{"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_count": 16, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737373", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737373.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 1 of 16\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10788 (GHW) (DCF)\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as\nexecutors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT\nOF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02737373\n\n\f", "char_count": 518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 2 of 16\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nTHIS MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY PROPER AND RIPE,\nREGARDLESS OF ITS TITLE\n\nII.\n\nPLAINTIFF INVOKES INAPPLICABLE LIMITATIONS STATUTES\nAND TOLLING PRINCIPLES\n\n3\n\nPLAINTIFF DISREGARDS BLACK-LETTER LAW ESTABLISHING\nPUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE BARRED HERE\n\n7\n\nHI.\n\nA.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S BANKS ANALYSIS AND SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS\nARE ERRONEOUS\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n9\n10\n\nEFTA02737374\n\n\f", "char_count": 458}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 3 of 16\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAlliedIrish Banks, PLC. v. Bank ofAm., N.A.,\nNo. 03-cv-3748 (DAB), 2006 WL 278138 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006)\n\n2, 8, 9\n\nNissen v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n7\n\nBurrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co.,\n226 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y 2002)\n\n3\n\nOmar ex reL Cannon v. Lindsey,\n243 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 334 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003)\n\n5\n\nCerveceria Modelo. S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC,\nNo. 07-cv-7998 (HB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28999 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,\n2008)\n\n3\n\n.v.=,\n926 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n2\n\nv. Monahan,\n832 So. 2d 708 (Sup. Ct. Fl. 2002)\n\n5\n\nDenton v. McKee,\n332 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n2\n\nDoe v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.,\nNo. 12-cv-686 (CM), 2013 WL 624688 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013)\n\n2\n\nFarina v. Metro. Transportation Auth.,\nNo. 18-cv-1433 (PKC), 2019 WL 3966163 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2019)\n\n2\n\nFed. Nous. Fin. Agency v. Ally Fin. Inc.,\nNo. 11-cv-7010 (DLC), 2012 WL 6616061 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012)\n\n8\n\nGhartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp.,\n869 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1989)\nGrimes-Jenkins v. Consol. Edison Co. ofNew York,\nNo. 16 Civ. 4897 (AT), 2017 WL 2258374 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017)\n\n2\n\nHeandon v. Graham,\n767 So. 2d 1179 (Sup. Ct. FIa. 2000)\n\n5\n\nEFTA02737375\n\n\f", "char_count": 1309}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\n•\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 4 of 16\n\nv. Gov't Emples. Ret. Sys.,\n1118/1992, 1993 V.I. LEXIS 23 (Feb. 22, 1993)\n\n7\n\nHunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI,\nNo. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) ....................................2\nJames v. Powell,\n19 N.Y.2d 249 (1967)\n\n8\n\nJaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,\n117 N.M. 337 (N.M. 1994).\n\n.9\n\nv. Hess Oil,\n867 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1989)\nCrabtree a rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\nv. Car Rentals, Inc.,\n29 A.D.3d 205 (2d Dep't 2006)\n\n7\n9\n8\n\nIn re Merrill\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig.,\n851 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n3\n\nNash v. Coram Healthcare Corp.,\nNo. 96-cv-0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,\n1996)\n\n3\n\nNat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\nNo. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10.\n2019)\n\n8\n\nOkyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC,\n961 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)\n\n2\n\nOrietview Techs, LLC v. Seven For All Mankind, LLC,\nNo. 13-ev-0538 (PAE), 2013 WL 4016302 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) ......................................3\nRange v. 535 Broadway Grp. LLC,\nNo. 17 Civ. 0423 (WHP), 2019 WL 4182966 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2019)\nv. V.L Haus. Auth.,\n57 V.I. 256 (U.S.V.I. Sup. Ct. 2012)\nv. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,\n65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985)\n\n2\n6, 7\n8\n\nEFTA02737376\n\n\f", "char_count": 1353}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 5 of 16\n\nStenberg v. Carhart,\n530 U.S. 914, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)\n\n9\n\nUnderwood v. Roswell Park Cancer Inst.,\nNo. 15 Civ. 684 (FPG), 2017 WL 131740 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017)\n\n1, 2\n\nIn re Venie,\n2017-NMSC-018, 395 P.3d 516 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 2017)\n\n4\n\nWeyant v. Phia Grp. LLP,\nNo. 17-cv-8230 (LGS), 2018 WL 4387557 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2018)\n\n2\n\nWilliam A. Gross Construction Assocs. v. American Manufacturers MutualIns.,\n600 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\n1, 2\n\nWillman v. Zelman & Assocs., LLC,\nNo. 11-cv-1216 (KBF), 2012 WL 811512 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012)\n\n2\n\nZimmelman v. Teachers' Ret. Sys.,\nNo. 08-cv-6958 (DAB) (DF), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29791 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.\n8, 2010)\n\n1\n\nStatutes\nE.P.T.L. § 11-3.2(a)(1)\n\n7\n\nFla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7)\n\n5, 6\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2)\n\n4\n\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130\n\n3\n\nCPLR § 202\n\n3\n\nOther Authorities\nC.\n\n& A.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.)\n\n1\n\nAlec A. Beech, COMMENT: AddingInsult to Death: Why Punitive Damages\nShould Not Be Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49\nAkron L. Rev. 553, 564 (2016)\n\n9\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\n\n1\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(t)\n\n3\n\n- iv -\n\nEFTA02737377\n\n\f", "char_count": 1245}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 6 of 16\n\nThe Co-Executors' submit this Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion,\npursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1).\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nThis motion is procedurally proper and ripe, regardless of its title\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that this motion should be denied because it is\n\nprocedurally improper. Plaintiff is wrong. \"[T]he technical name given to a motion challenging\na pleading is of little importance.\" See C.\n\n& A.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380\n\n(3d ed.). The Second Circuit has expressly found: \"Where the dates in a complaint show that an\naction is barred by a statute of limitations, a defendant may raise the affirmative defense in a preanswer motion to dismiss.\" Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989)\n(citations omitted). See also Zimmelman v. Teachers' Ret. Sys., No. 08-cv-6958 (DAB) (DF),\n2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29791, at *16-17, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (Freeman, M.J.), approved by,\nadopted by, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 29783 (Mar. 26, 2010) (\"a motion to dismiss on the basis that a\nplaintiff failed to file a timely administrative charge is analyzed under [Rule] 12(6)(6)1 (citations\nomitted)).\nPlaintiff, citing William A. Gross Construction Assocs. v. American Manufacturers Mutual\nIns., 600 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) and Underwood v. Roswell Park Cancer Inst., No.\n15 Civ. 684 (FPO), 2017 WL 131740, at *11 n.8 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017), argues that the Court\nshould not dismiss her time-barred claims because \"the scope of discovery would remain the\nsame.\" (Op. Br. p. 4.)2 However, those cases are factually distinguishable.\nWilliam was a construction defects and delay lawsuit in which the court found that, because\n\n' Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings given to them in the Co-Executors' moving brief (ECF No.\n27).\n2 ECF. No. 32.\n\n- 1-\n\nEFTA02737378\n\n\f", "char_count": 1966}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 7 of 16\n\nthe issue of liability would need to be resolved regardless of ancillary motions to dismiss (e.g., to\ndismiss indemnification claims), it made sense to let such claims proceed and revisit them after\ndiscovery. Id. at 590. By contrast, here, it would make no sense to permit Plaintiff to prosecute\nclaims that her own allegations establish are time-barred.\nUnderwood was a Title VII lawsuit in which the court declined to dismiss claims on statute\nof limitations grounds because that issue depended on whether each alleged discriminatory action\nwas a discrete, unlawful practice, an issue of fact which necessarily depended on the \"specific\nnature\" and surrounding circumstances of such actions. Id. at 31. Here, the issue is whether\nPlaintiff can demonstrate she was unable to discover the alleged abuse for years. She cannot\nbecause she alleges the opposite: she knew about the abuse when it allegedly happened to her.\nAs explained in the Co-Executors' moving brief, courts in this District also regularly grant\nmotions to dismiss legally deficient claims for punitive damages. (Mov. Br. pp. 4-5.) Plaintiff's\nretort that such cases are \"cherry-picked\" (Op. Br. p. 4) is unconvincing. Plaintiff's suggestion\nthat Judges Batts, Buchwald, and Kaplan, among others, misapplied the law, is not credible.\nNone of the cases cited by Plaintiff to argue otherwise involves a plaintiff impermissibly\nclaiming punitive damages in a personal injury lawsuit against a deceased tortfeasor's estate in\ndirect contravention of applicable law.3 As opposed to those cases, here there are no, and will\n\n3 See Range v. 535 Broadway Gip. LLC, No. 17 Civ. 0423 (WHP), 2019 WL 4182966, at '7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,\n2019) (ADA action); Hunter v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, No. 16 Civ. 8779 (ER), 2017 WL 5513636 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.\n16, 2017) (FDCPA action); Farina v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 18-cv-1433 (PKC), 2019 WL 3966163 (S.D.N.Y.\nAug. 21, 2019) (pu\n... [truncated, 3152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/6 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=6]", "char_count": 3152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 8 of 16\n\nnever be any, facts entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages. (See Op. Br. pp. 4-6.) Therefore, unlike\nin those actions, here there is no reason to permit the punitive damages claim to stand.\nEven if the Court were to treat this motion as one to strike pursuant to Rule 12(0, it should\nstill be granted. Courts in this District routinely grant motions to strike punitive damages including\nat the pleadings stage. See, e.g., In re Merrill\n\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 512,\n\n544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendant's motion to strike sections of complaint asserting\npunitive damages); Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V. v. USPA Accessories LLC, No. 07-cv-7998\n(HB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28999, at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008) (\"Because Defendant\nhas failed to allege that Plaintiffs conduct was egregious and directed at the public generally, its\nclaim for punitive damages cannot proceed.\"); Nash v. Coram Healthcare Corp., No. 96-cv-0298\n(LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1996) (granting motion to strike\npunitive damages prayer from the Complaint).\nCiting Burrell v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 427 (S.D.N.Y 2002), and\nOrietview Techs, LLC v. Seven For All Mankind, LLC, No. 13-cv-0538 (PAE), 2013 WL 4016302\n(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013), Plaintiff argues that, even if this motion is deemed one to strike, it should\nbe denied. (Op. Br. p. 4.) However, those cases are factually distinguishable. In Burrell,\nhomeowners sued an insurer and others alleging Fair Housing Act and RICO violations. 226 F.\nSupp. 2d at 431. Orietview was a patent infringement lawsuit. 2013 WL 4016302, at *1-2. Such\nactions have no bearing on this personal injury action against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.\nII.\n\nPlaintiff invokes inapplicable limitations statutes and tolling principles\nAs an initial matter, Plaintiff ignores that, under CPLR § 202, her Complaint must be timely\n\nunder New York law \n... [truncated, 2195 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/7 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=7]", "char_count": 2195}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 9 of 16\n\nlaw fail to address that her claims are still untimely under N.Y. law. (Mov. Br. p. 3.)4\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff argues her claims based on alleged abuse occurring in\nN.M. are timely because she has yet to disclose it to a licensed medical or mental health care\nprovider, which would trigger the limitations period under N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2). Plaintiff\nis wrong for at least two reasons.\nFirst, because her cause of action expired long before the current version of N.M. Stat. §\n37-1-30(A)(2) became effective on April 6, 2017, Plaintiff is not entitled to avail herself of it. See\nIn re Venie, 2017-NMSC-018, 395 P.3d 516 (Sup. Ct. N.M. 2017) (distinguishing cases such as\nthis, in which a cause of action expires before the enactment of a new limitations period, from\ncases in which a new limitations period extends the time to bring a cause of action before the prior\nlimitations period had expired such that a defendant has no vested right in the statute of limitations\ndefense based on the prior limitations period)? Rather, Plaintiff is only entitled to invoke the prior\nversion of N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(AX2), which provides that an action for damages based on\npersonal injury caused by childhood sexual abuse must be commenced \"three years from the date\nof the time that a person knew or had reason to know of the childhood sexual abuse and that the\nchildhood sexual abuse resulted in an injury to the person, as established by competent medical or\npsychological testimony.\" Plaintiff's Complaint establishes she knew she was abused and injured\nin 2002. (Comp1.11 42-45.) Therefore, her claims expired 15 years ago.\nSecond, even assuming the current version of N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30(A)(2) applies — which\n\nOne of the N.Y. CVA predicates is a NY Penal Law § 130 offense. Plaintiff's alleged torts occurring outside New\nYork do not qualify. See I Kamins, Mohler,\n& Shapiro, New York Criminal Practice, Second \n... [truncated, 2470 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/8 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=8]", "char_count": 2470}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 10 of 16\n\nit does not — Plaintiff concedes she has failed to disclose her alleged abuse to a licensed medical\nor mental health care provider, which is a necessary condition precedent to its application. (See\nOp. Br. 6.) Plaintiff's claim based on New Mexico law must be dismissed on that basis alone.\nPlaintiff next argues her claims have not run under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7) because she\nhas \"not yet discovered `the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse.' (Op. Br. 7\n(citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7).) Plaintiff is wrong about this as well. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(7)\nonly applies where a plaintiff alleges she was unable to discover her abuse and its effects, such as\ndue to memory loss or a lack of access to records. See\n\nv. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708, 710\n\n(Sup. Ct. Fl. 2002) (\"In Hearndon, we applied the delayed discovery doctrine to the plaintiff's\ncause of action ... for injuries resulting from childhood sexual abuse.... Although the Legislature\ndid not specifically provide for delayed accrual, we reasoned that in the narrow circumstance of\nlack of memory in childhood sexual abuse cases, the doctrine was appropriate because the lack of\nmemory was caused by the abuser.\" (citing Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Sup. Ct. Fla.\n2000)). Plaintiff makes no such allegations.\nOmar ex reL Cannon v. Lindsey, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1347 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 334 F.3d\n1246 (1 1 th Cir. 2003), which Plaintiff cites in support of her invocation of Fla. Stat. Ann. §\n95.11(7), confirms it is inapplicable to this action. In Omar, a minor (at the time of the alleged\ntorts and lawsuit) =child\n\nwho was under the care of the Florida Department of Children and\n\nFamilies (\"DCAF\") since he was two years old alleged that, until DCAF produced his records to\nhim in 2001, he had no meaningful opportunity to discovery who was responsible for abuse he had\nsuffered. See Omar, No. 02-cv-01063, Compl. (ECF No. 18) at ¶¶ 4\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/9 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=9]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 11 of 16\n\nPlaintiff's ambiguous allegation intended to plead around the statute of limitations — that\nshe is lust beginning to process\" the \"full extent\" of her injuries caused by Decedent due to abuse\noccurring over 15 years ago including when she was an adult — is not a basis to invoke Fla. Stat.\nAnn. § 95.11(7), which is intended to protect victims of childhood sex abuse who are unable to\ndiscern and thus assert their legal claims. Plaintiff cites no legal authority establishing otherwise.\nNor is Plaintiff's \"full extent\" allegation a basis to invoke the USVI \"discovery rule.\"\n\"[T]he present case is not one of those exceptional cases where the injury or its cause was not\nimmediately known to the victim, as is required for application of the `discovery rule' to the statute\nof limitations.\"\n\nv. V.I. Hous. Auth., 57 V.I. 256, 298 (U.S.V.I. Sup. Ct. 2012) (Swan,\n\nA.J., concurring). The USVI Supreme Court has recognized this issue may be decided on the\npleadings. Id. at 272.\nIn\n\nthe plaintiff argued that the trial court had erred in granting a motion to dismiss\n\nbased on statute of limitations grounds because the \"environmental discovery rule\" — a claimspecific counterpart of the general discovery rule invoked by Plaintiff here — applied. Id. at 272.\nThe Supreme Court held the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations, finding:\nThe discovery rule is not applicable ... In her complaint,\nasserts\nthat she witnessed Stanley open a bucket of Red Hot Sewer Solvent and\npour its contents into a sewer pipe outside her home.\nfurther claims\nthat upon inhaling the fumes from the sewer solvent her eyes, nose and\nthroat began to burn; she started vomitl.nd she sustained physical\ninjuries. Based on her own assertions,\nwas both aware of her\nalleged injures and their cause on the date they occurred, October 23, 2001.\nId. at 273 (emphasis added).\nIn this action, Plaintiff alleges that: Decedent sexually abused h\n... [truncated, 2249 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/10 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=10]", "char_count": 2249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 12 of 16\n\nafter Decedent \"cast her our' in 2004, she \"sank into alcoholism and other self-harm\" (id. ¶ 63).\nAccordingly, much like the plaintiff in\n\nPlaintiff's own allegations establish that she was\n\n\"aware of her alleged injuries and their cause\" long before she filed this lawsuit.\nThe cases Plaintiff cites to support her invocation of the discovery rule confirm it only\napplies where, unlike here, a plaintiff is unable to pursue her claims until a belated fact discovery.\nv. Hess Oil, 867 F.2d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 1989) (issue was when plaintiff knew he had\n\nSee\n\nbecome sick because of asbestos exposure); ■\n\nv. Gov't Emples. Ret. Sys., 1118/1992, 1993 V.I.\n\nLEXIS 23, at *1 (Feb. 22, 1993) (issue was when plaintiff knew ofthe permanency or her physical\ndisability following automobile accident for purposes of applying for disability benefits).\nIII.\n\nPlaintiff disregards black-letter law establishing punitive damages are barred here.\nPlaintiff does not argue that Florida, N.M. or N.Y. law permits her claim for punitive\n\ndamages. Therefore, should the Court find the laws ofthose jurisdictions apply, this motion should\nbe granted.\nNor does Plaintiff cite any legal authority justifying a departure from the black-letter\nchoice-of-law principle holding that the law of the place of an alleged tort applies to issues\nregarding punitive damages, which are conduct regulating. (Mov. Br. p. 5.) Plaintiff's central\npremise used to gin up a (feeble) connection to the USV1 is that Decedent \"purposefully availed\nhimself of the benefits of USVI estate law.\" (Op. Br. at p. 11.) Plaintiff's assertion is based on\nnewspaper articles and other non-binding sources that do not overcome the fact that, per her\nComplaint, N.Y. has a much stronger connection to this lawsuit than the USVI: Plaintiff chose to\nsue here (which is only possible pursuant to the same N.Y. statute that prohibits punitive damages\nagainst a deceased tortfeasor's e\n... [truncated, 2208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/11 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=11]", "char_count": 2208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 13 of 16\n\nwrongdoing (Compl. ¶ 23); and Plaintiff alleges Decedent resided in N.Y. during a \"substantial\nportion\" of the time relevant to this lawsuit, resided in N.Y. when he died, conducted \"substantial\"\nbusiness operations in N.Y., and owned or controlled \"numerous companies\" with a principal place\nof business in N.Y. as well as real property here (id. ¶1 18-27).\nThe USVI has no interest in applying its laws on punitive damages, which in any event are\nthe same as Florida, N.M. and N.Y., to alleged torts that took place in those locations. The fact\nthat Decedent's estate is being probated in the USVI 16 years after the alleged tortious conduct\ntook place is a connection much weaker than the one deemed \"tenuous\" in Nat'! Jewish\nDemocratic Council v. Adelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675,\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019), on which Plaintiff heavily relies. Even under the framework of\nAdelson, Florida, N.M. and N.Y., not the USVI, have the greater interests in applying their laws\nto torts that allegedly occurred there.\nPlaintiff's reliance on Adelson is based on an apparent misinterpretation of that action. In\nAdelson, the National Jewish Democratic Council and its chair sued Sheldon G. Adelson for\ndamages based on Adelson's prior filing of a defamation suit against them in the same court\npursuant to Nevada law. Id. at *1-2. The court had dismissed Adelson's prior action pursuant to\nNevada's anti-SLAPP statute, which has its own punitive damages provision. Id. at •1-2, 11. In\nthe action against Adelson, the court held that Nevada had a much stronger interest in applying its\npunitive damages law because Adelson had previously attempted to use Nevada's defamation law\nto chill First Amendment rights. Id. at •14. By contrast, \"New York's interest [was] relatively\nattenuated\" in the second action because \"[i]ts sole connection to this suit [was] that the suit was\n\nPlaintiff may not have the Cou\n... [truncated, 2233 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/12 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=12]", "char_count": 2233}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 14 of 16\n\nfiled here.\" Id. at *15. Here, the situation is the opposite given the strong N.Y. contacts stated\nabove. Other cases Plaintiff cites are distinguishable or support the Co-Executors' argument.'\na.\n\nPlaintiff's Banks analysis and supporting arguments are erroneous.\n\nPlaintiff's response to the Co-Executors' Banks analysis is that \"USVI case law makes\nclear that the USVI permits punitive damages against any defendant 'for conduct that is\noutrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of\nothers.' (Op. Br. p. 13.) Plaintiff misses the point. The issue here is not whether the USVI\npermits punitive damages generally. Rather, the issue is whether a proper Banks analysis shows\nthe USVI adopts the majority position by precluding the recovery of punitive damages against a\ndeceased tortfeasor's estate. As established in the Co-Executors' moving brief, every Banks factor\nfavors the estate on this question. (Mov. Br. pp. 7-8.)\nPlaintiff's arguments against the Co-Executors' Banks analysis are erroneous. First\nPlaintiff argues that, unless a jurisdiction enacts a statutory prohibition on punitive damages\nagainst a tortfeasor's estate, this Court should find the jurisdiction does not have such a prohibition.\nPlaintiff is wrong. Many jurisdictions among the majority have judicially adopted the prohibition.\nSee Alec A. Beech, COMMENT: Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be\nImposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev. 553, 564 (2016)\n(thirteen states and D.C. have judicially adopted the majority view).\nSecond, Plaintiff contends that the USVI A.G.'s request for punitive damages in a lawsuit\nagainst Decedent's estate means the third Banks factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor. However, even\n\n7 See James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 259-60 (1967) (applying N.Y. law to punitive damages against party who\nsought to prevent collect\n... [truncated, 2951 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/13 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=13]", "char_count": 2951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 15 of 16\n\nwhere an attorney general purports to interpret a law — and here the USVI AG did no such thing — the Supreme Court has warned against accepting such interpretation as authoritative. See\nStenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2614 (2000) (\"[O]ur precedent warns\nagainst accepting as 'authoritative' an Attorney General's interpretation of state law.\").\nThird Plaintiff argues the availability of punitive damages in this action would further the\nUSVI's rationales for awarding punitive damages - i.e., to punish wrongdoers and for deterrence.\nYet, a majority ofjurisdictions have already deemed that rationale inapplicable after the tortfeasor\ndies. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994)\n(\"punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery ofpunitive damages from\nthe estate of deceased tortfeasors\").\nFourth, Plaintiff contends there are no \"innocent heirs\" in this matter. However, this\nargument is based on pure speculation and otherwise unsupported by any legal authority.\nFifth, Plaintiff asks the Court to create new law by holding Decedent's suicide was an\nattempt to avoid punitive damages and, therefore, punitive damages should be permitted. This is\nalso speculation. Moreover, the only legal authority Plaintiff cites to support this argument is dicta\nfrom an Indiana state law case in which that state joined the majority ofjurisdictions holding that\n\"Indiana law does not permit recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a deceased\ntortfeasor.\" Crabtree ex reL. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind. 2005).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above and in their moving brief, the Co-Executors respectfully\nrequest that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice to the extent it is time-barred\nand Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, together with such other and further relief as the Court\ndeems just\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737373/14 or ?id=EFTA02737373&page=14]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737373", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 34\n\nFiled 04/07/20\n\nPage 16 of 16\n\nDated: New York, New York\nApril 7, 2020\nBy: /s/ Bennet I Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nAttorneyfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02737388\n\n\f", "char_count": 261}]}