{"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_count": 28, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA02732008", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA02732008.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 1 of 28\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nPlaintiff,\n-against-\n\nCase No. 1:19-cv-10479 (ALC) (DCF)\n\nDARREN K. INDYKE and RICHARD D.\nKAHN, in their capacities as the executors of\nthe ESTATE OF JEFFREY EDWARD\nEPSTEIN,\nDefendants.\n\nDEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THEIR\nMOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT\n\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, New York 10022 Tel: 212-704-6000\nFax: 212-704-6288\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\nEFTA02732008\n\n\f", "char_count": 545}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 2 of 28\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nPage\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\n1\n\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2\n\nI.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her From 2002-2004,\nWhen She Was An Adult\n\nARGUMENT\n\n2\n4\n\nI.\n\nPlaintiff's Causes Of Action Expired In 2014 At The Latest\n\n4\n\nII.\n\nPlaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations\nExceptions Fail\n\n7\n\nA.\n\nIII.\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa) is inapplicable because the Indictment arises out\nof the alleged sex trafficking of minors, not adults such as Plaintiff\n\n7\n\nB.\n\nCPLR § 213-c is inapplicable because it is not retroactive\n\n10\n\nC.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\"\ncircumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel\n\n12\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Are Barred As A Matter Of Law\nA.\n\nB.\n\nC.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n16\n\nBanks factor one: previously, USVI courts favorably cited the\nRestatement section that precludes punitive damages against\nestates\n\n18\n\nBanks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an\naward of punitive damages based on the wrongful acts of a\ndecedent\n\n19\n\nBanks factor three: Post-Banks, USV1 courts have favorably\napplied Restatement Section 908 to questions regarding punitive\ndamages\n\n19\n21\n\nEFTA02732009\n\n\f", "char_count": 1289}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 3 of 28\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nAbercrombie v. College,\n438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)\n\n15\n\nIn re Air Crash at Belle Harbor,\nNo. 02 MDL 1448 (RWS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.\n10, 2008)\n\n17\n\nAntone v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div.,\n64 N.Y.2d 20, 484 N.Y.S.2d 514, 473 N.E.2d 742 (1984)\n\n6\n\nBanks v. IntlRental & Leasing Corp.,\n55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 201 I)\n\n18, 19, 20\n\nBlissett v. Eisensmidt,\n940 F. Supp. 449 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)\n\n17\n\nBoos v. Runyon,\n201 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2000)\n\n13\n\nBooth v. Bowen,\nNo. CIV. 2006-217, 2008 WL 220067 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008)\n\n18\n\nBrandy v. Flamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd.,\n24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Tern Ct. 1989)\n\n20\n\nCerbone v. IntlLadies' Garment Workers' Union,\n768 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1985)\n\n13\n\nChristodoulou v. Terdeman,\n262 A.D.2d 595 (2d Dept. 1999)\n\n7, 8\n\nClemens v. Nealon,\n202 A.D.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)\n\n9\n\nCommerzbank AG v. Deutsche Bank Nall Tr. Co.,\n234 F. Supp. 3d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)\n\n4\n\nConklin v. Maidenbaum,\nNo. 12-cv-3606, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113975 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013)\n(Ramos, J.)\n\n14\n\nEFTA02732010\n\n\f", "char_count": 1142}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 4 of 28\n\nCrabtree v. Estate ofCrabtree,\n837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005)\n\n19\n\nv. Christian,\n46 V.I. 557 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2005)\n\n19\n\nDept ofEcon. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,\n747 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)\n\n15\n\nFairley v. =,\nNo. 09-Civ-6894 (PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26536 (Mar. 15, 2011\nS.D.N.Y.) (Gardephe, J.)\n\n12\n\nGallina v. Thatcher,\nNo. 2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct.\n23, 2018)\n\n7, 8\n\nGleason v. Gleason,\n26 NY2d 28, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1970)\n\n11\n\nGleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing,\n170 Misc. 2d 668, 649 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1996)\n\nII, 12\n\nGov't of Virgin Islands v.\nNo. S. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639 (V.I. Feb. 24, 2014).\n\nI8\n\nGraham v.\n224 F.R.D. 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n17\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co.,\n51 V.I. 619 (D.V.I. 2009)\n\n18\n\nHammerman v. Louis Watch Co.,\n7 A.D.2d 817, 181 N.Y.S.2d 65 (3rd Dept. 1958)\n\n6\n\nHammerman v Louis Watch Co.,\n7 AD2d 817\n\n6\n\nIn re Higgins,\n270 B.R. 147 (Bank.. S.D.N.Y. 2001)\n\n13\n\nIsaac v. Crichlow,\n63 V.I. 38, 2015 V.I. LEXIS 15 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n19\n\nJaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,\n117 N.M. 337 (N.M. 1994).\n\n.17\n\n-\n\n-\n\nEFTA02732011\n\n\f", "char_count": 1213}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 5 of 28\n\nv. Nyack Hosp.,\n86 F.3d 8 (2d Cir. 1996)\n\n13\n\nKashef v. BNP Paribas S.A.,\n925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019)\n\n10\n\nKunica v. St. Jean Fin.,\n97 Civ. 3804, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (Sweet,\nJ.)\n\n20\n\nLohr v. Byrd,\n522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988)\n\n17\n\nMcElligott v. City of N. Y.,\nNo. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201829 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,\n2017)\n\n7\n\nMoll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of N.Y.,\n700 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)\n\n15\n\nPappas v. Hotel on the Cay Time-Sharing Ass 'n,\n69 V.I. 3 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. 2015)\n\n19\n\nPoindexter v. Zacharzewski,\nNo. 18-14155-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.)\n\n17\n\nPowell v. Chi-Co's Distrib.,\nNo. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21 (U.S.V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014)\n\n20\n\nv. Consumers Distrib. Co.,\n648 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.)\n\n21\n\nMatter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. N.Y. State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal,\n2020 NY Slip Op 02127\n\n11\n\nSiegfried v Siegfried,\n92 A.D.2d 916\n\n6\n\nSimons v. Marriott Corp.,\n92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993)\n\n16\n\nSIB v. N.Y.C. Dep 't of Educ.,\nNo. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004)\n(Buchwald, J.)\n\n20\n\nv. N.Y.C. Dep't of COPT.,\nNo. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137152 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)\n\n13\n\nEFTA02732012\n\n\f", "char_count": 1380}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 6 of 28\n\nSt.\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Barrows,\n15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979)\n\n70\n\nStarr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Am. Claims Mgmt.,\nNo. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2015)\n\n16\n\nThe Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin,\nNo. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016)\n(Batts, J.)\n\n20\n\nv. Rios,\n780 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D.V.I. 2011)\nIn re U.S. Lines, Inc.,\n318 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 2003)\n\n20\n13\n\nViti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. ofAm.,\nNo. 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633 (S.D.N.Y.\nOct. 5, 2012)\n\n12, 13\n\nYesh Diamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya,\nNo. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744 (E.D.N.Y.\nSept. 27, 2010)\n\n13\n\nStatutes\nEPTL § 11-3.2 (a)(1)\n\n16\n\nFla. Stat. § 95.11 (3XO)\n\n1, 5\n\nMcKinney's Cons. Laws\n\n9, 11\n\nN.M. Stat. § 37-1-8\n\nI, 5\n\nNew York Child Victim's Act\n\n12\n\nNew York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law\n\n16\n\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a\n\n17\n\nOther Authorities\nAlec A. Beech, AddingInsult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be\nImposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's Estate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev.\n553 (2016)\n\n19\n\nCPLR § 202\n\n4, 5\n\nCPLR § 213-c\n\nI, 2, 3, 10, II, 12\n\nEFTA02732013\n\n\f", "char_count": 1232}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 7 of 28\n\nCPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)\n\nI, 4\n\nCPLR § 214-g\n\n12\n\nCPLR §215(8)\n\n8, 9\n\nCPLR § 215(8Xa)\n\n1,2,3,7,8,9\n\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\n\n1, 12, 21\n\n2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015)\n\n19\n\n2 Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 22.4 (7th ed. 2015)\n\n18\n\nRestatement (Second) of Torts\n\n18, 19, 20\n\nRouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in Europe: Growing Trend or\nNonexistent Concept\n\n18\n\nTimothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bomstein, Punished, Dead Or Alive:\nEmpirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against Deceased\nDefendants\n\n19\n\n- vi -\n\nEFTA02732014\n\n\f", "char_count": 672}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 8 of 28\n\nDefendants Darren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, as Co-Executors of the Estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (the \"Co-Executors\"), submit this memorandum of law in support of their\nmotion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint\n(ECF No. I) because it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is\nprohibited by statute.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nThis action is time-barred. Plaintiff, who claims South African citizenship and residency,\nalleges that, from 2002 (when she was 20 years old) to 2004, Jeffrey E. Epstein (\"Decedent\") now\ndeceased, committed various sexual offenses against her in the U.S. Virgin Islands (\"USVI\"),\nFrance, Florida,' New Mexico, and New York. (Comp!. 11 16, 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two\ncauses of action—battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress—and demands punitive\ndamages. (Id. 1154-64, p. 15.)\nHowever, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by: 2006 per the USVI's two-year statute of\nlimitations (5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A)); 2005 or 2007 per New York's one- or three-year statute of\nlimitations (CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3)); 2007 per New Mexico's three-year statute of limitations\n(N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8); 2008 per Florida's four-year statute of limitations (Fla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O));\nand 2014 per France's ten-year statute of limitations (Art. 2226 (1) of the\n\nCivil Code).\n\nAccordingly, Plaintiff's claims are untimely and must be dismissed.\nIn apparent recognition that her claims are time-barred, Plaintiff erroneously alleges that\nthey are timely pursuant to CPLR § 215(8)(a)2 and CPLR § 213-c, they were equitably tolled, and\n\nI In two conclusory allegations, Plaintiff lists Florida as one of the locations where she was assaulted (Compl. 1125,\n55), but offers no factual allegations in support.\n2 CPLR § 215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has been\ncommenced with\n... [truncated, 2242 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/7 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=7]", "char_count": 2242}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 9 of 28\n\nthat the Co-Executors are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\n(Compl. 7J 12-15.) Each of these arguments fails as a matter of law.\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here because Decedent's criminal indictment (the\n\"Indictment\"), which concerns alleged sexual abuse of minors, has nothing to do with Plaintiff,\nwho alleges misconduct when she was an adult. Similarly, CPLR § 213-c fails because it does not\napply retroactively, and Plaintiff's claims had already expired by the time it was enacted in\nSeptember 18, 2019. Plaintiff also fails to meet her burden at the pleadings stage to allege\nextraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\nFinally, Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages must also be dismissed as a matter of law.\nNew York law, which applies here because New York has the greatest connection to this matter,\nexpressly bars recovery of punitive damages in a personal injury action brought to recover\ndamages from a decedent tortfeasor's estate—i.e., exactly what Plaintiff attempts to do here.\nHowever, even if Florida, New Mexico, USVI, or\n\nlaw applies (the only other locations\n\nwhere Plaintiff alleges she was harmed), Plaintiff's punitive damages claim would likewise be\nbarred under the laws of those jurisdictions, which are in accord with New York and the majority\nof U.S. jurisdictions that prohibit recovery of punitive damages against a decedent tortfeasor's\nestate.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nI.\n\nPlaintiff Alleges Decedent Sexually Assaulted Her From 2002-2004, When She Was\nAn Adult\nPlaintiff claims she met Decedent in 2002, when she was twenty years old, in Cape Town,\n\nSouth Africa. (Compl. 1 38.) She alleges that an American woman approached her and asked if\nshe wanted to meet Decedent. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she met Decedent and, on some later date,\nanother woman helped Plaintiff get a visa, passport, and airline tickets so she could v\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/8 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=8]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 10 of 28\n\nin New York. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) Plaintiff claims that, shortly after arriving in New York, she was\nflown to the Caribbean on Decedent's private plane. (Id. ¶¶ 4243.) Plaintiff alleges that Decedent\nfirst sexually assaulted her in the USVI. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.)\nPlaintiff further alleges that she was sexually abused multiple times thereafter, during a\nperiod of two years, when she was forced to travel and meet Decedent in New York, Paris, and\nNew Mexico. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 49-50.) Plaintiff claims her final trip to the United States was in 2004,\nwhen she allegedly flew to see Decedent at his New Mexico ranch. (Id. ¶ 50.) During this trip,\nDecedent and Plaintiff allegedly had an argument because Plaintiff was \"not being obedient.\" (Id.)\nDecedent also asked Plaintiff to serve drinks on a plane headed to California, but Plaintiff and\nDecedent allegedly had another argument and Plaintiff flew home to South Africa instead. (Id.)\nThis trip—sixteen years ago—was the last time she alleges she saw Decedent. (Id.)\nApparently recognizing that her claims are time-barred under the applicable statutes of\nlimitations, Plaintiff alleges generic legal conclusions that also appear in other time-bared\ncomplaints against the Co-Executors that Plaintiff's counsel filed in this District on behalf of other\nindividuals. Thus, Plaintiff alleges in conclusory fashion:\n•\n\nThis action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8Xa), which provides\nthat a plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of a criminal action against\nthe same defendant to commence an action with respect to the event or occurrence from\nwhich the criminal action arose. A criminal action against [Decedent] with respect to the\nsame sex trafficking enterprise from which Plaintiff's claims arise was terminated on\nAugust 29, 2019. (Id. ¶ 12.)\n\n•\n\nThis action has been timely filed pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213-C, which provides that\na plaintiff s\n... [truncated, 2703 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/9 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=9]", "char_count": 2703}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 11 of 28\n\nhis death. Until his death, Plaintiff feared that [Decedent] and his co-conspirators would\nharm her or her family, or ruin her life, if she came forward. (Id. ¶ 14.)\n•\n\nDefendants are equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nAllowing Defendants to do so would be unjust. [Decedent] and his co-conspirators\nintimidated each of his victims into silence by threatening their lives and their livelihoods,\nand therefore prevented Plaintiff from commencing this lawsuit before his death. By using\nthreats, along with his wealth and power, [Decedent] was able to escape punishment for\nhis crimes against countless young women and underage girls for the duration of his life.\n(Id. ¶ 15.)\nNone of these threadbare allegations rescues Plaintiff's claims from being time-barred.\nARGUMENT\n\nI.\n\nPlaintiffs Causes Of Action Expired In 2014 At The Latest\nPlaintiff claims she was sexually assaulted between 2002 and 2004 in New York, the USVI,\n\nFlorida, New Mexico, and France. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 50, 55.) Plaintiff asserts two causes of action\nbased on these sexual assaults (battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress) and\ndemands punitive damages. (Id. ¶¶ 54-64, p. 15.) CPLR § 202 provides that, when a non-New\nYork resident such as Plaintiff sues on causes of action accruing outside New York, the complaint\nmust be timely under the statute of limitations of both New York and the jurisdiction where the\nclaim accrued.3 Here, Plaintiff's claims are not timely under New York law or any of the\njurisdictions where the alleged torts occurred and the Court must dismiss her claims.\nNew York. New York law applies a one-year limitations period to actions for assault and\nbattery and a three-year limitations period to actions for personal injury. CPLR §§ 214(5), 215(3).\nUnder either statute, Plaintiff's claims are untimely, as they expired in either 2005 or 2007.\n\n3 \"ln diversity cases in New York, federa\n... [truncated, 2165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/10 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=10]", "char_count": 2165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 12 of 28\n\nUSVj. Under USVI law, which is where Decedent's first sexual assault of Plaintiff\nallegedly occurred, the statute of limitations for battery actions is two years. 5 V.I.C. § 31(5)(A).\nThus, under USVI law, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by 2006 at the latest.\nFlorida. Although the Complaint does not allege any specific acts that occurred in Florida\n(nor even that Plaintiff was ever in Florida), even if it did, these claims would be time-barred.\nUnder Florida law, the statute of limitations for actions \"for assault, battery, false arrest, malicious\nprosecution, malicious interference, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort\" is four years.\nFla. Stat. § 95.11 (3)(O). Accordingly, under Florida law, Plaintiff's causes of action expired by\n2008 at the latest.\nNew Mexico. Under New Mexico law, actions for \"injury to a person\" must be brought\nwithin three years. N.M. Stat. § 37-1-8. Thus, under New Mexico law, Plaintiff's claims expired\nin 2007 at the latest.\nFrance. Under\n\nlaw, the civil statute of limitations in the event of violence or sexual\n\nassault against an adult is 10 years. Art. 2226 (1) of the\n\nCivil Code. Therefore, under\n\nlaw, Plaintiff's claims expired in 2014 at the latest.\nTo avoid these statutes of limitations, Plaintiff argues in her response to the Co-Executors'\npm-motion letter that she was a resident of New York at the time of the alleged torts and,\naccordingly, CPLR § 202 is inapplicable. (ECF No. 13 at pp. 2-3.) This argument is unavailing for\nat least two reasons.\nFirst even if Plaintiff is correct—and, as explained below, she is not—her claims are still\nuntimely under the laws of each jurisdiction that could conceivably apply to her claims.\nSecond Plaintiff fails to allege any facts in her Complaint plausibly establishing she was\never a resident of New York. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a South African\n\n- 5-\n\nEFTA02732019\n\n\f", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 13 of 28\n\ncitizen and resident (Compl ¶ 16); refers to only one specific visit to New York and that Plaintiff\nwas \"not there for long\" (id. ¶ 42); and asserts that Decedent \"forced [Plaintiff] to travel to the\nUnited States many times to see [Decedent] and be subjected to repeated sexual abuse for one to\ntwo weeks at a time, sometimes staying in his New York apartment\" (id. ¶ 46).\nAs a matter of law, New York residency requires significantly more than an occasional\nvisit there. Rather, Plaintiff must allege facts establishing that she intended to remain in New York\nwith some degree of permanency.\nIn Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 64 N.Y.2d 20, 30, 484 N.Y.S.2d 514,\n518-19, 473 N.E.2d 742, 746-47 (1984), which Plaintiff cites in her pre-motion response letter, the\ncourt found that \"[c]ases defining `resident' for purposes of venue under CPLR 503 are useful\nprecedents (see, e.g., Siegfried v Siegfried, 92 AD2d 916; Hammerman v Louis Watch Co., 7 AD2d\n817).\" The courts in Siegfried and Hammerman found that, in order for a person to be deemed a\nresident of New York, \"[s]he must stay there for some time and have the bona fide intent to retain\nthe place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency.\" Siegfried,\n92 A.D.2d 916, 916, 460 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (2nd Dept. 1983) (renting a room in Nassau County\nand party's statements regarding her intent to remain in Nassau County were insufficient to support\na finding that she was a resident of Nassau County); Hammerman v. Louis Watch Co., 7 A.D.2d\n817, 818, 181 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67 (3rd Dept. 1958) (\"Residence requires more stability than\noccasional stopovers at a hotel... and the mere fact that the plaintiffs rent premises on a year round\nbasis where they sleep while there on business, in our view, does not establish a residence.\").\nHere, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to claim New York residency as a matter of\nlaw. Visiti\n... [truncated, 2188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/12 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=12]", "char_count": 2188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 14 of 28\n\nII.\n\nPlaintiff's Attempts To Invoke Extraordinary Statute Of Limitations Exceptions\nFail\nA.\n\nCPLR § 215(8)(a) is inapplicable because the Indictment arises out of the\nalleged sex trafficking ofminors, not adults such as Plaintiff.\n\nContrary to Plaintiff's contentions, CPLR § 215(8)(a) does not apply here. CPLR §\n215(8)(a) provides: \"Whenever it is shown that a criminal action against the same defendant has\nbeen commenced with respect to the event or occurrencefrom which a claim governed by this\nsection arises, the plaintiff shall have at least one year from the termination of the criminal action\n... to commence the civil action.\" (Emphasis added).\nDecedent's Indictment, which Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint, was not commenced\nwith respect to Plaintiff. Rather, the Indictment alleges that Decedent sexually trafficked \"minor\ngirls\" (Ex. A to Compl., ¶ 1 (emphasis added)), stating throughout that it concerns sex trafficking\nof \"minors\" (id. ¶¶ 24, 6, 8, 11-15, 18-20, 22). Because Plaintiff alleges she was between 20 and\n22 years old when Decedent assaulted her (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 38, 50), this action and the Indictment\nnecessarily arise from different events or occurrences.\nNew York courts apply CPLR § 215(8Xa) narrowly. See Christodoulou v. Terdeman, 262\nA.D.2d 595, 596 (2d Dept. 1999) (CPLR § 215(8)(a) applied only to claims based on events of\nFebruary 26, 1993 and December 28, 1993, because it was only in connection with events of those\ntwo days that a criminal prosecution was commenced against defendant); Gallant' v. Thatcher, No.\n2017-52980, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 8435 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cnty. Oct. 23, 2018) (CPLR §\n215(8)(a) inapplicable where incidents charged in criminal action and those alleged in civil action\noccurred on different dates); McElligott v. City of\n\nNo. 15-cv-7107 (LGS), 2017 U.S. Dist.\n\nLEXIS 201829, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2017) (CPLR § 215(8Xa) inapplicable to claims against\nciv\n... [truncated, 2139 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/13 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=13]", "char_count": 2139}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 15 of 28\n\nGaUlna is especially instructive. In that case, an individual sued an attorney for battery and\nother claims based on the core allegation that, over the course of two years, the attorney committed\nvarious sexual misconduct against the plaintiff, including sexual assault. 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS\n8435, at *1. Defendant had also been criminally charged with forceable touching for incidents that\noccurred with the plaintiff in 2017. Id. at *3. The court dismissed as time-barred plaintiffs battery\ncounts based on incidents alleged to have occurred in 2016. Id. at *2-3.\nIn doing so, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that CPLR § 215(8Xa) applied to the\n2016 incidents, finding:\nPlaintiff argues that the July and October 2016 incidents are part ofthe same\nongoing course of events as the February, March and May 2017 incidents\nand should therefore be deemed timely commenced ... the case law does\nnot support Plaintiffs interpretation of ... CPLR §215(8Xa). The criminal\ninstruments ... demonstrate that Defendant was charged for incidents\noccurring on three (3) specific dates ... Pursuant to CPLR §215(8Xa),\ntolling would apply only to claims based on these dates, \"because it was\nonly in connection with the events of these [three] days that a criminal\nprosecution was commenced against the defendant.\" Christodoulou v.\nTerdeman, 262 AD2d 595, 596 [2d Dept. 1999]. As criminal charges were\nnot commenced with respect to the July 2016 and October 2016 events, the\ntolling provisions of CPLR §215(8) do not apply.\nId. at •3-4. Here, Plaintiff asserts a much more tenuous connection between this action and the\nIndictment than the one unsuccessfully asserted by the plaintiff in Galling (and the other cited\ncases). Therefore, the Court should reject Plaintiff's argument for the application of CPLR §\n215(8)(a).\nIn Plaintiff's response to the Co-Executors' pre-motion letter, Plaintiff asserts three\narguments for application o\n... [truncated, 2233 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/14 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=14]", "char_count": 2233}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 16 of 28\n\nPlaintiff cites Clemens v. Nealon, 202 A.D.2d 747, 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), for this\nassertion, stating that CPLR § 215(8Xa) \"does not require that the plaintiff be 'the victim or the\nspecific person upon whom the crime had been committed.' (ECF No. 13 at p. 1, quoting\nClemens, 202 A.D.2d at 749, emphasis in letter). This characterization of Clemens is misleading.\nIn Clemens, defendants were charged with criminal mischief resulting to damage to two boats. Id.\nat 748. The six plaintiffs in Clemens were aboard the two boats and sued to recover damages for\nassault and battery, infliction ofemotional distress, and false imprisonment. Id. Defendant asserted\nthat CPLR § 215(8) did not apply because the victims of the crimes were the owners of the two\ndamaged boats—not the plaintiffs who were on the boats. Id. at 749. The court disagreed, reading\nthe plain language of CPLR § 215(8), expressly requiring that the action arise out of the same\n\"event or occurrence.\" Id. Thus, Clemens does not alter the requirement that Plaintiff must show\nshe was a victim of the same \"event or occurrence\" on which the Indictment is based; she has not\nand cannot. The Indictment could not be clearer: it concerns sex trafficking ofminors. Plaintiff\ndoes not allege she was a minor when Decedent sexually assaulted her.\nSecond, Plaintiff urges a broad construction of CPLR § 215(8Xa) that effectively rewrites\nit by rendering the limitation therein—\"with respect to the event or occurrence from which a\nclaim governed by this section arises\"—meaningless. Plaintiff effectively argues that, unless the\nIndictment expressly rules out that it arises from the same event as this action, then Plaintiff is\nentitled to invoke CPLR § 215(8)(a). That argument is contrary to basic principles of statutory\ninterpretation prohibiting a reading of a statute that would render its words meaningless (see\nMcKinney's Cons. Laws ofNY, Book 1, Statutes § 92\n... [truncated, 2104 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/15 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=15]", "char_count": 2104}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 17 of 28\n\nPlaintiff cites Kashef v. BNP Paribas S.A., 925 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019), in support of her\nerroneous argument. However, Kashef is factually distinguishable. The civil and criminal actions\nin that case both arose out of the same conspiracy between BNP and Sudan to violate U.S.\nsanctions. Id. at 63. Here, Plaintiff's allegations—that she traveled as an adult to visit Decedent in\nvarious places where he sexually assaulted her—do not comport with what is set forth repeatedly\nin the Indictment—namely, an alleged scheme to traffic minors.\nAcknowledging this critical defect, Plaintiff argues in her pre-motion response letter that\nthe Indictment applies to trafficking of adults as well as minors, but deliberately misquotes the\nIndictment. According to Plaintiff:\nThe charges were not limited to crimes committed against specific victims. For\nexample, the overt acts alleged for the sex trafficking conspiracy charge were\nenticing and recruiting multiple victims, \"including minor victims identified\nherein.\"\n(ECF No. 13 at p. 1, citing Indictment (emphasis added).) However, this quote, and the argument\nrelying on it, is disingenuous. The cited portion of the Indictment actually states:\n\"In or about 2004, Jefferey Epstein, the defendant, enticed and recruited multiple\nminor victims, including minor victims identified herein....\"\n(Ex. A to Compl. ¶ 22(a) (emphasis added).) In other words, Plaintiff removed the word \"minor\"\nfrom the first part of the sentence to make it appear as though the latter reference to \"minor victims\"\nidentified merely a subset of the former \"multiple victims.\" Plaintiff's alteration of the text and\nmeaning of the Indictment indicates she is aware she has a losing argument. While Plaintiff may\nclaim she, too, is a victim of Decedent, she is not a victim by reason of the events giving rise to\nthe Indictment.\nB.\n\nCPLR § 213-c is inapplicable because it is not retroactive.\n\nPlaintiff also attem\n... [truncated, 2192 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/16 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=16]", "char_count": 2192}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 18 of 28\n\nsexual offenses. However, the twenty-year limitation set forth in CPLR § 213-c became effective\nSeptember 18, 2019, and is thus inapplicable here. (The statute of limitations was five years as of\n2006 and one year before then. L. 2006, ch. 3, § 5(b)). The twenty-year statute of limitations does\nnot apply retroactively except \"where the applicable !statute of limitations] in effect on the date\nof such act or omission has not yet expired.\" L. 2019, ch. 315, § 4 (emphasis added). That is not\nthe case here. Therefore, CPLR § 213-c cannot revive Plaintiff's claims arising from torts\ncommitted in New York.\nIn her pre-motion letter, Plaintiff contends—without legal authority and in complete\ndisregard of what the enacting bill for CPLR § 213-c states very clearly—that CPLR § 213-c\napplies retroactively because CPLR § 213-c itself does not expressly state otherwise. This is\nwrong. Plaintiff provides no reason to disregard what the law amending CPLR § 213-c actually\nstates, as quoted above.\nPlaintiff also has it backwards. Under New York law, \"[i]t takes a clear expression of the\nlegislative purpose ... to justify a retroactive application of a statute which assures that [the\nlegislative body] itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive\napplication and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.\"\nMatter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. N.Y. State Div. of Nous. & Cmty. Renewal, 2020 NY Slip Op\n02127, ¶ 12 (citing Gleason v. Gleason, 26 NY2d 28, 36, 256 N.E.2d 513, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347\n(1970) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The rules for determining whether a statute\nis to be applied retroactively are contained in McKinney's Consolidated Laws of NY, Book 1,\nStatutes § 51 et seq. See Gleason v. Holman Contract Warehousing, 170 Misc. 2d 668, 649\nN.Y.S.2d 647, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1996). McKinney's states:\nGenerally, statutes are construed as\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/17 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=17]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 19 of 28\n\nconstruction. ... Stated differently, a construction of a statute which will give it a\nretroactive operation is not favored by the courts, but on the contrary, the laws [sic]\nfavors a prospective interpretation wherever possible. It is well settled also that a\nstatute will not be given a retroactive construction unless an intention to make it\nretroactive is to be deduced from its wording, and a law will not receive a\nretroactive construction unless its language, either expressly or by necessary\nimplication, requires that it be so construed. A clear expression of the legislative\npurpose is required to justify a retrospective application....\nGleason, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 677-678.\nHere, there is no \"clear expression\" that the New York State legislature intended CPLR §\n213-c to be applied retroactively. Rather, the legislature expressly stated the opposite. See L. 2019,\nch. 315, § 4.\nBy contrast, the recently-enacted New York Child Victim's Act, a revival statute that\nprovides a one-year window in which to bring claims of sexual abuse ofminors that had previously\nexpired, expressly states it \"revive[s]\" claims that are \"barred as of the effective date of this section\nbecause the applicable period of limitation has expired.\" CPLR § 214-g. This confirms the New\nYork State Legislature is quite capable of indicating when a limitations period should be applied\nretroactively. Because the Legislature did not do that for CPLR § 213-c—it did the opposite—\nPlaintiff's claim cannot succeed.\nC.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege \"extraordinary\" circumstances\nsufficient to justify tolling or equitable estoppel.\n\nPlaintiff fails to meet her burden to allege extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify\ntolling or equitable estoppel including on the pleadings. \"Second Circuit cases discussing\nequitable tolling set a stringent standard for its application.\" Fairley v.\n\nNo. 09-Civ-6894\n\n(PGG), 2011 U.S. Dist.\n... [truncated, 2375 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/18 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=18]", "char_count": 2375}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 20 of 28\n\nLife Ins. Co. of Am., No. 10-cv-2908 (ALC) (MHD), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189633, at •30\n(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted by, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2013)\n(emphasis added) (citing\n\nv. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 09-civ-7639, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n\n137152, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);\n\nv. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996)).\n\nUnder this doctrine, a court may, only \"under compelling circumstances, make narrow\nexceptions to the statute of limitations ... 'to prevent inequity.\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Yesh\nDiamonds, Inc. v. Yashaya, No. 09-CV-2016 (DLI) (RER), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101744, at *2\n(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010); In re U.S. Lines. Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003)). \"That the\ndoctrine is to be employed only sparingly—in 'extraordinary' and 'compelling' circumstances—\nis reflected in the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to show that tolling is\njustified.\" Id. (emphasis added) (citing Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000)). A latefiling party seeking equitable tolling must also demonstrate she acted with \"reasonable diligence\"\nin pursuing her claims during the period she seeks to toll. Id. at *32 (citation omitted).\nEquitable estoppel only applies where a plaintiff knows her cause of action exists, but the\ndefendant's conduct caused her to delay bringing suit. See Yesh Diamonds, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n101744, at *5 (citing Cerbone v. Intl Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir.\n1985)). \"The rationale behind this equitable doctrine is to protect the person who brings their action\nafter it would normally be barred because she was 'lulled' into believing that she should delay\npursuing her cause of action.\" Id. (quoting In re Higgins, 270 B.R. 147, 158 (Bantu. S.D.N.Y.\n2001)). Equitable estoppel requires a plaintiff to show: \"(i) the defendant made a definite\nmisrepresentation of fact and had reason to believe that the\n... [truncated, 2163 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/19 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=19]", "char_count": 2163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 21 of 28\n\nTolling is inappropriate where, as here, a plaintiff fails to articulate any acts by a defendant that\nprevented the plaintiff from timely commencing suit. See id. at *6.\nHere, Plaintiff does not allege any particularized acts by Decedent that prevented her from\nexercising her rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.) Nor does Plaintiff allege that (i) Decedent made a\nmisrepresentation to her and had reason to believe she would rely on it, or (ii) Plaintiff reasonably\nrelied on it to her detriment. Therefore, there is no \"extraordinary\" basis alleged sufficient to toll\nthe statute of limitations or estop the Co-Executors from asserting a statute of limitations defense.\nPlaintiff asserts in her pre-motion response letter that \"the Complaint alleges in detail the\nmethods of intimidation and control that [Decedent] and his co-conspirators used to deter their\nvictims from seeking justice.\" (ECF No. 13 at 3.) This is false. Rather, the complaint merely\nalleges—in two conclusory paragraphs identical to paragraphs included in other plaintiff's\ncomplaints represented by the same counsel—that Decedent threatened and intimidated \"his many\nvictims, including Plaintiff.\" (Comp!. ¶¶ 14-15.) The remaining claims, even as retold by Plaintiff\nin her letter, do not allege any conduct by Decedent beyond \"tr[ying] to keep in contact with\nPlaintiff after the abuse ended.\" (ECF. No. 13 at p. 3, citing Compl. ¶ 51.) The allegations Plaintiff\npoints to as demonstrating intimidation merely describe Plaintiff's unextraordinary state of mind:\nPlaintiff was \"afraid of betraying [Decedent] because of his money and power\" (id., citing ¶ 47);\nPlaintiff was \"afraid [Decedent] would hurt her or her family\" (id.). There are no allegations\nexplaining that Decedent did anything to impede Plaintiff from bringing this lawsuit for some\nfifteen years.\nPlaintiff's assertion that such thin allegations are \"extraordinary\" is inconsistent with\nnumerous cou\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/20 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=20]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 22 of 28\n\nLEXIS 113975, at •27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2013) (Ramos, J.) (finding equitable tolling\ninapplicable and dismissing complaint, notwithstanding that plaintiffs alleged they reasonably\nrelied on defendants' representations over a period spanning more than ten months and dozens of\ntelephone calls).\nPlaintiff alternatively argues in her pre-motion response letter that her entitlement to\nequitable estoppel and tolling are \"fact-specific doctrines\" and thus should be resolved after\ndiscovery. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) Plaintiff misunderstands New York law and understates the\ndeficiencies in her own Complaint. Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to allege facts that support\ninvocation of an exception to the statute of limitations, there is no issue of fact sufficient to defeat\na motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds:\nIf properly pled, allegations of equitable estoppel normally create questions\nof fact which cannot be determined at a motion to dismiss ... However,\nwithout adequate pleading, the issue is not properly raised and therefore\ncannot defeat a motion to dismiss based on statute oflimitations grounds.\nSee Dep't ofEcon. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 943\n(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing cause of action because plaintiff made no\nallegation in complaint that \"its failure to timely institute its third-party\naction was due to its justified reliance upon a misrepresentation\" by\nopposing party); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. ofN. Y., 700 F. Supp. 1284,\n1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (\"Plaintiffs have not alleged that defendant caused\nthem to delay in bringing suit on a known cause of action. On the contrary,\nplaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that they did not discover the alleged ...\nviolations until long after the limitations period had expired. Equitable\nestoppel is therefore not appropriate in this case.\").\nAbercrombie v. College, 438 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added).\nHere, as in \n... [truncated, 2478 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/21 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=21]", "char_count": 2478}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 23 of 28\n\nId. at 266. Nor does Plaintiff allege facts that would support invocation of equitable tolling. These\nare pleading deficiencies, not questions of fact.\nIII.\n\nPlaintiff's Claim For Punitive Damages Are Barred As A Matter Of Law\nPlaintiff's claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law because it is barred by the\n\nlaw of each potentially applicable jurisdiction. When determining what law applies, courts look to\nthe choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Simons v. Marriott Corp., 92 Civ. 3762 (SWK), 1993\nU.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1993). Under New York law, the law of the\nstate where a tort occurs generally applies to punitive damages. See Starr Indent. & Liab. Co. v.\nAnt. Claims Mgmt., No. 14-cv-0463-JMF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60272, *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 7,\n2015) (\"Because punitive damages are conduct-regulating, 'the law of the jurisdiction where the\ntort occurred will generally apply.' (quoting Deutsch v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d\n521, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., No. 95-CV-9006 (LAP),\n2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6390, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003)).\nHere, Plaintiff alleges tortious conduct occurring in New York, Florida, New Mexico, the\nUSVI, and France. (Compl. ¶¶ 25, 55.) None of these jurisdictions permits recovery of punitive\ndamages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. That is the law in most jurisdictions, as reflected\nin the Restatement. See Restat. (Second) Of Torts § 908 cat. a (punitive damages not available\nagainst representatives of deceased tortfeasor). Each of these jurisdictions is addressed below in\nturn.\nNew York: New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law provides: \"No cause of action for\ninjury to person or property is lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. For any\ninjury, an action may be brought or continued against the personal representative of the decedent,\nbut punitive damages shal\n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/22 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=22]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 24 of 28\n\n'there is a strong policy against the assessment of punitive damages against an estate on account\nof wrongful conduct of the decedent.\"' Graham v.\n\n, 224 F.R.D. 59, 63 (N.D.N.Y. 2004)\n\n(quoting Blissett v. Eisensmidt, 940 F. Supp. 449, 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).\nNew York General Construction Law § 37-a defines \"personal injury\" as including \"an\nassault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable injury to the person either of the plaintiff,\nor of another.\" Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for her alleged personal injuries.\nAccordingly, Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages from Decedent's estate based on alleged\ntorts that occurred in New York.\nFlorida: The result is the same under Florida law. \"Florida law prohibits recovery of\npunitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased.\" Poindexter v. Zacharzewski,\nNo. 18-14155-CIV, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189861, at •6 (Nov. 5, 2018 S.D. Fla.) (citing Lohr v.\nByrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988) (\"[A] decedent's innocent heirs should not be punished when the\nwrongdoer is unavailable because of death. In so holding, we join the majority of jurisdictions in\nthis country that have considered this issue.\")).\nNew Mexico: Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Mexico has unequivocally held that\n\"punishment and deterrence are not accomplished by enabling recovery of punitive damages from\nthe estate of deceased tortfeasors.\" Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 117 N.M. 337, 346\n(N.M. 1994). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages under New Mexico law.\nFrance: Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against a tortfeasor's estate is barred under\nlaw because France prohibits punitive damages altogether. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at\nBelle Harbor, No. 02 MDL 1448 (RWS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109247, at •23-25 (S.D.N.Y.\nMar. 10, 2008) (\"Unlike many jurisdictions in the United States, including New York, France\nprohibits punitive dam\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/23 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=23]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 25 of 28\n\npunitive damages as a mechanism for punishing and deterring potentially harmful conduct, France\nhas instead deemed liability for compensatory damages in conjunction with penal liability (where\nappropriate) to be a sufficient deterrent.\") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 2 Linda\nL. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 22.4 (7th ed. 2015) (citing Rouhette, The Availability ofPunitive\nDamages in Europe: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept, 74 Def. Coun. J. 320 (2007)).\nUSVI: USVI courts apply a \"Banks analysis\" to determine U.S.V.I. common law. Banks v.\nIntl Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 979 (V.I. 2011). The Banks analysis includes\nconsideration of three factors: (1) whether any USVI courts have previously adopted a particular\nrule; (2) the position taken by a majority of courts of other jurisdictions; and (3) most importantly,\nwhich approach represents the soundest rule for the USVI. Gov't of Virgin Islands v.=,\n\nNo.\n\nS. CT. CIV. 2013-0095, 2014 WL 702639, at •1 (V.I. Feb. 24,2014). Applying the Banks factors\nhere demonstrates that USVI courts would adopt the rule in the Restatement (Second) of Torts—\nwhich is also followed in the majority of United States jurisdictions, including New York—and\nhold that punitive damages are not available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. These factors\nare analyzed below.\nA.\n\nBanks factor one: pre% iously, USVI courts favorably cited the Restatement\nsection that precludes punitive damages against estates.\n\nUSVI courts have favorably recited the Restatement's rule precluding punitive damages\nagainst a decedent tortfeasor's estate. See, e.g.,\n\nv. Dowson Holding Co., 51 V.I. 619, 628\n\n(D.V.I. 2009); Booth v. Bowen, No. CIV. 2006-217,2008 WL 220067, at •5 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2008).\nIn these cases, the U.S. District Court for the Virgin Islands considered the inverse of the issue\nhere, i.e., whether the personal representatives of an estate may obtain \n... [truncated, 2233 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/24 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=24]", "char_count": 2233}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 26 of 28\n\n\"[p]unitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor,\nordinarily, in an action under a death statute.\" Restat. (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (emphasis\nadded). Accordingly, this Banks factor favors the Co-Executors.\nB.\n\nBanks factor two: a majority of U.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of\npunitive damages based on the wrongful acts of a decedent.\n\nThis Banks factor overwhelmingly supports the Co-Executors' position. The majority of\nU.S. jurisdictions do not permit an award of punitive damages against the personal representatives\nof an estate based on the actions of the deceased tortfeasor. See, e.g., Crabtree v. Estate of\nCrabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ind. 2005) (\"The majority view denies punitive damages.\"); 2\nLinda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 20.4 (7th ed. 2015) (\"[A] majority of jurisdictions will\nnot award punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate.\" (citing Alec A. Beech, Adding\nInsult to Death: Why Punitive Damages Should Not Be Imposed Against a Deceased Tortfeasor's\nEstate in Ohio, 49 Akron L. Rev. 553 (2016))); Timothy R. Robicheaux and Brian H. Bornstein,\nPunished, Dead Or Alive: Empirical Perspectives on Awarding Punitive Damages Against\nDeceasedDefendants, 16 Psych. Pub. Pol. and L. 393, 398 (2010) (\"The Restatement (Second) of\nTorts (1965) is one authority stating that punitive damages should not follow the death of a\nwrongdoer, and the majority of courts considering the issue have provided rulings consistent with\nthis position.\").\nC.\n\nBanks factor three: Post-Banks, USVI courts have favorably applied\nRestatement Section 908 to questions regarding punitive damages.\n\nThe third Banks factor weighs strongly in favor of the Co-Executors as well. Post-Banks,\nUSVI courts have found that Section 908 of the Restatement is \"the soundest rule for the Virgin\nIslands with respect to the imposition of an award of punitive damages.\" P\n... [truncated, 2231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/25 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=25]", "char_count": 2231}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 27 of 28\n\nSuper. Ct. 2015), St\n\nHouse, Inc. v. Bat-rows, 15 V.I. 435 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1979), Brandy v.\n\nFlamboyant Inv. Co., Ltd., 24 V.I. 249 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1989), and\n\nv. Rios, 780 F. Supp. 2d\n\n376, 380 (D.V.I. 2011)); Powell v. Chi-Co 's Distrib., No. ST-13-TOR-14, 2014 V.I. LEXIS 21, at\n*5 n.13 (U.S.V.1. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (\"Applying a Banks analysis, the Court finds that\nRestatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2) reflects the common law of this jurisdiction.\"). There is\nno reason to think the USVI courts would adhere to one portion of Section 908 and not another.\nBecause every Banks factor favors the Co-Executors' position, to the extent USVI law\napplies to the alleged tortious conduct that occurred there, Plaintiff cannot recover an award of\npunitive damages against the Co-Executors. Therefore, even if any of Plaintiff's claims survive,\nregardless of which state's law applies here, the Court must dismiss her claim for punitive damages\nin its entirety.\nFinally, Plaintiff does not contend that her punitive damages claims are proper. Rather, in\nher pre-motion response letter, she asks the Court to delay ruling on the issue of punitive damages\nuntil after discovery. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) As there are no facts that would render Plaintiff's punitive\ndamages claim proper, there is no reason to allow it to stand. Not surprisingly, courts in this District\nregularly grant motions to dismiss claims for punitive damages. See, e.g., The Cookware Co.\n(USA), LLC v. Austin, No. 15 Civ. 5796, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177691, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.\n8, 2016) (Batts, J.) (granting motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages without leave to replead\nbecause allegations regarding defendant's bad-faith conduct were conclusory and did not rise to\nthe required level of malice); SIB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 U.S. Dist.\nLEXIS 13227, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (Buchwald, J.) (granting motion to dismiss\n\n... [truncated, 2213 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA02732008/26 or ?id=EFTA02732008&page=26]", "char_count": 2213}, {"efta_number": "EFTA02732008", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cv-10479-ALC-DCF Document 24 Filed 04/14/20 Page 28 of 28\n\nmotion to dismiss claim for punitive damages because, even if conduct alleged in complaint was\ntrue, it did not rise to the level necessary to award punitive damages);\n\nv. Consumers Distrib.\n\nCo., 648 F. Supp. 980, 981, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Cedarbaum, J.) (granting motion to dismiss\nclaim for punitive damages).\nPlaintiff merely seeks to delay the inevitable so she may use the prospect of punitive\ndamages—despite the legal prohibition on their availability here—as (misplaced) leverage over\nthe Co-Executors. This would serve no legitimate purpose. It would also impede productive\nsettlement discussions. Like the punitive damages claims in the cases cited above, Plaintiff's\npunitive damages claim should be dismissed.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Co-Executors respectfully request that the Court grant their\nmotion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\nbecause it is time-barred and Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because it is prohibited by\nstatute.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nApril 14, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\nTROUTMAN SANDERS LLP\n875 Third Avenue\nNew York, NY 10022\n212.704.6000\n\nBy✓s/Bennet J. Moskowitz\nBennet J. Moskowitz\nAttorneysfor Defendants\n\n- 21-\n\nEFTA02732035\n\n\f", "char_count": 1324}]}