{"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_count": 32, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02732143", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02732143.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 1 of 32\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nCASE NO: 19-cv-I0479-ALC\n\nv.\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D. KAHN,\nin their capacities as the executors of the\nESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD EPSTEIN,\n\nDefendants.\n\nPLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO\nDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nEFTA02732143\n\n\f", "char_count": 414}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 2 of 32\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n1\n\nARGUMENT\n\n4\n\nI. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff's Claims Are Untimely\n\n4\n\nA. Plaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa)\nI. The Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\n5\n6\n\n2. Plaintiff's Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the Indictment\nConcerned.\n7\n3. Defendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) Fail\n\n8\n\nB. Plaintiff's Claims are Timely Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\n10\n\nC. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims.\n\n13\n\nI. Statutory Interpretation Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. § 202.\n\n13\n\n2. Plaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue \"Without the State\" of New York.\n\n14\n\n3. Plaintiff's Residency When the Cause of Action Accrued Is a Factual Issue.\n\n14\n\nD. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Estoppel.\n\n15\n\nE. Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Cannot Invoke\nEquitable Tolling.\n\n17\n\nII. The Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages\n\n19\n\nA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages is Procedurally Improper.\n\n19\n\nB. Plaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case\n\n20\n\nI. USVI Law on Punitive Damages Governs This Case.\n\n20\n\n2. USVI Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against Defendants\n\n22\n\na. Banks Factor One: Whether Any USVI Courts Have Adopted a Rule\n\n22\n\nb. Banks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts from Other\nJurisdictions\n\n23\n\nc. Banks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the USVI\n\n24\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n25\n\nii\n\nEFTA02732144\n\n\f", "char_count": 1722}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 3 of 32\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nAntone v. Gen. Motors Corp.,\n473 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1984)\n\n15\n\nAshcroft v. lqbal,\n556 U.S. 662 (2009)\n\n4\n\nBabcock v. M,\n191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963)\n\n20\n\nBanks v. Intl Rental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011)\n\n22, 25\n\nBooth v. Bowen,\nNo. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\nv. Parlcchester S. Condos.,\n287 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2002)\n\n23\n18\n\nBurrows v. Bd. of Assessorsfor Town of Chatham,\n98 A.D.2d 250 (3d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 473 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 1984)\nChilders v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp.,\n36 F. Supp. 3d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)\n\n13\n4, 17\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdenton,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1999)\n\n9\n\nCIT Bank N.A. v. Schtffinan,\n948 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2020), certified question accepted, No. 36, 2020 WL 729773\n(N.Y. Feb. 13, 2020)\n\n25\n\nClemens v. Nealon,\n202 A.D.2d 747 (3d Dep't 1994)\n\n13\n\nCoffinan v. Coffinan,\n60 A.D.2d 181 (2d Dep't 1977)\n\n12\n\nCrabtree ex. Rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n24\n\n■ v.\nNo. 15-cv-5359, 2016 WL 5720811 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)\nDeMartino v.\n148 A.D.2d 568 (2d Dep't 1989)\n\n18\n15\n\niii\n\nEFTA02732145\n\n\f", "char_count": 1183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 4 of 32\n\nDenton v. McKee,\n332 F. Supp. 2d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n20\n\nEllis v. Zuck,\n546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977)\n\n23\n\nEstate ofFarrell ex rel. Bennett v. M,\n770 A.2d 517 (Del. 2001)\n\n23\n\nFlight Sci., Inc. v. Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd.,\n647 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\n18\n\nFunk v. Belneftekhim,\nNo. 14-CV-0376 (BMC), 2019 WL 3035124 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019)\n\n16\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018)\n\n9\n\nGen. Stencils. Inc. v. Chiappa,\n219 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1966)\n\n16\n\nGleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, Inc.,\n649 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1996)\n\n12\n\nGotlin v. Lederman,\nNo. 05-CV-1899 (IW), 2006 WL 1154817 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2006)\n\n17\n\nGov't ofthe V.I. v.\n60 V.I. 597 (V.I. 2016)\n\n22. 24\n\nGuardian Ins. Co. v. Gumbs,\nNo. ST-15-CV-195, 2016 WL 9525609 (V.I. Super. Aug. 22, 2016)\n\n25\n\nGuobadia v. Irowa,\n103 F. Supp. 3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)\n\n19\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009)\n\n23\n\nHammerman v. Louis Watch Co.,\n7 A.D.2d 817 (3d Dep't 1958)\n\n15\n\nHaralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc.,\n31 P.3d 114 (Ariz. 2001)\n\n23\n\nHarris v. City ofNew York,\n186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)\n\n4\n\niv\n\nEFTA02732146\n\n\f", "char_count": 1220}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 5 of 32\n\nHofer v. Lavender,\n679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)\n\n23\n\nIn re Gleason (Michael Vee, Ltd.),\n749 N.E.2d 724 (2001)\n\n12\n\nIn re S. African Apartheid Litig.,\n617 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)\n\n18\n\nv. City ofNew York,\nNo. 18-CV-1937 (VSB), 2020 WL 1644009 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020)\nKaopuiki v. Kealoha,\n87 P.3d 910 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003)\nKashe v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n19.20\n23\n4, 7, 9, 10\n\nKlaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,\n313 U.S. 487 (1941)\n\n20\n\nKosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C.,\n274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001)\n\n17\n\nLaRocca v. Cohen IP,\nNo. 08 Civ. 6274, 2009 WL 10435869 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009)\n\n8\n\nMcElligott v. City ofNew York,\nNo. 15 CIV. 7107 (LOS), 2017 WL 6210840 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017)\n\n9\n\nMcGuirk v. City Sch. Dist. ofAlbany,\n116 A.D.2d 363 (3d Dep't 1986)\n\n11\n\nMeegan S. v. Donald T.,\n475 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1984)\n\n11, 12\n\nNat'lJewish Democratic Council v. Adelson,\n417 F. Supp. 3d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)\n\n21\n\nPadula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp.,\n644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994)\n\n20\n\nMelton,\n299 S.E.2d 8 (W. Va. 1982)\n\n23\n\n=v.\nBoy Scouts ofAm., /nc.,\n65 N.Y.2d 189 (1985)\n\n21\n\nEFTA02732147\n\n\f", "char_count": 1184}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 6 of 32\n\nSiegfried v. Siegfried,\n92 A.D.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1983)\n\n15\n\nTillett v. Lippert,\n909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996)\n\n23\n\nStatutes\nN.Y. Penal Law § 130.35\n\n11\n\nN.Y. Stat. Law § 51\n\n12\n\nN.Y. Stat. Law § 54\n\n12\n\nN.Y. Stat. Law § 76\n\n13\n\nRules\nFed. R. Civ. P. 12\n\n19\n4, 13, 14, 15\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c\n\npassim\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215\n\npassim\n\nOther Authorities\nBrief of Defendants-Appellees, Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\nNo. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), Dkt. 92\n\n10\n\nComplaint, GVI v. Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein,\nNo. ST-20-CV-014 (V.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2020)\n\n22\n\nN.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y. S.B. No. 6574, 42nd Legis. Sess. (June 17, 2019)\n\n11\n\nRestat. (Second) of Torts § 908\n\n23\n\nTranscript of Pre-motion Conference,\nv. Indyke, et al.,\nNo. 19-cv-10475 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), Dkt. 39\n\n5\n\nvi\n\nEFTA02732148\n\n\f", "char_count": 894}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 7 of 32\n\nPlaintiff\n\nby and through her undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits\n\nthis Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.'\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nFor decades, Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited countless young women to\nhis homes across the world, and forced them to give him massages that escalated into sexual\nassault.\n\nwas just one of many victims that Epstein and his co-conspirators recruited\n\nto be a part of their sex-trafficking operation when she was a young woman. Epstein offered to\nhelp Plaintiff with her dream of modeling in New York, but instead sexually abused her for years.\nDefendants contend that Plaintiff's claims are untimely, but wholly ignore the burden that\nthey bear to prove such an affirmative defense at this stage of this litigation. First, Plaintiff's\nclaims are timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which provided Plaintiff with one year from\nthe termination of the criminal action again Epstein to file an action. Second, Plaintiffs claims\nare timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c, which provides rape victims with 20 years to bring an\naction against the perpetrator. Third, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that\nPlaintiff will be unable to invoke equitable estoppel and equitable tolling, highly factual doctrines.\nFinally, Defendants' motion to \"dismiss\" Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages is procedurally\nimproper and incorrect. The Court should deny Defendants' motion to dismiss in full.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nIn 2002,\n\nwas a 20-year old aspiring model living in South Africa. Compl.\n\n1 38. She had never left the country, but dreamed of becoming a model in New York City. Id.\n\n(AI 39, 41. One day, she met ME,\nthe opportunity to meet a man who\n\nan American model visiting South Africa, who offered her\ncalled the 'al\n\nof America\" and who could help her\n\nPlaintiff respectfully requests oral argument pursuant \n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/6 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=6]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 8 of 32\n\nachieve her dream of modeling in New York City. M. 1 38. That man was Jeffrey Epstein, who\nwas visiting South Africa with an American government official, an actor, and a comedian. Id.\nJuliette agreed, and met Epstein and his high-profile entourage at a restaurant. Id. 1 39.\nThey invited Juliette to attend the government official's speech the next day, accompanied by a\npolice escort. Id. Epstein asked Juliette to bring her modeling portfolio to his hotel for a \"casting,\"\ntold her that he owned a modeling agency and could get her an agent in New York City, and\nbragged that he was good friends with Les Wexner, the owner of Victoria's Secret. Id. 1 40.\nBecause of his clear power and relationships with high-profile individuals, Juliette believed him.\nAfter assuring Juliette's mother that she would be safe with him, Epstein's employees facilitated\nher travel to New York City, including by getting her a passport. Id. 11 40-41.\nWhen Juliette arrived in New York,\n\none of Epstein's employees, called\n\nJuliette and told her that she would be traveling to the Caribbean with Epstein on his private plane.\nM. 1 42. On the flight, Juliette felt terrified and trapped. Id. ¶143-45. Juliette eventually arrived\nat Epstein's island in the U.S. Virgin Islands (\"USVI\"), and\n\nsent Juliette to Epstein's room\n\nfor a massage. Id. 1 44. That was when Epstein began sexually assaulting Juliette. Id. During\nthe massages, he would touch her, use massage devices on her, force her to perform oral sex on\nhim, and rape her. Id. She cried herself to sleep each night. Id.1 45. For years, Epstein continued\nto sexually traffic Juliette. Epstein sexually abused Juliette during each visit, and at all of his\nhomes, including his New York mansion. Id.1 46.\nFrom the start, Juliette's interactions with Epstein were always defined by his power and\ncontrol: immediately introducing her to a high-level government official who was traveling with\ntwo\n... [truncated, 2214 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/7 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=7]", "char_count": 2214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 9 of 32\n\nEpstein purposefully displayed photographs of powerful political figures in his mansion to show\nthat he was well-connected and powerful. Id. 1 48. And if that was not clear enough, Epstein\nspecifically told Juliette that he planted drugs on another girl who accused him of rape and had her\nsent to prison. Id. 1 47. Even after Juliette was able to distance herself from Epstein in 2004, he\ncontinued to contact her over the years, and, two months before his death, asked her to send him\nnude photographs. Id. 11 50, 51. The experiences Epstein subjected her to left Juliette with an\neating disorder, debilitating panic attacks, anxiety, and substance abuse issues. Id.1 52.\nAfter decades of escaping appropriate punishment for his extraordinarily far-reaching and\ndisturbing crimes, Epstein was indicted in July 2019 on one count of sex trafficking conspiracy\nand one count of sex trafficking. Compl., Ex. A (the \"Indictment\"). The Indictment specifically\ndescribed how Epstein recruited victims to come to his New York and Florida mansions to give\nhim massages. Indictment 11 3, 9, 15. During the massages, Epstein \"would escalate the nature\nand scope of physical contact with his victims to include, among other things, sex acts such as\ngroping and direct and indirect contact with the victim's genitals\" with his hands or sex toys. Id.\n11 9, 15. Afterwards, Epstein and his associates would continue to contact victims to schedule\nappointments for additional sexual encounters so that he could continue to abuse them. ld.11 11,\n17. Juliette's claims arise directly from this scheme of recruitment and sexual assault.\nOn August 8, 2019, shortly after Epstein's Indictment, Epstein executed his last will and\ntestament, naming Defendants the executors of his Estate. Compl. 1 30. Two days later, Epstein\nwas found dead in his jail cell. Id.1 31. His last will and testament was filed in the USVI on\nAugust 15, 2019. Id.1 32. The U.\n... [truncated, 2235 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/8 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=8]", "char_count": 2235}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 10 of 32\n\nARGUMENT\nDefendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiff's request for punitive\ndamages should be denied. \"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient\nfactual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. .. . A claim\nhas facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the\nreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.\" Ashcroft v. Iqbal,\n556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must \"accept() all factual\nallegations in the complaint as true and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.\"\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2019).\nDrawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Defendants have failed to meet their\nburden of proving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. Further, Defendants' argument that the\nCourt should \"dismiss\" punitive damages is procedurally improper and substantively incorrect.\nI.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of 1' ro% ilia that Plaintiff's Claims\nAre Untimely\n\nBecause the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of\nproving that Plaintiff's claims are untimely. See Childers v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., 36\nF. Supp. 3d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). \"(A] complaint does not need to anticipate potential\naffirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance\nof such defenses.\" Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \"dismissal is\nappropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.\" Harris v. City of New York,\n186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, Plaintiff's factual allegations demonstrate that\n(A) her claims are timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), (B) her claims are timely under\nC.P.L.R. § 213-c, (C) C.P.L.R. § 202 d\n... [truncated, 2077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/9 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=9]", "char_count": 2077}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 11 of 32\n\nestopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, and (E) the limitations period for bringing\nher claims was equitably tolled. 2\nA.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Are Timely Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa).\n\nPlaintiff's claims fall squarely within N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), which allowed Plaintiff\nto file her complaint within a year of the Indictment's dismissal. That provision provides that:\nWhenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same\ndefendant has been commenced with respect to the event or\noccurrence from which a claim .. . arises, the plaintiff shall have at\nleast one year from the termination of the criminal action . . . in\nwhich to commence the civil action ....\nId. Plaintiff filed the Complaint within one year of the Indictment's dismissal—her claims are\ntherefore timely. Defendants' only argument to the contrary is that the Indictment did not concern\nthe same event or transaction from which Plaintiff's civil action arose because the Indictment\ntargeted, according to Defendants, some separate sex-trafficking operation that only involved\nunderage girls. Defs.' Mem. at 7 (\"Because Plaintiff alleges she was between 20 and 22 years old\nwhen Decedent assaulted her (Compl. yq 1, 38, 50), this action and the Indictment necessarily arise\nfrom different events or occurrences.\"). But Defendants mischaracterize § 215(8)(a), the case law,\nPlaintiff's Complaint, and, most egregiously, the vast sex-trafficking operation that the Indictment\ntargeted.\n\n2\n\nIn another victim's action against the Estate, the court recognized that the doctrines of\nequitable estoppel and equitable tolling are \"very fact specific\" and accordingly asked Defendants\nto refrain from filing a motion to dismiss prior to discovery. Transcript of Pre-Motion Conference\nv. Indyke, et at, No. 19-cv-10475 (LGS) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020), Dkt. 39 (\"[T]he\nat 3:4-8,\ndoctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling could, neverth\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/10 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=10]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 12 of 32\n\n1.\n\nThe Indictment Was Not Restricted to Minors.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Indictment covered the crimes Defendants committed against\nPlaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that she did not allege that she was a child when they occurred.\nDefendants seek to minimize the scope of the abuse alleged in the Indictment by focusing on its\nreference to \"minors.\" Defs.' Mem. at 7, 9-10. But clinging to the use of the word \"minors\" does\nnot change the nature of the vast and sophisticated operation alleged in the Indictment. Epstein's\npattern and practice was to recruit and traffic young females that he knew he could exploit, and\nthe Indictment spells out that pattern. Age is not the deciding factor as to whether a female was a\nvictim of Epstein's sex-trafficking operation and the patterns of recruitment and abuse described\nin the Indictment. And the fact that many of the victims were minors does not mean that\nnon-minors were not also victimized by Epstein's sophisticated sex-trafficking operation. Indeed,\nthe Indictment states that \"many\" ofEpstein's victims were minors, demonstrating that prosecutors\nwere investigating Epstein's crimes against young women over the age of 18 as well. Indictment\n¶ 11 (\"[Epstein] knew that many of his New York victims were underage.\"); id. ¶ 17 (\"JEFFREY\nEPSTEIN, the defendant, knew that certain ofhis victims were underage ....\" (emphasis added)).3\nThe mere fact that Plaintiff did not allege that she was a minor at the time that she was\nrecruited into Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme does not negate the fact that Plaintiff's civil claims\narise from the acts described in the Indictment. Plaintiff therefore had one year from August 29,\n\n3\n\nThe FBI confirmed this understanding of the Indictment's scope in a press release issued\ntwo days after Epstein's arrest, stating to Epstein's victims: \"We want to hear from you, regardless\nof the age you are now, or whatever age you were then, \n... [truncated, 2215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/11 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=11]", "char_count": 2215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 13 of 32\n\n2019, the date on which Judge Berman formally dismissed the Indictment, to file the Complaint.\nHaving filed suit on November 14, 2019, her claims fall well within that limitations period.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Concern the Same Sex-Trafficking Operation that the\nIndictment Concerned.\n\nEven if the Indictment was for some reason limited to Epstein's trafficking of minors (to\nthe exclusion of other victims), Plaintiffs claims would nonetheless arise from the same \"event or\noccurrence\" for the purposes of § 215(8)(a). See, e.g., Kashef, 925 F.3d at 62 (noting that \"a New\nYork appellate court explicitly rejected the theory that the tolling provisions of CPLR 215(8) are\nexclusively for the benefit of the victims of the crime charged in the criminal proceeding\" (internal\nquotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, the Court should not construe the\nIndictment \"narrowly,\" Defs.' Mem. at 7, where the Indictment itself describes a pattern of abuse\nagainst numerous victims spanning a number of years. Epstein repeated the same patterns of\nrecruitment and abuse time and time again on countless young females, including Plaintiff. See,\ne.g., Indictment ¶ 7 (explaining that Epstein \"perpetuated [the] abuse in similar ways\" against\nvictims). The Indictment was therefore not limited to neatly categorized events that happened on\nspecified dates—it covered a sprawling sex-trafficking operation that occurred \"over the course of\nmany years\" and affected an unspecified number of victims. Id. 1 I.\nDefendants' contention that the Indictment does not concern the same sex-trafficking\noperation that victimized her is incorrect. Defs.' Mem. at 9-10. The sex-trafficking operation that\nthe Indictment described is precisely the same sex-trafficking operation that Plaintiff was lured\ninto. Just as the Indictment alleged that Epstein enticed and recruited females to engage in sex\nacts with him in multiple location\n... [truncated, 2273 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/12 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=12]", "char_count": 2273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 14 of 32\n\nmassage on Epstein, Indictment ¶¶ 9, 15, Plaintiff's abuse started when\n\nsent her to\n\nmassage Epstein. Compl. 1 44. The Indictment alleges that Epstein would escalate the nature and\nscope of physical contact during the massages to include sex acts such as groping and touching\nvictims with sex toys, Indictment 11 9, 15, and Epstein escalated the nature and scope of Plaintiff's\nmassages to include touching her and using massage devices on her, among other things. Compl.\n1 44. And, finally, just as Epstein or his employees would contact victims to schedule their return\nto his home for additional sexual encounters, Indictment 1 11, Epstein contacted Plaintiff many\ntimes to arrange for her to travel back to the United States for sex. Compl. 1 46. The conduct\nalleged in the Indictment is precisely the conduct alleged in the Complaint.\n3.\n\nDefendants' Attempts to Narrow the Scope of C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) Fail.\n\nDefendants seek to advance a strained interpretation of § 215(8)(a)'s \"event or occurrence\"\nrequirement, asserting that this Court must \"apply C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) narrowly\" to limit its\navailability to the crimes committed against the specific victims identified in the Indictment.\nDefs.' Mem. at 7. But § 215(8) \"is a remedial measure intended to alleviate victims of crime from\nthe strict and arbitrary nature of the statute of limitations and to make it easier for such victims to\nobtain civil redress for the criminal wrongs that they have endured.\" LaRocca v. Callen IP, No.\n08 Civ. 6274, 2009 WL 10435869, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009). New York courts \"are instructed\nto give broad and liberal construction to remedial statutes\" like § 215(8). Id. Defendants' narrow\ninterpretation of § 215(8)(a) \"would frustrate the Legislature's goal of making it easier for victims\nof crimes to obtain civil redress for the criminal wrongs that they have endured.\" Id.\nFurther, the cases that Defendants cite to narrow §\n... [truncated, 2341 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/13 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=13]", "char_count": 2341}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 15 of 32\n\n595-596 (2d Dep't 1999) (criminal prosecution against defendant commenced only in connection\nwith events on two specific days); Gallina v. Thatcher, No. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS\n8435, at *3-4 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2018) (plaintiff sued for assault and battery that occurred over the\ncourse of two years but the indictment \"charged [the defendant] for incidents occurring on three\n(3) specific dates\"). By contrast, the Indictment in this case was not limited to a specific day or\ndiscrete event. Rather, the Indictment covered sexual abuse that occurred \"over the course of many\nyears.\" Indictment ¶¶ 1-2, 8, 20, 24. Further, the Indictment charged Epstein with conspiracy and\na broad sex-trafficking scheme, while the criminal actions in Christodoulou and Gallina charged\nthe defendants with crimes stemming from isolated incidents.°\nIn contrast, the Second Circuit's opinion in Kashef controls and demonstrates why\nPlaintiff's claims fall within § 215(8)(a) here. In Kashef, BNP Paribas (\"BNPP\") entered a guilty\nplea conceding \"knowledge of the atrocities being committed in Sudan and of the consequences\nof providing Sudan access to U.S. financial markets.\" Kashef, 925 F.3d at 56. The plaintiffs,\nSudanese victims of mass rape, torture, deliberate infection with HIV, and other atrocities, filed a\ncomplaint against BNPP within a year of the judgment of conviction, contending that their claims\nwere timely under C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a). Id. at 57, 62-63. BNPP attempted to argue—similar to\nDefendants' argument here—that § 215(8)(a) did not apply because the plaintiffs \"played no role\nin the proceedings surrounding BNP Paribas's plea agreement,\" the criminal action \"required no\ninvestigation of or briefmg on any injuries sustained by Plaintiffs,\" and the facts in the criminal\n\n4\n\nDefendants also cite McElligott v. City of New York, No. 15 CIV. 7107 (LGS), 2017 WL\n6210840, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017), but that cas\n... [truncated, 2154 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/14 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=14]", "char_count": 2154}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 16 of 32\n\ncase and the civil case were not \"identical.\" Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 51-52, Kashef\nv. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 18-1304 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 2018), Dkt. 92.\nThe Second Circuit rejected BNPP's argument, and instead found that the \"event or\noccurrence\" for § 215(8) purposes was more generally \"BNPP's conspiracy with Sudan to violate\nU.S. sanctions\" for humanitarian violations. 925 F.3d at 62-63. The court therefore held that the\nvictims of those humanitarian violations could bring timely claims under § 215(8)(a). Id. That\nconspiracy, like the one here, was a broad scheme spanning many years, rather than a single event\n(such as an assault on a specified date). Just as BNPP's conspiracy to violate sanctions was the\nrelevant event or occurrence in Kashef, Epstein's widespread sex-trafficking scheme is the event\nor occurrence at issue in Plaintiff's case for the purposes of applying § 215(8)(a). Defendants\nattempt to distinguish Kashef by pointing out that \"the civil and criminal actions in that case both\narose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan to violate U.S. sanctions,\" Defs.' Mem.\nat 10, but that fact only highlights Kashefs applicability to this case, which also involves a civil\naction and a criminal action arising from the same conspiracy. Defendants have failed to meet\ntheir burden of proving that Plaintiffs claims do not arise from the same event or occurrence as\nthe Indictment, and therefore that § 215(8)(a) does not apply to her claims.5\nB.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims are Timely Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c, which provides that:\nNotwithstanding any other limitation set forth in this article, . . . all\ncivil claims or causes of action brought by any person for physical,\npsychological or other injury or condition suffered by such person\n\n5\n\nDefendants argue that a broad construction of § 215(8)(a) would make the \"event \n... [truncated, 2388 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/15 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=15]", "char_count": 2388}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 17 of 32\n\nas a result of conduct which would constitute rape in the first degree\nas defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, . . . may be brought ...\nwithin twenty years.\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-c, Plaintiff alleges that Epstein sexually assaulted her multiple times within\n20 years of the filing of this lawsuit, and that the assaults constituted one or more sex crimes listed\nin § 213-c. Compl. IN 44, 56. Her claims are therefore timely under § 213-c.\nDefendants contend that the 20-year statute of limitations of § 213-c does not apply to\nPlaintiff's claims because it was adopted in 2019 and does not apply retroactively. Defs.' Mem.\nat 10-12. But New York \"[c]ourts have employed customary tools of construction to find the\nrequisite intent to give retroactive effect to new laws affecting periods of limitation.\" McGuirk\nv. City Sch. Dist. ofAlbany, 116 A.D.2d 363, 365 (3d Dep't 1986). Using those tools, New York\ncourts have held that certain amendments to limitations periods apply retroactively. See, e.g.,\nMeegan S. v. Donald T., 475 N.E.2d 449, 450 (N.Y. 1984) (\"[T]he enlargement of the Statute of\nLimitations for paternity suits is to be applied retroactively.\").\nContrary to Defendants' argument, the text and legislative history of § 213-c demonstrate\nthe New York Legislature's intent for it to apply retroactively. The bill's legislative history\nhighlights the \"ticking clock\" that the former statute of limitations imposed on victims of sexual\nabuse: \"For crimes of sexual violence in particular, the clock ticks against the trauma and culture\nof silence that prevents victims from speaking out. Over the last year, victims who have suffered\nin silence for decades have bravely spoken about their abuse .. . .\" N.Y. Comm. Rep., 2019 N.Y.\nS.B. No. 6574, 242nd Legis. Sess. (June 17, 2019). The Legislature's explicit reference to \"victims\nwho have suffered in silence for decades,\" like Plaintiff, and victims that have bee\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/16 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=16]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 18 of 32\n\n\"from speaking out,\" also like Plaintiff, evince an intent for the provision to apply retroactively to\nvictims like Plaintiff. In light of the legislative goals behind the amendment to § 213-c, the Court\nshould hold that it applies retroactively to Plaintiff's claims.\nMoreover, \"remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuate its\nbeneficial purpose.\" In re Gleason (Michael Vee, Ltd.), 749 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 2001). In\nciting N.Y. Stat. Law § 51 for the proposition that statutes are construed as applying only\nprospectively, Defendants wholly ignore § 54, which explicitly states that \"[r]emedial statutes\nconstitute an exception to the general rule that statutes are not to be given a retroactive operation.\"\nThe primary case the Defendants cite also recognizes that remedial statutes are given retroactive\neffect. See Deft.' Mem. at 11 (citing Gleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, Inc., 649\nN.Y.S.2d 647, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (recognizing that whether statute is remedial \"does greatly\nimpact upon the decision as to whether or not the new statute should be held to be retroactive\")).\nLegislative history establishes that the amendment to § 213-c was remedial in nature—it\nextended the statute of limitations for certain sexual offenses in order to correct the injustice that\nthe shorter limitations period imposed on victims. See Coffinan v. Coffinan, 60 A.D.2d 181, 188\n(2d Dep't 1977) (\"Remedial statutes are those designed to correct imperfections in prior law, by\ngenerally giving relief to the aggrieved party.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also\nMeegan S., 475 N.E.2d at 450 (finding that amendment extending statute of limitations in paternity\nsuits was remedial legislation);\nleaders-times-movement-signs-legislation-extending-rape-statute (last visited March 30, 2020)\n(\"This new law recognizes the injustice that has gone on for far too long . . .\"). \"[I]nsofar as\nrem\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/17 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=17]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 19 of 32\n\nv. Bd. ofAssessors for Town of Chatham, 98 A.D.2d 250, 253 (3d Dep't 1983) (internal quotation\nmarks and citations omitted), aff'd, 473 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 1984). The remedial purpose of the\namendment to § 213-c, to correct the injustice of providing rape victims who were prevented from\nspeaking out with only five years to bring actions, would be undermined if the amendment were\nonly applied prospectively. Plaintiff's claims are therefore timely under § 213-c.\nC.\n\nN.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 Does Not Apply to Plaintiff's Claims.\n\nBy its express terms, New York's borrowing statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202, only applies to\n\"rain action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state.\" Contrary to Defendants'\nargument, § 202 does not apply to or bar Plaintiff's claims for three independent reasons.\nI.\n\nStatutory Interpretation Precludes the Application of C.P.L.R. § 202.\n\nUnder principles of statutory interpretation, § 202 does not apply. In both § 215(8)(a) and\n§ 213-c, both of which apply to Plaintiff's claims as argued above, the New York Legislature\nincluded language that explicitly precludes § 202's application. Section 215(8)(a) specifically\nstates that a plaintiff has one year after an indictment's dismissal to assert her claims,\n\"notwithstanding that the time in which to commence such action has already expired.\" (Emphasis\nadded). That the Legislature intended to afford plaintiffs the ability to pursue civil actions in\nconnection with a prosecuted crime, even if the statute of limitations had expired, is clear and\nunambiguous, and the Court need go no further to find that § 215(8)(a) precludes the application\nof § 202. N.Y. Stat. Law § 76 (\"Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and express\nplainly, clearly and distinctly the legislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of\ninterpretation.\"); see also Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (3d Dep't 1994) (citing Stat.\nLaw § 76 a\n... [truncated, 2263 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/18 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=18]", "char_count": 2263}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 20 of 32\n\nis a limitation set forth in Article 2. (Emphasis added). Under the unambiguous language of\n§ 215(8)(a) and § 213-c, Plaintiff's claims would be timely even if § 202 would otherwise render\nPlaintiff's claims untimely under the statute of limitations of another jurisdiction.\n2.\n\nPlaintiff's Claims Did Not Accrue \"Without the State\" of New York.\n\nSection 202 only applies to claims \"accruing without the state.\" Defendants wholly ignore\nthe concept of accrual, and argue that because Plaintiff was sexually assaulted in many places, her\nclaims must fall within the limitations periods of all of the jurisdictions in which Epstein ever\nharmed her. Defs.' Mem. at 4-5. This is incorrect. As an initial matter, Defendants' arguments\non this point concede that Plaintiff's claims are timely when based on the multiple assaults Plaintiff\nsuffered in the state of New York. See Compl. ¶ 46 (\"Epstein forced her to travel to the United\nStates many times to see Epstein and be subjected to repeated sexual abuse for one to two weeks\nat a time, sometimes staying in his New York apartment.\"). And as to the instances where Plaintiff\nwas raped or abused in other locations, those crimes still accrued inside the state, as they were\nplanned and initiated in New York, which served as the epicenter of Epstein's sex-trafficking\nconspiracy. For example, Epstein and his co-conspirators lured Plaintiff to New York, and it was\nfrom New York that Epstein sent Plaintiff to other locations to be abused. See id. ¶ 41 (\"Epstein\ncalled Juliette's mother from New York to assure her that Juliette would be safe with him in New\nYork.\"); id. ¶ 42 (\"Shortly after arriving at the apartment,\n\n, another one of Epstein's\n\nco-conspirators, called and told Juliette that Juliette was going to the Caribbean.\").\n3.\n\nPlaintiff's Residency When the Cause of Action Accrued Is a Factual\nIssue.\n\nFinally, § 202 does not apply if the plaintiff is a New York resid\n... [truncated, 2229 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/19 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=19]", "char_count": 2229}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 21 of 32\n\n570 (2d Dep't 1989). \"[Tjhe determination of whether a plaintiff is a New York resident, for\npurposes of CPLR 202, turns on whether [she] has a significant connection with some locality in\nthe State as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year.\" Antone\nv. Gen. Motors Corp., 473 N.E.2d 742, 746 (N.Y. 1984). The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was\na New York resident at all relevant times, as she had always wanted to live in New York, Epstein's\nco-conspirators got Plaintiff a visa so that she could travel to New York often, and when she visited\nshe stayed at Epstein's New York home for one to two weeks at a time. Comp1.1 39 (\"Juliette\nconsidered meeting Epstein an amazing opportunity because modeling in New York City had\nalways been one of her biggest dreams\"); 1 41 (\"Groff told Juliette that Epstein wanted to bring\nher to New York City to model\" and \"Epstein called Juliette's mother from New York to assure\nher that Juliette would be safe with him in New York.\"); 1 46. Whether Plaintiff can establish that\nshe was a New York resident at the time her cause of action accrued is a factual issue. In fact, in\neach of the cases Defendants cite in contending that Plaintiff was not a New York resident at the\ntime her cause of action accrued (two of which did not address § 202), the residency determination\nwas made after fact-finding on the issue. See Antone, 473 N.E.2d at 745 (hearing held on\nresidence); Siegfried v. Siegfried, 92 A.D.2d 916, 916 (2d Dep't 1983) (\"residency hearing\" held\nin connection with motion to transfer venue); Hammerman v. Louis Watch Co., 7 A.D.2d 817, 818\n(3d Dep't 1958) (relying on affidavits in connection with motion to transfer venue).\nD.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Estoppel.\n\nEven if the Court were to hold that C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a) and § 213-c do not apply to\nPlaintiff's claims, or th\n... [truncated, 2294 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/20 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=20]", "char_count": 2294}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 22 of 32\n\nscare tactics that he used on Plaintiff. Due to Epstein's conduct, Plaintiff did not take action until\nafter she knew that Epstein was dead, and timely filed her claim approximately three months later.\nDefendants' contend that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only to situations in\nwhich the defendant makes a misrepresentation of fact. Defs.' Mem. at 13-14. But \"courts have\nlong had the power, both at law and equity, to bar the assertion of the affirmative defense of the\nStatute of Limitations where it is the defendant's affirmative wrongdoing—a carefully concealed\ncrime here—which produced the long delay between the accrual of the cause of action and the\ninstitution of the legal proceeding.\" Gen. Stencils. Inc. v. Chiappa, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171 (N.Y.\n1966). A defendant is therefore equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense\nif the defendant \"wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by\ndeception, concealment, threats or other misconduct.\" Funk v. Belneftekhim, No. 14-CV-0376\n(BMC), 2019 WL 3035124, at ■2 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).\nAssuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and drawing all inferences\nin her favor, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded misconduct that should equitably estop Defendants\nfrom asserting a statute of limitations defense. Plaintiff was terrified of disobeying Epstein.\nCompl. 11 43-44, 47-48. Defendants' claim that Plaintiff has not alleged \"any conduct\" by Epstein\nbeyond trying to keep into contact with her is incorrect—Epstein expressly told Plaintiff that he\nhad a rape victim sent to prison. Defs.' Mem. at 14; Compl. 1 47. Epstein also flaunted his\nconnections to powerful government officials, introduced her to a high government official and\ntwo celebrities while accompanied by a police escort, kept nude photographs of her, and continued\nto harass her vi\n... [truncated, 2269 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/21 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=21]", "char_count": 2269}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 23 of 32\n\nwas not required to \"affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of Defendants' statute of limitations\ndefense. Childers, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 315 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further,\n\"[w]hether equitable estoppel applies in a given case is ultimately a question of fact.\" Kosakow v.\nNew Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 725 (2d Cir. 2001). Courts applying New\nYork law have therefore reserved the highly factual issue of equitable estoppel for after discovery.\nSee, e.g., Gotlin v. Lederman, No. 05-CV-1899 (ILO), 2006 WL 1154817, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.\n28, 2006) (\"A vast majority of the cases on equitable estoppel permit plaintiffs to defeat a motion\nto dismiss on the pleadings, deferring the question until some discovery can be had.\").\nFor example, Defendants unilaterally conclude that Plaintiff's state of mind of fearing the\nman behind a transcontinental sex-trafficking operation who (1) manipulated and assaulted her and\ncountless other victims for years, (2) specifically told her that he could have his accusers sent to\njail, (3) introduced her to a former government official and two celebrities the very first time they\nmet, and (4) used power to escape punishment for crimes committed over decades is\n\"unextraordinary.\" Defs.' Mem. at 14. Whether Plaintiffs' state ofmind was \"extraordinary\" is a\nfactual issue that should be decided after discovery, not by Defendants. Defendants have failed to\nmeet their burden of proving that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts demonstrating her entitlement\nto equitably estopping Defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nE.\n\nDefendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Proving that Plaintiff\nCannot Invoke Equitable Tolling.\n\nPlaintiff's claims are also timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. While equitable\nestoppel focuses on a defendant's affirmative misconduct, equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiff\nand applies as\n... [truncated, 2201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/22 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=22]", "char_count": 2201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 24 of 32\n\n285, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff's\nfear of retaliation prevented her from filing her claims prior to Epstein's death.\nDefendants' contention that Plaintiff has not alleged any compelling circumstances\njustifying equitable tolling is incorrect. Defs.' Mem. at 12-13. A \"reasonable fear of retaliation\nmay be sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling,\nparticularly if the person threatening retaliation is a defendant.\"\n2016 WL 5720811, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). In =,\n\nv.\n\nNo. 15-cv-5359,\n\nthe court reasoned that fear of\n\nretaliation could support equitable tolling in the prison context because \"sustained control tends to\nresult in adverse psychological effects that invariably have behavioral consequences\" and that\n\"fear of retaliation [is a] natural consequence() of this unique psychological environment.\" Id. at\n*10 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nEpstein's pattern of controlling, manipulating, and intimidating his victims caused similar\npsychological effects in his countless victims as described in\n\nAnd Plaintiff alleges that\n\nEpstein's abuse and psychological manipulation had such effects on her. Compl. fl 4448, 52-53.\nThe Court should therefore extend equitable tolling to reach fear of retaliation in the context of\nEpstein's unprecedented abuse of and control over his victims, including Plaintiff.\nIn any event, as with equitable estoppel, \"when plaintiffs raise an equitable tolling\nargument, a court must deny a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations unless all\nassertions of the complaint, as read with required liberality, would not permit the plaintiffs to prove\nthat this statute was tolled.\" In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 287 (S.D.N.Y.\n2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion\nto dismiss\n... [truncated, 2194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/23 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=23]", "char_count": 2194}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 25 of 32\n\ndetermine whether limitations period was equitably tolled); Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F. Supp. 3d\n325, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (equitable tolling \"is a question appropriately reserved for a jury\" due\nto \"genuine issues of material fact\"). Defendants are not factfinders in this case and cannot decide\nwhether the circumstances of Epstein's sex-trafficking operation are \"extraordinary\" enough to\nwarrant tolling. They have failed to meet their burden of proving that Plaintiff can prove no set of\nfacts demonstrating entitlement to equitable tolling.\nII.\n\nThe Court Should Deny the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Punitive\nDamages.\n\nDefendants' argument that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law\nis incorrect. Not only are such damages available, they are warranted in this case. Beyond the\nprocedural impropriety of Defendants' purported motion to dismiss punitive damages—that on its\nown warrants its denial—under New York choice-of-law principles the law of the USVI applies\nto the issue of punitive damages. Under USVI law, a court may allow for punitive damages against\nthe estate of a deceased tortfeasor, especially when that tortfeasor went to great lengths during his\nlife to avoid punishment for causing immeasurable harm to countless victims.\nA.\n\nDefendants' Motion to Dismiss Pu nit is L. Damages is Procedurally\nImproper.\n\nAs an initial matter. the Court should not decide whether punitive damages are available at\nthis early stage. A motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for determining the availability of\npunitive damages. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to file a motion to dismiss for \"failure to state\na claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, \"[a] motion to\ndismiss is addressed to a `claim'—not to a form of damages.\"\n\nv. City of New York, No.\n\n18-CV-1937 (VSB), 2020 WL 1644009, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (internal quotation marks\nomitted\n... [truncated, 2214 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/24 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=24]", "char_count": 2214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 26 of 32\n\nemotional distress. Addressing the issue of punitive damages at this stage would therefore be\npremature. See, e.g., Denton v. McKee, 332 F. Supp. 2d 659, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding \"any\ndiscussion of damages, compensatory, punitive or otherwise, to be premature\" at the motion to\ndismiss stage). And Defendants' argument that punitive damages are prohibited by law does not\nmake their \"motion to dismiss\" a form of damages proper. M,\n\n2020 WL 1644009, at *17\n\n(holding that although punitive damages are not available against government entities, motion to\ndismiss punitive damages was premature).\nB.\n\nPlaintiff May Recover Punitive Damages in this Case.\n\nEven if a motion to dismiss punitive damages was an adequate way to address this issue,\nDefendants' motion still fails. Plaintiff may recover punitive damages because the USVI has the\nstrongest interest in whether punitive damages are available in this case' And, under USVI law,\nPlaintiff can recover punitive damages.\nI.\n\nUSVI Law on Punitive Damages Governs This Case.\n\nFederal courts look to the choice-of-law rules of the forum state in deciding choice-of-law\ndisputes. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 4% (1941). \"In the context of\ntort law, New York utilizes interest analysis to determine which of two competing jurisdictions\nhas the greater interest in having its law applied in the litigation. The greater interest is determined\nby an evaluation of the facts or contacts which relate to the purpose of the particular law in\nconflict.\" Padula v. Lilarn Prop. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994) (internal quotation\nmarks and alterations omitted). New York courts seek \"Wustice, fairness and the best practical\nresult.\" Babcock v.=I,\n\n191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).\n\n7\n\nAs explained below, under the doctrine of depecage New York law still governs as to the\nunderlying claims and as to compensatory damages.\n20\n\nEFTA02732168\n\n\f", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 27 of 32\n\n\"Punitive damages are conduct regulating,\" and \"[u]nder the doctrine of depecage, then,\nthe choice-of law analysis for punitive damages is distinct from the analysis for compensatory\ndamages.\" Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson, 417 F. Supp. 3d 416, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y.\n2019). \"[U]nder New York law—for punitive damages in particular—a court must consider the\nobject or purpose of the wrongdoing to be punished and give controlling weight to the law of the\njurisdiction with the strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented.\" Id. at\n426 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). \"[T]he choice-of-law inquiry for punitive\ndamages provisions is necessarily `defendant-focused.\"' Id.\nIn this case the USVI has a stronger interest in the resolution of whether punitive damages\ncan be awarded in this case than New York, Florida, New Mexico, or France.* In addition to flying\nPlaintiff to the USVI and sexually assaulting her there, Compl. l 42-44, Epstein was domiciled\nin the USVI. Id. 1 19; see also\n\nv. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 201 (1985)\n\n(holding that, although New York was the place of the wrong, New Jersey law applied because it\n\"would further [New Jersey's] interest in enforcing the decision of its domiciliaries to accept the\nburdens as well as the benefits of New Jersey law). Epstein also had a private island in the USVI,\nwhere he abused countless young females, including Plaintiff. Compl. IN 24, 44. Defendants then\nchose to probate his Estate in and under the laws of the USVI. M.132. Having availed themselves\nof all the benefits and protections that USVI probate and estate law have to offer, Defendants\n\nTo the extent Defendants rely on Judge Engelmayer's recent decisions in Mary Doe v.\nIndyke et at, 19-cv-10758 (PAE) (DCF) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) and Jane Doe 15 v. Indyke, et\nat, 19-cv-10653 (PAE) (DCF) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020), those cases are easily\n\n... [truncated, 2277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/26 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=26]", "char_count": 2277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 28 of 32\n\ncannot also seek to escape its drawbacks. New York, Florida, New Mexico, and France have no\nconceivable interest in denying the USVI from advancing that interest. As such, New York's\nchoice-of-law rules dictate the application of USVI law to the issue of punitive damages.'\n2.\n\nUSVI Law Would Allow for Punitive Damages against Defendants.\n\nUSVI law would allow for an award of punitive damages in this case. When determining\nhow best to apply common law, courts in the USVI apply what is known as the Banks analysis.\nSee Gov't of the V.I. v. =,\n\n60 V.I. 597, 600, 602 (2016); Banks v. Intl Rental & Leasing\n\nCorp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (2011). Under the Banks analysis, \"instead of mechanistically following\nthe Restatements, courts should consider three non-dispositive factors to determine Virgin Islands\ncommon law: (1) whether any Virgin Islands courts have previously adopted a particular rule; (2)\nthe position taken by a majority of courts from other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly, which\napproach represents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands.\" M,\n\n60 V.I. at 600 (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted). Applying the Bat analysis, Plaintiff can pursue punitive damages\nagainst Defendants.\na.\n\nBanks Factor One: Whether Any USVI Courts Have Adopted a\nRule\n\nUSVI courts have not adopted a rule as to whether a plaintiff can pursue punitive damages\nagainst the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. And Defendants' position that \"USVI courts have\nfavorably recited the Restatement's rule precluding punitive damages against a decedent\ntortfeasor's estate\" is simply wrong. Defs.' Mem. at 18. First, the Restatement's position is\n\nAs an indication of the Virgin Islands' interest in matters concerning Epstein's Estate, the\nAttorney General of the United States Virgin Islands filed suit against the Estate on January 15,\n2020, seeking, among other things, punitive damages. Complaint, GVI v. Estate of Jeffrey E.\nEpstein, \n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/27 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=27]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 29 of 32\n\nincluded only in commentary, and not the text of the Restatement itself. Restat. (Second) of Torts\n§ 908 cmt. a. Second, in both of the cases that Defendants cite, the issue before the court was\nwhether punitive damages are available in wrongful death actions, and therefore whether an estate\ncan recover punitive damages, not whether punitive damages are available against an estate. See,\ne.g.,\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628 (D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV.\n\n2006-217, 2008 WL 220067, at *5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008). Defendants have not cited a single\nUSVI case adopting the Restatement's commentary's position on that specific issue, or addressing\nthat issue at all. Given the lack of any rule in the Virgins Islands, this Banks factor is neutral.\nb.\n\nBanks Factor Two: The Position Taken by a Majority of Courts\nfrom Other Jurisdictions\n\nAs to the second Banks factor, Defendants overstate the number of jurisdictions that do not\npermit the award of punitive damages against an estate. Defs.' Mem. at 19. Numerous courts have\nheld that plaintiffs may recover punitive damages against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. See,\ne.g., Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 117 (Ariz. 2001) (concluding that \"there are\nsituations in which it would be appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, to express society's\ndisapproval of outrageous conduct by rendering such an award against the estate of a deceased\ntortfeasor\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tillett v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Mont.\n1996);\n\nv. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982). Those courts have reasoned that punitive\n\ndamages do not only serve to punish wrongdoers, but also to \"motivate others not to engage in\nsimilar action in the future.\" Kaopuiki v. Kealoha, 87 P.3d 910, 928 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003).10 In\n\nto\n\nSee also, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643, 644-45 (5th Cir. 1977) (punitive damages\nallowed against estate becau\n... [truncated, 2238 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/28 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=28]", "char_count": 2238}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 30 of 32\n\nthis case, general deterrence is of the utmost importance—Epstein spent decades abusing countless\nyoung women and girls, intimidating them into silence, and gaming the justice system with his\nwealth and power to avoid punishment. No person should be able to commit such acts while at\nthe same time considering himself to be above the law.\nFurther, in a case that Defendants cite, see Defs.' Mem. at 19, the court recognized that\npunitive damages might be available where, as here, the deceased tortfeasor takes his own life \"as\nan escape from punitive damages.\" Crabtree ex. Rel. Kemp v. Estate ofCrabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135,\n139 (Ind. 2005) (\"If we ever encounter a case where a tortfeasor seems to have considered his own\ndeath as an escape from punitive damages incident to some intentional tort, we can address that\nissue at that time.\"). Again, Epstein spent his life avoiding proportionate punishment for his\ncountless crimes, and once he was finally imprisoned pending trial for his sex-trafficking\noperation, he signed his will and then almost immediately caused his own demise. See Compl.\n11 8,14,30,31. Given the unique facts surrounding Epstein's crimes and death and the importance\nof general deterrence, the second Banks factor weighs heavily in favor of allowing for punitive\ndamages under these facts.\nc.\n\nBanks Factor Three: The Soundest Rule for the USVI\n\nAlthough none of the three Banks factors is dispositive, the third factor—\"which approach\nrepresents the soundest rule for the Virgin Islands\"—is the most important. See\n\n, 60 V.I.\n\nat 600. Defendants cite seven cases to support the proposition that USVI courts have found that\nthe Restatement is the soundest rule for the USVI, Defs.' Mem. at 19-20, but not one of those\ncases addresses the question of whether punitive damages are available against an estate, nor do\nthey consider the Restatement's position on that point.\nInstead, the soundest rule for the U\n... [truncated, 2169 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/29 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=29]", "char_count": 2169}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 31 of 32\n\ndual purpose of punitive damages to both punish wrongdoing and promote general deterrence.\nSee, e.g., Guardian Ins. Co. v. Gurnbs, No. ST-15-CV-195, 2016 WL 9525609, at *10 (V.I. Super.\nAug. 22, 2016) (\"[A] primary purpose behind punitive damages [is] . . . to further deter [the\ntortfeasor] and others like him from similar conduct in the future.\"). Allowing punitive damages\nin this case would be consistent with this view—punitive damages would deter other predators\nI tun manipulating the justice system and silencing victims of sexual abuse to avoid punishment.\nThe absence of any USVI case adopting the Restatement's commentary about punitive damages\nagainst estates, coupled with the extraordinary nature of Epstein's transcontinental sex-trafficking\nenterprise, suggest that allowing for punitive damages in this case would be the soundest rule for\nthe USVI.\" The Court should therefore deny Defendants' motion to dismiss punitive damages.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's\nComplaint. Because Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in full, Plaintiff requests\noral argument on Defendants' motion.\n\nTo the extent necessary, United States courts may certify questions to the Supreme Court\nof the Virgin Islands if there is \"a question of law which may be determinative\" and if \"it appears\nthere is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.\" Banks, 55 V.I. at 972\n(internal citations omitted). Because the issue would be a matter of first impression in the Virgin\nIslands, and given the split in common law authorities concerning the availability of punitive\ndamages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate, the Court should certify the question to the\nSupreme Court of the Virgin Islands if it deems it necessary to resolve the issue at this stage of the\ncase. See CIT Bank N.A. v. Schiffinan, 948 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 2020)\n... [truncated, 2280 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732143/30 or ?id=EFTA02732143&page=30]", "char_count": 2280}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732143", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 33 Filed 05/12/20 Page 32 of 32\n\nDated: May 12, 2020\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\n1st Sigrid S. McCabvlev\nDavid Boies\nBOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n333 Main Street\nAnnonk, NY 10504\n(914) 749-8200\nSigrid McCawley\n(Pro Hac Vice)\nBOWS SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200\nFt. Lauderdale, FL 33301\n(954) 356-0011\nJoshua I. Schiller\nAndrew Villacastin\nSabina Mariella\nBows SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP\n55 Hudson Yards\nNew York, NY 10001\n(212) 446-2300\n\nCounselfor Plaintiff\n\n26\n\nEFTA02732174\n\n\f", "char_count": 528}]}