{"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_count": 16, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02732227", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02732227.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 1 of 16\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\n-against-\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DCF)\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors of\nthe ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR\nMOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022\nTel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02732227\n\n\f", "char_count": 551}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 2 of 16\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nARGUMENT\n\n1\n\nI.\n\nI1.\nIII.\n\nIV.\nV.\n\nNew York's borrowing statute applies to Plaintiff's claims because her\nown allegations firmly establish she was not, and is not, a New York\nresident\n\n1\n\nThe 20-year limitations period in CPLR § 213-c does not apply\nretroactively or to torts allegedly committed outside New York\n\n3\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a) because she fails to assert a\ncriminal indictment that arises from Decedent's alleged conduct towards\nher.\n\n4\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances\nsufficient to invoke equitable estoppel or tolling\n\n6\n\nJudge Engelmayer recently dismissed two other plaintiffs' punitive\ndamages claims as a matter of law, rejecting the very arguments Plaintiff\nraises here\n\n7\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n10\n\nEFTA02732228\n\n\f", "char_count": 910}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 3 of 16\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nBache Halsey Stuart Inc. v. Namm,\n446 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)\n\n2\n\nBanks v. IntlRental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (2011)\n\n10\n\nBlisset v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 499 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n9\n\nv. Parkchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cu.r 2002)\n\n7\n\nCarson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc.,\n202 F. Supp. 3d 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)\n\n3\n\nCorcoran v. New York Power Auth.,\nNo. 95 CIV. 5357 (DLC), 1997 WL 603739 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1997)\n\n4\n\nCrabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate ofCrabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n10\n\nNo. 15-CV-5359 (KMK), 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)\n\n7\n\nDoe 15 v. Indyke,\nNo. 19-cv-10653 (PAE), 2020 WL 2086194 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)\n\n8, 9, 10\n\nDoe v. Indyke,\nNo. 19-cv-10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020)\n\n7, 8, 9, 10\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) ..................................7\nGen. Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n7\n\nGold v. Katz,\nNo. 90 CIV. 7726 (RLC), 1991 WL 237807 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, I991)..\n\n.2\n\nGodin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (ILO), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006).\n\n.7\n\nEFTA02732229\n\n\f\n\n[═══ TRANSCRIPT ═══]\nCase 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 5 of 16  Rule 12(0  8  Other Authorities C.  & A.  5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.)  8 10  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908  -iv-  EFTA02732231", "char_count": 1469}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 4 of 16\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n7\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n6\n\nLettis v. U.S. Postal Serv.,\n39 F. Supp. 2d 181 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)\n\n4\n\nIn re Merrill\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig.,\n851 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n\n8\n\nNash v. Coram Healthcare Corp.,\nNo. 96 Civ. 0298 (LMM), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101 (S.D.N.Y. June 27,\n1996)\n\n8\n\nNat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\nNo. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,\n2019)\n\n9\n\nPeople v. McLaughlin,\n80 N.Y.2d 466 (1992)\n\n4\n\nTexas v. Florida,\n306 U.S. 398 (1939)\n\n2\n\nWhitley v. Bowden,\nNo. 17-cv-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018)\n\n3\n\nWillis v. Westin Hotel Co.,\n651 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)\n\n2\n\nWilson v. Erra,\n94 A.D.3d 756, 942 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2012)\n\n4\n\nStatutes\n97 NY Jur Statutes § 185\n\n6\n\nCPLR § 213-c\n\nI, 3, 4\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa)\n\nI, 4, 5\n\nE.P.T.L. § I 1-3.2(a)(1)\n\n9\n\nNew York Child Victims Act\n\n8\n\nRule 12(bX6) and Rule 12(f)\n\n8\n\n-\n\n-\n\nEFTA02732230\n\n\f", "char_count": 1073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 5 of 16\n\nRule 12(0\n\n8\n\nOther Authorities\nC.\n\n& A.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.)\n\n8\n10\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 908\n\n-iv-\n\nEFTA02732231\n\n\f", "char_count": 218}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 6 of 16\n\nThe Co-Executors' submit this reply memorandum of law in support of their motion to\ndismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1).\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff asks the Court to depart from well-established law to\nresuscitate her claims that expired over a decade ago. First Plaintiff attempts to create a nonexistent issue of fact — which does not alter the result of the proper legal analysis in any event —\nregarding her residence, which she unequivocally alleges was not in New York. Second, Plaintiff\nasks the Court to disregard basic principles of statutory interpretation and numerous cases applying\nCPLR §§ 213-c and 215(8)(a) to support her erroneous application of those rules. Third, Plaintiff\nasks the Court to disregard Second Circuit authority holding that it is Plaintiff's burden to allege\n\"extraordinary circumstances\" to toll the applicable statutes of limitations, which she fails to do\nhere. Fourth, Plaintiff urges this Court to permit her to seek punitive damages notwithstanding\nthat, in two other actions against the Co-Executors involving similar claims, Judge Engelmayer\ndismissed claims for punitive damages in the face of the very arguments Plaintiff raises here. The\nCourt should reject Plaintiff's arguments.\nARGUMENT\nI.\n\nNew York's borrowing statute applies to Piaintiff's claims because her own\nallegations firmly establish she was not, and is not, a New York resident.\nAs laid out in the Co-Executors' moving papers, the New York borrowing statute requires\n\ndismissal of Plaintiff's claims to the extent that they are based on torts that allegedly occurred in\nFrance, New Mexico, and the USVI, as such claims are time-barred by the applicable laws of those\n\nI Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Co-Executors' moving brief (ECF\nNo. 24).\n\nEFTA02732232\n\n\f", "char_count": 1921}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 7 of 16\n\njurisdictions. (Mov. Br. pp. 4-6.) In a failed attempt to avoid this result, Plaintiffnow attempts to\nmanufacture a fact issue regarding her residency.2 (Op. Br. p. 15.)\nNot only is this argument unsupported by case law, it is directly contradicted by Plaintiff's\nown allegations in her Complaint. Plaintiff argues that her \"Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was a\nNew York resident at all relevant times.\" (Op. Br. p. 15.) However, nowhere in her Complaint\ndoes Plaintiff claim New York domicile or residency. Rather, in addition to expressly alleging\nthat \"Plaintiff\n\nis a citizen and resident of South Africa,\" all other supporting facts\n\nalleged in Plaintiff's Complaint -- including that she met Decedent when he was visiting Cape\nTown, that she repeatedly would \"travel to the United States\" \"for one to two weeks at a time,\"\nand that she \"flew home to South Africa\" (Comp1.11 16, 38, 46, & 50) -- confirm her claimed\nSouth African residency.\nPlaintiff further argues that there is a factual question regarding her New York residency\nbecause \"she had always wanted to live in New York, Epstein's co-conspirators got Plaintiff a visa\nso that she could travel to New York often, and when she visited she stayed at Epstein's New York\nhome for one to two weeks at a time.\" (Op. Br. p. 15). None of these allegations, even if true,\nwould suffice to establish Plaintiff's residency in New York under the New York borrowing\nstatute. See Gold v. Katz, No. 90 CIV. 7726 (RLC), 1991 WL 237807, at •2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,\n1991) (\"The test for domicile has two elements: '(r]esidence in fact, coupled with the purpose to\nmake the place of residence one's home.'\" (quoting Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939));\nBache Halsey Stuart Inc. v. Namm, 446 F. Supp. 692, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1978Xin determining\n\n2 \"An individual can have only one state of residence for purposes of the borrowing statute, and that is the state of his\ndomicile.\" Bache\n... [truncated, 2441 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/6 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=6]", "char_count": 2441}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 8 of 16\n\nresidency under the borrowing statute, \"[w]hat is vital is whether the Namms' Connecticut or New\nYork residence is where they intended to maintain their home\"). On their face, allegations that\nPlaintiff needed a visa to visit New York reveal her current claims of residency are nothing more\nthan an after-the-fact concoction.\nFurthermore, even if Plaintiff had also alleged in her Complaint that she was a New York\nresident -- which she did not do -- such an allegation would not preclude dismissal of her claims\nin the face of her numerous allegations establishing she was not a New York resident during the\nrelevant time period. \"'Where [the] plaintiff's own pleadings are internally inconsistent, a court\nis neither obligated to reconcile nor accept the contradictory allegations in the pleadings as true in\ndeciding a motion to dismiss.\"' Whitley v. Bowden, No. 17-cv-3564 (KMK), 2018 WL 2170313,\nat *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2018) (quoting Carson Optical Inc. v. eBay Inc., 202 F. Supp. 3d 247,\n255 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)).\nFinally, even if New York's borrowing statute does not apply, for the reasons set forth in\nthe Co-Executors' moving brief and herein, Plaintiff's claims are still untimely under New York\nlaw.\nII.\n\nThe 20-year limitations period in CPLR § 213-c does not apply retroactively or to\ntorts allegedly committed outside New York.\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff argues that CPLR § 213-c, which provides a 20-year\n\nlimitations period for certain civil claims based on sexual offenses that constitute specific New\nYork penal law violations, revives her claims. Plaintiff's argument fails for at least two reasons.\nFirst, the 20-year limitations period in CPLR § 213-c does not apply to Plaintiff's claims\nbecause they were already time-barred by 2007 at the latest, which was long before the nonretroactive 20-year limitations period in CPLR § 213-c became effective. The 20-year limitations\nperiod in CPLR § 213-c became\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/7 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=7]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 9 of 16\n\ntherein was 5 years as of 2006 and 1 year before then. L. 2006, ch. 3, § 5(b). The law enacting\nthe 20-year limitations period unequivocally states that it does not apply retroactively except\n\"where the applicable statute of limitations in effect on the date of such act or omission has not yet\nexpired.\" L. 2019, ch. 315, § 4. Here, Plaintiff's claims expired over a decade before the 20-year\nstatute of limitations became effective—so it is inapplicable.\nSecond Plaintiffs allegations of torts occurring outside New York cannot constitute\nviolations ofNew York penal law that serve as necessary predicates to the application ofCPLR §\n213-c. See People v. McLaughlin, 80 N.Y.2d 466, 471 (1992) (\"Because the State only has power\nto enact and enforce criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense\nunless it has territorial jurisdiction\"). In an attempt to avoid this well-established principle,\nPlaintiff argues that her claims based on torts that occurred outside New York still somehow\naccrued under New York law. This argument is both nonsensical and contrary to other black-letter\nlaw. See Corcoran v. New York Power Auth., No. 95 CIV. 5357 (DLC), 1997 WL 603739, at •5\n(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1997) (\"An action for battery accrues when the nonconsensual offensive\ncontact occurs.\"); Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F. Supp. 2d 181, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (\"Causes\nof action for assault and battery accrue immediately upon the occurrence of the- tortious act\");\nWilson v. Erra, 94 A.D.3d 756, 756, 942 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 (2012) (\"A cause of action alleging\nintentional infliction of emotional distress accrues on the date of injury\").\nIII.\n\nPlaintiff is unable to invoke CPLR § 215(8Xa) because she fails to assert a criminal\nind let ment that arises from Decedent's alleged conduct towards her.\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff confirms her allegation is that she did not even meet\n\nDecedent until sh\n... [truncated, 2290 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/8 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=8]", "char_count": 2290}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 10 of 16\n\nestablishing the Indictment and this lawsuit arise from the same \"event or occurrence.\" Plaintiff\nfails to do this.\nInstead, Plaintiff attempts to recast the Indictment as broader in scope than its contents\nallow. Specifically, Plaintiff takes two allegations concerning Decedent's purported actual\nknowledge of the age of some of the \"minor victims\" out of context to imply adult women were\nthe subject of the Indictment. (Op. Br. p. 6).3 This is disingenuous. The Indictment does not\nreference any adult victims. Rather, all the facts alleged in the indictment refer to Decedent's\nalleged conduct towards \"minor girls\" or \"minor victims\" (Indictment at ¶¶ 1-4, 6, 8, 11-15 1819, et seq.); and the two counts of the indictment, for Sex Trafficking Conspiracy and Sex\nTrafficking, charge crimes involving minors (id at ¶¶ 20 & 24).\nPlaintiff next tries to expand the scope of CPLR § 215(8Xa)'s \"event or occurrence\"\nrequirement. However, the cases cited in the Co-Executors' moving brief confirm that, even\nwhere it is undisputed that the subject criminal indictment concerns the civil plaintiff and the\nsame kind of conduct alleged in the plaintiff's civil complaint, CPLR § 215(8Xa) still does not\napply where the indictment and civil action arise from different events or occurrences. (See\nMov. Br. pp. 7-10.) Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that they\n\"focused on events that occurred on specified dates\" (Op. Br., p. 8) is based on Plaintiff's\ndubious assertion that, because the Indictment at issue here \"was not limited to a specific day or\ndiscrete event\" (id., p. 10), anyone alleging she suffered the same type of misconduct described\nin the Indictment is free to invoke CPLR § 215(8Xa). Such a reading is s contrary to basic\n\n3 The full sentences in the Indictment which Plaintiff references are as follows: \"JEFFREY EPSTEIN, the defendant,\nknew that many of his New York victims were underag\n... [truncated, 2249 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/9 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=9]", "char_count": 2249}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 11 of 16\n\nprinciples of statutory interpretation prohibiting a reading of a statute that would render its words\nmeaningless (see 97 NY Jur Statutes § 185), the case law cited in the Co-Executors' moving\nbrief, a plain reading of the Indictment and common sense.4\nIV.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances sufficient\nto invoke equitable estoppel or tolling.\nPlaintiff misstates the pleading burden with respect to equitable estoppel and tolling,\n\nasserting that \"Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that [she] will be unable to\ninvoke equitable estoppel and equitable tolling.\" (Op. Br. p. I.) Plaintiff has it backwards. As\nexplained in the Co-Executors' moving brief, the burden is on Plaintiff to sufficiently allege\n\"extraordinary circumstances\" to invoke these doctrines. (Mov. Br. pp. I, 12-15.)\nIn her opposition brief, Plaintiff does not address many of the cases that the Co-Executors\ncite on this point, but rather attempts to buttress her Complaint by painting a slightly more detailed\n(but still insufficient) picture of why she waited 15 years to bring this action. However, Plaintiff's\nComplaint is controlling. In her Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege: any particularized acts by\nDecedent that prevented her from exercising her rights; that Decedent made a misrepresentation\nto her and had reason to believe she would rely on it; or that she reasonably relied on any\nmisrepresentation by Decedent to her detriment.\nExcluding vague allegations concerning Decedent's alleged misconduct directed at some\nunidentified set of alleged victims that does not include Plaintiff (see, e.g., Comp!. y 26\n(\"[Decedentj utilized his seemingly unlimited power, wealth, and resources... intimidate and\nmanipulate his victims\"),5 Plaintiff primarily alleges her impressions and emotions between\n\nPlaintiff also once again relies on Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 201\n... [truncated, 2355 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/10 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=10]", "char_count": 2355}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF\n\nDocument 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 12 of 16\n\n2002 and 2004, rather than Decedent's conduct. (Id. ¶ 44, 45, 48.) Not a single case Plaintiff\ncites supports a finding that such allegations satisfy the \"extraordinary circumstances\" pleading\nburden required to invoke estoppel or tolling. To the contrary, the cases Plaintiff cites are either\ninapplicable6 or confirm her allegations fall short of that threshold.7\nWhile Plaintiff claims that \"Epstein attempted to keep in contact with Juliette through email over the years\" following Plaintiff's cutting tics with him in 2004, she cites to two emails\nthat neither contain threats nor misrepresentations—hardly \"extraordinary circumstances.\" In\nany event, the cited emails, which are dated to 2016 and 2019, cannot serve as justification for\nPlaintiff's failure to pursue her claims for the more-than-ten-year gap between when she \"cut\nties\" with Decedent and when she corresponded with him.\nV.\n\nJudge Engelmayer recently dismissed two other plaintiffs' punitive damages claims\nas a matter of law, rejecting the very arguments Plaintiff raises here.\nThe Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer recently dismissed punitive damages claims on the pleadings\n\nin two other actions against the Co-Executors involving claims similar to those Plaintiff raises in\nthis action. See e.g., Doe v. Indyke, No. 19-cv-10758 (PAE), 2020 WL 2036707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.\n\nPlaintiffs reliance on\nv.\nNo. 15-CV-5359 (KMK), 2016 WL 5720811, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,\n2016)—to support her assertion that reasonable fear ofretaliation \"may be sufficient\" to warrant equitable tolling (Op.\nBr. p. 17)—is misleading. In that action, the court granted a pro se prisoner leave to allege facts sufficient to show he\npursued his claims with reasonable diligence. Id. at *39. However, the Court was clear that its findings were based\non plaintiff's incarceration and pro se status. See id. at *35, 39 (\"in the prison context, reasonable fear of retaliation\nmay be sufficient\"; \"g\n... [truncated, 3566 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/11 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=11]", "char_count": 3566}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 13 of 16\n\nApr. 28, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss punitive damages against the Co-Executors); Doe 15\nv. Indyke, No. 19-cv-10653 (PAE), 2020 WL 2086194, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (same). In\ndoing so, Judge Engelmayer correctly rejected each of the arguments Plaintiff asserts here in\nsupport of her request to continue to pursue her legally deficient claim for punitive damages.\nFirst, Judge Engelmayer rejected the argument that a motion to dismiss a legally deficient\nclaim for punitive damages on the pleadings is procedurally improper: \"where punitive damages\nhave been unavailable as a matter of law, courts have not hesitated to dismiss prayers for such\ndamages at the threshold.\" Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at *3; see also Doe 15, 2020 WL 2086194,\nat *1. \"[A]mple authority permits striking prayers for punitive damages where such relief is\nunavailable as a matter of law.\" Id. at *4 (citing In re Merrill\n\nAuction Rate Sec. Litig., 851\n\nF. Supp. 2d at 544).8\nDiscarding the \"conceptual debate\" between motions filed under Rule 12(bX6) and Rule\n12(9, Judge Engelmayer further concluded that the Court could in any event dismiss claims for\npunitive damages sua sponte under Rule 12(f) because: \"With numerous personal injury actions\npending against the Epstein estate as a result of the recent enactment of the New York Child\nVictims Act, there is value in clarifying—for the parties and settlors—the damages available in\nactions where the law permits a sure answer on this point.\" Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at *5. The\nsame practical wisdom applies here.\nSecond, Judge Engelmayer rejected Mary Doe's and Jane Doe 15's attempts to apply\nUnited States Virgin Islands law to the issue of punitive damages, finding that the law of the place\n\n8 See also C.\n\n5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1380 (3d ed.) (\"the technical name given to a motion\n& A. M,\nchallenging a pleading is of little importance inasmuch as prejudice to the nonmoving party ca\n... [truncated, 2546 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/12 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=12]", "char_count": 2546}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 14 of 16\n\nof the torts governs. Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at *5-6; Doe 15,2020 WL 2086194, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.\nApr. 30, 2020). As established in the Co-Executors' moving brief, none of the jurisdictions where\nPlaintiff alleges the torts occurred permits punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.\n(ECF No. 24 pp. 16-18.)\nMoreover, Plaintiff here, like Mary Doe and Jane Doe 15, ignores Blisset v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 499, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). That well-reasoned decision establishes that Plaintiff\nmay not have the Court simultaneously apply the first sentence of E.P.T.L. § 11-3.2(a)(1)—the\nportion of the statute permitting her to bring this action against the Co-Executors—but disregard\nthe very next sentence precluding punitive damages. See Blisset, 940 F. Supp. at 457. To quote\nJudge Engelmayer, it would be \"problematic for [Plaintiff] to cherrypick within that provision,\ninvoking the part that authorizes a personal injury suit against an executor while disclaiming the\nbalance, which delimits the recovery available in such a suit.\" Doe, 2020 WL 2036707, at *6\n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (citing Blisset, 940 F. Supp. at 457).9\nThird Judge Engelmayer ruled that the choice-of-law debate (Le., New York law vs. USVI\nlaw) is \"academic.\" Id. at *7. \"That is because, while the USVI does not have a statute on point\nand USVI courts have not squarely resolved the issue, it is likely that USVI common law would\nnot permit an award of punitive damages against an estate.\" Id. See also Doe 15, 2020 WL\n2086194.2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020) (\"Doe does not have any stronger argument than did Mary\nDoe that USVI law applies ... or, if it did, that it would permit such damages\").\n\nLike the plaintiffs in Mary Doe and Doe 15, Plaintiff also erroneously relies on Nat? Jewish Democratic Council v.\nAdelson, No. 18 Civ. 8787 (JPO), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168675, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019). Even under the\nframework of Adelson, the place \n... [truncated, 2656 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732227/13 or ?id=EFTA02732227&page=13]", "char_count": 2656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 15 of 16\n\nPlaintiff in this action misapplies the Banks analysis factors, which USVI courts use to\ndetermine common law. See Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). As\nJudge Engelmayer found, a proper Banks analysis demonstrates: (Factor 1) \"USVI courts have\nrepeatedly cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 favorably\"; (Factor 2) consistent with\nthe Restatement, most U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against a\ntortfeasor's estate; and (Factor 3) USVI courts appear comfortable with the majority rule. Doe,\n2020 WL 2036707, at *8.\nPlaintiff's remaining arguments fail for the same reasons applied by Judge Engelmayer in\nMary Doe and Jane Doe 15. Plaintiff argues that, because the USVI Attorney General seeks\npunitive damages against the Estate in an unrelated civil racketeering lawsuit, punitive damages\nare allowed under USVI law. (Opp. at 22, n.9.) \"But the decision by a government lawyer to\nattempt to obtain such damages in a high-profile case involving allegations of extreme conduct ..\n. do not speak to the question that the third Banks factor assays: which rule of law best durably\nservers the USVI's interests.\" Doe v. Indyke, 2020 WL 2036707, at *8.\nSeparately, Plaintiff's reliance on Crabtree a ref Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d\n135, 139 (Ind. 2005), is misplaced. The court in that action held \"Indiana law does not permit\nrecovery of punitive damages from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor.\"\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above and in their moving brief (ECF No. 24), the Co-Executors\nrespectfully request that the Court grant their motion to dismiss, together with such other and\nfurther relief as the Court deems just and proper.\n\n- 10.\n\nEFTA02732241\n\n\f", "char_count": 1807}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732227", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 39 Filed 05/26/20 Page 16 of 16\n\nDated: New York, New York\nMay 26, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n212.704.6000\n\nBy:/s/ Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02732242\n\n\f", "char_count": 291}]}