{"efta_number": "EFTA02737392", "page_count": 3, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737392", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737392.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737392", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 36\n\nFiled 04/10/20\n\nPage 1 of 3\n\ntroutmar?\nsanders\n\nTroutman Sanders LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\ntroutman.com\n\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nD: 212-704-6000\nbennet.moskowitz@troulman.com\n\nApril 10, 2020\nELECTRONIC COURT FILING\nHon. Debra Freeman\nDaniel\nMoynihan\nUnited States Courthouse\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, New York 10007-1312\nRe:\n\nv. Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Executors of the Estate\nof Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:19-cv-10788 (GHW) (DCF)\n\nDear Judge Freeman:\nWe represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the\nEstate of Jeffrey E. Epstein to ether. the \"Co-Executors\"), in the above-referenced action. We\nwrite in response to Plaintiff\n' (\"Plaintiff\") April 8, 2020 letter (ECF No. 35) seeking\nto strike an argument from the Co-Executors' reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss\nPlaintiff's claims based on torts that allegedly occurred over fifteen years ago. Plaintiffs\ncounsel filed their letter, without first conferring with us, incorrectly claiming that the CoExecutors raised a new legal argument in their reply, and supplying new argument themselves,\nin a rushed attempt at a do-over following their failure to avoid the correct version of the statute\nof limitations applicable to Plaintiffs claims based on conduct that allegedly occurred in New\nMexico in 2002. The Court should reject Plaintiffs request for at least five reasons.\nFirst, there is no \"new\" argument here. Plaintiffs counsel argues that the Co-Executors'\nreply brief \"attempts for the first time to suggest that a different legal standard applies.\" (ECF\nNo. 35 at 2.) That is wrong. The Co-Executors contended from the outset, and continue to\ncontend, that Plaintiffs New Mexico claims are time-barred. The Co-Executors argued this in\nboth their motion to dismiss and their reply. (ECF No. 27 at 4; ECF No. 34 at 4.) And Plaintiffs\ncounsel concedes that the Co-Executors \"correctly identified the applicable New Mexico law.\"\n(ECF No. 35 at 1). Plaintiff has thus been aware since day one that the Co-Executors are\nmoving to dismiss her claims as time-barred and was apprised of the legal bases for that\nmotion.\nEven where an argument in a party's reply brief is deemed an \"extension\" of an\nargument made in its moving brief, the argument is not \"new.\" Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 710 F.\nSupp. 2d 328, 338 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In Niv, the court rejected plaintiffs letter request to\ndisregard defendants' argument that Israel was an adequate alternative forum on the ground it\n\nEFTA02737392\n\n\f", "char_count": 2571}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737392", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\nApril 10, 2020\nPage 2\n\nDocument 36\n\nFiled 04/10/20\n\nPage 2 of 3\n\ntroutmarill\n\nsanders\n\nwas newly raised in defendants' reply. Id. The Niv court held that the argument was not new, as\ndefendants' motion argued that New York was not an adequate forum, and thus the contention\nthat Israel was an adequate forum was simply an extension of this argument. Id.\nThere is also no unfair surprise' warranting the Court's disregard of the Co-Executors'\nlegal arguments. See Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2005)\n(finding plaintiff could not claim she was \"blind-sided\" by defendants' reliance on a particular\nargument that was raised, albeit more generally, in defendants' moving papers).\nSecond, even if an argument is deemed \"new,\" where, as here, it is reasonable to expect\nthat argument, it is not prejudicial for the Court to consider it. Niv, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.4\n(\"[E]ven if considered a new argument, the Court believes that it was reasonable to expect this\nargument and therefore it is not prejudicial to plaintiffs to consider those materials.\").\nThird, even if the Co-Executors supplied a new argument in their reply brief—they did\nnot—the Court has the discretion to and should consider it in the interest of justice. See Am.\nHotel Intl Grp. Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 611 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"rifle\nSecond Circuit has made it abundantly clear that a district court has discretion to consider a\nbelatedly-raised argument.\"); Niv, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 338 n.4 (holding a court may consider a\nnew argument raised in reply where \"in the interest of justice\"). The correct version of the statute\napplicable to Plaintiffs New Mexico claims is a potentially dispositive legal issue this Court must\ndetermine. This Court should not be precluded from considering that version merely because\nPlaintiff failed to consider it. That is especially so where, as here, Plaintiff does not contend that\nshe has been unfairly prejudiced or surprised.\nFourth, Plaintiffs substantive argument—that, even under the correct version of the\nstatute, her claims arising from alleged acts in New Mexico are timely—is incorrect. The\napplicable version of the statute of limitations required her to commence an action by the later\nof: (1) the first instant of the person's twenty-fourth birthday (\"Prong One\"); or (2) three years\nfrom the date of the time that a person knew or had reason to know of the childhood sexual\nabuse and that the childhood sexual abuse resulted in an injury to the person, as established\nby competent medical or psychological testimony (\"Prong Two\"). Kevin J. v. Sager, 2000NMCA-012, ¶ 7, 128 N.M. 794, 796-97, 999 P.2d 1026, 1028-29 (citing the correct version of\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-30, emphasis added). Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she \"still has not\ndisclosed her abuse to a licensed medical or mental health care provider in the context of\nreceiving health care from that provider.\" (ECF No. 1 ¶ 67.) Because there is no date under\nProng Two, Plaintiff must have filed her claims by the date established in Prong One. Because\nPlaintiff's Complaint establishes conclusively that she knew she was abused and injured in New\nMexico in 2002, and that she turned twenty-four in 2009, her claims expired under Prong One\n10 years ago. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 42-45.)\nPlaintiffs reliance on Kevin J. v. Sager is misplaced. In Kevin J., plaintiff saw a licensed\ncounselor who helped plaintiff understand the abuse he had suffered and established the date\nupon which this understanding occurred. 128 N.M. at 795. Here, Plaintiff concedes she has not\nseen a licensed medical or mental health care provider.\nI Plaintiff does not claim she was surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the so-called \"new argument.'\n\nEFTA02737393\n\n\f", "char_count": 3797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737392", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\nApril 10, 2020\nPage 3\n\nDocument 36\n\nFiled 04/10/20\n\nPage 3 of 3\n\ntroutmarilli\n\nsanders\n\nFifth, Plaintiff continues to ignore that, under New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202,\nwhich is applicable to federal diversity actions such as this,2 her claim must be timely under the\nstatute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the claim accrued. Thus, even\nif Plaintiffs claims were timely under New Mexico law—they are not—they still fail because they\nare untimely under New York law. At the time Plaintiff was allegedly sexually assaulted in 2002,\nNew York's statute of limitations required a plaintiff sexually assaulted as a minor to file her\ncause of action one year after reaching the age of 18. (CPLR 208; CPLR 215(c).) According to\nthe Complaint, Plaintiff turned 18 sometime in 2003. Accordingly, her claims for alleged torts\noccurring in New Mexico while she was a minor expired in 2004.3\nIn sum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Co-Executors rely on a new argument in\ntheir reply and concedes the Co-Executors have always argued that Plaintiffs New Mexico\nclaims were untimely under N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30. Nor has Plaintiff established any unfair\nprejudice or surprise warranting disregard of the Co-Executors' legal arguments. Finally, Plaintiff\nis incorrect on the merits, as her claims are untimely.\nThe real issue here is that Plaintiff failed to plead around the correct version of N.M. Stat\n§ 37-1-30 in her Complaint or to address it in her opposition brief. The version she (erroneously)\nattempted to invoke is inapplicable to her claims because it became effective years after those\nclaims expired. That Plaintiff missed this important legal issue and did not address the proper\nversion of the statute in her Complaint or opposition brief is not a basis on which to disregard\nthe Co-Executors' arguments, nor to permit Plaintiff to offer new argument by de facto sur-reply\nbrief submitted without leave of the Court. The Court should reject Plaintiff's letter motion and\ngrant the Co-Executors' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF. No. 27).\n\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\n\n2 \"In diversity cases in New York, federal courts apply ... C.P.L.R. § 202.\" Commerzbank AG v. Deutsche\nBank Nat'l Tr. Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 462, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted).\n3 Plaintiffs New Mexico claims were not revived by CPLR § 214-g, the \"Child Victim's Act,\" as they do not\nstate a claim for a violation of New York's Penal Law § 130, a necessary predicate for application of the\nChild Victim's Act. (Applying to claims for \"injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would\nconstitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a\nchild less than eighteen years of age... .\")\n\nEFTA02737394\n\n\f", "char_count": 2861}]}