{"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_count": 27, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02734365", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02734365.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Filing # 135754952 E-Filed 10/01/2021 02:16:32 PM\n\nIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE Pin EENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT\nIN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA\nCA FLORIDA HOLDINGS, LLC,\nPublisher of THE PALM BEACH POST,\nCase No.: 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\nPlaintiff,\nDivision: AG\nv.\n\nA\nCos\n\nDAVE ARONBERG, as State Attorney of\nPalm Beach County, Florida; SHARON IL\nBOCK, as Clerk and Comptroller of Palm\nBeach County, Florida,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANT, CLERK AND CO\nOF PALM BEACH COUNTY'\nTO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORS\nDefendant,\n\nAbruzzo, as Clerk a\n\n\"Clerk\"), by counsel, responds to Plainti\nBeach Post's (\"The Pot), Motion„S\n\nS\n\nC\n\nER\nNSE\nJUDGMENT\n\njoiler of Palm Beach County, Florida (the\norida Holdings, LLC, publisher of The Palm\nJudgment (DE # 58) (the \"Motion\"), and states\n\nas follows:\nINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND\nThe Postt(\n\ntheyClerk and Palm Beach County State Attorney' to gain access to\n\n\"confidenti\n\nr\n\ns. 119.07\n\n.24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution\" so it can disclose them to the public. See\n\n§§ 905.17,\n\n5.24, Fla. Stat.; Motion (DE # 58) at p.34. Unfortunately, the Clerk (who inherited\n\nf \"secret\" grand jury proceedings that are \"exempt from the provisions of\n\nAs noted in the Motion (DE # 58 at p. 2, n. 1), The Post dropped the State Attorney, Dave\nAronberg, as a party after he filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees under Section 57.105 (DE # 35)\nand Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 38), both of which argued that the State Attorney does\nnot possess any of the records The Post seeks.\n\nFILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY. FL,\n\nABRUZZO, CLERK, 10/01/2021 02:16:32 PM\n\nEFTA02734365\n\n\f", "char_count": 1579}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "this case from his predecessor2) is the sole remaining \"Defendant\" in this case because his office\nis charged with the ministerial duty of keeping \"stenographic records, notes, and transcriptions\nmade by the court reporter or stenographer\" of Palm Beach County grand jury proceedings \"in a\nsealed container not subject to public inspection.\" See § 905.17(1), Fla. Stat.\nSeveral statutes enforceable through criminal penalties require grand jury secrecy and\nforbid clerks of Florida's circuit courts from releasing grand jury materials ex\n\nt\n\nuest by\n\na grand jury for use by the grand jury or on order of the court pursu\n\n05.27.\" See\n\n§§ 905.17(1), 905.27(1)-(2), (4)-(5), Fla. &at. Chapter 905 does of\n\nt the Clerk any\n\nauthority or discretion to release any grand jury materials t\n\nprior public—regardless\n\nof the subject matter of the proceedings at issue or\n\ntiment about whether they\n\nshould be released.\nConsidering the Clerk's constitutional\n\nll1\nio2\n/a„\n\nis\n\n06\\\n\nry duties, lack of discretion, and role as\n\na depository for grand jury materials, hi\n\nense\n\nof whether, under Florida law, cle\n\nircuit courts can be sued by private parties seeking\n\nr\n\naccess to such records. The\nirrelevant to this prelimin\nConsequently, th\ntithe\nto grand\n\nthis lawsuit is necessarily limited to the issue\n\nbject matter of the underlying grand jury proceedings is\n\nstion concerning the legality of The Post's suit against the Clerk.\n\nerk to a no position on most of the facts put forth in The Post's Motion.;\n'des that private litigants can sue clerks for declaratory relief to gain access\n\naterials under Section 905.27(1)(c) and/or the Court's \"inherent authority,\" only\n\nthen would the inquiry advance to whether The Post can demonstrate to the Court that releasing\n\n2 Clerk Abruzzo was sworn into office as Palm\n\nBeach County's Clerk and Comptroller on\nJanuary 5, 2021.\n3 This should not, however, be construed as the Clerk's agreement with or adoption of any of the\nfactual positions taken by The Post\n2\n\n\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/1 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=1]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "testimony, minutes, and other evidence related to the Jeffrey Epstein grand jury is appropriate to\nserve \"the purpose of...furthering justice\" and/or preserve the dignity of the judicial system.\nHowever, the Clerk's office is merely the statutorily designated depository for these materials and\nperforms this function solely in a ministerial capacity as an arm of the Court, required comply with\nany directives from the Court concerning the materials The Post seeks. The Clerk is not aware of\nany authority or standing granted to his office to advocate for or against the releattty grand\njury materials, including the specific materials at issue here. Accordingly, Ins response is limited\n\ne\n\nto an overview of the law related to the \"furthering justice\" excepti\nauthority to help inform the Court's decision.\nH.\n\nnd the Court's inherent\n\nPROCEDURAL\n\nThe Post's operative pleading is its January I\nasserts a claim for declaratory relief (Count I)\nc\n\nended Complaint (DE # 17), which\ned to state a private cause of action under\n\nsection 905.27, Florida Statutes (Coun\n\nBo\n\ngranting The Post access to the te\n\ninutes, and other evidence presented in 2006 to the\n\nr.\n\nPalm Beach County grand j\npurpose of informing the\nOn Janua\nincorporated\nthat S\n\ncounts sought the same relief: a court order\n\ning Jeffrey Epstein so it can \"use those materials for the\n\n• \" (DE # 17 at pp. 20-21).\n\n, 202 , the State Attorney and Clerk filed their respective Answers's and\nto Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint (DE ## 22, 24); both arguing\n\n.27 does not create a private cause of action. The State Attorney also argued that\n\n4 In its Answer (DE # 24), the Clerk asserted that it was without knowledge of all the Amended\n\nComplaint's factual allegations regarding Epstein and the 2006 grand jury proceedings, and\ntherefore denied them and \"demandiedj strict proof thereof.\" The Post's Motion suggests\n(DE # 58 at p.3) that the material facts are \"uncontested\" based in part on the Clerk's Answer, but\nthat clearl\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/2 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=2]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "he was an improper party to the case because his office does not possess grand jury materials,\nwhich are filed with the Clerk's office under Section 905.17(1) (DE # 22 at pp.11-12).\nOn June 8, 2020, the Court entered its Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss\nCount II of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint With Prejudice (DE # 33). In pertinent part, the\nCourt ruled:\nIn sum, there is nothing in the text of section 905.27 from which on\ncan deduce that the Legislature contemplated a member o\nmedia, or anyone else for that matter, having a private\naction to compel the State Attorney and Clerk to disclose\nrecords. Indeed, to the contrary, section 905.27 prolf its tIRStSte\nAttorney and Clerk (assuming that, as pleaded by the P t, th y have\n'ou\nt being\nthe documents) from disclosing the documents\nordered to do so by the court. Reading sectio\nas creating a\nprivate cause of action against the State\no\nand Clerk is,\ne f section 905.27,\ntherefore, not only unsupported by the J n\ne of the statute. As\nbut is actually paradoxical to its pla\nsuch, this Court lacks the pow\ne the unambiguous\nlanguage of section 905.27 in\nwould extend its express\nterms and create a cause of\nn\nere none exists. \"To do so\nwould be an abrogation oJ4isla e power.\" (citation omitted).\nShortly thereafter, the Sta\n\nfiled his Motion for Attorneys' Fees under Section\n\n57.105 (DE # 35) and Motion\n\nSu\n\nfiled its Notice of Droppi\n\ntate Attorney as a party (DE # 48).\n\nOn April 4021,\nOrder, The\nA\nMotion\n\nary Judgment (DE # 38). On October 21, 2020, The Post\n\nithout having sought reconsideration or rehearing of the June 8, 2020\n\nits Motion seeking summary judgment against the Clerk (DE # 58). In its\nst relies upon nearly 20 pages of somewhat slanted and argumentative factual\n\nassertions about Epstein and the 2006 grand jury proceedings (DE # 58 at pp. 1-19) to support the\nre-argument of its position that Section 905.27 creates a private right of action (DE # 58 at pp. 2025), and the argument that access shoul\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/3 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=3]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "to The Post's claim for declaratory relief premised on Section 905.27 and the Court's \"inherent\nauthority\" (DE # 58 at pp. 26-30).\nDL\n\nSUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD\n\nThe Post's Motion pre-dates the effective date (May 1, 2021) of the Florida Supreme\nCourt's amendment of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 and adoption of the fede al summary\njudgment standard. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510\n77-78 (Fla. 2021) (\"amendment applies to pending cases and all motions\n2021\"). Although The Post has not \"file[d] a renewed5 summary jud\nrule,\" the Supreme Court instructed that \"the new rule mus\nAV\nsummary judgment motion decided on or after that date, <t\ni\nei\nomitted). Accordingly, even though The Post'si\nassumes the new standards governing Rule 1\nly\nOnce filed with clerks of\nmaterials are \"records of the j\nJudicial Administration ar\n\n81s,\nttr\n\n0\n\no. 3d 72,\nafter May I,\n\non under the new\n\nv\n\ne adjudication of any\npending cases.\" Id. (citation\n\nfiled pit-amendment, the Clerk\n\nis , o its adjudication.\nAR\n\nMENT\n\n,>atrppit courts pursuant to Section 905.17(1), grand jury\nh\" governed by Rule 2.420 of the Florida Rules of\n\n'ect to its procedures governing public access. Times Pub. Co. v.\n\nAke, 645 So. 2d\n\n, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), approved, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995). Under\n\nthe facts of%t\n\nule 2.420 is the mandatory procedural mechanism through which access to\n\ngrand j\n\nrials must be sought. However, The Post did not follow Rule 2.420 to request or\n\nchallenge a denial of access to these materials.\n\n5 Florida's Supreme Court noted that, \"[i]n cases where a pending summary judgment motion has\nbeen briefed but not decided, the court should allow the parties a reasonable opportunity to amend\ntheir filings to comply with the new rule.\" 317 So. 3d at 78\n5\n\nEFTA02734369\n\n\f", "char_count": 1804}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Even if that were not the case, The Post still could not obtain access to grand jury materials\nto disseminate them to the public by suing the Clerk because-for many of the same reasons\nexplained in the Court's June 8, 2020 Order (DE # 33)—there is no private right of action under\nSection 905.27(1Xc) and no viable claim for declaratory relief based on Section 905.27 or the\nCourt's \"inherent authority.\" Accordingly, The Post's remaining claim is procedurally and legally\ndeficient, its Motion should be denied, and this entire case should be dismissed wilpjudice.\nA.\n\nOverview of the Powers and Duties of Clerks of the Circuit Co\nT\nThe Second DCA explained in Times Pub. Co. v. Ake, 645 Soe a\n\n5, that the offices\n\nof the clerks of Florida's circuit courts serve two functions:\nThe office of the clerk of the circuit court derives i\nnd authority from two\narticles of the Florida Constitution. Article\non 1(d), of the Florida\nConstitution provides that the clerk is a coun\no shall be \"ex officio clerk\nof the board of county commissioners, au\norder and custodian of all county\nfunds.\" In the exercise of these noni\nes, the clerk is an autonomous\nelected county officer not subject to\ntree on or control of the court. Article V,\nsection 16, establishes the offs\ncler of the circuit court within the judicial\nframework. That section flirt\ns that the office may be divided into two\noffices by general or speci\nent such division, the clerk must act in a dual\ncapacity. See Alachu\nPowers, 351 So.2d 32 (Fla.1977). In the\nperformance of his dut\ne court's record keeper, the clerk is a ministerial\nofficer of the court devoi\niscretion. Corbin v. State ex rel. Slaughter, 324 So.2d\n203 (Fla. 1st DC\nThe court has the inherent and exclusive constitutional\nauthority ov its en les who act in its behalf See The Florida Bar, 398 So.2d\n446 (Fla.\nclerk, when acting in the exercise of his duties derived from\narticle\nng as an arm of the court and, as such, is immune from the\nsupe\nauthority of the legislature. T\n... [truncated, 2531 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/5 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=5]", "char_count": 2531}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "of the Supreme Court of Florida, rather than the legislative branch.\" 660 So.2d at 257. This is\nbecause the judiciary is a co-equal branch of government, not an \"agency.\" Id.\nAmong other responsibilities, clerks of the circuit courts are charged with the duty of\nmaintaining certain records of the judicial branch. In performing this duty, clerks are \"ministerial\nofficer[s] of the court devoid of discretion.\" Times Pub. Co. v. Ake, 645 So. 2d at 100\n\"Records of the judicial branch'\" are \"all records, regardless of\ncharacteristics, or means of transmission, made or received in connection '\nofficial business by any judicial branch entity,\" and they in\n\n'cal form,\nnsaction of\n\nrt records\" and\n\n\"administrative records.\" See Rule 2A20(bX1), Fla. R. Jud. n\n\nhasis added). \"Court\n\nrecords...are the contents of the court file, including the pt es\n\nket and other similar records\n\ngenerated to document activity in a case, transcriptftl e\n\nthe clerk, documentary exhibits in\n\nthe custody of the clerk, and electronic recor\niro,it I SItpes, or stenographic tapes of depositions\nor other proceedings filed with the clerk\n\nel i\n\nA ...p\n\nnic records, videotapes, or stenographic tapes\n\nof court proceedings.\" See R\n\nt\n\nrecords...are all other records\n\nreceived pursuant to court rule, law, or ordinance, or in\n\nconnection with the tran\n2.420(b)(1)(B), F\n\"The\nof Ma\n\n)(1)(A), Fla. R. Jud. Admin.\n\n\"Administrative\n\nof official business by any judicial branch entity.\" See Rule\n\nJud. Admin (emphasis added).\n'an of all administrative records of any court is the chief justice or chiefjudge\nSee Rule 2.420(b)(3), Fla. R. Jud. Admin (emphasis added). \"As to all other\n\nrecords, the custodian is the official charged with the responsibility for the care, safekeeping, and\nsupervision of such records.\" Id.\n\n6 \"Judicial branch\" is defined as including \"the clerk of court when acting as an arm of the court.\"\n\nSee Rule 2.420(bX2), Fla. R. Jud. Admin; see also Times Pub. Co. v. Ake, 660 So.2d at 257.\n7\n\nEFTA0273\n... [truncated, 2007 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/6 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=6]", "char_count": 2007}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "B.\n\nThe Framework for Keeping Confidential Grand Jury Materials\nIn establishing Florida's grand jury process, the Legislature directed that \"[t]he chief judge\n\nof each circuit court shall regularly order the convening of the grand jury for a term of 6 months\"\nand \"[w]hen requested, the court shall advise the grand jury about its legal duties.\" See §§ 905.01,\n905.18, Fla. Stat. Once the legislature established a grand jury process, its implementar on became\na \"judicial administrative responsibility since the grand jury's operation is witlilllyte judicial\nbranch.\" See State ex rel. Reichle v.\n\n409 So.2d 1043, 1044 (F\n\nnoted in its June 8, 2020 Order (DE # 33 at p. 1) that this case \"imp\n\nThe Court\nords of the Palm\n\nBeach County grand jury, over which the Chief Judge presides.\"\nThe Post alleges in its Amended Complaint that \"'4 %t h)\njury is preserved, it is an important appendage oft\nof that court is equally important and he is\njury's activities...'4 The Post also argu\nH (DE # 27 at p. 13), and continu\nis Under the Court's Supervi\njustice...an appendage or\nFlorida la\n\"criminal co em\nmann\n\nui\n\n\\oi\n\nh as Florida, where the grand\n\nich impanels it...[and]...the judge\n\narged with the supervision of the grand\n\n' its\n\nposition to the Clerk's Motion to Dismiss Count\n\n'n its Motion (DE # 58 at p. 26), that the \"Grand Jury\nJurisdiction\" and \"a judicial proceeding in a court of\nto the circuit court.\"\n\ngrand jury proceedings to be kept \"secret,\" making it \"unlawful\" and\n\no court\" to \"disclose, divulge, or communicate to any other person...in any\n\nver, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content,\n\ngist, or import thereof...\" See §§ 905.24, 905.17(4), 905.27(2)-(5), Fla. Stat. The Legislature\n\n7 By way of comparison, a Federal grand jury is governed by Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of\n\nCriminal Procedure and considered to be \"an institution independent from the judicial branch.\"\nSee Pitch v. U.S., 953 F.3d 1226, 1237 (III Cir. 2020).\n8 See Amended Compla\n... [truncated, 2191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/7 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=7]", "char_count": 2191}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "specifically addressed the confidentiality of grand jury materials in Section 905.17(1), which\nprovides:\nThe stenographic records, notes, and transcriptions made by the court reporter or\nstenographer [if any] shall be filed with the clerk who shall keep them in a sealed\ncontainer not subject to public inspection. The notes, records, and transcriptions\nare confidential and exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I\nof the State Constitution and shall be released by the clerk only on request y a\ngrand jury for use by the grand jury or on order of the court pursuant to s.\n7.\nIt bears mentioning that there is no requirement that Florida grand\nrecorded. See Thompson v. State, 565 So.2d 1311, 1313 (Fla. 1990) (Sec\ndo not establish a duty to record grand jury proceedings, nor is th\n\nroc\n\nins be\n\n.17 and 905.27\n\na onstitutional basis to\n\nimpose such a duty in all cases). In contrast, Federal Rule\n\nfinal Procedure 6(e) requires\n\ngrand jury proceedings to be recorded and \"[u]nless t \\ c\n\ners otherwise,\" for an attorney\n\nfor the government to \"retain control of the\n\nt\n\nprepared from those notes.\" See Rule 6(eX\n\nCrim. P.\n\nOnce a clerk of the circuit o\n905.17(1), they become adminC\nd\ni\n\nreporter's notes, and any transcript\n\nives grand jury materials pursuant to Section\nords of the judicial branch falling under the purview\n\nof Florida Rule of Judicial A\n•d mtion 2.420, under which they continue to maintain their\nyy\nconfidentiality prot tions\ner Section 905.17. Subdivisions (cX7) and (cX8) of Rule 2.420\nprovide that \"\ndeemed td\n\nmade confidential under...Florida ...law\" and \"all records presently\ndential...by Florida Statutes...\" shall be confidential records of the judicial\n\nbranch.\nRule 2.420(d)(1)(B) further provides that \"[e]xcept as provided by court order, the clerk of\nthe court shall maintain as confidential information subject to subdivision (cX7) or (cX8) of this\nrule that is currently confidential or exempt from section 119.07, Florida Statutes, and \n... [truncated, 2119 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/8 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=8]", "char_count": 2119}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "statutes:...(xvi) Grand jury records. §§ 905.17, 905.28(1), Fla. Stat.\" See Rule 2.420(d)(1)(B),\nFla. R. Jud. Admin. (emphasis added). Furthermore, because both \"grand jury records\" and \"grand\njury notes\" are administrative records of the judicial branch, the Appendix to the Florida Rules\nof Judicial Administration (\"Records Retention Schedule for Administrative Records\") provides\nspecific minimum record retention requirements for these materials:\n\nGRAND JURY NOTES\nThis record series consists of stenographic records, notes, and transcriptions made\nby the court reporter or stenographer during the grand jury session. These records\nare normally kept in a sealed container and arc not subject to public inspection\npursuant to Section 905.17(1), Florida Statutes. A Court order must be obtained for\ndisposition.\nRETENTION: 10 years from closing of session.\nGRAND JURY RECORDS\nThis record series consists ofjury summons, roues for rccusal, juror payments,\ninformation to jurors' employers, lists ofjurors, juror questionnaires, and other\nrecords related to a grand jury. This record series includes records related to a\ngrand jury and the statewide grand jury.\nRETENTION: 2 years.\n\nC.\n\nProcedural Mechanisms for Public Access to Judicial Branch Records\nFlorida Rule\n\nto judicial b\nshall be\n\nJudicial Administration 2.420(m) establishes the procedure to obtain access\nc\n\n: \"Requests for access to judicial branch records shall be in writing and\n\nto the custodian. The request shall provide sufficient specificity to enable the\n\ncustodian t identify the requested records.\" See Rule 2.420(m)(1), Fla. R. Jud. Admin. (emphasis\nadded). Once a proper request is made, the custodian responsible for providing access to the\nrecords of that custodian's entity \"shall determine whether the requested record is subject to this\nrule and, if so, whether the record or portions of the record are exempt from disclosure.\" See\n\n10\n\nEFTA02734374\n\n\f", "char_count": 1934}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Rule 2.420(mX2), Fla. R. Jud. Admin. If a request is denied, the custodian must respond to the\nrequest by stating in writing the basis for the denial. Id.\nWhere access to \"administrative records of the judicial branch\" is denied, Rule 2.420(1)\nprovides that the party denied access must file an action for mandamus or other appropriate relief\nin: (1) the court having appellate jurisdiction, when a judge who has denied a request f r access to\nrecords is the custodian; or (2) in all other cases, the circuit court of the circuit in\n\nthe denial\n\nof access occurs. Here, the grand jury materials The Post seeks are j \"\n\nministrative\n\nrecords, of which the Chief Judge would be the \"custodian\" under\nPost should have made a written request for these materia\nRule 2.420(m) and, if that request was denied, filed an ac\n\na .\n\n)(3). Thus, The\n\nto Chief Judge under\ndamus in the Fourth District\n\nCourt of Appeal pursuant to Rule 2.420(1X1).\nRule 2.420(j) establishes the procedure\n( S r r to \\iing access to confidential court records.\nUnder Rule 2.420(jX2), a party seekin\n\ness\n\nmotion that identifies the court rec\n\nich access is sought, specifies the basis for obtaining\n\naccess, sets forth the legal auth\nand supported by a soun\nfor service of the\nfindings wh\nRule\n\nconfidential court records must file a written\n\nobtaining access, and certifies that it is made in good faith\nand legal basis. Rule 2.420(jX3)-(4) specifies the requirements\n\nion (o all parties and reasonably ascertainable affected non-parties) and the\nbe made in any order granting access to confidential court records.\n\nrequirement of filing a \"motion\" to obtain access to \"confidential court records\"\n\n(as opposed to filing an \"action\" under Rule 2.420(1) when denied access to \"administrative\nrecords\") inherently contemplates that a court case is already pending in which confidential court\nrecords have been filed and in which the requesting party can file a \"motion\" for access to those\nrecords. Otherwise, Rule 2.420(j) would, li\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/10 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=10]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "\"action\" to seek \"confidential court records.\" Thus, even if the grand jury materials The Post seeks\ncould be considered \"confidential court records,\" The Post would have been required to file a\nmotion under Rule 2.420(j) in the grand jury proceeding or criminal case against Epstein based on\nthe indictment.9 If such a motion had been filed and denied, The Post could have sought appellate\nreview under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(d) (\"Orders Excluding or Granting\nAccess to Press or Public\").\nD.\n\n40A\nThe Post Failed to Comply with Rule 2.420\n\nN\n\nThe Post does not allege compliance Rule 2.420 in its\n\nhit and offers no\n\nproof of compliance in its Motion. In fact, it appears to be undi\n\nThe Post did not make\n\na written request to the Chief Judge under Rule 2.420(\n\nde an action in the appellate\n\ncourt under Rule 2.420(1), and did on t file a motionif 8,t\nRule 2.420(j). Instead, The Post vaguely allec\n\nir t\n\nState Attorney [Amended Complaint (DS aw\n17)\ncourt against the Clerk and State At\nAs explained above, th\n[records received \"p\nthe \"custodian\" [\nrequest direc\n\nu\n\nn '\n\n\"confidential court records\" under\nquested the records from the Clerk and\n\nli 72] and filed this civil lawsuit in the circuit\n\ny\nmaterials The Post seeks are \"administrative records\"\n\nlaw...\" under Rule 2.420(b)(1)(B)] of which the Chief Judge is\n.420(bX3)]. However, The Post offers no proof that it made a written\n\nto e Chief Judge for the Epstein grand jury materials, nor any proof that such a\nied. See Rule 2.420(mX1), Fla. R. Jud. Admin. Moreover, even if such a request\n\nand denial had occurred, the only proper mechanism to challenge a Chief Judge's denial of access\nis an action for mandamus in the appellate court (which clearly did not happen).\n\nSee\n\nRule 2.420(1X1), Fla. R. Jud. Admin. Likewise, The Post offers no proof that it filed a motion to\n\n9 See Motion (DE # 58) at ¶919, 36; Appendix (DE # 59) at 8.\n\n12\n\nEFTA02734376\n\n\f", "char_count": 1937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "obtain access to confidential court records under Rule 2.420(j), and obviously did not seek\nappellate review of the denial of any such motion under Rule 2.420(1) and Appellate Rule 9.100(d).\nFlorida's Supreme Court confirmed in Times Pub. Co. v. Ake, 660 So.2d at 257, that access\nto judicial records is governed exclusively by Rule 2.420. The Post's indisputable failure to request\nand pursue access to the grand jury records it seeks through the procedures est lished in\nRule 2.420 conclusively establishes that this lawsuit is procedurally and le\nConsequently, the Motion should be denied, and this entire case sho\n\ndefective.\ni missed with\n\nprejudice.\nE.\n\nThere is No Private Right of Action Against a Clerk\n\nbtanr urand Jury Records\n\nEven assuming arguendo that the grand jury mmi( i t\nssue are not \"records of the\n,\njudicial branch\" exclusively subject to Rule 2.420,tT is es ?1 has no valid legal basis to sue the\nClerk to obtain access to them. This Court a\n\nN mined in its June 8, 2020 Order (DE # 33)\n\nthat there is no private right of action ag ' Sthe\nan action for declaratory relief to\nCourt's \"inherent authority\" to\nThe Court's June\nin the text of\nmember of\nthe St\n\nerk under Section 905.27. The Post cannot use\n\nt the Court's June 8, 2020 ruling or to invoke the\nm public access to grand jury materials.\n\nOrder (DE # 33 at p. 5) correctly established hat \"there is nothing\n7 from which one can deduce that the Legislature contemplated a\n\na, or anyone else for that matter, having a private cause of action to compel\ney and Clerk to disclose grand jury records.\" The Post's Motion does not raise\n\nany new arguments or cite any new authorities to justify the Court's reconsideration and reversal\nof this well-reasoned decision.10 There is no private right of action under Section 905.27.\n\nl° The Post's Motion repeats the same arguments about its alleged standing and the availability of\na \"private right of action\" under Section 905.27 [Motion (DE # 58) at ¶¶ 81-90] that it alleged in\n... [truncated, 2020 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/12 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=12]", "char_count": 2020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "The Post cannot use a claim for declaratory relief under Chapter 86 to create substantive\nrights which the plain language of Section 905.27 clearly demonstrates do not exist. On its face,\nthe Section 905.27 does not expressly or impliedly grant the public or members of the media any\nright to obtain access to grand jury materials. To the contrary, Chapter 905 explicitly denies public\naccess to \"secret\" grand jury proceedings and prohibits access to grand jury materials.\nNevertheless, The Post's cause of action for declaratory relief is based on\nthe Court declare that pursuant to Fla. Stat. Section 905.27(1), it is entitled\nminutes, and other evidence presented to the 2006 Palm Beach Co\n\nuest that\ne testimony,\n\nury because such\n\ndisclosure and access would be in the furtherance of justice\" Ci\n(D\n\ni\n\nseeks a declaration that disclosure of the testimony, min\n\ns n\n\ner evidence presented in the\n\n2006 Palm Beach County grand jury is appropriate S \\ut\n\nt his Court's inherent authority over\n\n(ce\n\n70). The Post \"further\n\ngrand jury proceedings because of the except'\n( c aSs\na u , ' interest in this case and the compelling\ncircumstances supporting transparency\"\nHowever, the Declaratory\n\nt ¶ 71).\n\nAct is a procedural mechanism that confers subject\n\nmatter jurisdiction—it does no ffer\nIns. Co., 95 F.Supp.3d 13\n\n#\n\ny substantive rights. See Gilbert v. State Farm Mut. Auto.\n\n, n. 5 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Under Section 86.011, a court only has\n\njurisdiction to\n\ndecl\n\npower, privil\n\nt, and any fact upon which the existence or nonexistence of such immunity,\n\npower\n\ntory judgments on the existence or nonexistence of any immunity,\n\nor right may depend.\nCourts play an important \"gatekeeping\" role in declaratory relief actions. See Ribaya v.\n\nBoard of Trustees of City Pension Fundfor Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa,\n\nthe Amended Complaint [DE # 17 at ¶¶ 56-59], and which it argued in its Opposition to the Clerk's\nMotion to Dismiss Count II [DE # 27 at pp. 9-13].\n14\n\nEFTA\n... [truncated, 2011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/13 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=13]", "char_count": 2011}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "162 So.3d 348, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). In particular, courts must be leery of attempts to \"pervert\"\nthe statute by those attempting to use it as a \"catch-all.\" Id. \"To ensure that this does not occur,\nthe courts have developed requirements to invoke the act that go beyond the wording of the act\nitself: that there is a 'bona fide dispute' between the parties and a `bona fide...need for [a]\ndeclaration.\" Id. (citations omitted). Where circumstances beyond the pleadings demonstrate\nthat there is not a bona fide need for declaratory relief, trial courts should exercr\nto decline to adjudicate the claim. Id.\n\nauthority\n\nQ\n\nHere, this authority should be exercised because The Post has\n\nor proven that its\n\nclaim for declaratory relief involves a determination of the\n\nen\n\nsubstantive rights. Rather, The Post is improperly askin\n\nto create a new substantive\n\npublic right of access to grand jury materials un\n\nor non-existence of its\n\nse of declaratory relief. Gilbert,\n\n95 F.Supp.3d at 1364. As discussed above, th\n? s 4%\nrlotS&\no\nlic right of access under Section 905.27.\nSimilarly, the Court's \"inherent authori\n\nconfer any rights, privileges, or powers to The\n\nPost that could be adjudicated und\n\ne 6. There is no \"bona fide\" dispute over the existence\n\nof the Court's \"inherent autho\n\nse v. Palm Beach County, 361 So.2d 135, 136 n. 3 (Fla.\n\n1978) (Court's powers arre'\n\nnt in the sense they exist because the court exists....\" (emphasis\n\nadded)). Instead,\n\nPost i using its claim for declaratory relief as pretense to try to tell the Court\n\nhow its \"inh\n\nthonty\" should be used.\n\nAleis pect to Section 905.27, The Post appears to be trying to use a claim for declaratory\nrelief the same way it is often used in cases involving violations of the Sunshine Law and Chapter\n119. See e.g., Ribaya, 162 So.3d at 355. As noted in Ribaya, because section 286.011 does not\ncontain an \"express right of action...it has become common for litigants to file actions for claims\nunder the Sunshine Law that a\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/14 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=14]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "relief,\" which \"in effect...alleges a claim under 286.011 and seeks a remedy under chapter 86.\"\nM. at 355. However, it is important to note that Section 286.011—unlike Sections 905.17 and\n905.27—grants the public a right to access government meetings and has provisions recognizing\nthe public's right to pursue legal actions to enforce that right:\nSection 286.011 creates broad public access to governmental\nmeetings. This statute implements the constitutional right of access\ncreated in Article I, section 24, of the Florida Constitution!\nSubsection 286.011(4) clearly contemplates legal action\nmembers of the public to enforce the Sunshine Law\n§ 286.011(4) (providing for attorney's fees where \"an a\nbeen filed...to enforce the provisions of this section\"\ncourt determines that a violation has occurred).\nSee Ribaya, 162 So.3d at 355 (emphasis added).\nSimilarly, Chapter 119 implements the polic\nmunicipal records are open for personal inspect\n\nstate that all state, county, and\nyving by any person,\" thus creating a\n\npublic right to access records \"made or r\n\npdfsyuant to law or ordinance or in connection\n\nwith the transaction of official busi\n\nagency.\" See § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat. (agency\n\nrecords are \"open for personal\n\nand copying by any person\"); §119.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat.\n\n(\"Every person who has custo\n\na public record shall permit the record to be inspected and\n\ncopied by any perso\ns des\ne\n\ng to do so, at any reasonable time, under reasonable conditions, and\n\nunder supervi\n\nby\n\ncustodian of the public records\"); see also Times Pub. Co. v. Ake, 660\n\nSo.2d at\n\n. Like Section 286.011, Chapter 119 contains several provisions \"clearly\n\ncontempla g\" legal actions by members of the public to enforce their rights under Chapter 119.\nSee §119.07(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (\"In any civil action in which an exemption to this section is asserted,\nif the exemption is alleged to exist under or by virtue of s. 119.071(1Xd) or (f), (2Xd), (e), or (f),\nor (4)(c), the public record or part thereof in qu\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/15 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=15]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "to enforce the provisions ofthis chapter, the court shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case\npriority over other pending case\") (emphasis added); § 119.12(1), Fla. Stat. (\"If a civil action is\nfiled against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall assess and award\nthe reasonable costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney fees, against the responsible\nagency if the court determines that...\") (emphasis added).\nConversely, Chapter 905 establishes that there is IQ public right to acdeigrand jury\nproceedings or materials. In fact, Section 905.24 implements the public\n\nt \"[Orand jury\n\nproceedings are secret,\" and Section 905.17(1) makes records of\n\nings \"exempt\n\nj\n\nfrom the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of th\n\nto\n\nChapter 905 does it ol contain an express right of\n\nr any provisions \"clearly\n\ncontemplating\" (or even recognizing) the publi\naccess to grand jury records. To the con\n\nstitution.\" Moreover,\n\nt o pursue legal actions to obtain\nis ourt recognized in its June 8, 2020 Order\n\n(DE # 33 at p. 5): \"inhere is nothing in\n\next\n\nsection 905.27from which one can deduce that\n\nthe Legislature contemplated a m\n\nb\n\ne media, or anyone else for that matter, having a\n\nprivate cause ofaction to co\n\nel th\n\ntate Attorney and Clerk to disclose grand jury records.\n\nIndeed, to the contrary, s\n\n'05.27 prohibits the State Attorney and Clerk (assuming that, as\n\npleaded by the P\n\nthey\n\nordered to d\n\nhe court. Readingsection 905.27 as creating a private cause ofaction against\n\nthe St\n\n• the documents)from disclosing the documents withoutfirst being\n\nand Clerk is, therefore, not only unsupported by the language ofsection 905.27,\n\nbut is actually paradoxical to its plain language ofthe statute.\"\nSimilarly, any argument that a substantive right of public access to grand jury materials\ncan be derived from a court's \"inherent authority\" collapses because that authority does not grant\nany rights or powers to anyone except the courts. Mor\n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/16 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=16]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "could somehow emanate from courts' inherent authority, it still could only be exercised \"subject\n\n2018);\n\nM,\n\nto, or not in conflict with, valid existing laws.\" See Jimenez v. Bondi, 259 So. 3d 722, 725 (Fla.\n361 So.2d at 137; Weinberg v. Siemens Fin. Services, Inc., 88 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla.\n\n3d DCA 2011) (A \"court's inherent power does not permit a court to ignore existing law, such as\nwrit of replevin statutes.\"). Given the existing laws\" surrounding the secrecy of grand jury\nproceedings, the Court's inherent powers could not be used as a basis to grantht e'\nseeks.\n\nThe Post\n\nO\n\neS'\nlaim asserted in\n\nUltimately, The Post's declaratory relief claim is analogo\n\nA 2020), in which the\n\nMacNeil v. Crestview Hospital Corp., 292 So.3d 840, 843-45\n\n1\n\nFirst DCA affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a claimc\n\nory relief where the plaintiff\n\nt)\n\n\"asserted no other cause of action below that woul„S\n\nSoftIhip a justiciable controversy exists on\n\nwhich to predicate a declaratory judgment cc S ot ' „\n\ner citing Ribaya for the elements of a\n\ndeclaratory relief claim and its warning\n\n\"ch\n\nshould not be `perverted' by perm\n\na as a `catch-all,\"' the court in MacNeil recognized\n\nthat \"[a]besnt a showing of at\ndeclaration, dismissal is\n(Fla. 1m DCA 20\n\nn 1\n\ner 86 is a statute with `special objectives' that\n\nolorable right which would be affected by the requested\n\" Id. at 842, 845 (citing Webster v. Inch, 286 So.3d 847, 848\n\n12\n\n0\n\n\"These(\ninclude Sections 905.17(1) (prohibiting the clerk from releasing grand jury records\nexcept on request by grand jury or on order of the court under s. 905.27), 905.24 (grand jury\nproceedings are \"secret,\" and grand jurors and interpreters are prohibited from disclosing the\nnature or substance of the deliberations or vote of the grand jury), and 905.27(1) (prohibiting the\ndisclosure of the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury or other evidence received\nby it except under the enumerated exceptions).\n12 MacNeil discusses all the requi\n... [truncated, 2366 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/17 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=17]", "char_count": 2366}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "In MacNeil, the plaintiff attempted to bootstrap a claim for declaratory relief to an alleged\nviolation of Section 627.736(5)(a) (the PIP statute), which (like Section 905.27) \"lacks an express\nor implied private cause of action to enforce its provisions.\" Id. at 842. The Post is trying to do\ndie same thing using Section 905.27 and the Court's \"inherent authority.\" Thus, The Post's\ndeclaratory relief claim seeks an improper advisory opinion and must suffer the same fate as\nMacNeil's (dismissal with prejudice). MacNeil, 292 So.3d at 841, 845; see also\nDept of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 943 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th0\ndismissal of action seeking declaratory relief where no private right\n\nv. State,\n(affirming\n\nexisted under the\n\nDriver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.);\n\nv.\n\nCounty, 237 So. 3d 1026, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)\n\ndismissal of action seeking\n\ndeclaratory relief where no private right of action\n\nh. Bd. of Palm Beach\n\nthe Class-Size Amendment to the\n\nFlorida Constitution).\nThe Post's only remaining claiNt• ....„\n( is ' S ion' (Count I) seeking declaratory relief based\non Section 905.27 and the Court's '\nbe granted. Accordingly, The\n\nis\n\nuthority\" fails to state a claim upon which relief can\notion should be denied, and Count I should be dismissed\n\nwith prejudice.\nF.\n\nthe C\n\nOverview\n\nthe L\n\nif the \"Furthering Justice\" Inquiry is Needed\n\nIf thi\n\ndetermines that The Post has the legal right to seek declaratory relief against\nn access to the Epstein grand jury materials based on Section 905.27, the Clerk\n\ndoes not believe he has the authority to advocate for or against The Post's requested relief. The\nClerk does, however, believe that he has an obligation to apprise the Court of the relevant law\nsurrounding its decision.\n\n19\n\nEFTA02734383\n\n\f", "char_count": 1797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "The Post only seeks the Epstein grand jury records under the \"furthering justice\" exception\nto Section 905.27. See § 905.27(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Specifically, The Post seeks these grand jury\nmaterials to use them \"for the purpose of informing the public\" (DE # 17 at p.20) and concedes\nthat it \"is not seeking these materials in connection with either a civil or criminal case, it seeks a\ndeclaration that the scope of its use of the disclosed materials is not limited\" (DE # 17 at 1 70\n(emphasis added)).\nSection 905.27(2) explicitly states that, \"[w]hen [a] disclosure\npursuant to subsection (1) ... the grand jury testimony afforded such\n\nby a court\ne court can only\n\nbe used in the defense or prosecution of the civil or crimin\n\ne\n\nwhatsoever.\" See § 905.27(2), Fla. Stat. This provisiot\n\nbe at odds with The Post's\n\nrequests for the Epstein grand jury materials to use t S ,\n\nr e purpose of informing the public\"\n\n(DE # 17 at p.20) and a \"declaration that th Sc\n\n8 for no other purpose\n\nits use of the disclosed materials is not\n\nlimited\" (DE # 17 at 1 70).\nThe Court is certainly a\n\no\n\ne ' portant reasons for grand jury secrecy. Minton v.\n\nState, 113 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fl 195 ) \"to protect the jurors themselves; to promote a complete\nfreedom of disclosure; to\n\nt the escape of a person indicted before he may be arrested; to\n\nprevent the subo\n\non of erjury in an effort to disprove facts there testified to; and to protect the\n\nreputations\n\nns against whom no indictment may be found\").13 While the Court has\n\ndiscret\n\nthe rule of secrecy when the \"purposes of the secrecy rule are accomplished and\n\na disclosure becomes essential to the attainment of justice and the vindication of the truth,\" the\n\n13 Based on the facts asserted in The Post's Motion, preventing the escape of a person indicted\n\nbefore he may be arrested, preventing the subornation of perjury in an effort to disprove facts there\ntestified to, and protecting the reputations of persons against whom no indictment may be found\nd\n... [truncated, 2061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/19 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=19]", "char_count": 2061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Court must be mindful of \"the effect on subsequent grand jury proceedings-on jurors, on witnesses,\non the privacy of the system itself-of indiscriminate disclosure.\" Id.\nThose who serve on grand juries and the witnesses appearing before them have a justifiable\nexpectation that their identities will be protected. Minton, 113 So. 2d at 365. Releasing grand jury\nmaterials to a member of the press could set a dangerous precedent that grand jury members and\nwitnesses can no longer trust the government officials who assured them that their\nbe protected when they participated in the grand jury process. See Grand\nCity of St. Petersburg, Fla., 624 So. 2d 291, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 199\nargument that disclosure of grand jury records would result in\nas an investigative body if the state could no longer info\n\nies would\nerm, A.D. v.\n\nState Attorney's\nction of the grand jury\n\ns that their testimony would\n\nbe secret\" persuasive).14\n\"To obtain access to grand jury testim\n? s Sy,kis\n\nr predicate must be laid.\" Jent v. State,\n\n408 So. 2d 1024, 1027 (Fla. 1981), holg ' m...,\nm ' ted by Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla.\n1984). Then, once a proper predi\n\nI i the trial judge must examine the grand jury records\n\nsought to be disclosed to dete\n\nmateriality of the records.\" Minton, 113 So. 2d at 364.\n\n\"[fit is crystal clear that sr\n\ng more than a mere surmise or speculation\" about what the grand\n\njury records may / thin, is needed to lift the veil of secrecy from the grand jury proceedings. Id.\nat 365.\n\nO\n\n14 If disclosure of the Epstein grand jury materials is ordered, the Clerk presumes, but in an\nabundance of caution also requests, that the Clerk only be ordered to provide the materials to the\nCourt for an in camera review so that the Court can determine whether records revealing the\nidentifies of any grand jurors or witnesses should not be disclosed or should be redacted to protect\nthese individuals' identities.\n\n21\n\nEFTA02734385\n\n\f", "char_count": 1944}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "In State v. Tillett, Ill So. 2d 716, 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959), the Second DCA discussed the\nuncertainty surrounding the \"furthering justice\" exception to grand jury secrecy:\nThe concept of furtherance of justice is inherently difficult of precise defmition.\nThe application of such principle also is difficult and is necessarily dependent upon\nthe peculiar factual circumstances of each particular case. A court of competent\njurisdiction, before granting the use of grand jury testimony upon the furtherance\nof justice doctrine, should require the satisfactory establishment of the right\nAmmt\nt its\nuse. The onus must be borne by the person seeking to gain access to and use d the\ntestimony.\nWhile there is a paucity of case law controlling the Court's inq ' ASOe \"fu\n\nring\n\nO rthe\n\njustice\" issue, it does appear that appellate courts have been fairly c nsi\n\ndenying private\n\ncivil litigants access to grand jury records under the \"furth\n\nce exception; including in\n\ncivil actions for libel and slander based on grand jury tessi(c\n\ne.g., Tillett, III So. 2d 716)\n\n\\yr raft, 184 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. 4th\n\nand actions for malicious prosecution (See e.g., Wi<ite2\nDCA 1966); Dworetzky v. Monticello Smoked\n? S 1 te\n,1\nhave also denied access to grand jury\n\n56 A.D. 772 (App. Div. 1939)). Courts\n\nun r the \"furthering justice\" exception where the\n\nparty seeking the materials fails to\n\ni\n\nWille, 480 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4\n\n85) (even where \"hypothetically, discovery might affect\n\nthe achievement of justic\n648 (Fla. 3d DC\nbecause th\nthat th\nG.\n\nproper predicate to obtain them. See e.g., James v.\n\nper predicate must still be laid); State v. Meeks, 610 So. 2d 647,\n\n2) (q ashing trial court's order requiring die disclosure of grand jury records\nseeking disclosure \"did not contain any facts which supported his allegations\n\nd withheld critical facts from the grand jury\").\nOverview of the Law if the \"Inherent Power\" Inquiry is Needed\nAs explained by the Florida Supreme Court in State a rel.\n\nv. City of A\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/21 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=21]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "subject to, or not in conflict with, valid existing laws and constitutional provisions.\" See also\nJimenez, 259 So. 3d at 725; M, 361 So.2d at 137. \"Inherent powers\" of courts have been\ndescribed as \"all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial\nfunctions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions\neffective. These powers are inherent in the sense they exist because the court exists....\" M, 361\nSo.2d at 136 n. 3 (quoting CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COUR\n\n973)).\n\nWith respect to the requirement that courts exercise their inherent\n\n\"subject to, or\n\nnot in conflict with, valid existing laws,\" courts should be mindful\nplaced on the disclosure of grand jury records. See Weinberg, 8\nA\npower does not permit a court to ignore existing law, suchS\nm\ne\nabove, the existing laws surrounding the disclosure\n\nit\n\nagainst any disclosure, and even where disclo\nc\nprosecution of the civil or criminal case\nAs a rule, where the Le\nexceptions to that prohibition\njudicial fiat. See e.g.,\n\n4s.,\n\nfor\n\n3\n\nthe Legislature\n22 (A \"court's inherent\nlevin statutes.\"). As noted\n\nry proceedings and records weigh\nitted can only be \"used in the defense or\n\nother purpose whatsoever.\" See § 905.27(2),\n\nacts a general prohibition and enumerates limited\nnot at liberty to expand the enumerated exceptions by\nte, 215 So. 3d 113, 115-16 & n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (invoking\n\nthe principle of\n\nio\n\nof powers d\n\nuse \"where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, ... it\n\nis ordi\n\nius est exclusio alterius as requiring courts to respect the separation\n\nbe construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned\")\n\n(quoting Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976)); see also Buzzard v. Buzzard, 412 So.\n2d 388, 390-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (recognizing the general rule that \"a court is not authorized\nin the construction of a statute, to create exceptions not specifically made.\" (quoting Ogle v.\n... [truncated, 2085 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/22 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=22]", "char_count": 2085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "The Post relies upon several federal cases in support of its argument concerning the Court's\ninherent authority to publicly disclose grand jury records (Motion (DE # 58) at pp. 27-28). In\nreviewing these cases, it is important to note the differences between Florida and Federal grand\njuries. As discussed above, Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs matters\nrelated to a federal grand jury and provides the framework for recording and disclosing\nproceedings, including the exceptions to the generally applicable rule of secrec\nFed. R. Crim. P. While Rule 6 is materially different from Section 905.27\n\ntile 6(e),\ntatutes, they\n\nare intended to accomplish the same goal—protecting the secrecy of\n\nproceedings.\n\nThere is a split amongst the Federal circuit courts\n\nhether Federal district\n\ncourts have the \"inherent authority\" to order the disclosuret\nStates, 953 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denieC ‘t14/\noverturned its own precedent, holding that di\n? s eAlli;\ne\n\nrecords. In Pitch v. United\n,\n\n624 (2020), the Eleventh Circuit\n\nhave no inherent, supervisory power to\n\nauthorize the disclosure of grand jury\n\no\n\nRule 6(e). At issue in Pitch was\n\ndistrict court could order the release of grand jury\n\nmaterials related to \"Moore's\nAfrican American couple>\n\nKle of the enumerated exceptions provided by\n\nching—a horrific event involving the murders of two\nyhich no one has ever been charged\" based on circumstances not\n\nexplicitly covere\n\nRule 6(e). Id. at 1229. Author Anthony Pitch petitioned for the release of\n\nthe grand j\n\npts related to the crime so he could use them to inform the public about the\n\nunsolv\n\nId. Mr. Pitch's request did not meet any exception provided by Rule 6(e), but\n\nthe district court granted the petition, relying on a previous 11'11 Circuit decision holding that \"a\ndistrict court may, pursuant to its inherent, supervisory power over the grand jury, authorized the\ndisclosure of grand jury records outside of Rule 6(e)'s enumerated exceptions in \n... [truncated, 2124 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02734365/23 or ?id=EFTA02734365&page=23]", "char_count": 2124}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "decision, before the case was reheard en bane. Id. Considering the import of the \"long-established\npolicy that grand jury proceedings in federal courts should be kept secret\" and the purposes of such\nsecrecy, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately decided to recede from precedent, holding that Rule 6(e)\n\"by its plain terms limits disclosures of grand jury materials to the circumstances enumerated\ntherein.\" Id. at 1233-34.\nOther circuits have arrived at the same conclusion, while some continue to\n\nisclosure\n\nunder the Court's inherent authority. See, e.g. McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.\n\n844 (D.C. Cir.\n\n2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 597 (2020); In re Grand Jury 89-4-72\n\n81, 488 (6th Cir.\n\n1991) (\"[W]ithout an unambiguous statement to the contrary\n\non\n\nnot, breach grand jury secrecy for any purpose other th\n\nodied by the Rule.\"); United\n\nStates v. McDougal, 559 F.3d 837, 840-41 (8thi\n\nASV\nn\n\ninstitution separate from the courts, over whos 1%\noe ct\nwill not order disclosure absent a reco ' ? e\n\ns, we cannot, and must\n\n(\"`Because the grand jury is an\n\ning the courts do not preside,' ... courts\n\nption to Rule 6(e) or a valid challenge to the\n\noriginal sealing order or its imple\n\nn '\n\n225 A.3d 224, 240 (R.I. 2020)\n\ne sland courts have no inherent authority to release grand\n\njury records); compare C\nof Craig, 131 F.3\n\n(alteration omitted); In re 38 Studios Grand Jury,\n\nv. United States, 837 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2016); In re Petition\n\nt2 d Cir. 1997). Notably, The Post cites Carlson in its Motion (DE #\n107\n\n58 at ¶ 95). O\n\n25\n\nEFTA02734389\n\n\f", "char_count": 1551}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "V.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, The Post's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied,\nand this case should be dismissed with prejudice.\n/s/Kenneth G. Turkel\nKenneth G. Turkel — FBN 867233\nE-mail: kturkel@bajocuva.com\nShane B. Vogt - FBN 257620\nE-mail: svogt®bajocuva.com\nl ac\nJames C. Moone — FBN 111668\nE-mail: 'moons\nBAJO I CUVA I\n100 North Tampa Street,\nTampa, Florida 33602\nTelephone: (813\n199\nFacsimile: (81\n3\nt,\nAttorneys\nAbruzzo, as Clerk\nand Co\nPalm Beach County, Florida\n\n26\n\nEFTA02734390\n\n\f", "char_count": 514}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02734365", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\nI HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of October, 2021, I caused a true and correct\ncopy of the foregoing to be served via the Florida Court's E-Filing Portal upon the following\ncounsel of record:\nStephen A. Mendelsohn\nGreenberg Traurig, P.A.\n401 East Las Olas Blvd., Ste. 2000\nFort Lauderdale, FL 33301\nE-mails: mendelsohns@gtlaw.com\nsmithl@gtlaw.com\nFLServiceQgtlaw.com\n\no\nG\n\nMichael J. Grygiel\nGreenberg Traurig, P.A.\n54 State St., 6th Floor\nAlbany, NY 12207\nE-mail: grvgielmegtlaw.com\nNina D. Boyajian\nGreenberg Traurig, P.A.\n1840 Century Park East, Ste. 1900\nLos Angeles, CA 90067\nE-mails: bovaiiannQatlaw.com\nriveraalOgtlaw.com\n\nAc ci ty\n\nAttorneysfor Plaintiff\nIs/ Kenneth G. Turkel\nAttorney\n\npO\n\n27\n\nEFTA02734391\n\n\f", "char_count": 745}]}