{"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_count": 14, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02734407", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02734407.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Filing # 140691263 E-Filed 12/20/2021 02:46:09 PM\n\nIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH\nJUDICIAL CIRCUIT N AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA\nCIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION: AG\nCASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681-1OCa-MB\nCA FLORIDA HOLDINGS LLC PUBLISHER\nOF THE PALM BEACH POST,\nPlaintifiVetitioner\nvs.\nDAVE ARONBERG,\nSHARON R BOCK,\nDefendant/Respondents.\n\nCO SA\nFINAL JUDGMENT\nTHIS CAUSE came before the court on the mo\nFlorida Holdings, LLC, publisher of The Palm B\ncomplaint in this action. (D.E. # 58.) Th\n\na\n\nary judgment of plaintiff CA\no\n\ne Newspaper\"), on Count I of its\ning defendant,\n\nAbruzzo, in his\n\ncapacity as the Clerk and Comptroller\n\nm B ch County (\"the clerk\"), filed a response to the\n\nmotion on October 1, 2021. (D.E.\n\ne Newspaper filed a reply on October 13, 2021. (D.E.\n\n# 77.) The motion was heard\nsubmissions of the putt\n\ncourt on October 22, 2021. The court has considered the\narguments of counsel, the record in the case, and is otherwise\n\nadvised of the pr4js. Because Count II of the Newspaper's complaint, which is the only other\ncount,+ha\n\nosed of by Order filed June 7, 2020 (D.E. # 33), this is a final judgment in the\n\ncase.'\n\nThe court is aware that in an October 22, 2021, article published by the Newspaper it suggested\nthat the court indicated at the hearing that it was inclined to release the records. The Newspaper\nmay have misheard the court's remarks during the hearing, which lasted nearly two hours. The\ncourt is not criticizing the Newspaper and has a great deal of respect for the reporter but must\nclarify that the court stated that it had not made a decision whether it would order that the grand\njury records would be produced. (Hrg. Tr. at 19:11-16.) The court reiterated, \"So, I just wanted\n\n1\n\nFILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY. FL,\n\nABRUZZO, CLERK, 12/20/2021 02:46:09 PM\n\nEFTA02734407\n\n\f", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND ITS CURRENT STATUS\nThe Newspaper filed its complaint on November 14, 2019, seeking disclosure and\nproduction of documents, exhibits, testimony transcripts, audio and visual materials, and all other\nthings (\"the Materials\") presented to the 2006 grand jury in proceedings instituted by the State\nAttorney for the 15°' Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (\"the State Attorney\")\nwhich resulted in an indictment of Jeffrey Epstein for one count of Felon\nProstitution, No. 50-2006-CF-0094544OOOC-MB, and a subsequent char\nUnder Age 18 for Prostitution, 50-2008-CF-009381-A300C-MB. In\n\ntation of\nuring Person\n\ncIO\n\non June 30, 2008,\n\nMr. Epstein pleaded guilty to the charge of Procuring Person\n\nA\n\nwas sentenced to 12 months of community control in t\n\nof the Palm Beach County\n\nSheriff's Office. (2008-CF-009381, D.E. # 11, 12;\nCount I of the Newspaper's comp\n? c ''S\nnied\n905.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, should\n\n• erp\n\nNewspaper so that it may then\n\n8 for Prostitution. He\n\n9454, D.E. # 89.)\na declaratory judgment that section\nto permit disclosure of the Materials to the\n\nir content as part of its continued investigation and\n\nreporting of matters relating to\n\n. Ep\n\nin. That count also seeks a declaration ordering disclosure\n\nof the Materials \"pursuanrp\n\ncourt's] inherent authority over grand jury proceedings because\n\nof the exception\n\nublic nterest in this case and the compelling circumstances supporting\n\ntransparency\n\nended Complaint, ¶ 71.)\nPRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE\n\nThe court notes that the only other defendant in this case, the State Attorney, has been\ndismissed, and there have been no attempts to intervene in this case to take a position against\n\nto make that clear from the outset, that there will be no wholesale turning over of any records if —\nand, again, that is a significant word — if the production is ordered.\" (Hrg. Tr. at 20:9-13,\nemphasis added.)\n2\n\nEFTA02734408\n\n\f", "char_count": 1937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "disclosure. The clerk's position is that he is merely the custodian of the Materials, and as such he\nhas no real interest in the issues before the court as identified. The clerk only needs direction from\nthe court on whether or not he should produce and disclose the Materials. Nonetheless, the clerk\nhas zealously advocated the position against disclosure based upon grand jury secrecy and\nconfidentiality because under Rule 2.420(d)(1)(B)(xvi) of the Florida Rules of General Practice\nand Judicial Administration, the clerk is required to maintain the confidentialtt\nrecords.\nThe clerk is correct that his role as custodian of the Materials '\ndirection once confidentiality is determined. The clerk's\n\ns)\nl 'n\n\ncomplicated, or expanded, because the Newspaper filed tKi\n• z ti\ntt\naction and has moved for summary judgment\n\n\\,\n\n0\n\nand jury\n\nollow the court's\n\nproceeding has been\na civil declaratory judgment\n\nRule of Civil Procedure 1.510.\n\nHowever, the proper procedure for obtaining • istirs, f confidential court records is set forth in\nFlorida Rule of General Practice and J ' ial\n\ninistration 2.420(j), which only requires the\n\nfiling of a \"motion\" seeking disclo\n\n. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin Rule 2.420(jX2).\n\nAccordingly, the court\n\nt the Newspaper's complaint and motion for summary\n\nill\n\njudgment as a motion for aTilivs e under Rule 2.420(j).2 As a result, the court need not determine,\nas a matter of la\n\nheth\n\nthe clerk of the court is a proper party defendant to a declaratory\n\njudgment ac\n\nthe release of grand jury records. Although the clerk of court is the proper\n\n2 Rule 2.4200)(3) requires a party seeking disclosure to serve the motion \"on all parties and\nreasonably affected non-parties[.]\" Of course, that did not occur here and would have been\nimpossible to carry out, as \"reasonably affected non-parties\" cannot be determined without\nactually seeing the Materials. Because the court is denying the relief sought, however, this issue\nis academic.\n3\n\nEFTA02734409\n\n\f", "char_count": 1987}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "subject of any order directing the release of protected grand jury records issued pursuant to Rule\n2.420(j), under the rule it is not a \"defendant\" or \"party\" in relation to the requested itself.\nThe court's determination to treat the Newspaper's claim as a Rule 2.420(j) motion\nresolves another issue as well. The Newspaper devotes significant argument to its standing to\nprosecute this action, arguing that section 905.27 vests it with a private right of action. (Motion,\nI' 81-90.). First, the argument of whether section 905.27 creates a private ri\nalready substantively addressed by this court's Order dismissing Cou\n\nction was\na Amended\n\nComplaint. (D.E. # 33). Second, the court sees no reason to question e\n\nper's standing to\n\nbring a Rule 2.4200) motion, which is available to any memV th\n\nblic seeking access to\n\nrecords of the judicial branch. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & J\n\nd\n\nS\n\nLastly, even in treating the complaint and mo ; ary\nt\n\n2.420(a).\njudgment as a motion under\n\nssues before the court are issues of law.\n\nRule 2.420(j), there are no disputed fact issu\nAccordingly, this is a final judgment.\nT\n\nThe facts germane to tlis fnal judgment are not in dispute and are recounted here. The\n2006 grand jury was con\n\njn proceedings instituted by the State Attorney regarding alleged\n\ncriminal miscon\n\nof a sexual nature by Jeffrey Epstein, now deceased. Materials were\n\npresented to\n\nd jury. The United States Department of Justice, by and through the office of\n\nthe Unites\n\nAttorney for the Southern District of Florida, obtained the Materials.; The\n\n3 This fact is established by Exhibit 3 to the Newspaper's motion, which is the United States\n\nDepartment of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility Report, \"Investigation into the U.S.\nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal\nCriminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the\nInvestigation,\" Nov. 2020 (\"the Report\"). The Report makes referen\n... [truncated, 2162 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/3 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=3]", "char_count": 2162}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Newspaper operates and does business in Palm Beach County, Florida. The clerk is a duly elected\ngovernmental official, and he and his office have custody of the Materials.\nANALYSIS\nThe Newspaper appears to have presented questions of first impression regarding both the\ninterpretation of section 905.27 and the \"inherent authority\" of the court. Those questions also\nimplicate issues of constitutional import regarding the historic tension between\nand the First Amendment. Additionally, the Newspaper presents these qu\ngenuine subjects of public interest and concern regarding the prosecut\nMr. Epstein was a person of great wealth and influence a\n\nof\n\nsecrecy\n•he\n\ncontext of\n\nof Mr. Epstein.\ng a sex predator who\n\nengaged in criminal sex trafficking of minors, among othK ci2\n•\nThe public record establishes' that Mr. E\nagreement with the United States Attorney fo\n\ninto a federal non-prosecution\n\nne count of procuring a minor for prostitution,\n\nfor which he served less than a y\n\nof New York for the\n\nt\n\nern District of Florida in exchange for a\n\nguilty plea in the then pending state co\n\nMr. Epstein was federally indi\n\n•\n\nlease incarceration at the Palm Beach County Jail.5\n19 by the United States Attorney for the Southern District\n\ne of conduct during the 2002-2005 time-span preceding the 2006\n\nstate indictment\n\nthe 2008 no-prosecution agreement negotiated with the federal prosecutor.\n\nMr. Epstein\n\ner brought to trial on those 2019 charges, having committed suicide in his\n\nNew Yell.\n\nSee the Report, referenced in n. 1, supra.\n\nId\n5\n\nEFTA02734411\n\n\f", "char_count": 1561}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "In this Order, the court rules against the Newspaper because the established and binding\nmaxims of Florida law constrain it to do so. As noted below, federal courts have departed from\nthe limited prescriptions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in granting access to grand\njury records in \"special circumstances.\" E.g., In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir.\n1997) (recognizing \"that there are certain \"special circumstances\" in which release of grand jury\nrecords is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of [Rule 6(e)]\"). Florida la\n\nvever, has\n\nyet to recognize such flexibility under either section 905.27 or Rule 2.420C- )\n(A)\n\nSection 905.27 and the phrase \"furthering j\n\nThe court first addresses the issue whether the Newspac\nof . .. furthering justice\" under section 905.27(1Xc).\n\n' cis\n1\nII\n\ne.\nts within \"the purpose\n\nof sections 905.27(1) and (2)\n\nprovide context:\n(1) A grand juror, state attorney, assi\nattorney, reporter, stenographer,\ninterpreter, or any other person app\nre the grand jury shall not disclose\nthe testimony of a witness exa\nd b ore the grand jury or other evidence\nreceived by it except when r u41*y a court to disclose the testimony for the\npurpose of:\n(a) Ascertaining wheth\nbefore the court;\n(b) Determt\n(c) Fu\n\nit is consistent with the testimony given by the witness\n\nth r the witness is guilty of perjury; or\nn justice.\n\n(2)Alt\n\nawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose,\nor communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to\nbe\nlished, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person,\nin any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the\ngrand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except wizen such testimony\nis or has been disclosed in a court proceeding. When a court orders the\ndisclosure of such testimony pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a criminal\ncase, it may be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney of the court in which such\ncriminal\n... [truncated, 2252 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/5 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=5]", "char_count": 2252}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a civil\ncase, it may be disclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the\nlatter to their legal associates and employees. However, the grand jury testimony\nafforded such persons by the court can only be used in the defense or\nprosecution of the civil or criminal case andfor no other purpose whatsoever.\n(Emphasis added.)\nReading subsection 1(c) (\"furthering justice\") in tandem with subsection (2), it is evident\nthat the phrase \"furthering justice\" is to be interpreted in the context of seeking dis\njury materials for use in a pending criminal or civil case. The Newspaper0\nnot seeking disclosure of the Materials for such a purpose. (Amend\n\nof grand\nedges that it is\n\nt, ¶ 70; Motion ¶\n\n114.) Instead, the Newspaper advocates a more expansive int\n\ntatimrof the term \"furthering\n\njustice\" and also posits that because it is not seeking discloAcz t?\nfl\n\naterials for use in a criminal\n\nor civil case, it seeks an additional declaration tha\ni \\ t e ed use of the Materials \"is not so\n\ni\n\nlimited\" by section 905.27(2). (Id.) The Ne s i,rlisv ts the ability to publish the Materials and\nreference them in its reporting and also t crake\nwt\nComplaint, prayer at 21; Motion, t\nThe Newspaper makes tron\nli\nsection 905.27 as part of\nMr. Epstein's co\nfederal char\ndisclo\n\nMaterials available \"to the public.\" (Amended\n\n6\n\nments to advance its more expansive construction of\n\n'ngjustice.\" Unquestionably, the established matters surrounding\n\nthe ircumstances of his resolution of the 2006 state charges and potential\nhis 2008 guilty plea and incarceration are matters of public interest, and\n\ne Materials may arguably fall within the concept of \"furthering justice\" in the\n\nbroadest, social sense of the phrase. Yet, the court's interpretation of the scope of section 905.27\n\n6 The Newspaper concedes in its submissions that the court could first conduct an in camera review\n\nof the Materials and redact any informa\n... [truncated, 2147 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/6 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=6]", "char_count": 2147}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "and of the phrase \"furthering justice\" is governed and constrained by the established rules of\nstatutory construction.\nIn interpreting a statute, the court must respect the role of the legislature, the legislative\nprocess, and the language of the statute. \"`A court's function is to interpret statutes as they are\nwritten and give effect to each word in the statute.\" State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 125 (Fla.\n4th DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dept ofRevenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789\n\n320, 324\n\n(Fla. 2001). \"[W]hen legislation is clear `our task is to apply the text,\n\nove upon it.'\n\nKaplan v. Epstein, 219 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting av\n\nFlore v. Marvel\n\nEntertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). \"It is our [\n\nto interpret the law as\n\ngiven us by the people in the Constitution or by the Legisl,C i ate\njudicial cerebration for law or that which we th.ini Ns,\nen w\nenforced.\" In re Investigation ofCircuit Jud Itcc\n\nnot permitted to substitute\n\nould be and command that it be\n\nth Judicial Circuit ofFlorida, 93 So. 2d\n\norget that in construing acts of the legislature,\n\n601, 608 (Fla. 1957). \"As courts, we sh\n\nnev\n\nwe are concerned only with the po\n\nlegislature to enact the law. Our peculiar social and\n\neconomic views have no plac\n\nr\ne\n\na consideration.\" Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 838\n\n(Fla. 1963).\nTurning t\nbe read in a v\n\ntion\n\n5.27, the term \"furthering justice\" as used in subsection (1Xc) cannot\n\nwithout regard to the entire text of the statute, and particularly subsection (2).\nmust [also] be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due\n\nregard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.' Indian River\nCounty v. Ocean Concrete, Inc., 308 So. 3d 1010, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dep't\nof EnvtL Prot v. ContractPoint Fla.\n\n, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting\n\nForsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist, 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).\n\n8\n\nEFTA02734414\n\n\f", "char_count": 1985}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Subsection (2) clearly limits section 925.27's scope to those instances in which grand jury\ntestimony or materials need to be disclosed for use in a criminal or civil case. Subsection (2)\nprovides that once grand jury testimony is disclosed in the course of a court proceeding, it is then\nopen to unlimited dissemination. But before that occurs, the court must determine that one of the\nthree needs prescribed in subsection (I) is present in a criminal or civil case that requires\ndisclosure. There is nothing in section 905.27 that gives a court cane blanche au\ngrand jury materials in any situation that might bear some relationship to \" ijul\n\nto release\ngjustice\" in its\n\nbroadest sense.\nAccordingly, the Newspaper's argument that section\nAo : 12\njustice\" permits disclosure of grand jury materials in the sAi tt *o)\n\nthe term \"furthering\n\nt be denied here, where there\n\nis no criminal or civil case in which it is to be used.\n(B)\n\nThe court's \"inherent 11114c, .\"\n\nAlternatively, the Newspaper ar\nrelease of the Materials. At seve\n\"entitlement\" to disclosure of\n\ntha\n\ne court has \"inherent authority\" to order the\n\nits submissions, the Newspaper asserts its \"right\" or\nrials under both section 905.27 and the court's \"inherent\n\nauthority and supervisors.\" (Amended Complaint ¶ 70, Motion, ¶¶ 86, 113, 114) There\nis, however, no\n\nAmendment right to the disclosure of grand jury materials. \"A settled\n\nproposition\n\nthe press does not contest, is this: there is no First Amendment right of access\n\nto gra\n\nings.\" In re Motions of Dow\n\n& Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir.\n\n1998), cert. denied sub nom. Dower & Co., Inc. v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 820 (1998); accord, In\nre Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2000).\nThe Newspaper provides several passages from state and federal cases generally\nrecognizing a court's \"inherent authority.\" (Motion, ¶ 95.) The Newspaper also cites several\n\n9\n\nEFTA02734415\n\n\f", "char_count": 1907}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "federal cases in which grand jury materials were disclosed, yet those cases substantially turn on\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which governs disclosure of grand jury materials and\ncontains provisions not present in Florida statutes and rules. (Motion, ¶ 96.) The Newspaper also\nreferences the recent example of a Kentucky state court releasing portions of grand jury testimony\nin the Breonna Taylor case under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.24, which gives\nKentucky courts broad, unrestricted authority to \"at any time . . . direct othe\ndisclosure of grand jury materials. (Motion, ¶¶ 97-100.) Finally, the\nPetition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), in which the court there\nto consider in determining whether, under federal law and rule,\n\n4\n\njury materials for reasons other than those enumerated in F\nThe Newspaper argues that this court should ap\n\nd\n\nfo\n\nregarding\nr cites In re\number of factors\n\nurt may release grand\n\ne of Criminal Procedure 6(e).\n\ni gp actors in exercising its \"inherent\n\nauthority\" to release the Materials.\nA court's \"inherent authority\" h7 6' sS\n.e.\nbo' it daries.\n\"Ulf a specific statute or rule applies,\nl\nthe trial court should rely on the\n\nca\n\nMoakley v. Smallwood, 826 So\n\n227 (Fla. 2002) (addressing inherent authority to sanction\n\nattorney misconduct); ac\n2011) (finding th\n\ne\n\n\"In a contes\nauthor\n\nrule or statute rather than on inherent authority.\"\n\nntini v. Cleveland Clink Florida, 65 So. 3d 22, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA\n\nal co rt erred in relying on inherent authority instead of sanctions statute).\nena clear, valid, unchallenged statute and a trial court's general \"inherent\n\ntatute must prevail.\" Swearingen v. Pretzer, 310 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA\n\n2020) (Kelsey, J. dissenting).\nThe Newspaper has provided no Florida authority holding that a trial court may use its\n\"inherent authority\" to order disclosure of grand jury materials in the face of section 905.27, which\ngoverns and enumerates the circumstances under which grand jury mat\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/9 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=9]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Again, the court acknowledges the Newspaper's vibrant and sincere arguments for seeking\ndisclosure as a matter of public interest and in \"furthering justice\" in the broader sense of the term.\nNonetheless, \"(u)nder fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot judicially\nalter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so.\" Fla. Dept of Revenue,\n789 So. 2d at 324.\nEven if \"furthering justice\" as stated in section 905.27 could be exten(IA yond the\nspecific situations prescribed by that statute, still the court cannot do so, h\nOrder issued by this court (The Honorable Krista Mani) in State of Fl\n50-5006-CF-009454-AXXX (Order, Jan. 4, 2020), in whi\nDepartment of Law Enforcement's motion for disclosure\n\ncourt notes the\nGrey Epstein, No.\ndenied the Florida\n\ngrand jury materials at issue\n\nhere:\nAlthough the term \"furthering\n\"\nms quite broad, the history of the\nexception in both common law and\nm c e law establishes that the exception\nis actually quite narrow — it do\nmpass any reason that could \"further\njustice,\" but rather requires\nof a particularized and compelling need\nwhich outweighs any inte\ntabling secrecy and cannot be satisfied in\nanother manner. Brooki\ne, 495 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Fla. 1986) (holding\nthat \"a party seeking d\n[of grand jury proceedings] must make a strong\nshowing of a particulari\nin order to outweigh the public interest in secrecy\"\n(citing United St\nSells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983) (emphasis\nadded))). Su\nowing must be comprised of \"more than a mere surmise or\nspeculatio Minto , 113 So. 2d at 365. If a party makes this a showing, then the\ntrial c\nexamine the grand jury testimony in camera and make a\nde\nof its materiality. Id. Disclosure should then be permitted only if\nthe attainment of justice.\" Brookings, 495 So. 2d at 138; Minton, 113\nt 365.\n44\n\nThis court reiterates that the term \"furthering justice\", as recognized in the foregoing quote,\nstill requires the showing of a particularized and compelling \n... [truncated, 2185 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/10 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=10]", "char_count": 2185}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "It is true that \"furthering justice\" is an amorphous term which can be read to support a\nbroad range of justifications for disclosure. Black's Law Dictionary offers several contexts in\nwhich the term \"justice\" has been defined. Id. (11th Ed. 2019). It may well be that the disclosure\nof Jeffery Epstein's grand jury records could reveal that fair treatment did not occur and that Mr.\nEpstein might have escaped appropriate punishment through some failing of our justice system.\nHowever, the public's generalized interest in investigating that potential in\nconsidered and weighed against the specific policies in favor of grand jury\n\nmust be\n—policies that\n\npreserve the safety of grand jurors and witnesses and encourage their frank and unhampered\n\nVT)\n\ntestimony in all cases submitted to grand jury. See Grand V\nJ\n\naSt inn, A.D. v. City of St.\n\nPetersburg, Fla. 624 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (cit.\n\ni\n\nv. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla.\n\n1959)). Here, the justification for disclosure is deriv ills,\n\ny from the notoriety of the accused\n\nand the public's suspicion of unfair treatment\ngrand jury records, it could have an unini\n\ngone were enough to compel disclosure of\n\nSs.\"c ling effect on witnesses and jurors considering\n\nthe indictment of powerful indict\n\ni future grand jury proceedings. In any event, the\n\nNewspaper in the present case\n\nto establish a particularized and compelling need which\n\noutweighs any interest in 7,•\n\n*ning grand jury secrecy.\n\nFinally, thitc urt' \"inherent power\" does not give it cane blanche to ignore legal\nprecedent or\nPerha\n\nmandate simply because it finds the underlying cause particularly worthy.\nmstances presented above will induce the Legislature to amend section 905.27 to\n\ngrant the courts additional authority or leeway in ruling on unique cases such as this one.\nAlternatively, an appeal of this order might persuade a higher court to establish a less restrictive\ninterpretation of the \"furthering justice\" exception, the limitations of section 905.27,\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734407/11 or ?id=EFTA02734407&page=11]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "of statutory construction, separation of powers and stare decisis to rule according to the law as it\nexists today.\nCONCLUSION\nBased upon the constraints imposed upon this court by section 905.27, the court has limited\nauthority to order the release of grand jury records. No matter how palatable and persuasive the\nNewspaper's arguments may be, the court cannot exercise that limited authority here: Nor does\nthe court's \"inherent authority\" permit it to broaden the statute's limits. The court commends both\nparties' attorneys for their exceptional oral and written presentations.\nAccordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that final judgment is hereby\nentered dismissing this action in its entirety. Defendant Joseph Abruzzo, in his capacity as Clerk\nof the Circuit Court & Comptroller for Palm Beach\nreserves jurisdiction to entertain any motio\nProcedure. This is a final, appealable ju\nDONE and ENTERED in\n\n1\n\nshaI go hence without day. The court\nder Rule 1.525, Florida Rules of Civil\n\nent.\nh County, Florida.\n41: 7 : t o.\n4 Si\n\n.14\n/ 11t2S,\"\n•nuisis\n\n,2-1\nx.\n<maid Hafele.. Sir CultJudg0iv. or. Itr or ru t\nPt\n\n502019CA014681XXXXMB\nDonald !fettle\nCfrailt Judge\n\nAddress\n\nName\n\n12/20/2021\n\nEmail\n\nn/a\nCYNTHIA M GUERRA\n\nClerk_eservice@mypalmbeachclerk.com\n\nn/a\n\n13\n\nEFTA02734419\n\n\f", "char_count": 1290}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734407", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Name\n\nAddress\n\nEmail\n\nDOUGLAS A. WYLER\n\n961687 GATEWAY BLVD SUITE\n201-I FERNANDINA BEACH, FL doug.wyler@comcast.net\n32034\n\nJAMES CULLEN MOONEY\n\nn/a\n\nJESSICA NEER MCDONALD\n\nPOST OFFICE BOX 229 WEST\nPALM BEACH, FL 33401\n\njmooney@bajocuva.com,\nIheckman@bajocuva.com\nCLERK_ESERVICE@MYPALMBEACHCLERK.COM,\njnmcdonald@myp\n\nachderk.com\n\nkturkel@ba'ora.c ,\nlisa.meri e er@bajocuva.com,\nteri.dele\nbajocuva.com\n\nKENNETH G. TURKEL\n\nn/a\n\nLAUREN R. WHETSTONE\n\n777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300 E\nWEST PALM BEACH, FL 334\n\n-\n\nWHETSTONEL@GTIAW.COM,\n.\nflservice@gtlaw.com,\na 9dra.famadas@gtlaw.com\n\nwf,.- bideaum@gtlaw.com,\n•\nMARK F. BIDEAU\n\nn/a\n\nthomasd@gtlaw.com,\nFL.Service@gtlaw.com\n\nMICHAEL GRYGIEL\n\n54 STAR Ei STAGF.6TH FLOOR\nALB Y Y\\ k207\n\nMICHAEL J. GRYGIEL\n\nGRYGIELM@GTLAW.COM\ngrygielm@gtlaw.com\n\nNINA D. BOYAJIAN\n\n1840 CENTURY PARK EAST\nUITE 1900 LOS ANGELES, CA\n90067\n\nNINA D. B\n\nn/a\n\nSHANE B. VOGT\n\nn/a\n\nboyajiann@gtlaw.com,\nriveraal@gtlaw.com\nshane.vogt@bajocuva.com,\ngarnold@bajocuva.com\n\nmendelsohns@gtlaw.com,\n5100 TOWN CENTER CIR SUITE\nSTEPHEN A. MENDELSOHN, ESQ\nsmithl@gtlaw.com,\n400 BOCA RATON, FL 33486\nflservice@gtlaw.com\n\n14\n\nEFTA02734420\n\n\f", "char_count": 1136}]}