficking operation alleged in the Indictment fails.\n3.\n\nDefendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) Fail.\n\nDefendants seek to advance a strained interpretation of § 215(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\"\nrequirement, asserting that this Court must \"apply C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) narrowly\" to limit its\navailability to the specific crimes committed against the specific victims identified in the\nIndictment. Defs.' Mem. at 6. But the cases that Defendants cite for that proposition are\ninapposite. In Christodoulou v. Terdeman, the Second Department held that § 215(8)(a) \"applies\nonly to those claims which are based on events of February 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993,\nbecause it was only in connection with events of these two days that criminal prosecution was\ncommenced against defendant.\" 262 A.D.2d 595, 595 (2d Dep't 1999). Similarly, in Galling v.\nThatcher, the court held that the plaintiff could not rely on § 215(8)(a) to file a civil suit for assault\nand battery that occurred over the course of two years because the indictment \"charged [the\ndefendant] for incidents occurring on three (3) specific dates.\" No. 2017-529\n... [truncated, 2267 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/14 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=14]", "char_count": 2267}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 16 of 32\n\n(two dates in Christodoulou and three dates in Gallina), and both Christodoulou and Gallina\nexplicitly recognized that the relevant criminal prosecutions were commenced \"only in connection\nwith the events of these [specific] days.\" See Christodoulou, 262 A.D.2d at 596; Gallina, 2018\nN.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435, at *3-4. By contrast, the Indictment in this case was not limited to a\nspecific day or discrete event. Rather, the Indictment covered sexual abuse that occurred \"over\nthe course of many years.\" Indictment yq 1-2, 8, 20, 24. Further, the Indictment charged Epstein\nwith conspiracy and a broad sex-trafficking scheme, while the criminal actions in Christodoulou\nand Gallina charged the defendants with crimes stemming from isolated incidents.3\nIn contrast, the Second Circuit's opinion in Kashef controls and demonstrates why\nPlaintiff's claims fall within § 215(8)(a) here. In Kashef, BNP Paribas (\"BNPP\") entered a guilty\nplea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan and of the consequences\nof providing Sudan access to U.S. financial markets.\" Kashef, 925 F.3d at 56. The plaintiffs,\nSudanese victims of mass rape, torture, deliberate infection with HIV, and other atrocities, filed a\ncomplaint against BNPP within a year of the judgment of conviction, contending that their claims\nwere timely under C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a). Id. at 57, 62-63. BNPP attempted to argue—similar to\nDefendants' argument here—that § 215(8)(a) did not apply because the plaintiffs \"played no role\nin the proceedings surrounding BNP Paribas's plea agreement,\" the criminal action \"required no\ninvestigation of or briefing on any injuries sustained by Plaintiffs,\" and the facts in the criminal\ncase and the civil case were not \"identical.\" Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 51-52, Kashef\nv. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), Dkt. 92.\n\n3\n\nDefendants also cite McElligott v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 7\n... [truncated, 2226 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/15 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=15]", "char_count": 2226}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 17 of 32\n\nThe Second Circuit rejected BNPP's argument, and instead found that the \"event or\noccurrence\" for § 215(8) purposes was more generally \"BNPP's conspiracy with Sudan to violate\nU.S. sanctions\" for humanitarian violations. 925 F.3d at 62-63. The Court therefore held that the\nvictims of those humanitarian violations could bring timely claims under § 215(8)(a). Id. That\nconspiracy, like the one here, was a broad scheme spanning many years, rather than a single event\n(such as an assault on a specified date). Just as BNPP's conspiracy to violate sanctions was the\nrelevant event or occurrence in Kashef, Epstein's widespread sex-trafficking scheme is the event\nor occurrence at issue in Plaintiff's case for the purposes of applying § 215(8)(a). Defendants\nattempt to distinguish Kashef by pointing out that \"the civil and criminal actions in that case both\narose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions,\" Defs.' Mem.\nat 8, but that fact only highlights Kashef s applicability to this case, which also involves a civil and\ncriminal action arising from the same conspiracy. Defendants have failed to meet their burden of\nproving that Plaintiff's claims do not arise from the same event or occurrence as the Indictment,\nand therefore that § 215(8)(a) does not apply to her claims.'\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims are Timely Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\nPlaintiffs claims are also timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c. That provision provides\nvictims of rape or criminal sexual acts (and other delineated sexual offenses) 20 years to bring a\ncivil action for resulting injuries:\n\nDefendants argue that a narrow reading of § 215(8)(a) \"gives meaning to the statute's\nlanguage 'with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section\narises.' Defs.' Mem. at 8. But Plaintiff is not asking, for example, for the Court to hold that any\nperson with a tangential connection to E\n... [truncated, 2335 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/16 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=16]", "char_count": 2335}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 18 of 32\n\nNotwithstanding any other limitation set forth in this article, .. . all civil claims or\ncauses of action brought by any person for physical, psychological or other injury\nor condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct which would constitute\nrape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, ... or criminal\nsexual act in the first degree as defined in section 130.50 of the penal law, ... may\nbe brought ... within twenty years.\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c.5\n\nPlaintiff alleges that Epstein sexually assaulted her by forcible\n\ncompulsion at some point after late 1999, within 20 years of the filing of this lawsuit, and that the\nassault constituted one or more sex crimes listed in § 213-c. Compl. yq 13, 38, 46, 51. Her claims\nare therefore timely under § 213-c.\nWithout citing any case supporting their argument, Defendants contend that the 20-year\nstatute of limitations of § 213-c does not apply to Plaintiff's claims because it became effective\nthrough an amendment on September 18, 2019, and the amendment does not apply retroactively.\nDefs.' Mem. at 5. But New York courts have not adopted any such rigid rule prohibiting the\nretroactivity of statutory amendments to limitations periods. Instead, \"[c]ourts have employed\ncustomary tools of construction to find the requisite intent to give retroactive effect to new laws\naffecting periods of limitation.\" McGuirk v. City Sch. Dist. ofAlbany, 116 A.D.2d 363, 365 (3d\nDep't 1986). Using those tools, New York courts have held that certain amendments to limitations\nperiods apply retroactively. See, e.g., Meegan S. v. Donald T., 475 N.E.2d 449, 450 (N.Y. 1984)\n(\"[T]he enlargement of the Statute of Limitations for paternity suits is to be applied\nretroactively.\").\n\n5\n\n\"A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse\nwith another person ... [b]y forcible compulsion\" and \"is guilty of criminal sex\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/17 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=17]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 19 of 32\n\nThe text and legislative history of § 213-c demonstrate the New York Legislature's intent\nfor the 20-year limitations period to apply retroactively. First, the text of the provision itself says\nthat it applies \"notwithstanding any other limitation set forth in this article.\" N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n(emphasis added). \"[T]his article\" refers to Article 2 of Chapter 8 of the C.P.L.R., which contains\nNew York's statutes of limitation for civil actions, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201, suggesting that the\nLegislature intended for no other statute of I im itat ions to apply.\nFurther, the bill's legislative history highlights the \"ticking clock\" that the former statute\nof limitations imposed on victims of sexual abuse: \"For crimes of sexual violence in particular,\nthe clock ticks against the trauma and culture of silence that prevents victims from speaking out.\nOver the last year, victims who have suffered in silence for decades have bravely spoken about\ntheir abuse ....\" N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. No. 6574, 242nd Legis. Sess. (June 17, 2019).\nThe Legislature's explicit reference to \"victims who have suffered in silence for decades,\" like\nPlaintiff, and victims that have been prevented \"from speaking out,\" also like Plaintiff, evince an\nintent for the provision to apply retroactively to victims like Plaintiff. Governor\n\nechoed\n\nthe sentiment behind the provision while signing the bill, explaining that \"[f]ive years is an insult\nto these survivors and today we're providing them more time to come to terms with the trauma\nthey experienced and to seek justice.\"\njoined-leaders-times-movement-signs-legislation-extending-rape-statute (last visited March 30,\n2020) (emphasis added). In light of the legislative goals behind the amendment to § 213-c, the\nCourt should hold that it applies retroactively to Plaintiff's claims.\nMoreover, \"remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its\nb\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/18 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=18]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 20 of 32\n\nthe statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses in order to correct the injustice that the shorter\nlimitations period imposed on victims. See Coffman v. Coffinan, 60 A.D.2d 181, 188 (2d Dep't\n1977) (\"Remedial statutes are those designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by generally\ngiving relief to the aggrieved party.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Meegan S., 475\nN.E.2d at 450 (finding that amendment extending statute of limitations in paternity suits was\nremedial legislation).\nmovement-signs-legislation-extending-rape-statute (last visited March 30, 2020) (\"This new law\nrecognizes the injustice that has gone on for far too long . . . .\"). \"[1]nsofar as remedial statutes\nare concerned, the court should consider the mischief sought to be remedied and should favor the\nconstruction which will suppress the evil and advance the remedy.\" Burrows v. Bd. ofAssessors\nfor Town ofChatham, 98 A.D.2d 250, 253 (3d Dep't 1983) (internal quotation marks and citations\nomitted), aff'd, 473 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 1984). The remedial purpose of the amendment to § 213-c,\nto correct the injustice of providing victims of rape and other criminal sexual acts who were\nprevented from speaking out by their abusers (like Plaintiff) with only five years to bring actions,\nwould be undermined if the amendment were only applied prospectively. Plaintiff's claims are\ntherefore timely under § 213-c's 20-year limitations period.\nC.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Estoppel.\n\nEven if the Court were to hold that C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) and § 2I3-c do not apply to\nPlaintiff's claims, it should hold that they are still timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.\nThe Complaint alleges in detail the methods of intimidation and control that Jeffrey Epstein and\nhis co-conspirators used to deter their victims from seeking justice. Epstein went to great lengths\n\n... [truncated, 2219 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/19 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=19]", "char_count": 2219}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 21 of 32\n\nhad every reason to believe that filing this suit during Epstein's lifetime would have had severely\nnegative (even life-threatening) consequences for her. She therefore did not take action until after\nshe knew that Epstein was dead, and timely filed her claim approximately three months later.\nDefendants' contend that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only to situations in\nwhich the defendant makes a misrepresentation of fact. Defs.' Mem. at 10-11. But \"courts have\nlong had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the\nStatute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative wrongdoing—a carefully concealed\ncrime here—which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the\ninstitution of the legal proceeding.\" Gen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y.\n1966). A defendant is therefore equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense\nif the defendant \"wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by\ndeception, concealment, threats or other misconduct.\" Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 14-CV-0376\n(BMC), 2019 WL 3035124, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).\nAssuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and drawing all inferences\nin her favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded misconduct that should equitably estop Defendants\nfrom asserting a statute of limitations defense.\n\nPlaintiff was terrified of Epstein and his\n\nco-conspirators.6 For example, Epstein constantly bragged to Plaintiff about his connections to\npowerful people like Leslie Wexner and made countless representations about his wealth, power,\nand connections. Compl. 1139, 40, 44. Epstein also forced Plaintiff to meet with a powerful\nlawyer so that the lawyer could gather personal information about Plaintiff. Id.1 43. Defendants\n\n6\n\nIn fact, Plaintiff i\n... [truncated, 2251 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/20 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=20]", "char_count": 2251}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 22 of 32\n\ndiscount this allegation because it happened during the time period when Epstein was abusing\nPlaintiff. Defs.' Mem. at 10. But Defendants conveniently leave out Plaintiff's allegation that\n\"Epstein later used the information that the lawyer had obtained through his meeting with Jane\nDoe to intimidate her and to keep her compliant in his sex-trafficking scheme.\" Compl. ¶ 43. That\nallegation therefore directly supports Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel argument. Epstein also ensured\nthat Plaintiff, who struggled financially for her entire life, became dependent on him so that she\nwould remain compliant and keep quiet about the abuse. He provided her with things she\ndesperately needed, like housing and the prospect of future employment opportunities. Comp].\n\n1137, 39, 40, 45. This manipulation contributed to Plaintiff's silence until Epstein's death.\nPlaintiff's allegations are more than sufficient to allow her claims to proceed under an\nequitable estoppel theory at this early stage of the litigation. \"[A] complaint does not need to\nanticipate potential affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively\nplead facts in avoidance of such defenses.\" Childers, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 315 (internal quotation\nmarks and citation omitted). Further, \"[w]hether equitable estoppel applies in a given case is\nultimately a question of fact.\" Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706,\n725 (2d Cir. 2001). Courts applying New York law have therefore reserved the highly factual\nissue of equitable estoppel for summary judgment after discovery or for a jury. See, e.g., Gotlin\nv. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILG), 2006 WL 1154817, at •13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006) (\"A\nvast majority of the cases on equitable estoppel permit plaintiffs to defeat a motion to dismiss on\nthe pleadings, deferring the question until some discovery can be had.\").7 Defendants have failed\n\n7\n\nIn another victim's\n... [truncated, 2288 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/21 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=21]", "char_count": 2288}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 23 of 32\n\nto meet their burden of proving that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts demonstrating her\nentitlement to equitably estopping Defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nD.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Tolling.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. While equitable\nestoppel focuses on a defendant's affirmative misconduct, equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiff\nand applies as a matter of fairness where the plaintiff has been \"prevented in some extraordinary\nway from exercising [her] rights.\" Flight Set, Inc. v. Cathay Pac. Airways Dd., 647 F. Supp. 2d\n285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff's\nfear of retaliation prevented her from filing her claims prior to Epstein's death.\nDefendants' contention that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting equitable tolling\nis incorrect. Defs.' Mem. at 9. A \"reasonable fear of retaliation may be sufficient to constitute\nextraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling, particularly if the person threatening\nretaliation is a defendant.\"\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). The\n\nv. M,\n\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811, at •11\n\ncourt's reasoning also applies in this context. The court\n\nreasoned that fear of retaliation could support equitable tolling in the prison context because\n\"sustained control tends to result in adverse psychological effects that invariably have behavioral\nconsequences\" such as, among other things, \"interpersonal distrust and suspicion of threat or\npersonal risk; . . . diminished sense of self-worth and personal value; and posttraumatic stress\n\nv. Indyke, et at, No. 19-cv-10475 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), Dkt. 39 (\"[T]he\nat 3:4-8,\ndoctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling could, nevertheless, save the claims and make\nthem timely and that is very fact s\n... [truncated, 2120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/22 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=22]", "char_count": 2120}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 24 of 32\n\nreactions to the pains of imprisonment. Retaliation and fear of retaliation are natural consequences\nof this unique psychological environment.\" Id. at *10 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nEpstein's pattern of controlling, manipulating, and intimidating his victims caused similar\npsychological effects in his countless victims, which in turn caused severe fear of retaliation. And\nPlaintiff alleges that Epstein's abuse and psychological manipulation had such effects on her.\nCompl. ¶140, 44, 46-48. The court should therefore extend equitable tolling to reach fear of\nretaliation in the context of Epstein's abuse of and control over his victims, including Plaintiff.\nIn any event, as with equitable estoppel, \"when plaintiffs raise an equitable tolling\nargument, a court must deny a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations unless all\nassertions of the complaint, as read with required liberality, would not permit the plaintiffs to prove\nthat this statute was tolled.\" In re S. African ApartheidLitig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 287 (S.D.N.Y.\n2009). Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss and to proceed to\ndiscovery on the issue of equitable tolling. See, e.g.,\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d\n\n58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2002) (evidentiary hearing appropriate to determine whether limitations period\nwas equitably tolled); Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d 325, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (equitable\ntolling \"is a question appropriately reserved for a jury\" due to \"genuine issues of material fact\");\nChilders, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 315 (holding that plaintiff did not need to plead facts establishing right\nto equitable tolling). Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that Plaintiff can\nprove no set of facts demonstrating entitlement to equitable tolling in this case.\nII.\n\nThe Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive\nDamages.\n\nDefendants' argument that P\n... [truncated, 2273 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/23 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=23]", "char_count": 2273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 25 of 32\n\nown warrants its denial—under New York choice-of-law principles the law of the Virgin Islands\napplies to the issue of punitive damages. Under Virgin Islands law, a court may allow for punitive\ndamages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor, especially when that tortfeasor went to great\nlengths during his life to avoid punishment for causing immeasurable harm to countless victims.\nA.\n\nDefendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages is Procedurally\nImproper.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Court should not decide whether punitive damages are available at\nthis early stage. A motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for determining the availability of\npunitive damages. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state\na claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, \"[a] motion to\ndismiss is addressed to a `claim'—not to a form of damages.\" Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern,\n693 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Defendants' request for the Court to dismiss\nPlaintiff's request for punitive damages does not relate to either of Plaintiff's claims (for battery\nand intentional infliction of emotional distress) and does not relate to the sufficiency of the\nallegations in the Complaint. The issue of what types of damages Plaintiff is entitled to should\ntherefore be dealt with at a later stage. See, e.g., Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, No. 16 Civ.\n8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (\"Because punitive damages are a\nform of damages, not an independent cause of action, a motion to dismiss a prayer for relief in the\nform of punitive damages is procedurally premature.\" (internal quotation marks and citation\nomitted)); Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same).\nB.\n\nPlaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case.\n\nEven if a motion to dismiss punitive damages was an\n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/24 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=24]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 26 of 32\n\nhas the strongest interest in whether punitive damages are available in this case.8 And, under\nVirgin Islands law, Plaintiff can recover punitive damages.\nI.\n\nThe Law of the Virgin Islands for Punitive Damages Governs Under New\nYork's Choice-of-Law Principles.\n\nFederal courts look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in deciding choice-of-law\ndisputes. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Ca, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). \"In the context of\ntort law, New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions\nhas the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation. The greater interest is determined\nby an evaluation of the facts or contacts which relate to the purpose of the particular law in\nconflict.\" Padula v. Marti Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994) (internal quotation\nmarks and alterations omitted). New York courts seek \"[j]ustice, fairness and the best practical\nresult.\" Babcock v. M,\n\n191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).\n\n\"Punitive damages are conduct regulating,\" and luinder the doctrine of depecage, then,\nthe choice-of law analysis for punitive damages is distinct from the analysis for compensatory\ndamages.\" Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 ()PO), 2019 WL\n4805719, at •6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). While the law of the place of the tort generally applies\nto conduct regulating law, \"under New York law—for punitive damages in particular—a court\nmust consider the object or purpose of the wrongdoing to be punished and give controlling weight\nto the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue\npresented.\" Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). \"Punitive damages are designed\n\n8\n\nAs explained below, under the doctrine of depecage New York law still governs as to the\nunderlying claims and as to compensatory damages.\n20\n\nEFTA02737628\n\n\f", "char_count": 1982}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 27 of 32\n\nto punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff, and so the choice-of-law inquiry for\npunitive damages provisions is necessarily 'defendant-focused.\"' Id.\nAlthough Defendants correctly note that the law of the jurisdiction of where the tort\noccurred generally applies, Defs.' Mem. at 12, in this case the Virgin Islands has a stronger interest\nin the resolution of whether punitive damages can be awarded in this case than New York or\nFlorida. This being a \"defendant-focused\" analysis, Adelson, 2019 WL 4805719, at *6, the Virgin\nIslands' interest in applying its law on punitive damages is greater than New York's. Epstein was\ndomiciled in the Virgin Islands, not New York or Florida. Compl. 1 19; see also\n\nv. Boy\n\nScouts of Ant., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 201 (1985) (holding that, although New York was the place\nof the wrong, New Jersey law applied because it \"would further [New Jersey's] interest in\nenforcing the decision of its domiciliaries to accept the burdens as well as the benefits or New\nJersey law). Epstein also had a private island in the Virgins Islands, where he abused countless\nyoung females. Compl. 1 24. Defendants then chose to probate his Estate in and under the laws\nof the Virgin Islands. Id.1 32. Having availed themselves of all the benefits and protections that\nVirgin Islands probate and estate law have to offer, Defendants cannot also seek to escape its\ndrawbacks. Whereas the Virgin Islands has a strong interest in applying its law on punitive\ndamages, New York and Florida have no conceivable interest in denying the Virgin Islands from\nadvancing that interest. As such, New York's choice-of-law rules dictate the application of Virgin\nIslands law to the issue of punitive damageA.9\n\nAs an indication of the Virgin Islands' interest in matters concerning Epstein's Estate, the\nAttorney General of the United States Virgin Islands filed suit against the Estate on January 15,\n2020, seek\n... [truncated, 2170 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/26 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=26]", "char_count": 2170}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\n2.\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 28 of 32\n\nVirgin Islands Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against\nDefendants in this Case.\n\nVirgin Islands law would allow for an award of punitive damages in this case. When\ndetermining how best to apply common law, courts in the Virgin Islands apply what is known as\nthe Banks analysis. See Gov't ofthe V.I. v. =,\n\n60 V.I. 597, 600, 602 (2016); Banks v. Intl\n\nRental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). As part of the Banks analysis, the Virgin Islands\nSupreme Court has \"instructed that, instead of mechanistically following the Restatements, courts\nshould consider three non-dispositive factors to determine Virgin Islands common law:\n(1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position\ntaken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which approach\nrepresents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands.\" M,\n\n60 V.I. at 600 (internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted). Under the Banks analysis, given the extraordinary nature of this case, Plaintiff\ncan pursue punitive damages against Defendants.\na.\n\nBanks Factor One: Whether Any Virgin Islands Courts Have\nAdopted a Rule\n\nVirgin Islands courts have not adopted a rule as to whether a plaintiff can pursue punitive\ndamages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor who went to great lengths to avoid punishment\nfor his crimes, including by taking his own life. Although Defendants cite to the Second\nRestatement of Torts' position that punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives\nof a deceased tortfeasor, Defs.' Mem. at 13-14, that position is included only in commentary and\nis not binding on Virgin Islands courts.\n\nSee\n\n60 V.I. at 600 (instructing not to\n\n\"mechanistically\" follow the Restatements). And although some Virgin Islands trial courts have\ncited to the Restatement, those courts were not faced with the question at issue in this case:\nwhether punitive damages are\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/27 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=27]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nthat did not involve an estate);\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 29 of 32\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (Super. Ct.\n\n2009) (\"[P]unitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions in the Virgin Islands.\").\nDefendants have not cited a single Virgin Islands case adopting the Restatement's commentary's\nposition on that specific issue. Given the lack of any established rule in the Virgins Islands\ngoverning this case, this Banks factor is neutral.\nb.\n\nBanks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts\nfrom Other Jurisdictions\n\nAs to the second Banks factor, numerous courts have held that plaintiffs may recover\npunitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. See, e.g., Haralson v. Fisher\nSurveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (concluding that \"there are situations in which it\nwould be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to express society's disapproval of outrageous\nconduct by rendering such an award against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor\" (internal quotation\nmarks omitted)); Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont. 19%) (rejecting \"the reasoning of\nthose courts which have disallowed punitive damages against the estates ofdeceased tortfeasors\");\nv. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982) (\"Punitive damages in this state serve other\nequally important functions and are supported by public policy interests going beyond simple\npunishment of the wrongdoer.\"). Those courts have reasoned that punitive damages do not only\nserve to punish wrongdoers, but also to \"motivate others not to engage in similar action in the\nfuture.\" Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910, 928 (Flaw. Ct. App. 2003).10 In this case, general\n\n10\nSee also, e.g., Ellis v. Zack, 546 F.2d 643, 644-45 (5th Cir. 1977) (punitive damages\nfrom taking\nallowed against estate because they provide \"deterrents to others similar)\nsteps of the character condemned\"); Estate of Farrell ex reL Bennett v.\n, 770 A.2d 517,\n521-22 (Del. 200\n... [truncated, 2339 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/28 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=28]", "char_count": 2339}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 30 of 32\n\ndeterrence is of the utmost importance—Epstein spent decades abusing countless young women\nand girls, intimidating them into silence, and gaming the justice system with his wealth and power\nto avoid punishment. No person should be able to commit such acts while at the same time\nconsidering themselves to be above the law.\nEven courts that generally do not allow for punitive damages against a deceased\ntortfeasor's estate have expressly acknowledged that punitive damages might be available where,\nas here, the deceased tortfeasor takes his own life \"as an escape from punitive damages.\" Crabtree\nex. ReL Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005) (\"If we ever encounter a case\nwhere a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own death as an escape from punitive damages\nincident to some intentional tort, we can address that issue at that time.\"). Here, it is undisputed\nthat punitive damages would have been available against Epstein if he were still alive. But Epstein\nspent his life using his power, wealth, and intimidation to avoid proportionate punishment for his\ncountless crimes. See Compl.11 8, 14. And once he was finally imprisoned pending trial for his\nsex-trafficking operation, he signed his will and then almost immediately caused his own demise.\nSee id. 11 30, 31. Given the unique facts surrounding Epstein's crimes and death, and the need to\ndeter others from committing such heinous crimes against vulnerable victims and then using power\nto avoid the consequences, the second Banks factor weighs heavily in favor of allowing for punitive\ndamages under these facts.\nc.\n\nBanks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the Virgin Islands\n\nAlthough none of the three Banks factors is dispositive, the third factor—\"which approach\nrepresents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands\"-is the most important. See\n\n, 60 V.I.\n\nat 600. The soundest rule for the Virgin Islands is to allow for punitive dam\n... [truncated, 2239 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/29 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=29]", "char_count": 2239}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 31 of 32\n\nseeking justice, and then caused his own demise once he was about to face real punishment for his\ncountless crimes. Allowing for punitive damages in this case would be in line with the general\ndeterrence principle behind punitive damages because it would deter others from manipulating the\njustice system and silencing victims of sexual abuse to avoid punishment. See, e.g., Guardian Ins.\nCo. v. Gumbs, No. ST-15-CV-195, 2016 WL 9525609, at *10 (V.I. Super. Aug. 22, 2016) (\"[A]\nprimary purpose behind punitive damages [is] . . . to further deter [the tortfeasorl and others like\nhim from similar conduct in the future.\"). The rule would also be consistent with the cases\nsuggesting that punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor may be available if the\ntortfeasor committed suicide to avoid punishment. The absence of any Virgin Islands case\nadopting the Restatement's commentary about punitive damages against estates, coupled with the\nextraordinary nature of Epstein's transcontinental sex-trafficking enterprise, counsel in favor of\nsuch a rule.\" The Court should therefore deny Defendants' motion to dismiss punitive damages.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's\nComplaint. Because Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in full, Plaintiff requests\noral argument on Defendants' motion.\n\nTo the extent necessary, United States courts may certify questions to the Supreme Court\nof the Virgin Islands if there is \"a question of law which may be determinative\" and if \"it appears\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.\" Banks, 55 V.I. at 972\n(internal citations omitted). Because the issue would be a matter of first impression in the Virgin\nIslands, and given the split in common law authorities concerning the availability of punitive\ndamages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, the Court shou\n... [truncated, 2485 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737603/30 or ?id=EFTA02737603&page=30]", "char_count": 2485}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737603", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 39\n\nDated: March 30, 2020\n\nFiled 03/30/20\n\nPage 32 of 32\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n/s/ Joshua I. Schiller\nDavid Boies\nBOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n333 Main Street\nArmonk, NY 10504\n(914) 749-8200\nSigrid McCawley\n(Pro Hac Vice)\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200\nFt. Lauderdale, FL 33301\n(954) 356-0011\nJoshua I. Schiller\nAndrew Villacastin\nSabina MarieIla\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards\nNew York, NY 10001\n(212) 446-2300\n\nCounselfor Plaintiff Jane Doe 1000\n\n26\n\nEFTA02737634\n\n\f", "char_count": 546}]}