{"efta_number": "EFTA02737249", "page_count": 4, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02737249", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02737249.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02737249", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 16\n\nFiled 01/21/20\n\nTroutman Sanders LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\ntroutman.com\n\nPage 1 of 4\n\ntroutmar?\nsanders\n\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nbennet.moskowitz@troutman.com\n\nJanuary 21, 2020\nECF\nHon. GmcsH.\nMoynihan\nDaniel\nUnited States Courthouse\n500 Pearl St.\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\nRe:\n\nv. Darren K. lndyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Executors of the Estate\nof Jeffrey E. Epstein, 1:19-cv-10788 (GHW) (DCF)\n\nDear Judge\nWe represent Defendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, Co-Executors of the\nEstate of Jeffrey E. Epstein (together, the \"Co-Executors\"), in the above-referenced action. We\nwrite pursuant to Your Honor's Individual Rules 1(A) and 2(C)(i) to set forth the grounds for the\nCo-Executors' anticipated motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the time-barred\nclaims and punitive damages demand in Plaintiff\nComplaint (ECF No. 1).\n1. Plaintiff alleges torts occurring over 15 years ago in NY and other jurisdictions.\nPlaintiff, who claims Arizona residency, alleges that Mr. Epstein, now deceased, sexually\nassaulted her from 2002 to 2004 in Florida, New Mexico, New York, the U.S. Virgin Islands\n(\"USVI\") and France. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 12, 17, 29, 34, 59-61.) Plaintiff alleges causes of action for\nbattery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Id. ¶¶ 71 - 82.) Plaintiff seeks,\namong other things, \"punitive damages in an amount to be determined.\" (Id. p. 12.)\n2. Plaintiff's causes of action are partially time-barred.\nCPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-New York resident such as Plaintiff sues on a\ncause of action accruing outside New York, the complaint must be filed timely under the statute\nof limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the cause of action accrued. A claim\nthat is untimely under one or both of the two jurisdictions must be dismissed.\nPlaintiff turned 18 at some point in 2003. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff alleges she was\nsexually assaulted by Mr. Epstein until 2004, i.e., when Plaintiff was an adult (Compl. ¶¶ 34, 59-\n\nEFTA02737249\n\n\f", "char_count": 2068}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737249", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\nJanuary 21, 2020\nPage 2\n\nDocument 16\n\nFiled 01/21120\n\nPage 2 of 4\n\ntroutmaril\nsanders\n\n61). Accordingly, excluding Plaintiff's alleged torts subject to the New York Child Victims Act,' if\nany, Plaintiff's causes of action sounding in battery must be commenced within one year of\naccrual (CPLR § 215(3)); or, if Plaintiff's claims sound in personal injury, within three years\n(CPLR § 214(5)). Therefore, under New York law, Plaintiff's claims arising from her alleged\nsexual abuse expired in 2007 at the latest.\nPlaintiff's claims based on alleged torts occurring outside New York also expired long\nago, including torts that occurred while she was a minor, as follows: (Florida) for torts occurring\nwhile she was a minor, the later of within 7 years after she reached age of majority (Le., by\n2010), within 4 years after she left the dependency of Mr. Epstein (2008 at the latest),2 or within\n4 years from the time she discovered both the injury and the causal relationship between the\ninjury and the abuse (Fla. Stat. § 95.11(7));3 and, after Plaintiff reached age of majority, within 4\nyears (Le., sometime in 2007) (Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O)); (New Mexico) for torts occurring while\nshe was a minor, the later of the \"first instant\" of Plaintiff's 24th birthday (i.e., sometime in 2009)\nor 3 years from the date that Plaintiff first disclosed her childhood sexual abuse to a licensed\nmedical or mental health care provider in the context of receiving health care (N.M. Stat. § 37-130) (plaintiff alleges she never made such a disclosure (Compl. ¶ 67)); and, after Plaintiff\nreached age of majority, 3 years (i.e., in 2006) (N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); (USVI) when Plaintiff\nturned 23 (Le., sometime in 2008) (5 V.I.C. §§ 31(5)(A), 36(a)(1)).\nAlthough Plaintiff suggests she is only suing on claims based on torts that occurred while\nshe was still a minor (Compl. ¶ 69), she also alleges Mr. Epstein abused her \"for years\" (Id. at ¶\n29). The Court is not required to reconcile Plaintiff's contradictory allegations. See Whitley v.\nBowden, No. 17-CV-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313, at '11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) (\"'a court is\nneither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory allegations in the pleadings as true in\ndeciding a motion to dismiss.- (citation omitted)).\nTherefore, Plaintiff's claims based on torts occurring in New York after she reached majority,\nas well as her claims based on torts occurring in New Mexico, Florida and the USVI —\nregardless of whether she was a minor at the time — must be dismissed.\n\nThe Child Victims Act created a one-year window period in which civil claims alleging damages \"suffered\nas a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of\nthe penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age\" may be filed despite the statute\nof limitations having already run. CPLR § 214-g (emphasis added).\n2 Plaintiff alleges Mr. Epstein \"cast her out\" in 2004. (Compl. ¶¶ 59-61.) Therefore, Plaintiff could not have\ndepended on him after that time.\n3 Plaintiff's allegations that she is only now beginning to \"process\" her injuries (Compl. ¶¶ 65, 68) is not\nequivalent to alleging tolling due to her belated discovery of such injuries. She makes no such allegation.\n\nEFTA02737250\n\n\f\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF January 21, 2020 Page 4  Document 16  Filed 01/21120  Page 4 of 4  troutmaril sanders  Respectfully submitted, s/Bennet J. Moskowitz Bennet J. Moskowitz  EFTA02737252", "char_count": 3524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737249", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\n\nDocument 16\n\nFiled 01/21/20\n\nJanuary 21, 2020\nPage 3\n\nPage 3 of 4\n\ntroutmariP\n\nsanders\n\n3. Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.\nCourts in this District regularly grant motions to dismiss claims for punitive damages.\nSee, e.g., The Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n177691, at '17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive\ndamages without leave to replead because allegations regarding defendant's bad faith conduct\nwere conclusory and did not rise to required level of malice); SJB v. N.Y.C. Dept of Educ., No.\n03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227, at '25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.)\n(granting motion to dismiss punitive damages claims because punitive damages were not\nstatutorily available); Blasetti v. Pietropolo, 213 F. Supp. 2d 425, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)\n(Kaplan, J.) (the] claim for punitive damages ... is dismissed.\").\nHere, Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must be dismissed as a matter of law\nbecause none of the jurisdictions where the alleged torts against Plaintiff occurred permit\npunitive damages against the personal representatives of a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See\nPoindexter v. Zacharzewski, 18-civ-14155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at '6 (Nov. 5, 2018\nS.D. Fla.) (\"Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer\nwho is deceased.\"); Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346 (N.M. 1994)\n(\"punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages\nfrom the estate of deceased tortfeasors.\"); NY EPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1) (\"For any injury, an action\nmay be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent, but punitive\ndamages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged in any such action brought to recover\ndamages for personal injury.\" (emphasis added)). That is also the law in most U.S. jurisdictions,\nas reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cmt. a\n(\"Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor.\").\nSee also Powell v. Chi-Co's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at '5 n.13\n(U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts \"reflects\nthe common law of this jurisdiction\") 4.5\n\nUSVI courts apply a -Banks analysis\" to determine U.S.V.I. common law. Banks v. Intl Rental &\nLeasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011). The Banks analysis includes consideration of three factors:\n(1) whether any USVI courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2) the position taken by a majority\nof courts of other jurisdictions; and (iina importantly, which approach represents the soundest rule for\nthe USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.\nNo. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at '1 (V.I.\nFeb. 24, 2014). Each Banks factor favors the Estate: (1) pre-Banks, USVI courts expressed approval for\nthe general rule that punitive dii\ncannot be recovered against the personal representatives of a\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009)\nwrongdoer's estate (see. e.g..\n(considering the inverse issue)); (2) a majority of courts from other jurisdictions preclude punitive\ndamages against the personal representatives of a wrongdoers estate (2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive\nDamages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)); and (3) post-Banks, USVI courts have held Restatement § 908\nrepresents the soundest rule for the USVI (see Powell. supra.).\nlaw does not recognize punitive damages. See 2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 22.4\n(7th ed. 2015) (citing Rouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Europe: Growing Trend or\nNonexistent Concept, 74 Def. Coun. J. 320 (2007)).\n\nEFTA02737251\n\n\f", "char_count": 3816}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02737249", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10788-GHW-DCF\nJanuary 21, 2020\nPage 4\n\nDocument 16\n\nFiled 01/21120\n\nPage 4 of 4\n\ntroutmaril\nsanders\n\nRespectfully submitted,\ns/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\n\nEFTA02737252\n\n\f", "char_count": 196}]}