{"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_count": 7, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02732805", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02732805.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Filing # 108527071 E-Filed 06/08/2020 02:04:34 PM\nTN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT\nIN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA\nCIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION AG\nCASE NO. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\nCA FLORIDA HOLDINGS LLC PUBLISHER OF THE PALM BEACH POST,\nPlaintiff/Petitioner\nvs.\nDAVE ARONBERG,\nSHARON R BOCK,\nDefendant/Respondents.\n\nORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS CQUNT II OF\nPLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITILPIL5THCIF,\nTHIS CAUSE cant before the Court on Dave Aronbe\nBeach County's (\"State Attorney\") and Sharon R. Bock, as\nCounty's, (\"Clerk') respective Motions to Dismiss C\n\ntomcy of Palm\nomptroller of Palm Beach\nA Florida Holdings, LLC,\n\nPublisher of the Palm Beach Post's (\"The Post\"\n\ncd Complaint (DE## 22, 24). This\n\ncase is assigned to Division AG, which is c\n\nsided over by the Honorable Donald\n\nHafele. However, the undersigned, as City J\n\ne of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, presided\n\nover the June 3, 2020 hearing on t\n\nNttomcy and Clerk's Motions as the Motions\n\nimplicate records of the Palm Beach County grand jury, over which the Chief Judge presides.\nSee § 905.01, Fla. Stat. (2019). After careful consideration of the pleadings and the arguments\npresented at the hearing, the Court grants the Motions for the following reasons.\nBackground\nThe Post\nprosec\n\noutlet which has heavily reported on the 2006 Palm Beach County criminal\nJeffrey Epstein. Through the instant civil lawsuit, The Post seeks \"imntdiate\n\naccess to the testimony, minutes, and other evidence presented in 2006 to the Palm Beach\nCounty grand jury\" in Mr. Epstein's case and alleges that both the State Attorney and Clerk arc\n\"in possession and/or control of [those] documents.\" (DE # 17, First Amended Complaint at ill\n3,4, and 77). Specifically, The Post seeks declaratory judgment as to its rights to obtain the\ngrand jury testimony in Mr. Epstein's case from the State Attorney and Clerk (Count I) as well as\n\nPage 1 of 7\n\nFILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, SHARON R. BOCK, CLERK, 06/08/2020 02:04:34 PM\n\nEFTA02732805\n\n\f", "char_count": 2036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case No. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\njudgment against the State Attorney and the Clerk pursuant to section 90527, Florida Statutes,\nwhich sets forth the parameters of grand jury secrecy in Florida. (Count II). Both the State\nAttorney and the Clerk move to dismiss Count II of The Post's First Amended Complaint,\narguing that that section 90527 does not create a private cause of action. (DE## 22, 24). The\nCourt agrees.\nAnalysis\n\"In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court\n\nt ccept the\n\nallegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favors\n\nthe\n\nAlmarante v. Art Institute of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So. 2d 703, 704-0\n\n4 DCA\n\n2006). The motion should only be granted if the moving party demo\n\nt the plaintiff\n\nMiff.\"\n\ncannot provide any facts that would support a cause of action.\n\nfo ows that if the cause of\n\naction alleged is nonexistent under Florida law, dismissal\n\nd. Cummings v. Dawson,\n\n444 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (aft\n\nf cause of action not recognized\n\nby Florida law).\nSection 90527, Florida Statutes (2019), is\n\n`Te3rtimony not to be disclosed, exceptions,\"\n\nand states:\n(1) A grand juror, state alto\niEtant state attorney, reporter, stenographer,\ninterpreter, or any other non\ncaring before the grand jury shall not disclose the\ntestimony of a witness e\nd before the grand jury or other evidence received by it\nexcept when requir by a court to disclose the testimony for the purpose of:\nwhether it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness before\nrung whether the witness is guilty of perjury; or\nring justice.\n\n(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose, divulge, or\ncontramicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to be published,\nbroadcast, disclosed, divulged, or conununicated to any other person, in any manner\nwhatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the content,\ngist, or import thereof, except when such testimony is or has been disclosed in a court\nproceeding. When a court orders the disclosure of such testimony pursuant to subsection\n(1) for use in a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney of the court\nin which such criminal case is pending, and by the prosecuting attorney to his or her\nassistants, legal associates, and employees, and to the defendant and the defendant's\nPage 2 of 7\nEFTA02732806\n\n\f", "char_count": 2428}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case No. 50-20 19-CA-0 14681-XXXX-MB\nattorney, and by the latter to his or her legal associates and employees. When such\ndisclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (I) for use in a civil case, it may be\ndisclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the latter to their legal\nassociates and employees. However, the grand jury testimony afforded such persons by\nthe court can only be used in the defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal case and\nfor no other purpose whatsoever.\n(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the attorney-client relationship. A client shall have\nthe right to communicate to his or her attorney any testimony given by the client to the\ngrand jury, any matters involving the client discussed in the clients presence be ore the\ngrand jury, and any evidence involving the client received by or proffered to\ngrand jury\nin the clients presence.\n(4) Persons convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a\ndegree, punishable as provided in s. 775.083, or by fine not exec\n\nr of the first\n,000, or both.\n\n(5) A violation of this section shall constitute criminal contemp\n§ 90527, Fla. Stat. (2019).\nAs the State Attorney and Clerk argue\n\nt concedes, section 90527\n\nnnkcs no express provision for a civil suit or c\n\ny. Nonetheless, The Post maintains that\n\nit is entitled to seek the grand jury records\n\ncause of action pursuant to the \"furthering\n\njustice\" exception to grand jury secre\nlimited question for this Court's\n\ndin subsection 90527(IXc). Therefore, the\non is whether a cause of action under section 90527\n\nshould be judicially implied. Se\n\nu y v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994).\n\nIn advocating that it\n\nintain a cause of action against the State Attorney and Clerk\n\nunder section 90\n\nThe ost urges the Court to examine three factors \"(1) whether the\n\nplaintiff is o\n\nass for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there\n\nis any\nremedy;\n\na\n\no\n\nether explicit or implicit, of a legislative intent to create or deny such a\n3) whether judicial implication is consistent with the underlying purposes of the\n\nlegislative scheme.\" (Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant, Dave Aronberg, As State Attorney of\nPalm Beach County, Florida's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the First Amended Complaint at\npage 13 (citing Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)). Within these three\nfactors, The Post recognizes that there is no indication of legislative intent to create a cause of\naction, but leans heavily on the benefit factor, arguing that the \"furthering justice\" exception to\n\nPage 3 of 7\nEFTA02732807\n\n\f", "char_count": 2623}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case No. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\ngrand jury secrecy outlined in section 90527(1Xc) was meant to benefit the public at large, for\nwhich the press acts as a surrogate. The Post's arguments are unpersuasive as to the discrete\nissue of whether a private cause of action lies in section 90527.\nTo begin with, The Post's reliance on the benefit factor is misplaced. Per the Florida\nSupreme Court's 1994 opinion in Murthy, \"the question of whether a statute establishes a duty to\ntake precautions to protect or benefit a particular class of persons is no longer determinative on\nthe question of whether a cause of action should be recognized?' Sorenson v. Pro\nCompounding Pharmacists of W. Pa., Inc., 191 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016\n644 So. 2d at 985). Instead, \"whether a statutory cause of action should\nquestion of legislative intent.\" Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. L\n\nng Murthy,\ni. y implied is a\n\ntp, 959 So. 2d 176,\n\n182 (Fla. 2007). See also QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo.\n\nen Asstn, Inc., 94 So. 3d\n\n541, 551 (Fla. 2012) (\"Since Murthy, we have reaffirmed\n\ne that whether a statutory\n\ncause of action should be judicially implied is a ques\n\nD A 2019).\n\n& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Loftus, 276 So. 3d 849, 851\nAs is always the case when a court\nlanguage of the statute is the starting,\n\"When the statute is clear and\n\nr\n\nlanguage for legislative intent\nLoftus, 276 So. 3d at 851\n\ne\n\nlative intent\"); Universal Prop.\n\ns a legislative intent analysis, the plain\nriding, point. See Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 182.\n\ncourts will not look behind the statute's plain\ns\n\nto rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.\"\n\nth DCA 2019)Xquoting Daniels v. Ma. Dep't ofHealth, 898 So.\n\n2d 61, 64 (Fla. 20\n\n). \"H wever, a single part of a statute should not be read in isolation.\" Id.\n\n\"Instead, 'all\n\nf statute roust be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.\"' Id.\n\n(quotinit Fo\n\nLongboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist, 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla.\n\n1992)).\nAs The Post acknowledges, \"there is a dearth of legislative history surrounding Section\n90527 and the The Palm Beach Post was unable to locate any documents capturing any\nlegislative intent regarding the possibility of a private right of action.\" (Plaintiff's Opposition to\nDefendant, Dave Aronberg, As State Attorney of Palm Beach County, Florida's Motion to\nDismiss Count Il of the First Amended Complaint at page 14). While the lack of any legislative\n\nPage 4 of 7\nEFTA02732808\n\n\f", "char_count": 2449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case No. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\nhistory indicating an intent to create a private right of action is telling, it is not dispositive as the\nplain language of the section 90527 is clear an unambiguous and, therefore, controls. Horowitz,\n959 So, 2d at 182.\nExamining the plain language of section 90527 in its entirety, which requires the Court to\nlook at more than just the \"furthering justice\" provision of section 90527(lXc) relied on by The\nPost, it is clear that the intent of the Legislature in passing section 90527 was to limit, not\nfacilitate, disclosure of grand July records. In no uncertain terms, the Legislature\n\n•ded that\n\nno \"person appearing before the grand jury\" may \"disclose\" testimony or evi\n\np\n\nexcept when \"required by a court\" under certain limited circumstances. §\n\n, Fla. Stat. In\n\nsolidifying that its intent was to prohibit disclosure without coat pe\nprovided that disclosure without a court order is a criminal offv\nTherefore, to the extent section 90527 could be read as\n\npqs 1\n\nsio\n§9\n\nented\n\nLegislature\n\n27(4), Fla. Stat.\n\nduty on the State Attorney\n\nand Clerk, the duty imposed is one of secrecy, not di'\nIn sum, there is nothing in the text of sec\n\n7 from which one can deduce that the\n\nLegislature contemplated a member of the r\n\nor\n\ncause of action to compel the State\n\nClerk to disclose grand jury records. Indeed,\n\nto the contrary, section 90527 p\npleaded by The Post, they hay\nbeing ordered to do so b\n\none else for that matter, having a private\n\nState Attorney and the Clerk (assuming that, as\ncuments) from disclosing the documents without first\nurtfil Reading section 90527 as creating a private cause of\n\naction against the\n\nte Att\n\nsection 905\n\nis ctually paradoxical to its plain language of the statute. As such, this Court\n\nlacks t4jconstrue\nextend its\n\ny and Clerk is, therefore, not only unsupported by the language of\n\nthe unambiguous language of section 90527 in a way that would\n\nress terms and create a cause of action where none exists. \"To do so would be an\n\nabrogation of legislative power.\" Horowitz. 959 So. 2d 176. 182 (quoting Holly v. Auld. 450 So,\n2d 217. 219 (FIa. 1984)),\nConclusion\nBased on the foregoing, the Court finds Count II of The Post's First Amended Complaint\ntrust be dismissed with prejudice as it pursues a nonexistent cause of action under section\n\nPage 5 of 7\nEFTA02732809\n\n\f", "char_count": 2355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case No. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\n90527. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court does not suggest The Post has no available\nmechanism to obtain a court order granting it access to the grand jury proceedings. The Court\nalso does not render any opinion as to whether releasing these records is appropriate for the\npurpose of \"furthering justice\" within the meaning of section 90527. Rather, the Court's\ndismissal of Count II is necessitated by precedent and the simple fact that a civil lawsuit against\nthe State Attorney and Clerk under section 90527 is not the proper mechanism for The Post to\npursue its goal.\nTherefore, it is hereby\nORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Dave Aronberg, as State Att\nCounty's and Sharon R. Bock, as Clerk & Comptroller of Palm Beac\n\naim Beach\ns, respective\n\nMotions to Dismiss Count II of CA Florida Holdings, LLC, P\n\nr o the Palm Beach Post's\n\nFirst Amended Complaint are GRANTED and Count H o\n\nfirst Amended Complaint is\n\nhereby DISMISSED with prejudice.\nDONE AND ORDERED, in West Palr\n\na\n\nPalm Beach County, Florida this 8th day\n\nof June, 2020.\n\n/000G11B_,\n0 0\n((rata Map(\n50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\nKrIsta Marx\nChief Judge\n\n(se\n\nsly go\n\n06/082020\n\n111 The\nnotes that, if there was a court order directing the State Attorney or the Clerk to\ndisclose re rds and the State Attorney or the Clerk refused, the remedy for disobeying a court order\nis contempt or, in some instances, a mandamus proceedings — not a civil lawsuit.\nCOPIES TO:\n\nDOUGLAS A. WYLER\n\nNo E-mail Address Available\nNo Address Available\ndoug.wyler@comcast.net\n961687 GATEWAY BLVD\nSUITE 201-I\nFERNANDINA BEACH, FL\n\nPage 6 of 7\n\nEFTA02732810\n\n\f", "char_count": 1634}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732805", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case No. 50-2019-CA-014681-XXXX-MB\n\nMICHAEL GRYGIEL\n\nMICHAEL J. GRYGIEL\nNICOLE R. FINGERHUT\n\n32034\n54 STATE STREET\n6TH FLOOR\nALBANY, NY 12207\nNo Address Available\nPOST OFFICE BOX 229\nWEST PALM BEACH, FL\n33401\n\nNINA D. BOYAJIAN\n\nNo Address Available\n\nNINA D. BOYAJIAN\n\n1840 CENTURY PARK\nEAST\nSUITE 1900\nLOS ANGELES, CA 90067\n5100 TOWN CENTER CIR\nSUITE 400\nBOCA RATON, FL 3\n\nSTEPHEN A.\nMENDELSOHN, ESQ\n\nGRYGIELM@GTLAW.COM\n\ngrygielm@gtlaw.com\nCLERK ESERVICE@MYPALMBEACH\nCLERK.COM\nrifingerhut@rnypalrnbeachclerk.\ncorn\nboyajiann@gtla\nriveraal@gt1\nNo E\nAvailable\n\nelsolms@gtlaw.com\n@gtlaw.com\nervice@gtlaw.com\n\nPage 7 of 7\n\nEFTA02732811\n\n\f", "char_count": 633}]}