{"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_count": 20, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737579", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737579.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 1 of 20\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nJANE DOE 1000,\nPlaintiff;\nCa se No. 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, in\ntheir capacities as the executors of the ESTATE OF\nJEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT\nOF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02737579\n\n\f", "char_count": 547}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 2 of 20\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS\n\n2\n\nA.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her In And Around 1999,\nWhen She Was An Adult\n\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\n2\n4\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels, And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nRevive Her Time-Deserved Claims\n\n4\n\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Expired Many Years Ago And Must Be Dismissed\n\n4\n\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations\nExceptions Fail\n\n5\n\ni.\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable because the Indictment\nconcerned sex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff\n\n5\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\"\ncircumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel\n\n8\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Must Be Dismissed Because They\nAre Precluded By New York Law\n\n12\n\nii.\nD.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n14\n\ni\n415133784\n\nEFTA02737580\n\n\f", "char_count": 1025}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 3 of 20\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAbercrombie v. College,\n438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)\n\n11, 12\n\nAshcroft v. Iqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly,\n550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n4\n\nBlissett v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n13\n\nBoos v. Runyon,\n201 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2000)\n\n9\n\nCerbone v. IntlLadies' Garment Workers' Union,\n768 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1985)\n\n9\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1999)\n\n6\n\nConklin v. Maidenbaum,\nNo. 12-cv- 3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013)\n(Ramos, J.)\n\n11\n\nCrucible Materials Corp. v. N.Y. Power Auth.,\n50 A.D.3d 1353 (Third Dept. 2008)\n\n8\n\nDep't ofEcon. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,\n747 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)\n\n11\n\nDeutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp.,\n723 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n13\n\nFairley v.\nNo. 09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (Mar. 15, 2011\nS.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.)\n\n8\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct.\n23, 2018)\n\n6, 7\n\n11\n415133784\n\nEFTA02737581\n\n\f", "char_count": 1119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 4 of 20\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n(continued)\nPage\nGraham v.\n224 F.R.D. 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n13\n\nGuidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp.,\nNo. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,\n2003)\n\n13\n\nIn re Higgins,\n270 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)\n\n9\n\nv. Nyack Hosp.,\n86 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1996)\n\n9\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n8\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\nNo. 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998)\n(Sweet, J.)\n\n12\n\nLohr V. Byrd,\n522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)\n\n13\n\nMcElligott v. City ofN.Y.,\nNo. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,\n2017)\n\n6\n\nMoll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. ofN.Y.,\n700 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)\n\n11\n\nPoindexter v. Zacharzewski,\nNo. 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.)\n\n13\n\nv. Consumers Distrib. Co.,\n648 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.)\n\n12\n\nSimons v. Marriott Corp.,\nNo. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,\n1993)\n\n12\n\nSJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofEduc.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n(Buchwald, J.)\n\n12\n\niii\n415133784\n\nEFTA02737582\n\n\f\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF  Document 34  Filed 02/28/20  Page 6 of 20  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) Page 97 NY Jur Statutes § 185  7  V 41513378v2  EFTA02737584", "char_count": 1405}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 5 of 20\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n(continued)\nPage\nv. N.Y.C. Dep't ofCorr.,\nNo. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n9\n\nStarr Indent. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt,\nNo. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n12\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin,\nNo. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dig. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n(Batts, J.)\n\n12\n\nIn re U.S. Lines, Inc.,\n318 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 2003)\n\n9\n\nViti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm.,\nNo. 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633 (S.D.N.Y.\nOct. 5, 2012)\n\n9\n\nYesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya,\nNo. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744 (E.D.N.Y.\n2010)\n\n9, 10\n\nStatutes\nEPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1)\n\n13\n\nHa. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)\n\nI, 4\n\n2019 N.Y. Laws 315, 2019 N.Y\n\n5, 6\n\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a\n\n13\n\nNew York Penal Law Article 130\n\n3\n\nOther Authorities\nCPLR § 214(5)\n\nI, 4\n\nCPLR § 215(3)\n\nI, 4\npassim\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a)\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\n\nI, 9\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\n3, 4, 5\n\niv\n415133784\n\nEFTA02737583\n\n\f", "char_count": 1117}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 6 of 20\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n(continued)\nPage\n97 NY Jur Statutes § 185\n\n7\n\nV\n41513378v2\n\nEFTA02737584\n\n\f", "char_count": 167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 7 of 20\n\nDefendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Co-Executors\"), submit this memorandum of law in support of their\nmotion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(6)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF\nNo. I) because it is time-barred, and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is prohibited\nby a New York statute and well-established Florida law.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nThis action is time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that, in or about 1999, when she was an adult,\n\n16, 38, 40,42, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action—battery\n\nand intentional infliction of emotional distress—and demands punitive damages. (Id.\n\nII\n\nYork and Florida. (Compl.\n\n11\n\nJefferey E. Epstein (\"Decedent\") now deceased, committed sexual offenses against her in New\n\n49-59, p.\n\n13.) Plaintiff's causes of action expired many years ago per New York's one- and three-year\nstatutes of limitations (CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)) and Florida's four-year statute of limitations (Fla.\nStat. § 95.11 (3)(O)).\nIn apparent recognition that her claims are time-barred, Plaintiff erroneously alleges that\n(i) a New York statute of limitations enacted last year revives her claims, notwithstanding the\nenacting law expressly and unequivocally provides it does not apply retroactively to claims that\nare already time-barred, (ii) her claims are timely pursuant to CPLR § 215(8Xa),' (iii) her claims\nwere equitably tolled, and (iv) the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of\nlimitations defense. (Compl. IN 12-14.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\nThe 2019 New York law enacting a new, longer statute of limitations is very clear: it does\nnot apply retroactively except \"where the applicable statute of limitations in effect on the date of\n\nCPLR § 2I5(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has b\n... [truncated, 2273 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/6 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=6]", "char_count": 2273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 8 of 20\n\nsuch act or omission has not yet expired.\" 2019 N.Y. Ch. 315, 2019 N.Y. SB 6574, §4. Plaintiff's\ncauses of action expired many years before the new law went into effect.\nMoreover, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here because Decedent's criminal indictment\n(the \"Indictment\"), which concerns alleged sexual trafficking of minors, has nothing to do with\nPlaintiff, who alleges sexual assault when she was an adult. Plaintiff also fails to meet her burden\nto allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\nPlaintiff's demands for punitive damages must also be dismissed as a matter of law. Both\nNew York and Florida law bar recovery of punitive damages from a decedent tortfeasor's estate—\ni.e., exactly what Plaintiff is seeking here.\nSTATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS\nA.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her In And Around 1999, When\nShe Was An Adult\n\nPlaintiff alleges she met Decedent in \"late 1999\" at his New York residence. (Compl. 1\n38.) Plaintiff does not allege that she was a minor at this time. According to Plaintiff, she went to\nDecedent's residence to discuss modeling opportunities. (Id.\n\n38-39.) Plaintiff alleges that, at\n\nsome point thereafter, she moved into an apartment owned by Decedent on 66th Street in\nManhattan. (Id. 40.)\nPlaintiff further alleges that Decedent had \"recruiters\" who would call her to visit Decedent\nat his residence to give him a massage. (Id.) Decedent allegedly sexually assaulted Plaintiff during\nthese massages. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges, with no further details, that Decedent flew her to\nFlorida, where he sexually assaulted her again. (Id.142.) Plaintiff also claims Decedent promised\nher modeling opportunities \"for years, up until the last time [she] saw Epstein,\" but does not\nprovide even an approximate date identifying when that was or when the alleged abuse ended. (Id.\n1 45.)\n\n2\n\nEFTA02737586\n\n\f", "char_count": 1972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 9 of 20\n\nApparently recognizing that her claims are time-barred under applicable statutes of\nlimitations, Plaintiff alleges a few generic legal conclusions that also appear in other time-barred\ncomplaints against the Co-Executors that Plaintiff's counsel filed in this District on behalf of other\nindividuals. Thus, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion:\n•\n\nThis action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provides\nthat a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action\nagainst the same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or\noccurrence from which the criminal action arose. A criminal action against [Decedent]\nwith respect to the same sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiffs claims arise\nwas terminated on August 29, 2019. (Id.1 12.)\n\n•\n\nThis action has also been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c, which\nprovides that a plaintiff shall have 20 years to file civil claims \"for physical,\npsychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person as a result of conduct\nwhich would constitute\" certain sex crimes under New York Penal Law Article 130.\n[Decedent] and Ghislaine Maxwell sexually assaulted Plaintiff by forcible compulsion\nwithin 20 years of filing this Complaint, and that sexual assault constitutes one or more\nsex crimes described in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-C. (Id.1 13.)\n\n•\n\nAny statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims is tolled due to the continuous\nand active deception, duress, threats of retaliation, and other forms of misconduct that\n[Decedent] and his co-conspirators used to silence his many victims, including\nPlaintiff. [Decedent]'s actions deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to commence this\nlawsuit before his death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that [Decedent] and his coconspirators would harm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. (Id.\n14.)\n\n•\n\nDe\n... [truncated, 2636 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/8 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=8]", "char_count": 2636}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 10 of 20\n\nA RGUMENT\nA.\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels, And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nRevive Her Time-Deserved Claims\n\n\"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,\naccepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n662, 678 (2009). While a Court must normally accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations\nin a complaint and draw all inferences in a plaintiff's favor, those principles are \"inapplicable to\nlegal conclusions.\" Id. at 678 (2009) (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v. Tivombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556\n(2007)). Thus, a pleading that offers only \"labels and conclusions\" or \"a formulaic recitation of\nthe elements of a cause of action will not do.\" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007).\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Expired Many Years Ago And Must Be Dismissed\n\nPlaintiff asserts causes of action for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress\narising out of events starting in late 1999 and occurring in New York and Florida, all when Plaintiff\nwas an adult. Each cause of action is time-barred and must be dismissed.\nUnder New York law, causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one\nyear of accrual (CPLR § 215(3)); and claims sounding in personal injury, within three years (CPLR\n§ 214(5)). Under Florida law, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims is four years. See Fla.\nStat. § 95.11(3)(O).\nPlaintiff does not allege that she endured the alleged sexual assaults for a period of time\nthat would permit her to avoid these statutes of limitations. (See Compl.112, 45.) Plaintiff's failure\nto allege when Decedent's alleged sexual assaults ended is either a tacit admission that this action\nis time-barred or a fatal pleading failure. In either event, this action must be dismissed.\nIn Plaintiff's response to the Co-Execu\n... [truncated, 2173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/9 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=9]", "char_count": 2173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 11 of 20\n\nHowever, CPLR § 213-c is not a revival statute. CPLR § 213-c, which became effective as of\nSeptember 18, 2019, does not apply retroactively except \"where the applicable statute of\nlimitations in effect on the date of such act or omission has not yet expired.\" 2019 N.Y. Laws 315,\n2019 N.Y. SB 6574, § 4.\nPlaintiff does not allege—and did not argue in her pit-motion letter—that any of her claims\nwere timely as of September 18, 2019. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c does not apply.\nInstead, Plaintiff argued in her pre-motion letter that, because the 2019 law rewriting CPLR\n§ 213-c did not set forth the prohibition on retroactive application in the text of CPLR § 213-c\nitself, Plaintiff should be able to invoke it. (ECF Doc. 25, § I.) That is wrong.\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations\nExceptions Fail\ni.\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa) is inapplicable because the Indictment concerned sex\ntrafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff\n\nNor does CPLR § 215(8)(a) apply here. CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown\nthat a criminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event\nor occurrencefrom which a claim governed by this section arises, the plaintiff shall have at least\none year from the termination of the criminal action ... to commence the civil action.\" (emphasis\nadded.)\nDecedent's Indictment, which Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint, was not commenced\nwith respect to Plaintiff. Rather, the Indictment charges Decedent sexually abused \"minor girls\"\nfrom 2002 to 2005 (Compl., Ex. A at 111 1, 20), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking\nof minors. (Id. 11 2-4, 6, 8, 11-15, 18-20, 22.) Plaintiff does not allege she was a minor when\nDecedent sexually assaulted her in or around 1999. Therefore, this action and the Indictment arise\nfrom different occurrences.\n\n5\n\nEFTA02737589\n\n\f", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 12 of 20\n\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8Xa) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262\nA.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of\nFebruary 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those\ntwo days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallina v. Thatcher, No.\n2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR §\n215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action\noccurred on different dates); McEllison v. City of N.Y., No. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 201829, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8Xa) inapplicable to claims against\ncivil defendants not charged as co-defendants in criminal action, notwithstanding same events gave\nrise to both actions).\nGallina is especially instructive. In that case, an individual sued an attorney for battery and\nother claims based on the core allegation that, over the course of two years, the attorney committed\nvarious sexual misconduct against the plaintiff, including sexual assault. 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS\n8435, at * I. Defendant had also been criminally charged with forceable touching for incidents that\noccurred with the plaintiff in 2017. Id. at *3. The court dismissed as time-barred plaintiffs battery\ncounts based on incidents alleged to have occurred in 2016. M. at *2-.3.\nIn doing so, the court rejected plaintiffs argument that CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied to the\n2016 incidents, finding:\nPlaintiff argues that the July and October 2016 incidents are part of the same\nongoing course of events as the February, March and May 2017 incidents\nand should therefore be deemed timely commenced ... the case law does\nnot support Plaintiff's interpretation of ... CPLR §215(8)(a). The criminal\ninstruments ... demonstrate that Defendant was charged for incidents\noccurring on thr\n... [truncated, 2356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/11 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=11]", "char_count": 2356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 13 of 20\n\nnot commenced with respect to the July 2016 and October 2016 events, the\ntolling provisions of CPLR §215(8) do not apply.\nId. at *34.\nHere, Plaintiff asserts a more tenuous connection between this action and the Indictment\nthan the one unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiff in Gallina (and the other cited cases). The\nCourt should therefore reject Plaintiff's argument for the application of CPLR § 215(8Xa).\nIn Plaintiff's response to the Co-Executors' pre-motion letter (ECF No. 25, § 1), Plaintiff\nasserts two erroneous arguments for application of CPLR § 215(8)(a). First, Plaintiff argues that\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) does not require the Indictment to expressly identify Plaintiff as one of\nDecedent's victims. This is a strawman argument: no one argues otherwise.\nHowever, Plaintiff is required to show—but cannot show under the circumstances here—\nthat this action and the Indictment arise from the same event. They do not. Not only does the\nIndictment not refer to Plaintiff, it also does not refer to misconduct of the type that Plaintiff alleges\nhere. The Indictment could not be clearer: it concerns sex trafficking of minors. Plaintiff does not\nallege she was a minor when Decedent sexually assaulted her. Nor does she allege anything\nestablishing she was a sex trafficking victim.\nSecond Plaintiff urges a broad construction of CPLR § 215(8)(a) that effectively rewrites\nit by rendering the limitation therein—\"with respect to the event or occurrence from which a\nclaim governed by this section arises\"—meaningless. Plaintiff effectively argues that, unless the\nIndictment expressly rules out that it arises from the same event as this action, then Plaintiff is\nentitled to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). That argument is contrary to basic principles of statutory\ninterpretation prohibiting a reading of a statute that would render its words meaningless (see 97\nNY Jur Statutes § 185), the case law cited above, a plain read\n... [truncated, 2059 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/12 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=12]", "char_count": 2059}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 14 of 20\n\nPlaintiff cites a single case in support of this erroneous argument, Kashef v. BNP Paribas\nS.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019). However, Kashef is distinguishable on its face, since the civil\nand criminal actions in that case both arose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan\nto violate U.S. sanctions. Kashef, 925 F.3d at 63.\nHere, by contrast, Plaintiff's allegations—that she was an adult whom Decedent sexually\nassaulted—do not comport with the alleged scheme to traffic minors set forth repeatedly in the\nIndictment. Nor does Plaintiff sufficiently set forth allegations establishing she was a trafficking\nvictim in any respect. Therefore, while Plaintiff may claim she, too, is a victim of Decedent, she\nis not a victim by reason of the events giving rise to the Indictment.\nPlaintiff also cites a Third Department case, Crucible Materials Corp. v. N.Y. Power Auth.,\n50 A.D.3d 1353 (Third Dept. 2008), to support her separate assertion that the Court must permit\nher to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) based on statutory interpretation principles. Yet Crucible does not\nconcern CPLR § 215(8)(a). Further, in that case, the Third Department reaffirmed the principle\nthat, when interpreting a statute, courts \"giv[e] clear effect to the plain meaning of the words\nemployed.\" Crucible Materials Corp., 50 A.D.3d at 1355-56. This is exactly what the CoExecutors urge here and what Plaintiff argues against—namely, a proper interpretation of CPLR\n§ 215(8)(a) that gives meaning to the words \"with respect to the event or occurrence from which\na claim governed by this section arises.\" The Court should reject Plaintiff's attempt to rewrite the\nstatute.\nii.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances\nsufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify\ntolling or equitable estoppel. \"Second Circuit \n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/13 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=13]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 15 of 20\n\n26536, at *16 (Mar. 15, 2011 S.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.) (finding equitable tolling did not apply and\ngranting defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. I2(b)(6) motion to dismiss complaint on statute of limitations\ngrounds). Equitable tolling only applies where a plaintiff is \"prevented in some extraordinary way\nfrom exercising h[er] rights.\" Viii v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD),\n2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013) (emphasis added) (citing\n\nv. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr.,\n\nNo. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);\n\nv. Nyack Hosp.,\n\n86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)).\nUnder this doctrine, a court may, \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow\nexceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.' Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yesh\nDiamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at *2\n(E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003)). \"That the doctrine is to\nbe employed only sparingly—in 'extraordinary' and 'compelling' circumstances—is reflected in\nthe fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is justified.\" Id.\n(emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A late-filing party\nseeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable diligence\" in pursuing\nher claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at *32 (citation omitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists, but the\ndefendant's conduct causes her to delay bringing suit. See Yesh, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744,\nat *5 (citing Cerbone v. Intl Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1985)).\n\"The rationale behind this equitable doctrine is to protect the person who brings their action after\nit would no\n... [truncated, 2200 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/14 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=14]", "char_count": 2200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 16 of 20\n\nEquitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: \"(i) the defendant made a definite misrepresentation\nof fact, and had reason to believe that the plaintiff would rely on it; and (ii) the plaintiff reasonably\nrelied on that misrepresentation to h[er] detriment.\" Id. (citation omitted). Tolling is inappropriate\nwhere, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that prevented the plaintiff\nfrom timely commencing suit. See id. at •6.\nPlaintiff does not allege any particularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from\nexercising her rights. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that (i) Decedent made a misrepresentation to her\nand had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) Plaintiff reasonably relied on it to her\ndetriment. Nor does Plaintiff allege any facts showing she acted with \"reasonable diligence\" in\npursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Therefore, there is no \"extraordinary\" basis\nalleged sufficient to toll the statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute\nof limitations defense.\nPlaintiff erroneously asserts in her pre-motion letter that her allegations in paragraphs 27,\n40 and 43 of her Complaint constitute \"extraordinary circumstances\" sufficient to invoke these\ndoctrines. (ECF No. 13, § II.) However, Paragraph 27 does not even relate to Plaintiff. Rather, it\nconcerns general allegations of misconduct by Decedent related to other, unidentified alleged\nvictims. There is nothing alleged about why such misconduct prevented Plaint:if from filing this\naction a long time ago.\nPlaintiff's reliance on paragraphs 40 and 43 is also misplaced. The allegations in those\nparagraphs are that, during the period of the alleged assaults of Plaintiff, Decedent threatened her\nand on a single occasion forced her to meet with an attorney who asked her \"personal questions.\"\nHowever, Plaintiff does not allege that Decedent did anything after the a\n... [truncated, 2087 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/15 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=15]", "char_count": 2087}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 17 of 20\n\nThere are numerous court decisions in which stronger, clearer allegations are deemed\ninsufficient to justify equitable estoppel or tolling. See, e.g., Conklin v. Maidenbaum, No. 12-cv3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975, at •27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (Ramos, J.) (finding\nequitable tolling inapplicable and dismissing complaint notwithstanding that plaintiffs alleged they\nreasonably relied on defendants' representations over a period spanning more than ten months and\ndozens of telephone calls).\nPlaintiff alternatively argues in her pre-motion letter that her entitlement to equitable\nestoppel and tolling are fact issues not subject to rulings by the Court on a motion to dismiss. (ECF\nNo. 25, § H.) Plaintiff misses the point. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to allegefacts that support\ninvocation of an exception to the statute of limitations, them is no issue of fact sufficient to defeat\na motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds:\nIf properly pled, allegations of equitable estoppel normally create questions\nof fact which cannot be determined at a motion to dismiss.... However,\nwithout adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore\ncannot defeat a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds.\nSee Dept ofEcon. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 943\n(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing cause of action because plaintiff made no\nallegation in complaint that \"its failure to timely institute its third-party\naction was due to its justified reliance upon a misrepresentation\" by\nopposing party); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284,\n1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (\"Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant caused\nthem to delay in bringing suit on a known cause of action. On the contrary,\nplaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that they did not discover the alleged ...\nviolations until long after the limitations period had expired. Equitable\nestoppel is th\n... [truncated, 2508 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/16 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=16]", "char_count": 2508}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 18 of 20\n\nin the Complaint which statements led her to believe that she could delay bringing her lawsuit.\"\nId. at 266. Nor does Plaimiff allege facts that would support invocation of equitable tolling.\nD.\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Must Be Dismissed Because They Are\nPrecluded By New York Law\n\nPlaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law because it is barred by statute\nand well-established law. Courts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss legally deficient\nclaims for punitive damages. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796,\n2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to\ndismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because allegations regarding\ndefendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the required level of malice);\n5.18 v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofEduc., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y.\nJuly 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages claims because\npunitive damages were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin., No. 97 Civ. 3804, 1998\nU.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.) (granting motion to dismiss\nclaim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was true, it did not rise\nto the level necessary to award punitive damages);\n\nv. Consumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp.\n\n980, 981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive\ndamages).\nWhen determining what law applies, the court looks to the choice of law rules of the forum\nstate. Simons v. Marriott Corp., No. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at *15\n(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, the law of the state where a tort occurs generally\napplies to punitive damages. See Starr Indem. & Dab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463JMF, 2\n... [truncated, 2202 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/17 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=17]", "char_count": 2202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 19 of 20\n\n(quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Phanns. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Guidi v.\nInter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at *1\n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)).\nHere, Plaintiff has alleged tortious conduct occurring in New York and Florida. (Comp].\n40, 42.) New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provides: \"No cause of action for injury to\nperson or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any injury,\nan action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but\npunitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to\nrecover damagesfor personal injury.\" NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (emphasis added). \"Also, 'there\nis a strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account of\nwrongful conduct of the decedent.\"' Graham v.\n\n. 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n(quoting Blissett v. Eisensmich, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a defines \"personal injury\" as including \"an\nassault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff,\nor of another.\" Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries, i.e., \"battery\" and\n\"intentional infliction of emotional distress,\" which are actionable injuries to Plaintiff's person.\nAccordingly, Plaintiff may not recover against the Co-Executors for punitive damages based on\nalleged torts that occurred in New York.\nNor are punitive damages available to Plaintiff under Florida law. Poindexter v.\nZacharzewski, No. 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at *6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) (citing\nLohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)). \"Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages\nfrom the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased.\" Id. That is the law in most jurisdictions, as\nreflected in t\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737579/18 or ?id=EFTA02737579&page=18]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737579", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10577-LJL-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 20 of 20\n\navailable against representatives of deceased tortfeasor). Even if Plaintiff's claims somehow\nsurvive, her claims for punitive damages must therefore be dismissed.\nIn her pre-motion letter, Plaintiff does not dispute that this prohibition on punitive damages\nin personal injury actions against a decedent tortfeasor's estate is black-letter New York and\nFlorida law. Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to simply delay ruling on the issue of punitive damages\nuntil after discovery. (ECF No. 25, § II.) However, as there are no facts alleged that would render\nPlaintiff's punitive damages claim proper, there is no reason to allow it to stand.\nPlaintiff seeks to delay the inevitable so she may use the prospect of punitive damages—\nexpressly prohibited as they may be—as (misplaced) leverage over the Co-Executors. This would\nserve no legitimate purpose. It would also impede productive settlement discussions. Plaintiff's\npunitive damages claim, like the punitive damages claims in the cases cited above, should be\ndismissed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss\nPlaintiff's Complaint, together with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and\nproper.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nFebruary 28, 2020\nBy: /s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nAttorney for Defendants\n\n14\n\nEFTA02737598\n\n\f", "char_count": 1495}]}