{"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_count": 14, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737274", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737274.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 1 of 14\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv- 10788 (GHW) (DCF)\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN, as\nexecutors of the ESTATE OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT\nOF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\n411603298v2\n\nEFTA02737274\n\n\f", "char_count": 515}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 2 of 14\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS\n\n2\n\nA.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Torts Occurring Over 15 Years Ago In New York And\nOther Jurisdictions, Starting When She Was Age Seventeen\n\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\n2\n2\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nState A Claim\n\n2\n\nB.\n\nMost Of Plaintiff's Claims Expired Many Years Ago\n\n3\n\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Fails As A Matter Of Law\n\n4\n\nI.\n\n2.\n\n3.\n\nBanks factor one: previously, USVI courts favorably cited the\nRestatement section that precludes punitive damages against\nestates\n\n7\n\nBanks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an\naward of punitive damages based on the wrongful acts of a\ndecedent.\n\n7\n\nBanks factor three: Post-Banks, USVI courts have favorably\napplied Restatement Section 908 to questions regarding punitive\ndamages\n\n8\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n41603298v2\n\n9\n\n-i-\n\nEFTA02737275\n\n\f", "char_count": 1055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 3 of 14\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAshcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n2\n\nBanks v. Int'l Rental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011)\n\n6, 7, 8\n\nBell Att Corp. v. Twombly,\n550 U.S. 544 (2007)\n\n2\n\nBlissett v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n6\n\nBooth v. Bowen,\nNo. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\n\n7\n\nBrandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd.,\n24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Ten. Ct. 1989)\nCrabtree v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n7\n\nv. Christian,\n46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005)\n\n8\n\nGov't of Virgin Islands v.\nNo. S. Cr. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014)\n\n6\n\nGraham v.\n224 F.R.D. 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n6\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009)\n\n7\n\nIsaac v. Crichlow,\n63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n8\n\nJaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,\n117 N.M. 337 (N.M. 1994).\n\n.6\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\nNo. 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998)\n(Sweet, J.)\n\n4\n\nii\n41603298v2\n\nEFTA02737276\n\n\f", "char_count": 1079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 4 of 14\n\nLohr v. Byrd,\n522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)\n\n6\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sparing Ass'n,\n69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n8\n\nPoindexter v. Zacharzewski,\nNo. 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.)\n\n6\n\nPowell v. Chi-Co's Distrib.,\nNo. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21 (U.S.V.I. Super. O. Apr. 3, 2014)\n\n8\n\nv. Consumers Distrib. Co.,\n648 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.)\n\n4\n\nSimons v. Marriott Corp.,\nNo. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12,\n1993)\n\n5\n\nSIR v. N.Y.C. Dep't ofEduc.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n(Buchwald, J.)\n\n4\n\nSt.\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows,\n15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979)\n\n8\n\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt.,\nNo. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n5\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin,\nNo. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n(Batts, J.)\n\n4\n\nv. Rijos,\n780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D.V.I. 2011)\n\n8\n\nWhitley v. Bowden,\nNo. 17-CV-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018)\n\n3\n\nStatutes\nEPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1)\n\n5\n\nFla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)\n\n4\n\nFla. Stat. § 95.11(7)\n\n4\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-8\n\n4\niii\n\n416032984\n\nEFTA02737277\n\n\f", "char_count": 1304}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 5 of 14\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-30\n\n4\n\nNew York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law\n\n5\n\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a\n\n6\n\nNew York's Child Victims Act\n\n1\n\nOther Authorities\nAlec A. Beech, Adding Insult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be\nImposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev.\n553 (2016)\n\n7\n\nCPLR § 202\n\n3\n\nCPLR § 214(5)\n\n3\n\nCPLR § 214-g\n\n1\n\nCPLR § 215(3)\n\n3\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\n\n1\n\n2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)\n\n7\n\nRestatement of Torts Section 908\n\n8\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts\n\n7\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts (1965)\n\n8\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2)\n\n7, 8\n\nRouhette, The Availability ofPunitive Damages in Europe: Growing Trend or\nNonexistent Concept\n\n6\n\nTimothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bornstein, Punished, Dead Or Alive:\nEmpirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased\nDefendants\n\n8\n\niv\n416032984\n\nEFTA02737278\n\n\f", "char_count": 1016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 6 of 14\n\nDefendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Co-Executors\"), submit this memorandum of law in support of their\nmotion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(6)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF\nNo. I) to the extent it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is\nprohibited as a matter of law.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nThis action is largely time-barred. Plaintiff alleges that Jeffrey E. Epstein (\"Decedent\"),\nnow deceased, sexually assaulted her from 2002, when she was 17, to 2004, in Florida, New\nMexico, New York, the U.S. Virgin Islands (\"USVr') and France. (Comp1.11 4, 12, 17, 29, 34,\n59-61.) Plaintiff alleges causes of action for battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional\ndistress. (Id. 11 71—82.) Plaintiff seeks, among other things, \"punitive damages in an amount to be\ndetermined.\" (Id. p. 12.)\nExcluding Plaintiff's alleged tons occurring in New York when she was 17 and thus subject\nto New York's Child Victims Act (\"CVA\") I Plaintiff's claims expired many years ago. Under\nNew York law, for example, Plaintiffs claims arising from her alleged sexual abuse as an adult\nexpired in 2007 at the latest. Therefore, all of the Plaintiff's non-CVA claims must be dismissed.\nPlaintiff's demand for punitive damages must also be dismissed as a matter of law. Each\njurisdiction where the alleged torts occurred bars recovery of punitive damages from a decedent\ntortfeasor's estate—i.e., exactly what Plaintiff seeks here.\n\n'The CVA created a one-year window period, commencing in August 2019, in which civil claims alleging damages\n\"suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the\npenal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age\" may be filed, despite the statute of limitations\nhaving already run. CPLR § 214-g (e\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/5 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=5]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 7 of 14\n\nSTATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS\nA.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Torts Occurring Over 15 Years Ago In New York And\nOther Jurisdictions, Starting When She Was Age Seventeen\n\nPlaintiff, who claims Arizona residency, alleges that in 2002, when she was 17, her sister,\nwho is five years older, introduced Plaintiff to Decedent, describing him as generous and desiring\nto help Plaintiff attend college. (Compl. qq 32, 34.) Plaintiff further alleges that, starting in 2002\nand ending in 2004, Decedent sexually assaulted her in Florida, New Mexico, New York, the\nUSVI, and France. (Id. In 4. 12, 17, 29, 34, 59-61.) Although Plaintiff suggests she is only suing\non claims based on torts that occurred while she was still a minor (id. 1 69), she also alleges\nDecedent abused her \"for years\" (id.1 29). Plaintiff largely fails to articulate which alleged torts\nhappened when and in which jurisdictions.\nPlaintiff asserts three causes of action: battery (First Cause of Action); assault (Second\nCause of Action); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Third Cause of Action). (Id. 11i\n71—82.) As noted above, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in an unspecified amount. (Id. p. 12.)\nARGUMENT\nA.\n\nLegal Standard: Plaintiff's Legal Conclusions, Labels And Formulaic\nRecitations Of The Elements Of Her Causes Of Action Are Insufficient To\nState A Claim\n\n\"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,\naccepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n662, 678 (2009). While a Court must normally accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations\nin a complaint and draw all inferences in a plaintiff's favor, those principles are \"inapplicable to\nlegal conclusions.\" Id. at 678 (2009) (citing Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556\n(2007)). Thus, a pleading that offers only \"labels and conclusions\" or \"a formulaic recitation of\nthe elements\n... [truncated, 2105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/6 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=6]", "char_count": 2105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 8 of 14\n\nrequired to reconcile Plaintiffs contradictory allegations concerning whether she is suing only for\nalleged torts that occurred when she was 17, or for sexual abuse allegedly committed when she\nwas an adult. See Whitley v. Bowden, No. I7-CV-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313, at •11\n(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) (\"'a court is neither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory\nallegations in the pleadings as true in deciding a motion to dismiss.' (citation omitted)).\nB.\n\nMost Of Plaintiff's Claims Expired Many Years Ago\n\nCPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on a cause\nof action accruing outside New York, the complaint must be timely filed under the applicable\nstatutes of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. A\nclaim that is untimely under one or both of the two jurisdictions must be dismissed.\nPlaintiff turned 18 at some point in 2003. (Compl. I 34.) Plaintiff alleges she was sexually\nassaulted by Decedent until 2004, i.e., when Plaintiff was an adult. (Id. 1134, 59-61.) Excluding\nPlaintiffs alleged torts subject to the CVA (i.e., tons occurring in New York when she was under\n18), Plaintiffs causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year of accrual\n(CPLR § 215(3)); or, if Plaintiff's claims sound in personal injury, within three years (CPLR §\n214(5)). Therefore, under New York law, Plaintiff's non-CVA claims arising from her alleged\nsexual abuse expired in 2007 at the latest.\nPlaintiffs claims based on alleged torts occurring outside New York also expired long ago\nunder the laws of those jurisdictions, including non-New York torts that occurred while she was a\nminor (if any), as follows: (Florida) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of within\n7 years after she reached the age of majority (i.e., by 2010), within 4 years after she left Decedent's\ndependency (2008 at the latest)\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/7 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=7]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 9 of 14\n\nand the causal relationship between that injury and the alleged abuse (Ha. Stat. § 95.11(7));3 and,\nafter Plaintiff reached age of majority, within 4 years (i.e., sometime in 2007) (Ha. Stat. § 95.11\n(3)(O)); (New Mexico) for torts occurring while she was a minor, the later of the \"first instant\" of\nPlaintiff's 24th birthday (i.e., sometime in 2009) or 3 years from the date that Plaintiff first\ndisclosed her childhood sexual abuse to a licensed medical or mental health care provider in the\ncontext of receiving health care (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-30) (Plaintiff alleges she never made such a\ndisclosure (Comp1.167)); and, after Plaintiff reached age of majority, 3 years (i.e., in 2006) (N.M.\nStat. § 37-1-8); (USVI) when Plaintiff turned 23 (i.e., sometime in 2008) (5 V.I.C. §§ 31(5)(A),\n36(a)(1)).\nC.\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Fails As A Matter Of Law\n\nPlaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law because it is barred by the\nlaw of each potentially applicable jurisdiction. Courts in this District regularly grant motions to\ndismiss legally deficient claims for punitive damages. See, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v.\nAustin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts,\nJ.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead because\nallegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to the\nrequired level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n13227, at *25-.26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss punitive\ndamages claims because punitive damages were not statutorily available); Kunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\nNo. 97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet, J.)\n(granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in\ncomplaint was true,\n... [truncated, 2292 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/8 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=8]", "char_count": 2292}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 10 of 14\n\nConsumers Distrib. Co., 648 F. Supp. 980, 981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting\nmotion to dismiss claim for punitive damages).\nWhen determining what law applies, the Court looks to the choice-of-law rules of the forum\nstate. Simons v. Marriott Corp., No. 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at *15\n(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, the law of the state where a tort occurs generally\napplies to punitive damages. See Starr Indent & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015) (\"Because punitive damages are\nconduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred will generally apply.'\n(quoting Deutsch v. Novarris Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Guidi\nv. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006 (LAP), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at *I\n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)).\nHere, Plaintiff alleges tortious conduct occurring in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the\nUSVI, and France. (Compl. 1140, 42.) None of these jurisdictions permits recovery of punitive\ndamages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. That is unsurprising given that is the law in most\njurisdictions, as reflected in the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (punitive\ndamages not available against representatives of deceased tortfeasor). Each of these jurisdictions\nis addressed below in turn.\nNew York: New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provides: \"No cause of action for\ninjury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any\ninjury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent,\nbut punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought\nto recover damages for personal injury.\" NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (emphasis added). \"Also,\n'there is a strong policy against the \n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/9 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=9]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nof wrongful conduct of the decedent?\" Graham v.\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 11 of 14\n\n,224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n(quoting Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a defines \"personal injury\" as including \"an\nassault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff,\nor of another.\" Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries. Accordingly,\nPlaintiff may not recover punitive damages against the Co-Executors based on alleged torts that\noccurred in New York.\nFlorida: \"Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a\nwrongdoer who is deceased.\" Poindexter v. Zacharzewski, No. 18-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n189861, at *6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Ha.) (citing Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Ha. 1988)).\nNew Mexico: The Supreme Court of New Mexico has unequivocally held that \"punishment\nand deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from the estate of\ndeceased tortfeasors.\" Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994).\nFrance:\n\nlaw does not recognize punitive damages. See 2 Linda L. Schlueter,\n\nPunitive Damages § 22.4 (7th ed. 2015) (citing Rouhette, The Availability ofPunitive Damages in\nEurope: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept, 74 Def. Coun. J. 320 (2007)).\nUSVI: In 2011, the Supreme Court of the USVI effectively instructed USVI courts to\napply what is now known as a \"Banks analysis\" to determine U.S.V.I. common law. Banks v. Int'l\nRental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011). The Banks analysis includes consideration\nof three non-dispositive factors: (1) whether any USVI courts have previously adopted a particular\nrule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly.\nwhich approach represents the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.\n\nNo.\n\nS. CT. CIV. 2013-00\n... [truncated, 2067 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/10 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=10]", "char_count": 2067}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 12 of 14\n\nApplying the Banks factors here demonstrates that USVI courts would adopt the rule in the\nRestatement (Second) of Torts—which is also followed in the majority of United States\njurisdictions, including New York, Florida and New Mexico—and hold that punitive damages are\nnot available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.\n1.\n\nBanks factor one: previously, USVI courts favorably cited the\nRestatement section that precludes punitive damages against estates.\n\nUSVI courts have favorably recited the Restatement's rule precluding punitive damages\nagainst a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See, e.g.,\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619,\n\n628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. C1V. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067, at *5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10,\n2008). In these cases, the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands considered the inverse of the\nissue here, i.e., whether the personal representatives of an estate may obtain punitive damages in\nan action arising from the decedent's wrongful death. In determining that punitive damages were\nnot available under such circumstances, the courts cited the Restatement, which provides that\nIplunifive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor,\nordinarily, in an action under a death statute.\" Restat. (Second) of Tons § 908 cmt. a (emphasis\nadded). Accordingly, this Banks factor favors the Co-Executors.\n2.\n\nBanks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an\naward of punitive damages based on the wrongful acts of a decedent.\n\nThis Banks factor overwhelmingly supports the Co-Executors' position. The majority of\nU.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against the personal representatives\nof an estate based on the actions of the deceased tortfeasor. See Crabtree v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. 2005) (\"The majority view denies punitive damages.\"); 2 Linda L.\nSchlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. \n... [truncated, 2260 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/11 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=11]", "char_count": 2260}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 13 of 14\n\nOhio, 49 Akron L. Rev. 553 (2016))); Timothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bornstein, Punished,\nDead Or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased\nDefendants, 16 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 393, 398 (2010) (\"The Restatement (Second) of Torts\n(1965) is one authority stating that punitive damages should not follow the death of a wrongdoer,\nand the majority of courts considering the issue have provided rulings consistent with this\nposition.\").\n3.\n\nBanks factor three: Post-Banks, USVI courts have favorably applied\nRestatement Section 908 to questions regarding punitive damages.\n\nThe third Banks factor weighs strongly in favor of the Co-Executors as well. Post-Banks,\nUSVI Courts have already found that Section 908 of the Restatement is \"the soundest rule for the\nVirgin Islands with respect to the imposition of an award of punitive damages.\" Pappas v. Hotel\non the Cay Time-Sharing Ass'n, 69 V.I. 3, 15 n.8 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015) (citing\nChristian, 46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005), Isaac v. Crichlow, 63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS\n15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015), St.\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows, 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979),\n\nBrandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1989), and\n\nv. Rijos, 780\n\nF. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011)); Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I.\nLEXIS 21, at •5 n.13 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (\"Applying a Banks analysis, the Court\nfinds that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction.\").\nTherefore, every Banks factor favors the Co-Executors: (1) pre-Banks, USVI courts\nexpressed approval for the general rule that punitive damages cannot be recovered against a\nwrongdoer's estate; (2) the majority of courts from other jurisdictions preclude punitive damages\nagainst a wrongdoer's estate; and (3) post-Banks, USVI courts have held that Section 908 of the\nRestatement of Tort\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02737274/12 or ?id=EFTA02737274&page=12]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737274", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 27\n\nFiled 02/28/20\n\nPage 14 of 14\n\n***\n\nIn conclusion, even if any of Plaintiff's claims survive, her claim for punitive damages\nmust be dismissed in its entirety.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss\nPlaintiff's Complaint to the extent it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages,\ntogether with such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nFebruary 28, 2020\nBy: Is/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nAttorney for Defendants\n\n9\n96367540_2\n\nEFTA02737287\n\n\f", "char_count": 685}]}